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According to the USA and its western allies, the minority regime in Ethiopia is a peace maker in the Horn of Africa. The problem is such characterization of the minority regime in Ethiopia by the USA and its western allies is counter to the understanding of the people of the Horn Africa. The people of the Horn of Africa have known the minority regime in Ethiopia not as peace maker but as the main instigator, financier and promoter of conflict in East Africa. To expose such Misrepresentation of the minority regime by the United States and its allies you do not need to go further than South Sudan.
Prior 1991, It is public knowledge that the South Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) was fully supported by the previous military regime of Ethiopia called the Derg. The Derg supported SPLA as a Tit for Tat to Sudan supporting the Tigrai Liberation Army (TPLF) and Eritrean Liberation Front (EPLF). As a result, the SPLA and its supporting institutions were based in the Ethiopian Gambella region and surrounding areas. When the TPLF came to power, in May 1991, the first thing it did was to order the SPLA to leave its camps in Gambella and surrounding areas within 24 hours. Remember we are talking about a camp that held close to a million South Sudanese war refugees. When the refugees were not able to cross the overflowing rivers and were forced to wait until they recede, the TPLF sent its murderous and blood thirsty soldiers and killed the women and children using heavy artillery. In their quest to flee from TPLF soldiers and heavy artillery the rest were taken by the river and most of them eaten by crocodiles. In the absence of any support systems, the few that were able to cross into South Sudan territory lived in the jungle like animals and perished of thirst and hunger. If you need more information on this incident, you need to read the story of the lost boys of South Sudan. Those boys were part of the refugees who crossed from Gambella into South Sudanese territory and later picked up by a western NGO for resettlement in The United states.
After the liberation of South Sudan, mainly through the help of Uganda and Eritrea, the shameful minority regime in Ethiopia supported by the United States and its western allies were able to infiltrate the government of South Sudan. Under the disguise of security cooperation and capacity building TPLF generals, Like Tsadkan Gebretnasae, who ordered the killing of South Sudanese women and children in Gambella became chief advisers to the South Sudanese government. It is only a fool who thinks these TPLF generals were in Juba to help the government of South Sudan. Their job was to identify the Nur and Dinka fault line and create a discord among the peoples of South Sudan. Once the civil war started the mission was accomplished and the goal gravitated into replacing the current government of South Sudan by Ethiopian allies. That agenda, at least in the short term, failed mainly due to the full support of Uganda to the Salva kirr government and the latter’s insistence to remain in power, regardless of the continuous threats of the united states and its allies. Once Seyoum Mesfin and its handlers knew that it was not possible to change the Salva Kirr government within a short period of time they planned for the long term. They agreed to put Machar as vice president and call for election later. Hence the problems that we are seeing in South Sudan right now, including the constant fighting in Juba, is an extension of the Ethiopian minority regime agenda to prepare Machar as the next president of South Sudan. If you do not know this yet Machar is armed, financed and hosted by the minority regime in Ethiopia.
Although the minority regime in Ethiopia and its handlers are to blame for the disintegration of South Sudan and the ongoing Mayhem, the major blame goes to the leaders of South Sudan. The government of South Sudan lost its direction and forgot the vows of the likes of the late John Gerang, who died for the liberation of South Sudan. Its officials engaged in wide spread corruption and their uncontrolled appetite for money and wealth put them in the trap of the of the Ethiopian minority regime and its handlers. Once the war started Machar simply changed his office from Juba to Addis Ababa and the minority regime in Ethiopia worked hard to promote him as a viable leader of South Sudan. Do not take me wrong, I am not against Machar becoming the president of South Sudan. He is the citizen of South Sudan and he has all the rights to be the president of South Sudan. The sad story is his handlers are preparing him not to serve the people of South Sudan but to promote their interests. Hence it is important for Machar and Salva Kirr to sit together and talk about the interest of the peoples of South Sudan than the interest of those who are waiting to exploit the natural resources of South Sudan and make them poor forever. The writings are on the wall. For the people of the greater Horn of Africa, the lesson that we have to take from the above story is, in every conflict in the horn of Africa it could be in Somalia, South Sudan or Eritrea it is easy to find the hands of the minority regime in Ethiopia and its handlers. Thus if the people of the Horn of Africa do not realize the hidden activities of the minority regime in Ethiopia and its allies the destruction and mayhem will continue. Time to be smart and think ahead of the curve.
Peace talks between South Sudan’s warring sides have failed to reach a deal to end a civil war which has claimed tens of thousands of lives in the world’s youngest nation. Last week, the United States proposed implementing a United Nations arms embargo on South Sudan and new sanctions unless the government signs a peace deal to end the conflict. Now the situation in South Sudan is the subject of a new documentary, “We Come as Friends,” by Austrian director Hubert Sauper that provides an aerial view of the conflict in Sudan from a shaky, handmade two-seater plane. The film depicts American investors, Chinese oilmen, United Nations officials and Christian missionaries struggling to shape Sudan according to their own visions, while simultaneously applauding the alleged “independence” of the world’s newest state. What emerges is a devastating critique of the consequences of cultural and economic imperialism. We speak with Hauper and feature excerpts from the film, which debuts this week in theaters.
The Political Parties Leadership Forum has called upon IGAD to replace some of its mediators.
The PPLF, which is headed by President Salva Kiir, was formed in 2010 after a national dialogue to unite leaders of all the political parties.
The PPLF says Ethiopia and Sudan should be removed from the mediation process.
It says the Compromise Agreement proposed by IGAD Plus is subjected to personal and national commercial interests from these two countries.
In statement, the group says it doubts that mediators from these countries can contribute to a genuine peace in South Sudan because their own countries are in conflicts.
The Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Dr Martin Elia Lomoro, spoke on behalf of the PPLF chairman.
“It is now our conclusion therefore that for peace to return to South Sudan, the entire IGAD Mediation team must be reconstituted,” Dr Lomoro said.
“While General Lazarus Sumbweyio may be acceptable, definitely Seyoum Mesfin and Mohammed Ahmed Mustaffa El-Daby must be replaced.”
The statement comes days after negotiators returned to Addis Ababa for the fourth round of peace talks.
Dr Martin Elia said the venue of the talks should also be relocated to Tanzania, Rwanda or South Africa.
“Not only that, but the venue of the peace talks be equally relocated to a country that has a rudimentary democracy and no rebellion,” he added.
He argued that these countries have a history of successful emersion from conflicts and would be good examples for South Sudan.
Other parties that are also members of the PPLF include the SPLM-DC, headed by Dr Lam Akol, the United Democratic Front, among others.
This group, now under the umbrella group known as the National Alliance, has disagreed with the government on key issues in the peace process, including the proposed Compromise Agreement.
Members of the national alliance were not at the press conference where the PPLF called for change of the IGAD mediators.
“For peace to return to South Sudan, the entire IGAD mediation team must be reconstituted.” – Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro, South Sudan Cabinet Affairs Minister
Agroup of pro-government political parties headed by South Sudan’s Cabinet Affairs Minister Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro have been deported from Ethiopia in response to Juba preventing opposition leader Lam Akol from traveling to the Addis Ababa talks.
Elia and his group traveled to Addis Ababa with the government delegation last week to participate in the peace talks, but Akol, who leads a group of independent opposition parties, said he was prevented from boarding his flight minutes before takeoff on orders of President Salva Kiir.
Speaking on Sunday at a hotel in Juba, Elia said an IGAD administrator approached his delegation hours after they arrived in Addis Ababa and told them arrangements were made for them to return to South Sudan the next day.
Elia said the administrator showed them a document reading: “unless Dr Lam Akol is allowed to travel with his delegation, the IGAD mediators reject your participation and have directed us to inform you accordingly.”
The minister in Kiir’s cabinet said IGAD was not fully informed about what happened to Lam in Juba. He claimed that Akol was requested to obtain clearance and wait for travel permit from authorities but refused to wait. Akol said a police official prevented him from boarding the plane.
“Why didn’t the IGAD mediators prevent the government delegation from traveling because it was the government not political Parties which Prevented Dr. Lam Akol from traveling?” Elia also charged.
Elia accused IGAD of bias against Kiir’s government, and urged the venue of the peace talks move to either Tanzania, Rwanda, or South Africa.
“The attitudes of the IGAD mediators seem to favour groups both internal and external that are opposed to the democratically elected government of South Sudan in fulfillment of their regime change agenda,” he accused.
“It is now our conclusion that for peace to return to South Sudan the entire IGAD mediation team must be reconstituted. While [Kenyan] General Lazarus Sumbeiywo may be acceptable definitely,Seyoum Mesfin [of Ethiopia] and Mohammed Ahmed Mustaffa El Daby [of Sudan] must be replaced,” he said.
He said the two latter countries are undemocratic and have their own rebels so are unfit to negotiate peace in South Sudan.
This is the latest incident in an ongoing power struggle within the “political parties” group of stakeholders meant to participate in the peace talks between Akol’s group of opposition parties and Elia’s group parties which have joined the government.
Last year IGAD deported Elia’s associate Martin Tako from Ethiopia. Tako had claimed to represent the political parties after South Sudanese authorities prevented Lam from traveling to Addis Ababa during a previous round of talks.
“The IGAD process was begun in haste, for good reason, since the situation was dire, but it suffers from some structural problems. It is a mediation, not a facilitation, and has tried to force antagonists to adopt positions they did not devise. This reduces the likelihood that they will honour any undertakings. Whilst there is advantage in having a regional body broker talks on its own turf, each member of IGAD has its own interests. Ethiopia and Kenya are both partners and rivals while General Sumbeiywo, who chaired IGAD’s CPA process, is now subordinate to an Ethiopian diplomat, Seyoum Mesfin. Division amongst interested parties reduces leverage, credibility and the chances of success.”
“African Solutions To African Problems”?
“Some Thoughts on the IGAD Peace Process for South Sudan”
By Phillip Winter
http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/15559/African-Solutions-to-African-Problems.aspx#.U_sDrnpFVow.facebook
The current IGAD-led process to bring peace to South Sudan is adjourned; the parties have spent six months wrangling and have not properly honoured their commitment to a ceasefire and negotiation. The longer the process is stalled, the more public security in South Sudan deteriorates and the less control the government has. As in the period from 1989 to 2005, the international community is obliged once more to try to protect the population from the humanitarian consequences of state failure.
IGAD
The IGAD process was begun in haste, for good reason, since the situation was dire, but it suffers from some structural problems:
It is a mediation, not a facilitation, and has tried to force antagonists to adopt positions they did not devise. This reduces the likelihood that they will honour any undertakings.
Whilst there is advantage in having a regional body broker talks on its own turf, each member of IGAD has its own interests. Thus Uganda sent troops to protect a neighbouring government and Sudan too publicly supported Salva Kiir. Many nonetheless believe Sudan is also assisting the rebellion, backing both horses as it were, and would deal with Riek Machar if it concluded Salva’s government had become too weak to protect its oil income. Ethiopia and Kenya are both partners and rivals while General Sumbeiywo, who chaired IGAD’s CPA process, is now subordinate to an Ethiopian diplomat, Seyoum Mesfin. Division amongst interested parties reduces leverage, credibility and the chances of success.
iii) The May 9th Agreement is the one visible “roadmap” or negotiating framework. It is insufficiently detailed. By contrast, the DRC peace negotiations and transitional process, between 1999 and 2006, were based on the Lusaka Accord, which was also a ceasefire agreement with provision for a national political dialogue, military monitoring, a government of transition, elections and a new political dispensation. Crucially, the Accord also specified how the national dialogue was to be structured and who was to be represented there. The parties agreed on a facilitator, with the help of the AU and, after three years, the process was concluded when the transitional government took office in 2003.
iv) The lack of international leverage on the parties is striking, particularly when China, Malaysia and India have substantial oilfield investments at risk. The US and Troika can of course twist the diplomatic arm of the disputants and the US has begun a sanctions process, but it is regional sanctions, were they imposed, that would be most likely to work on the leadership of each side, since the region is probably where most leaders hold most of their assets and have interests that could be targeted. The only leverage with any chance of success is the combined efforts of all the interested nations.
When a Process Falters
At a comparable point in the DRC process in 2002, the EU and USA encouraged the government and MLC rebels to sign a bilateral agreement in the expectation that the RCD rebels would be forced to follow. They did not, and the whole process had to be brought back on the rails by a new stratagem. The then UNSG, Kofi Annan invited all interested parties, except for the Congolese, to an “informal consultation” in New York, at which the US government representative, one Charlie Snyder, came close to apologizing for supporting this failed initiative and urged the international community to “sing from the same song sheet” – i.e. adopt a common position on the way forward and leave the parties no room to wriggle out of their commitments.
The Congolese were outraged at not being invited to the meeting, but they got the message. Subsequently, with the help of Mustapha Niasse, Haile Menkerios , Thabo Mbeki and his team, this approach got the process back on the Lusaka track. The result was a final cessation of hostilities, a transitional government, credible elections and peace in eight out of eleven provinces. The remaining three in the eastern DRC proved beyond the capacity of the new government to stabilize (the Kivus and Oriental Province.) The UN could consider convening a similar informal meeting.
It is unlikely that IGAD’s role can be terminated or that the process will be allowed to collapse, but it may have to be reinforced. For example a figure from outside the region, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, who is already involved through the ANC, could be brought in to chair a reinvigorated process, retaining the three current envoys as advisors. Additionally, the Troika could encourage China to form a new group of backers, a quartet. This Quartet, the AU and the region would also make up whatever oversight body any eventual agreement requires.
Can This Process Work ?
In the case of South Sudan today, it is possible to discern the outlines of a way forward, troubled as the process is. Whilst the President, Salva Kiir, however compromised, is the elected president, his government reaches the end of its term in April 2015. Were he promised from that point on that he would benefit from a bodyguard, pension and secure retirement in Bahr el Ghazal, to be guaranteed by the AU, IGAD, and a Quartet, Salva Kiir might be persuaded to support negotiation of a transitional government before that date and then stand down on the expiry of his mandate.
Riek Machar, whose goal is clearly the presidency, has already said that he would not wish to be part of a government of transition, presumably calculating that it may fail and he would anyway need to build an electoral support base with his new opposition movement. He may also believe that, in case IGAD fails, the military option is his best chance of becoming president. Should he wish to adopt such a course, the AU, IGAD and Quartet together might be able to dissuade him.
If the two leaders can thus be put aside, the goal of the mediators would then be to use the time before April 2015 to devise with the parties and install a government of technocrats who would oversee a constitutional debate, some measure of national reconciliation and the preparation of elections in, say, 2018. Ideally any former politician would be entitled to stand in an eventual election but not to serve in the transitional government.
The only mechanism available for ensuring some credibility in such an election is the UN mission. The UN mission supported the successful referendum process in South Sudan in 2010-11, with much help from the US and the EU. MONUC performed a similar role in the DRC in 2006, when the US and EU also funded the process and the mission devoted considerable effort to making sure it was credible. If such support can succeed in the DRC and South Sudan, then it can be surely be repeated in South Sudan.
It is rumoured that the USA favours Pagan Amum as the leader of a transitional government. Whether this is or is not true, obvious support from a foreign power is in the end detrimental to the recipient. It would be better to let Pagan Amum take his chances in future elections and persuade the parties to agree on public figures without presidential ambition or a compromised past record as the leaders of the transition –Abel Alier, Bona Malwal and Francis Deng for example, with younger figures from the churches and civil society to back them up.
The objective would be to give the people of South Sudan a realistic chance of changing their leadership by democratic means. To have any chance of success, the transitional government would need to be overseen by a body such as CIAT (Comite pour l’Appui a la Transition) in the DRC, from 2003-6. This was a regular meeting of the UNSC P3 ambassadors, plus Belgium, South Africa, Angola and other interested nations, with the government. It was designed to review progress and hold all parties to what they had agreed. When it faltered, Thabo Mbeki, then still President of South Africa, intervened. Today, a putative Quartet for South Sudan, with the assent of the UNSC, AU and IGAD, would have to form some such mechanism of oversight and support.
Lastly, the transitional government, with the help of the AU and others, would need to devise a long term process of national reconciliation based upon a documenting of atrocities, if possible a listing of the dead, an acknowledgement of responsibility and, probably, the creation of hybrid courts as well. Should either Salva Kiir or Riek Machar be indicted by a hybrid court, they would have to take their chances, but ultimate impunity should not be offered by the mediators as an inducement to them to support a negotiated transition.
Any of the suggestions above may prove impossible to negotiate or to set up. They are nonetheless offered, based in part on a comparable experience in the DRC, as a contribution to the discussion of ways in which South Sudan can be kept from further collapse.
It is assumed and perceived that it is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that is mediating the South Sudan peace process, yet a closer look at the composition of the various teams and monitors established to deal with the crisis in the last 8 months, reveals a set up that is geared to fail-or perpetuate the crisis, rather than resolve the underlying issues. Most importantly, it is a process which undermines the credibility, impartiality, and most of all the trust that is needed to bring the two sides together. It is completely dominated and guided by the Ethiopian regime, which is fully controlled by the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).
It is also unclear how neutral regional governments are. Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya all appear to have taken positions in the conflict, and have strong bilateral interests in the outcome of the crisis.
Speaking of interests…it is Ethiopia (TPLFs) interests that are being advanced in the name of IGAD. Let us take a look into the composition of IGAD’s “Mediation Team”, “Monitoring and Verification Team”, and “Protection and Deterrent Force” and see how. Clearly, one can see Ethiopia’s (TPLF) pervasive presence, not just in the negotiation rooms, but also on the ground, including the peacekeeping missions in South Sudan.
OromianEconomist 
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