jump to navigation

Freedom House Country Report: Ethiopia’s Freedom on the Net 2015 Status: Not Free October 28, 2015

Posted by OromianEconomist in Uncategorized.
Tags: , ,
add a comment

???????????Ethiopia's net freedom in 2015 status, not free
Ethiopia: Freedom on the Net 2015 (Not Free)
STATUS:
NOT FREE
TOTAL SCORE:  82
(0 = Best, 100 = Worst)
OBSTACLES TO ACCESS:  23
(0 = Best, 25 = Worst)
LIMITS ON CONTENT:  28
(0 = Best, 35 = Worst)
VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS:  31
(0 = Best, 40 = Worst)

82
Freedom on the Net Score
(0=BEST, 100=WORST)
↑ = Score improvement
↓ = Score decline

Quick Facts

Population:
Internet Penetration: 2.9 percent
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes
Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes
Press Freedom Status: Not Free
Key Developments:

JUNE 2014—MAY 2015

  • A significant number of service interruptions in the name of routine maintenance and system updates resulted in worsening service across the country. Internet services on 3G mobile internet networks were reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014 (see Restrictions on Connectivity).
  • A growing number of critical news and opposition websites were blocked in the lead up to the May 2015 elections (see Blocking and Filtering).
  • Six bloggers of the prominent Zone 9 blogging collective arrested in April 2014 were officially charged with terrorism in July 2014; two of the bloggers were unexpectedly released and acquitted in July 2015, joined by the four others in October (seeProsecutions and Arrests).
  • A university political science teacher known for his Facebook activism and another blogger were arrested and charged with terrorism in July 2014, among three others (see Prosecutions and Arrests).
  • Online journalists in the Ethiopian diaspora were attacked with Hacking Team’s sophisticated surveillance malware (seeTechnical Attacks).
Introduction:

Ethiopia, the second most populated country in sub-Saharan Africa, has one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile phone connectivity in the world. Telecommunication services, in general, and the internet, in particular, are among the most unaffordable commodities for the majority of Ethiopians, as poor telecom infrastructure, the government’s monopoly over the information and communication technologies (ICTs) sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the growth of ICTs in the country, making the cost of access prohibitively expensive.

Despite the country’s extremely poor telecommunications services and a largely disconnected population, Ethiopia is also known as one of the first African countries to censor the internet, beginning in 2006 with opposition blogs.[1] Since then, internet censorship has become pervasive and systematic through the use of highly sophisticated tools that block and filter internet content and monitor user activity. The majority of blocked websites feature critical news and opposition viewpoints run by individuals and organizations based in the diaspora. In the lead up to the May 2015 general elections, a growing number of critical news and opposition websites were blocked, while select tools, such as Storify and a popular URL shortening tool Bitly, remained blocked throughout the year. The government also employs commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape, and surveillance of mobile phone and internet networks is systematic and widespread.

In 2014–15, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown on bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and quash critical voices. The Zone 9 bloggers arrested in April 2014 were charged with terrorism in July 2014 and subsequently subjected to a series of sham trials through mid-2015. In July 2015, two of the imprisoned Zone 9 bloggers were unexpectedly released and acquitted of all charges, which observers attributed to U.S. President Barack Obama’s official visit to the country later that month. The four remaining Zone 9 bloggers were acquitted in October. Nevertheless, five other critical voices and bloggers who were arrested in July 2014 and charged with terrorism remain in prison. During the numerous Zone 9 trials throughout 2014–2015, several supporters were temporarily arrested for posting updates and pictures of their trials on social media via mobile devices.

Obstacles to Access:

A significant number of service interruptions in the name of routine maintenance and system updates resulted in worsening service across the country. Internet services on 3G mobile internet networks were reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014.

Availability and Ease of Access

In 2015, access to ICTs in Ethiopia remained extremely limited, hampered by slow speeds and the state’s tight grip on the telecom sector.[2] According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), internet penetration stood at a mere 3 percent in 2014, up from just 2 percent in 2013.[3] Only 0.5 percent of the population had access to fixed-broadband connections, increasing from 0.25 percent in 2013.[4] Ethiopians had more access to mobile phone services, with mobile phone penetration rates increasing from 27 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2014,[5] though such access rates still lag behind an estimated regional average of 74 percent,[6] and cell phone ownership is much more common in urban areas than rural areas. Meanwhile, less than 5 percent of the population has a mobile-broadband subscription as of the latest available data from 2013.[7] In March 2015, Ethiopia’s single telecoms provider, the state-owned EthioTelecom, announced it had launched 4GLTE mobile technology in the capital Addis Ababa,[8] but the service is reportedly only available to a mere 400,000 subscribers.[9]  Radio remains the principal mass medium through which most Ethiopians stay informed.

While access to the internet via mobile phones increased slightly in the past year, prohibitively expensive mobile data packages still posed a significant financial obstacle for the majority of the population in Ethiopia, where per capita income stood at US$470 as of the latest available data from 2013.[10] Ethiopia’s telecom market is highly undeveloped due to monopolistic control, providing customers with few options at arbitrary prices, which are set by the state-controlled EthioTelecom and kept artificially high.[11] As of mid-2015, monthly packages cost between ETB 200 and 3,000 (US$10 to $150) for 1 to 30 GB of 3G mobile services.

The combined cost of purchasing a computer, setting up an internet connection, and paying usage charges makes internet access beyond the reach of most Ethiopians. Consequently, only 2 percent of Ethiopian households have fixed-line internet access in their homes.[12] While access via mobile internet is increasing, the majority of internet users still rely on cybercafes to log online. A typical internet user in Addis Ababa pays between ETB 5 and 7 (US$0.25 to $0.35) for an hour of access. Because of the scarcity of internet cafes outside urban areas, however, rates in rural cybercafes are more expensive.

For the few Ethiopians who can access the internet, connection speeds are known to be painstakingly slow and have not improved in years, despite rapid improvements everywhere else around the world.  Logging into an email account and opening a single message can still take as long as six minutes at a standard cybercafe with broadband in the capital city—the same rate reported over the past few years—while attaching documents or images to an email can take as long as eight minutes or more.[13] According to May 2015 data from Akamai’s “State of the Internet” report, Ethiopia has an average connection speed of 1.8 Mbps (compared to a global average of 3.9 Mbps).[14]

Despite reports of massive investments from Chinese telecom companies in recent years,[15] Ethiopia’s telecommunications infrastructure is among the least developed in Africa and is almost entirely absent from rural areas, where about 85 percent of the population resides. There are only a few signal stations across the country, resulting in frequent network congestions and disconnections, even on state controlled media.[16] Consequently, many people often use their cell phones as music players or cameras. In a typical small town of Ethiopia, individuals often hike to the top of their nearest hills to access a signal for a mobile phone call. Frequent electricity outages also contribute to poor telecom services.

Restrictions on Connectivity

The Ethiopian government’s complete control over the country’s telecommunications infrastructure via EthioTelecom enables it to restrict access to the internet and mobile phone services. Ethiopia is connected to the international internet via satellite, a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to its international gateway, and the SEACOM cable that connects through Djibouti to an international undersea cable. All connections to the international internet are completely centralized via EthioTelecom, enabling the government to cut off the internet at will. As a result, the internet research company Renesys classified Ethiopia “as being at severe risk of Internet disconnection,” alongside Syria, Uzbekistan, and Yemen in a February 2014 assessment.[17]

There were a significant number of service interruptions throughout the year in the name of routine maintenance of network infrastructure and system updates across the country, resulting in worsening service. Numerous users reported extremely slow internet and text messaging speeds during the coverage period, and internet services on EVDO and CDMA networks were reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014.[18]

In a sample test conducted in March 2015 to measure the frequency and pervasiveness of mobile network interruptions, 40 to 60 percent of phone calls dropped in the middle of conversation.[19]Nearly 70 percent of the time, testers needed to make prolonged and repeated attempts for their calls to go through. Text messaging services were also found to be extremely poor and slow. The same sample test found that it took an average of six minutes to send a text message to ten individuals, while replies varied from one to six minutes. Approximately 30 percent of text messages were not delivered to the intended recipient at all. The test further found that 60 percent of mobile phone users frequently ran out of their prepaid mobile data allowances prematurely.

ICT Market

The space for independent initiatives in the ICT sector, entrepreneurial or otherwise, is extremely limited,[20] with state-owned EthioTelecom holding a firm monopoly over internet and mobile phone services as the country’s sole telecommunications service provider. Despite repeated international pressure to liberalize telecommunications in Ethiopia, the government refuses to ease its grip on the sector.[21]

China is a key investor in Ethiopia’s telecommunications industry,[22] with Zhongxing Telecommunication Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei currently serving as contractors to upgrade broadband networks to 4G in Addis Ababa and to expand 3G across the country.[23] The partnership has enabled Ethiopia’s authoritarian leaders to maintain their hold over the telecom sector,[24] though the networks built by the Chinese firms have been criticized for their high cost and poor service.[25] Furthermore, the contracts have led to increasing fears that the Chinese may also be assisting the authorities in developing more robust ICT censorship and surveillance capacities.[26] In December 2014, the Swedish telecom group Ericsson emerged as the latest partner to improve and repair the quality of Ethiopia’s mobile network infrastructure,[27] though China’s ZTE still maintains the lion’s share of the telecom infrastructure investment sector.

Meanwhile, onerous government regulations stymie other aspects of the Ethiopian ICT market. For one, imported ICT items are tariffed at the same heavy rate as luxury items, unlike other imported goods such as construction materials and heavy duty machinery, which are given duty-free import privileges to encourage investments in infrastructure.[28] Ethiopians are required register their laptops and tablets at the airport with the Ethiopian customs authority before they travel out of the country, ostensibly to prevent individuals from illegally importing electronic devices, though observers believe the requirement is an effort to keep tabs on the ICT activities of Ethiopian citizens.[29]

Local software companies in the country have also suffered from heavy-handed government regulations, which do not have fair, open, or transparent ways of evaluating and awarding bids for new software projects.[30] Government companies are given priority for every kind of project, while smaller entrepreneurial software companies are completely overlooked, leaving few opportunities for local technology companies to thrive.

Meanwhile, cybercafes are subject to onerous operating requirements under the 2002 Telecommunications (Amendment) Proclamation,[31] which requires cybercafe owners to obtain an operating license with EthioTelecom via a murky process that can take months. In the past few years, EthioTelecom began enforcing its licensing requirements more strictly in response to the increasing spread of cybercafes, reportedly penalizing Muslim cafe owners more harshly. Violations of the stringent requirements, such as a prohibition on providing Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services, entail criminal liability, though there have been no reported violations to date.[32]

Regulatory Bodies

Since the emergence of the internet in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA) has been the primary regulatory body overseeing the telecommunications sector. In practice, executives in the government have complete control over ICT policy and sector regulation.[33] The Information Network Security Agency (INSA), a government agency established in 2011 and controlled by individuals with strong ties to the ruling regime,[34] also has significant power in regulating the internet under the mandate of protecting the country’s communications infrastructure and preventing cybercrimes in the country.

Limits on Content:

Dozens of critical news and opposition websites and blogs were blocked as the country prepared for the general elections in May 2015. Over 100 websites remained blocked overall. The activities of progovernment commentators noticeably increased during the coverage period.

Blocking and Filtering

The Ethiopian government imposes nationwide, politically motivated internet blocking and filtering that tends to tighten ahead of sensitive political events. The majority of blocked websites are those that feature opposition or critical content run by individuals or organizations based in the country or the diaspora. The government’s approach to internet filtering generally entails hindering access to a list of specific internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the EthioTelecom-controlled international gateway. Deep-packet inspection (DPI) is also employed, which blocks websites based on a keyword in the content of a website or piece of communication (such as email).[35]

During the coverage period, over one hundred websites remained inaccessible in Ethiopia.[36] Blocked sites included Ethiopian news websites, political party websites, blogs, television and online radio websites, and the websites of international digital rights organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Tactical Technology Collective. Select tools such as text messaging apps and services on Google’s Android operating system on smartphones were inaccessible at irregular intervals but for unclear reasons.

Online censorship intensified as the country prepared for the May 2015 general elections, with new blocks on dozens of social media pages, blogs, and diaspora-based opposition websites that were created to report on the general election.[37] A diaspora-operated website called AddisVoice, which published a series of critical articles about the educational qualifications of government officials, was a top target for blocking in 2014-2015.[38] International news outlets were also targeted. In June 2014, the Ethiopian authorities were accused of jamming the satellite operations of the BBC, Deutsche Welle, France 24, and the Voice of America, blocking a few of the stations’ websites as well.[39] Al Arabiya, a Saudi Arabia-based media outlet, and Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English websites were intermittently blocked throughout the coverage period.[40]

Blogs are also a prime target for blocking. In 2007, the government instituted a blanket block on the domain names of two popular blog-hosting websites, Blogspot and Nazret, though the authorities have since become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, now blocking select pages such as the Zone9 independent blog hosted on Blogspot,[41] as opposed to the entire blogging platform. Nazret, however, remained completely blocked as of June 2015.

Facebook and Twitter platforms were otherwise generally accessible, although some individual Facebook groups belonging to opposition individuals remained blocked altogether when accessed via the unencrypted (HTTP) URL pathway. However, the social media curation tool Storify—first blocked in July 2012[42]—remained blocked during the coverage period,[43] in addition to the URL shortening tool Bit.ly.[44] Circumvention tools are also blocked, including Tor—an online tool that enables users to browse anonymously—which has been blocked since May 2012.[45]According to an independent source, key terms such as “proxy” yield no search results on unencrypted search engines,[46] reflecting the government’s efforts to limit users’ access to circumvention tools and strategies.

Some restrictions are also placed on mobile phones, such as the requirement for a text message to obtain prior approval from EthioTelecom if it is to be sent to more than ten recipients.[47] A bulk text message sent without prior approval is automatically blocked, irrespective of the content of the message.

There are no procedures for determining which websites are blocked or why, precluding any avenues for appeal. There are no published lists of blocked websites or publicly available criteria for how such decisions are made, and users are met with an error message when trying to access blocked content. This lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s continued denial of its censorship efforts. Meanwhile, the decision-making process does not appear to be controlled by a single entity, as various government bodies—including the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), EthioTelecom, and the ICT ministry—seem to be implementing their own lists, contributing to a phenomenon of inconsistent blocking. Government officials flatly deny the blocking of websites or jamming of international satellite operations while also stating that the government has a legal and a moral responsibility to protect the Ethiopian public from extremist content.

Content Removal

In addition to increasing blocks of online content, politically objectionable content is often targeted for removal, often by way of threats from security officials who personally seek out users and bloggers to instruct them to take down certain content, particularly critical content on Facebook. The growing practice suggests that at least some voices within Ethiopia’s small online community are being closely monitored. For instance, during the various legal proceedings of the Zone 9 bloggers throughout 2014-2015 (see “Prosecutions”), friends and reporters who posted pictures and stories of the trials on social media were briefly detained and asked to remove them.[48]

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Lack of adequate funding is a significant challenge for independent online media in Ethiopia, as fear of government pressure dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites. A 2012 Advertising Proclamation also prohibits advertisements from firms “whose capital is shared by foreign nationals.”[49] Launching a website on the local .et domain is expensive and onerous,[50] requiring a business license from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a permit from an authorized body.[51]  While the domestic Ethiopian blogosphere has been expanding, most blogs are hosted on international platforms by diaspora community members.

Despite extremely low levels of internet access, the authorities employ progovernment commentators and trolls to manipulate the online news and information landscape. There was a noticeable increase in the number of progovernment commentators in the last few years, as confirmed in a June 2014 report by the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT) that detailed the government’s efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online. According to the ESAT report, hundreds of bloggers reporting directly to government officials had been trained on how to post progovernment comments and criticize antigovernment articles on social media platforms.[52]

Meanwhile, increasing repression against journalists and bloggers has had a major chilling effect on expression online, particularly following the arrest of the Zone 9 bloggers in April 2014 and their ongoing trials throughout 2014-2015 (see “Prosecutions”). Fear of pervasive surveillance has also led to widespread self-censorship, and many bloggers publish anonymously to avoid reprisals.[53] Local newspapers and web outlets receive their independent news and information from regime critics and opposition organizations in the diaspora, and few Ethiopian journalists work for either domestic print media or overseas online outlets due to the threat of repercussions.

Digital Activism

Despite very low internet penetration in the country, tech-savvy Ethiopians are increasingly using social media for campaigning and social activism. Digital activism was particularly pronounced and widespread following the arrest of six Zone 9 bloggers and three journalists for their alleged affiliation with the Zone 9 collective (see “Violations of User Rights”). Ethiopian bloggers and social media users flocked online to spread the #FreeZone9Bloggers hashtag in a campaign that quickly swept across the social media sphere and garnered widespread support from around the world throughout 2014-2015. In the first five days of the campaign, the #FreeZone9Bloggers hashtag was tweeted more than 8,000 times.[54]While the international campaign elicited no official response from the government, sustained digital activism throughout the year continually informed the international community of the Zone 9 case, pushing high level diplomats to condemn the Ethiopian government’s actions, which many believe helped lead to the release of two of the bloggers in July 2015.

Following the prominence of the Zone 9 blogger campaign, hashtag campaigns on social media have become one of the most popular methods of activism in Ethiopia, enabling citizens to demand for social change and justice on a variety of issues. Two hashtag campaigns in late 2014 were particularly active on Ethiopian social media. One campaign, #BecauseIamOromo, stemmed from the release of an Amnesty International report on repression and human rights violations in the Oromo region of Ethiopia,[55]  building momentum across a three-day Twitter campaign, which attracted a significant number of followers.[56] Another campaign, #Justice4Hanna, demanded justice for a 16 year old high school girl who was gang-raped and then later died from associated injuries in Addis Ababa in October 2014.[57]

Digital activism was also prominent in the lead-up to the May 2015 general elections, though calls for protest came mostly from the Ethiopian diaspora rather than from local activists who feared the government’s violent crackdowns against protest movements. State media stepped up its campaign against the press, in general, and the use of social media, in particular, claiming that foreign agents and terrorists were using social media to destabilize the country.

Violations of User Rights:

The limited space for online expression continued to deteriorate alongside an increasing crackdown on bloggers. The Zone 9 bloggers arrested in April 2014 were charged with terrorism in July 2014 and subsequently subjected to a series of sham trials through mid-2015. In July 2015, two of the imprisoned Zone 9 bloggers were unexpectedly released and acquitted of all charges, leaving four in prison alongside five other individuals who were arrested in July 2014 and charged with terrorism for their various ICT activities. Independent journalists in the diaspora were targeted with Hacking Team surveillance spyware.

Legal Environment

The 1995 Ethiopian constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and access to information, while also prohibiting censorship.[58] These constitutional guarantees are affirmed in the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, known as the press law, which governs the print media.[59] Nevertheless, the press law also includes problematic provisions that contradict constitutional protections and restrict free expression, such as onerous registration processes for media outlets and high fines for defamation.[60] The Criminal Code also penalizes defamation with a fine or up to one year in prison.[61]

In 2012, the government introduced specific restrictions on an array of ICT activities under amendments to the 1996 Telecom Fraud Offences Law,[62] which had already placed bans on certain communication applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)[63] like Skype and Google Voice, call back services, and internet-based fax services.[64] Under the 2012 amendments, the penalties under the preexisting ban were toughened, increasing the fine and maximum prison sentence from five to eight years for service providers, and penalizing users with three months to two years in prison.[65] The law also added the requirement for all individuals to register their telecommunications equipment—including smartphones—with the government, which security officials typically enforce by confiscating ICT equipment when a registration permit cannot be furnished at security checkpoints, according to sources in the country.

Most alarmingly, the 2012 Telecom Fraud Offences Law extended the violations and penalties defined in the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and criminal code to electronic communications, which explicitly include both mobile phone and internet services.[66] The anti-terrorism legislation prescribes prison sentences of up to 20 years for the publication of statements that can be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism, a vaguely defined term.[67]

According to a December 2014 news report by Ethiopian State Television, a draft Computer and Internet Crime Bill is currently in the works by the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). The news report featured remarks by the INSA director, who insisted that the draft cybercrime law aimed to strengthen the government’s powers to prevent, control, investigate, and prosecute cybercrimes, including on social media. Observers are concerned that the law will empower state agencies to monitor private social media activities without oversight.[68]

Prosecutions and Detention for Online Activities

Ethiopia is among the world’s top five jailers of journalists.[69] In 2014-2015, the authorities intensified their crackdown against bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to arrest and prosecute individuals for their online activities and silence dissent. Most alarmingly, six bloggers from the critical Zone 9 blogging collective and three journalists with alleged associations to Zone 9 were arrested in late April 2014. The arrests occurred just days following a Facebook post announcing the group’s plans to resume its activism after taking a seven-month hiatus due to “a considerable amount of surveillance and harassment” the bloggers had previously suffered at the hands of security agents for their writings and social media activism.[70]

Initially held for three months without charges, the bloggers were charged in July 2014 with terrorism under the harsh Anti-Terrorism Proclamation for conspiring with the banned opposition group Ginbot 7, which the government classifies as a terrorist group.[71] The bloggers were further accused of encrypting their communications to disseminate seditious writings with the intent of overthrowing the government, the latter of which is an offense under the criminal code.[72] The government reportedly submitted 30 pages of phone and surveillance records spanning a period of three years as evidence of the terrorism charges,[73] alongside email communications and digital security handbooks.[74]

Despite widespread international condemnation of the Zone 9 arrests, the detainees were denied bail and brought to court dozens of times without any progress to their case for more than a year.[75]They remained in jail throughout the first half of 2015 until early July, when two of the bloggers and three associated journalists were unexpectedly released without charges. The four remaining Zone 9 bloggers were acquitted in October.[76] During the trials between June and November 2014, at least three other individuals were arrested temporarily for posting updates and pictures of their trials on social media via mobile devices.

Several other critical bloggers and online activists were arrested in July 2014, including Abraha Desta and Zelalem Workagegnehu, both academics and bloggers who were held without charges for four months until October 2014 when they were charged for their alleged support of the opposition group Ginbot 7.[77] They were also charged with using social media to contact members of Ginbot 7.[78] Widely known for his Facebook posts criticizing the ruling party, Abraha Desta was reportedly beaten brutally before being taken to an unidentified prison.[79] Three other individuals—Yonatan Wolde, Abraham Solomon, and Bahiru Degu—were also arrested around the same time for allegedly applying for an internet security and social media training abroad.[80] At a court hearing in August 2015, the defendants’ cases were delayed until November.[81]

Meanwhile, the well-known dissident journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega is still carrying out an 18-year prison sentence handed down in July 2012 under the anti-terrorism law.[82]

Surveillance and Anonymity

Government surveillance of online and mobile phone communications is pervasive in Ethiopia, and evidence has emerged in recent years that reveal the scale of such practices. According to 2014 Human Rights Watch research, there are strong indications that the government has deployed a centralized monitoring system from the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE, known as ZXMT, to monitor phone lines and various types of communications, including mobile phone networks and the internet.[83] Known for its use by repressive regimes in Libya and Iran, ZXMT enables deep packet inspection (DPI) of internet traffic across the EthioTelecom network and has the ability to intercept emails and web chats.

Another ZTE technology, known as ZSmart, is a customer management database installed at EthioTelecom that provides the government with full access to user information and the ability to intercept SMS text messages and record phone conversations.[84]ZSmart also allows security officials to locate targeted individuals through real-time geolocation tracking of mobile phones.[85] While the extent to which the government has made use of the full range of ZTE’s sophisticated surveillance systems is unclear, the authorities frequently present intercepted emails and phone calls as evidence during trials against journalists and bloggers or during interrogations as a scare tactic.[86]

There has been an increasing trend of exiled dissidents targeted with surveillance malware in the past few years (see “Technical Attacks”). Recent Citizen Lab research published in March 2015 uncovered the use of Remote Control System (RCS) spyware against two employees of the diaspora-run independent satellite television, radio, and online news media outlet, Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT), based in Alexandria, Virginia, in November and December 2014.[87] Made by the Italian company Hacking Team, RCS spyware is advertised as “offensive technology” sold exclusively to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world, and has the ability to steal files and passwords, as well as to intercept Skype calls and chats. [88]

While Hacking Team claims that they do not deal with “repressive regimes,”[89] the social engineering tactics used to bait the two ESAT employees made it clear that the attack was targeted. Moreover, analysis of the RCS attacks uncovered credible links to the Ethiopian government, with the spyware’s servers registered at an EthioTelecom address under the name “INSA-PC,” referring to the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), the body established in 2011 to preside over the security of the country’s critical communications infrastructure.[90] INSA was already known to be using the commercial toolkit FinFisher—a device that can secretly monitor computers by turning on webcams, record everything a user types with a key logger, and intercept Skype calls—to target dissidents and supposed national security threats.[91]

Given the high degree of online repression in Ethiopia, political commentators use proxy servers and anonymizing tools to hide their identities when publishing online and to circumvent filtering, though the ability to communicate anonymously has become more difficult. The Tor Network anonymizing tool has been blocked since May 2012.

Anonymity is further compromised by strict SIM card registration requirements. Upon purchase of a SIM card through EthioTelecom or an authorized reseller, individuals must provide their full name, address, government-issued identification number, and a passport-sized photograph. EthioTelecom’s database of SIM registrants enables the government to cut-off the SIM cards belonging to targeted individuals and to restrict those individuals from registering for new SIM cards. Internet subscribers are also required to register their personal details, including their home address, with the government. In 2013, an inside informant leaked worrying details of potential draft legislation that seeks to mandate real-name registration for all internet users in Ethiopia, though there are no further details of this development as of mid-2015.[92]

While the government’s stronghold over the Ethiopian ICT sector enables it to proactively monitor users, its access to user activity and information is less direct at cybercafes. For a period following the 2005 elections, cybercafe owners were required to keep a register of their clients, but the requirement has not been enforced since mid-2010.[93] Nevertheless, some cybercafe operators revealed that they are required to report any “unusual behavior” to security officials, and officials often visit cybercafes (sometimes in plainclothes) to ask questions about specific users or to monitor user activity themselves.[94]

Intimidation and Violence

Government security agents frequently harass and intimidate bloggers, online journalists, and ordinary users for their online activities. Independent bloggers are often summoned by the authorities to be warned against discussing certain topics online, while activists claim that they are consistently threatened by state security agents for their online activism.[95] Prior to their imprisonment in April 2014, the Zone 9 bloggers reported suffering a considerable amount of harassment for their work, leading them to go silent for several months. Shortly after the bloggers announced a resumption of activities on Facebook in April 2014, six Zone 9 bloggers were arrested and sent to a federal detention center in Addis Ababa where they were reportedly mistreated and tortured to give false confessions throughout the year.[96] The active Gmail accounts belonging to several of the Zone 9 bloggers while in detention suggests that they may have been forced give their passwords to security officials against their will.[97]

Ethiopian journalists in the diaspora have also been targeted for harassment, according to one reporter of the diaspora-based website ECADF, who received death threats from an alleged government spy in Netherlands for his reporting.[98]

Technical Attacks

Opposition critics and independent voices face frequent technical attacks, even when based abroad. In recent years, independent research has found evidence that the Ethiopian authorities use sophisticated surveillance malware and spyware, such as FinFisher’s FinSpy and Hacking Team’s Remote Control Servers (RCS), to target exiled dissidents. The most recent attack was recorded in December 2014 by researchers at Citizen Lab, who discovered RCS spyware in attached documents sent in emails to journalists with the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT), an independent TV, radio, and online news outlet run by members of the Ethiopian diaspora in Virginia.[99] Having been targeted with the RCS spyware before,[100]the journalists did not download the attachments that would have installed the spyware and enabled the attackers to access files on the infected computers. The journalists believe the attack was an effort by the authorities to ascertain ESAT’s sources within Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, a technical attack in late 2012 and early 2013 on an exiled dissident (and American citizen) is currently the basis of an ongoing legal case at a U.S. District Court filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).[101] In April 2013, EFF sued the Ethiopian government in a U.S. court on behalf of the anonymous Ethiopian dissident for implanting malicious FinSpy malware on the individual’s computer. Linked to a server belonging to EthioTelecom, FinSpy had secretly recorded dozens of Skype calls, copied emails the individual had sent, and logged a web search conducted by his son on the history of sports medicine for a school research project.[102]

Notes:

[1] Rebecca Wanjiku, “Study: Ethiopia only sub-Saharan Africa nation to filter net,” IDG News Service,  October 8, 2009, http://bit.ly/1Lbi3s9.

[2] Tom Jackson, “Telecoms slow down development of Ethiopian tech scene – iceaddis,”humanipo republished on Ethioconstruction,  October 22, 2013, http://bit.ly/1ZlzWhw.

[3] International Telecommunication Union, “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.

[4] International Telecommunication Union, “Fixed (Wired)-Broadband Subscriptions, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.

[5] International Telecommunication Union, “Mobile-Cellular Telephone Subscriptions, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.

[6] International Telecommunication Union, “Key ICT data, 2000-2015,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.

[7] International Telecommunication Union, “Ethiopia Profile (Latest data available: 2013),”ICT-Eye, accessed August 1, 2014, http://bit.ly/1NEnLHk.

[8] Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia launches 4G mobile service in the capital,” ed. Mark Potter,Reuters, March 21, 2015, http://reut.rs/1FP0Pky.

[9] “A short report about Ethio-Telecom recent launch of 4G network in Addis Ababa,” EthioTube video, 8:44, April 3, 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ryeb90.

[10] World Bank, “Ethiopia Overview,” last updated April 05, 2015,http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.

[11] Ethiopia – Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband and Forecasts, Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd.:June 2014, http://bit.ly/1ji15Rn.

[12] International Telecommunication Union, “Ethiopia Profile (Latest data available: 2013).”

[13] According to tests by Freedom House consultant in 2015.

[14] Akamai, “Average Connection Speed: Ethiopia,” map visualization, The State of the Internet, Q4 (2014), http://akamai.me/1OqvpoS.

[15] Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia signs $700 mln mobile network deal with China’s Huawei,”Reuters, July 25, 2013, http://reut.rs/1OpDgVj.

[16] Endalk Chala, “When blogging is held hostage of Ethiopia’s telecom policy,” in “GV Advocacy Awards Essays on Internet Censorship from Iran, Venezuela, Ethiopia,” Global Voices, February 3, 2015, http://bit.ly/1OpDvzz.

[17] Jim Cowie, “Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine: Internet Under Fire,” Renesys (blog), February 26, 2014, http://bit.ly/1R2z0IT.

[18] Freedom House interviews.

[19] Conducted by Freedom House consultant, March 2015.

[20] Al Shiferaw, “Connecting Telecentres: An Ethiopian Perspective,” Telecentre Magazine, September 2008, http://bit.ly/1ji348h.

[21] “Ethio Telecom to remain monopoly for now,” TeleGeography, June 28, 2013,http://bit.ly/1huyjf7.

[22] Paul Chapman, “New report explores the Ethiopian – telecoms, mobile and broadband – market insights, statistics and forecasts,” WhatTech, May 1, 2015, http://bit.ly/1L46Awu.

[23] “Out of reach,” The Economist, August 24, 2013, http://econ.st/1l1UvJO.

[24] “Out of reach,” The Economist.

[25] Matthew Dalton, “Telecom Deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism,”The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2014, http://on.wsj.com/1LtSCkD.

[26] Based on allegations that the Chinese authorities have provided the Ethiopian government with technology that can be used for political repression—such as surveillance cameras and satellite jamming equipment—in the past. See: Addis Neger, “Ethiopia: China Involved in ESAT Jamming,” ECADAF Ethiopian news & Opinion, June 23, 2010, http://bit.ly/1LtSYI9; Gary Sands, “Ethiopia’s Broadband Network – A Chinese Trojan Horse?” Foreign Policy Blogs, Foreign Policy Association,  September 6, 2013, http://bit.ly/1FWG8X1.

[27] ENA, “Ericsson to take part in telecom expansion in Ethiopia,” Dire Tube, December 18, 2014,  http://bit.ly/1PkZfvA.

[28] The Embassy of the United Stated, “Doing Business in Ethiopia,” http://1.usa.gov/1LtTExh.

[29]  World Intellectual Property Organization, “Ethiopia Custom Regulation: No 622/2009,”http://bit.ly/1NveoeB.

[30] Mignote Kassa, “Why Ethiopia’s Software Industry Falters,” Addis Fortune 14, no. 700 (September 29, 2013), http://bit.ly/1VJiIWC.

[31] “Proclamation No. 281/2002, Telecommunications (Amendment Proclamation,” Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 28, July 2, 2002, http://bit.ly/1snLgsc.

[32] Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency, “License Directive for Resale and Telecenter in Telecommunication Services No. 1/2002,” November 8, 2002, accessed October 20, 2014,http://bit.ly/1pUtpWh.

[33] Dr. Lishan Adam, “Understanding what is happening in ICT in Ethiopia,” (policy paper, Research ICT Africa, 2012) http://bit.ly/1LDPyJ5.

[34]  Halefom Abraha, “THE STATE OF CYBERCRIME GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA,” (paper) http://bit.ly/1huzP0S.

[35] Daniel Berhane, “Ethiopia’s web filtering: advanced technology, hypocritical criticisms, bleeding constitution,” Horns Affairs, January 16, 2011, http://bit.ly/1jTyrH1 .

[36] Test conducted by an anonymous researcher contracted by Freedom House, March 2015. During the test, some websites opened at the first attempt but were inaccessible when refreshed.

[37] Interview with the producer of a website called  Mircha.org,http://mircha.org/category/english/ .

[38] Abebe Gelaw, “Exposed: Prof. Constantinos Berhe has two fake degrees,” Addis Voice, January 18, 2015,  http://bit.ly/1zrOETe.

[39] “BBC condemns Ethiopian broadcast jamming,” BBC, May 30, 2014, http://bbc.in/1oCH8VO.

[40] “Ethiopia ‘blocks’ Al Jazeera aebsites,” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2013, http://aje.me/1144wNh.

[41] Zone9, blog post, October 8, 2015, http://zone9ethio.blogspot.com/.

[42] Mohammed Ademo, Twitter post, July 25, 2012, 1:08 p.m.,https://twitter.com/OPride/status/228159700489879552.

[44] Ory Okolloh Mwangi, Twitter post, November 6, 2013, 9:20 a.m.,https://twitter.com/kenyanpundit/status/398077421926514688.

[45] “Ethiopia Introduces Deep Packet Inspection,” Tor (blog), May 31, 2012,http://bit.ly/1A0YRdc; Warwick Ashford, “Ethiopian government blocks Tor network online anonymity,” Computer Weekly, June 28, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LDQ5L2.

[46] A 2014 report from Human Rights Watch also noted that the term “aljazeera” was unsearchable on Google while the news site was blocked from August 2012 to mid-March 2013. According to HRW research, the keywords “OLF” and “ONLF” (acronyms of Ethiopian opposition groups) are not searchable on the unencrypted version of Google (http://) and other popular search engines. Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” March 25, 2014, 56, 58,http://bit.ly/1Nviu6r.

[47] Interview with individuals working in the telecom sector, as well as a test conducted by a Freedom House consultant who found it was not possible for an ordinary user to send out a bulk text message.

[48] Reporters prevented from reporting on the trial of Zone9 Bloggers: Trial Tracker Blog,http://trialtrackerblog.org/home/ .

[49] Exemptions are made for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin. See, Abrham Yohannes, “Advertisement Proclamation No. 759/2012,” Ethiopian Legal Brief (blog), September 27, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LDQf5c.

[50] “Proclamation No. 686/2010 Commercial Registration and Business Licensing,” Federal Negarit Gazeta,  July 24, 2010, http://bit.ly/1P3PoLy;  World Bank Group, Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency, Economy Profile 2015, Ethiopia, 2014, http://bit.ly/1L49tO6.

[51] Chala, “When blogging is held hostage of Ethiopia’s telecom policy.”

[52] “Ethiopia Trains Bloggers to attack its opposition,” ECADF Ethiopian News & Opinions, June 7, 2014, http://bit.ly/1QemZjl.

[53] Markos Lemma, “Disconnected Ethiopian Netizens,” Digital Development Debates(blog),November 2012,  http://bit.ly/1Ml9Nu3.

[54] “#BBCtrending: Jailed bloggers spark Ethiopia trend,” BBC Trending, April 30, 2014,http://bbc.in/1kpaTDX.

[55] Mahlét Solomon, “Because I am Oromo,” Facebook page for campaign, November 15, 2014,   http://on.fb.me/1VJOKag.

[56] Amnesty International, Ethiopia: Because I am Oromo’: Sweeping repression in the Oromia region of Ethiopia, October 28, 2014, http://bit.ly/1QenAS6.

[57] Melody Sundberg, “A 16-Year-Old’s Death Is Forcing Ethiopia to Confront Its Sexual Violence Problem,” Global Voices, January 16, 2015, http://bit.ly/1OqziKr.

[58] Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995), art. 26 and 29, accessed, August 24, 2010, http://www.ethiopar.net/constitution.

[59] Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation No. 590/2008,Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 64, December 4, 2008.

[60] Article 19, The Legal Framework for Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia, accessed September 10, 2014,  http://bit.ly/1Pl0f33.

[61] Criminal Code, art. 613, http://bit.ly/1OpHE6F.

[62] “A Proclamation on Telecom Fraud Offence,” Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 61, September 4, 2012, http://www.abyssinialaw.com/uploads/761.pdf.

[63] The government first instituted the ban on VoIP in 2002 after it gained popularity as a less expensive means of communication and began draining revenue from the traditional telephone business belonging to the state-owned Ethio Telecom. In response to widespread criticisms, the government claimed that VoIP applications such as Skype would not be considered under the new law, though the proclamation’s language still enables the authorities to interpret it broadly at whim.

[64]“Telecommunication Proclamation No. 281/2002, Article 2(11) and 2(12),” Federal Negarit Gazeta  No. 28, July 2, 2002, accessed July 25, 2014, http://bit.ly/1jTCWkV. As an amendment to article 24 of the Proclamation, the Sub-Article (3) specifically states, “The use or provision of voice communication or fax services through the internet are prohibited” (page 1782).

[65] A Proclamation on Telecom Fraud Offence.

[66] Article 19, “Ethiopia: Proclamation on Telecom Fraud Offences,”legal analysis, August 6, 2012, http://bit.ly/1Lbonjm.

[67] “Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009,” Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 57, August 28, 2009.

[68]  “EBS Special- The social media boom in Ethiopia,” Diretube video, 31:01, February 2015,  http://bit.ly/1Mlc0FD.

[69] Committee to Protect Journalists,“2014 prison census: 221 journalists jailed worldwide,” December 1, 2014, https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2014.php.

[70] “Six members of Zone Nine, group of bloggers and activists are arrested,” [in Amharic]Zone9 (blog), April 25, 2014, http://bit.ly/1VJn6ow.

[71]“Federal High Court Lideta Criminal Bench court, Addis Ababa,” http://1drv.ms/1OqAjlC.

[72] Endalk Chala, “What You Need to Know About Ethiopia v. Zone9 Bloggers: Verdict Expected July 20,” Global Voices Advocacy, July 17, 2015, http://bit.ly/1jTDO9b.

[73] Jared Goyette, “For this group of Ethiopian journalists, the Hacking Team revelations are personal,” Public Radio International,  July 8, 2015, http://bit.ly/1UN64ID.

[74] “Federal High Court Lideta Criminal Bench court, Addis Ababa.”

[75] Ellery Roberts Biddle, Endalk Chala, Guardian Africa network, “One year on, jailed Ethiopian bloggers are still awaiting trial,” The Guardian, April 24, 2015, http://gu.com/p/47ktv/stw; “Nine Journalists and Bloggers Still Held Arbitrarily,” Reporters Without Borders, “Nine Journalists and Bloggers Still Held Arbitrarily,” August 21, 2014, http://bit.ly/1P3TW4I.

[76] Committee to Protect Journalists, “In Ethiopia, Zone 9 bloggers acquitted of terrorism charges,” news statement, October 16, 2015, https://www.cpj.org/2015/10/in-ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-acquitted-of-terrorism.php.

[77] “Defendants in Zelalem Workagegnehu et al Case Reappointed to December 25th,” De Birhan (blog), December 18, 2014, http://bit.ly/1Pl0Ph6.

[78] “Ethiopia Charges 10 of Links with Ginbot 7 Movement Today,”  De Birhan (blog), October 31, 2014, http://bit.ly/1ZlQJRB.

[79] “Ethiopia arrests for young, prominent opposition figures,” Ethiomedia, July 8, 2014,http://bit.ly/1MldQGC.

[80] Tedla D. Tekle, “The Journalism and Scholarship of Attachment – Ethiopia, Africa,”Transcend Media Service, May 25, 2015, http://bit.ly/1ZlR46L.

[81]“Court Day of Our Co-Blogger Celalem Workagegnehu et al,” De Birhan (blog), March 19, 2015, http://bit.ly/1Pl0Vp9; Addis Standard, Facebook post, August 20, 2015, http://on.fb.me/1JXGSWz.

[82] Such trumped-up charges were based on an online column Nega had published criticizing the government’s use of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to silence political dissent and calling for greater political freedom in Ethiopia. Nega is also the 2011 recipient of the PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award.“That Bravest and Most Admirable of Writers: PEN Salutes Eskinder Nega,” PEN American Center (blog), April 13, 2012, http://bit.ly/1Lm89Y7; See also, Markos Lemma, “Ethiopia: Online Reactions to Prison Sentence for Dissident Blogger,” Global Voices, July 15, 2012, http://bit.ly/1OpKaKf; Endalk Chala, “Ethiopia: Freedom of Expression in Jeopardy,” Global Voices Advocacy, February 3, 2012, http://bit.ly/1jfIEO3.

[83] Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” 62.

[84] Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” 67.

[85] Ibid, 52.

[86]  Committee to Protect Journalists, “Ethiopian Blogger, Journalists Convicted of Terrorism,” January 19, 2012, http://cpj.org/x/47b9.

[87] Bill Marczak et al., Hacking Team Reloaded? US-Based Ethiopian Journalists Again Targeted with Spyware, Citizen Lab, March 9, 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ryogmr.

[88] Hacking Team,“Customer Policy,” accessed February 13, 2014, http://hackingteam.it/index.php/customer-policy.

[89]  Declan McCullagh, “Meet the ‘Corporate Enemies of the Internet’ for 2013,” CNET, March 11, 2013, accessed February 13, 2014, http://cnet.co/1fo6jJZ.

[90] Marczak et al., Hacking Team Reloaded? US-Based Ethiopian Journalists Again Targeted with Spyware.

[91] Fahmida Y. Rashid, “FinFisher ‘Lawful Interception’ Spyware Found in Ten Countries, Including the U.S.,” Security Week, August 8, 2012, http://bit.ly/1WRPuap.

[92] Interview conducted by Freedom House consultant.

[93] Groum Abate, “Internet Cafes Start Registering Users,” The Capital republished Nazret(blog), December 27, 2006, http://bit.ly/1Lm98aX.

[94] Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” 67.

[95]   SIMEGNISH (LILY) MENGESHA, “CRAWLING TO DEATH OF EXPRESSION – RESTRICTED ONLINE MEDIA IN ETHIOPIA,” Center for International Media Assistance (blog), April 8, 2015, http://bit.ly/1IbxFie.

[96] Trial Tracker Blog, “Trials.”

[97] Anonymous Freedom House researcher reported seeing several of the detained Zone9 bloggers actively online in Gmail chat.

[98]ክንፉ አሰፋ  በስለላ ከሆላንድ የተባረረው የጋዜጠኛውን አንገት እቆርጣለሁ አለ,”  ECADAF Ethiopian News & Opinion,  April 12, 2015,  http://ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/14790/ .

[99] Marczak et al., Hacking Team Reloaded? US-Based Ethiopian Journalists Again Targeted with Spyware.

[100] Bill Marczak, et al., Hacking Team and the Targeting of Ethiopian Journalists, Citizen Lab, February 12, 2014, http://bit.ly/1heE0Nm.

[101] Jenifer Fenton, “Ethiopia spying case casts spotlight on cyber surveillance in US,” Al Jazeera, July 13, 2015, http://alj.am/bhaq.

[102] Electronic Frontier Foundation,“Kidane v. Ethiopia,” last updated August 28, 2014,https://www.eff.org/cases/kidane-v-ethiopia.

The Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama October 28, 2015

Posted by OromianEconomist in Uncategorized.
Tags: , , , , ,
add a comment

???????????

The Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama (Part 1)

By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*

Part I

The first condition necessary in order to understand about “the” Dhugaa-Ganama (i.e. “the” Absolute Truth) is to refer to the Oromo concept of jireenya, that is, existence or the fact that things exist. (Note that the Afaan Oromo terms, le’ii and leetoo, are roughly equivalent tojireenya both in meaning and content). In the Oromo system of knowledge, theunderstanding and interpretation of the world, of oneself, and other people essentially take as their starting point the concept of jireenya — existence — with reference to jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being. As such, the Oromo concept ofReality can best be subsumed under three broad concepts (a) Uumaa (Cosmology); (b)Waaqa (Undifferentiated-Being); and (c) Saffu (Human Ontology).

(A) The Concept of Uumaa — Cosmology

Uumaa is the totality of the created universe. The very term Uumaa, which derives from the verb uumuu, literally meaning “to create”, refers to all that is created — non-living things, living entities, and spiritual beings. Yet, the Oromo notion of Uumaa is not something static, but a continuous process. In order to understand, one needs first to grasp the way the concept of Waaqa has an inextricable link to the dynamic notion of Uumaa.

(B) The Concept of Waaqa — Undifferentiated-Being

The Oromo concept of Waaqa is crystal clear: The first Being was Waaqa. It must be noted that the very term Waaqa, with a capital W, should not be mistaken for waaqa, with a small w. As opposed to the former, which is under discussion, the latter simply means sky or heaven. Unlike Waaqa, waaqa is necessarily synonymous with samii, that is, heaven. (Bartles, 1990, pp. 89-111; Knutson, 1967, pp. 47-48; Geleta Koro, 2008, pp. 407, 449, 925) He continues to exist and is absolute, eternal, and infinite. Waaqa is the sustaining power of all that is. However, although Waaqa is often conceived of as the absolute unity, He is also many. (Bartles, 1990, p. 114) This is due to the notion of Ayyaanaa — the immaterial principle which determines the essence of all individual entities. In Oromo philosophical thought, everything emanates from Waaqa in the form of Ayyaanaa. Ayyaanaa can loosely be defined as an immaterial principle that underliesUumaa and determines the essence of all individual entities as well as their common properties. As G. Dahl argues, as immaterial principle,Ayyaanaa “is decisive for the character and fate of … [every]entity.” (Dahl, 1996, p. 167) Therefore, Bartle’s critical observation is correct in that “Mountains and trees, days, months and seasons, every man and his lineage –all have their own ayana. These ayana rule our lives; they make us what we are – ayana are conceived of as beings.” (Bartles, 1990, p. 113) Joseph van de Loo also affirms this depiction when he defines Ayyaanaa as the “invisible part of being, the spirit.” (Joseph van de, 1991, p. 141).

The main implication of these contentions is that everything that exists, whether as material entity or as abstract value, has its ownAyyaanaa. Accordingly, in the Oromo concept of Reality, it would be absurd to make a complete distinction between a thing and its character. Every existent being, whether actual or abstract, cannot be conceptualized without Ayyaanaa. Whatever exists has this property called Ayyaanaa. Ayyaanaa is inherent in every created individual entity. All created things are distinguished from each other by means ofAyyaanaa. From what Dahl points out it is thus justifiable that:

The traditional [sic] cosmology of the Oromo is built around a “quasi-platonic” division between the real world and the world of ideas or principles. Everything that exists in the material world as well as in the form of abstract values, has its correspondence in the form of an immaterial principle (ayaana) which is decisive for the character and fate of that entity. (Dahl, 1996, p. 167)

Yet, the philosophical question is: How can one explain the problem of one-many or the question of change-permanence, especially as this relates to the philosophical question of existence-freedom, if Ayyaanaa is conceived of as some-thing that determines the essence of every individual entity? To properly answer this question, we need to have a clear understanding of the Oromo concepts of Waaqa andSaffu, respectively.

Waaqa is the ultimate source of all that is. It is essential to note, as Bartles suggests, that the very term Waaqa would better be rendered as Divinity rather than what is meant by the English word ‘Supreme Being,’ ‘God,’ or ‘Creator.’ The main reason, he argues:

It comprises more, since it includes countless particular manifestations of Waqa in this world, particularizations of his creative work which are conceived as beings. Hence the word ‘divinity’ will often be a better translation than ‘God’. “Divinity … can be used to convey to the mind at once a being, a kind of nature or existence, and a quality of that kind of being; it can be made to appear more substantive or qualitative, more personal or general, in connotation, according to the context … (Bartles, 1990, p. 89)

In a similar vein, Knutsson himself points out the epistemological difficulty inherent in the Oromo concept of Waaqa. “It is inadvisable to translate waka by the word God, which in most western theological traditions connotes ideas of unity and independence.” (Knutsson, 1967, p. 49) Thus, he also suggests the use of the term Divinity instead of God.

Without demeaning Bartles and Knutsson’s respected contentions, however, I would like to offer a philosophical explanation of the reason why the term Undifferentiated-Being conveys a better translation than the term Divinity. First, what must be borne in mind is that the way the very term Waaqa itself is often qualified by the adjective guraacha, literally meaning “black”. In the Oromo view, the term “black” adds the notion of originality. It shows the unknown origin of Waaqa. As Dahl affirms, Waaqa “is black, gura’acha, an expression that essentially summarizes the notions of uninterferedness, originality and lack of distinction. ‘Everything flows out of this undifferentiated state in the form of ayaana.’” (Dhal, 1996, p. 169) Therefore, unlike other thinkers, I am forced to render the word Waaqa as Undifferentiated-Being instead of Divinity. (In the works of Knutsson, Bartles, and Dahl, there is a tendency to render the term Waaqa as Divinity. This is due to the influence of G. Lienhardt’s work, Divinity and Experience, on the Dinka religion and in which Lienhardt “met with similar difficulties in translation” for the word nihalic. For more detail, see Bartles, 1990, p. 89; Knutson, 1967, pp. 47-53; Dahl, 1996, p. 170)

Second, it would be absurd to separate the notion of Ayyaanaa from the concept of Undifferentiated-Being. This is mainly due to the Oromo’s concept of creation. As Dahl argues, the Oromo view of “cosmology, ecology and human ontology is one of the flow of life emanating from Divinity [i.e. Undifferentiated-Being].” (Dahl, 1996, p. 167) This contention has one important implication: The Dynamicaspect of Oromo’s view of creation. As I have stated above, the Oromo notion of creation is that it is not static, but a continuous process. “It would be wrong to regard creation as something which for Oromo was a matter of once and for all. With their conception of time, the act of creation (umaa) is still there: it continues as characteristic of the agent of creation.” (Dahl, 1996, p. 167)

Accordingly, the Undifferentiated-Being is not only the Uumaa’s ratio d’être, but also that ofAyyaanaa’s; despite the fact that the character and fate of everything is determined by the latter ― Ayyaanaa. Therefore, it would be wrong to mistake the reality conceived of the author is calling the Undifferentiated-Being for Ayyaanaa, although the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. It must be remembered that the latter is always conceived of as some-thing of the former. As Bartles points out, Ayyaanaa is Undifferentiated-Being, but it cannot be said that the reverse is true. He argues:

The crucial difference is that Waqa is invoked by everyone universally since he is concerned with all, while an ayana, linked as it is to a particular person, animal or plant, is only invoked and feared by those who linked to it either by nature or free choice. It is ‘something of Waqa’ in a person, an animal or plant making them the way they are: a particular manifestation of the divine, of Waqa as creator and as source of all life.We see the ayana as flowing out of Waqa in a way, filling the whole of creation, filling every creature whose ayana they are, making them the way they are, both inside and outside. But the ayana remain invisible to human eyes. What is visible in man is not his ayana. This visible aspect of man is rather formed and conditioned by his ayana: his ayana manifests itself in it. (Bartles, 1990, pp. 115, 118-19; Also see Sumner, 1995, p. 33)

In a similar vein, Knutson argues that “waka is the most comprehensive … It Includes ayana.” (Knutson, 1967, p. 48)

One important thing must be noted from the above contentions. Ayyaanaa, unlike Uumaa, is not necessarily subject to the idea oftemporality. Rather, it may also characterized by non-spatio-temporal reality by virtue of having the character of Undifferentiated-Being. Therefore, in contradistinction to Uumaa, Ayyaanaa exists before and after the thing it causes comes into being. Everything that exists is thus exclusively attributed to Ayyaanaa, whose act of creation has its ultimate source in Undifferentiated-Being. Hence, the Oromo conception of Reality implies a world-process or dynamic universe that has come to be by virtue of Ayyaanaa. In this manner, Ayyaanaaencompasses Uumaa, just as Uumaa embraces Ayyaanaa.

However, the incommensurability of the concepts of Uumaa versus Ayyaanaa poses the philosophical question of existence-freedom to human reason. As a result of this philosophical problem, the Oromo have adopted and developed the concept of Saffu — Human Ontology.

(C) The Concept of Saffu — Human Ontology

As Gemetchu M. argues the:

Oral tradition [sic] offered each generation words that became the vehicle of their hopes and aspirations. Each generation found its own meaning in the words in relation to its particular historical situation. This relationship between the terms of the tradition and the particular meaning of these terms in specific circumstances gives the Oromo tradition its historical character. As the result of this historical character of the tradition, early in Oromo tradition, there developed a tension between Uumaa (literally “creation”) and ayyaana as the will of Waaqa [or Undifferentiated-Being]. It is perhaps this contradiction that gave rise to the concept ofSaffu (mutual relationship between elements of the social and cosmic orders) which maintains practice obligatory through ethical conduct. (Gemetchu, 1996, p. 97)

Of this mutual relationship, Bartles has it that Saffu is “the mutual relationship (rights and duties) between individual creatures or groups of creatures according to their place in the cosmic and social order on the basis of ayana.” (Bartles, 1990, p. 373) It “is about mutual relation amongst things. Every creature should live in harmony, without inflicting harm on each other.” (Dirribi Demisse Bokku, 2011, p. 80) It must be remembered that the whole concept of Saffu derives from there being a need for such a philosophical explanation of human “existence.”

As I have stated at the beginning of this article, in the Oromo system of knowledge, the understanding and interpretation of the world, of oneself, and of the other people takes as its starting point a thought concerning jireenya — existence. This conceptual starting point constitutes the principal point of difference between my thinking and that of who have written on Oromo ideas and way of thinking individuals who tend to identify the concept of Saffu with moral philosophy alone rather than exploring its epistemological significance. To begin with, in the Oromo system of knowledge, the concept of Reality per se stems from a distinct view of jireenya. The main implication is that for the Oromo people, their concept of jireenya serves as a useful starting point for the understanding and interpretation of Uumaa, Waaqa, and Saffu. The philosophical thought Oromo have in this regard is a rich source of ideas that can provide an epistemological justification for the Oromo concept of Reality as a whole. The noun jireenya derives from the root jir — to be, to exist. (Knutsson, 1967, p. 59) Here, it is important to stress that the whole concept of jireenya implies everything that exists. In Oromo philosophy, the idea of jireenyais inclusive of everything there is within the cosmos.

However, one important distinction concerning this idea must be stated right away. The term jireenya refers to the existence of every individual entity. But when it is used for human “existence”, it has quite a different connotation. The English terms, human and man, are typically rendered as nama in the language of Afaan Oromo. In Oromo philosophy, however, there is no such thing as jireenya-nama, but rather we find jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama. The point is that whenever the concept of jireenya is used with reference to nama or the human being, it must be preceded by a noun jiruu — “activity” and a conjunction fi ― and. This name in terms of philosophical thought, has two main implications: First, in Oromo philosophical thought, it would be absurd to totally identify human “existence” with that of the existence of other entities. The very assertion, jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama, makes the concept crystal clear that human beings have a character that is in contradistinction to the existence of, for instance, saree — dog, muka — tree, dhakaa — stone, or minjaala — table. As such, there is nothing like jiruu-fi-jireenya-saree, so to compare human existence with that of a dog, for example, would be self-contradiction. On the contrary, phrases like jireenya-saree — the life/existence of dog or jireenya-muka — the life/existence of tree in accord with human reason, suggest some degrees of communality among all other entities in contradistinction to human “existence”.

Second, the difference between man’s “existence” and that of other entities stems from the element of human “activity” — jiruu. In Oromo philosophy, despite the fact that man exists the way other things do, his very existence, however, differs by virtue of his or her jiruu — “activity”. Human “existence” must be characterized by this very jiruu — “activity”. Essentially, the very conjunction fi ― which is necessarily used alongside the noun jiruu — “activity” suggests that human “existence”, unlike other things, is intrinsically linked with such “activity”.

Accordingly, in the indigenous Oromo system of knowledge, Saffu is used as the generic name for such various “activities” of individual wo/man. As we have stated above, the incompatibility that stems from the view of Uumaa versus Ayyaanaa has resulted in the construction of the concept of Saffu. Stated otherwise, the need for the construction of the concept of Saffu is due to paradoxes of bothmetaphysical and epistemological, that have resulted from existence of the concepts of Uumaa and Ayyaanaa. On the one hand, the Oromo view of Undifferentiated-Being is a representation of an ideal world or the universe of thought. This thought has its roots in thephilosophical question concerning the beginning of the universe. As a response to this fundamental question, Waaqa is often conceived of as the ultimate source of all that is; and consequently as the universe of thought. However, the Oromo do not take a precise categoricalphilosophical position on whether Waaqa produces the world out of nothing or out of His own substance. Thanks to the concept of Saffu, which I shall explicate further, the radical philosophical position just discussed has been overlooked due to there being an epistemological difficulty in coming to a human understanding of the true nature of Undifferentiated-Being.

(to be continued)

Note: The responsibility for the article is entirely mine.

Galatoomaa!

——

References

– Baxter, P. T. W., Hultin, J., and Triulzi, A. eds. Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996.

– Dirribi D. B. Oromo Wisdom In Black Civilization. Finfinnee: Finfinne Printing and Publishing S. C., 2011.

– Geleta K. Hirkoo: English-Afan Oromo-Amharic Dictionary. Aster Nega Publishing Enterprise, 2008.

– Knutson, K. E. Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution Among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia. Gӧteborg: Etnografiska Museet, 1967.

– Lambert, B. Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand. Berlin, 1990.

– Leus, Ton. Aadaa Boraanaa: A Dictionary of Borana Culture. Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2006.

– Loo, J. V. D. The Religious Practices of the Guji Oromo. Addis Ababa, 1991.

– Sumner, Claude, Oromo Wisdom Literature. Vol.1 Addis Ababa: Gudina Tumsa Foundation, 1995.

——

* Yoseph Mulugeta Baba received his B.A; M.A; and Ph.D. degrees in Philosophy from the CUEA. His research areas include Metaphilosophy, Oromo Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Post-colonial African Political Philosophy, Postmodernism, and Ethiopian historiography. Currently, he is completing his forthcoming book (CUEA PRESS) — on ‘The Ilaa-fi-Ilaamee Philosophical Method of Enquiry.’ He can be reached at kankokunmalimaali@gmail.com.

The Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama (Part 2)

By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*

Part II

(In my Previous article, I elucidated the way in which the Oromo system of knowledge essentially takes its starting point from the concept of jireenya — existence — with reference to jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being; for the understandingand interpretation of the world, of oneself, and of other people. In doing so, I clearly indicated how Oromo’s concept of Reality can best be subsumed under three broad concepts: (a)Uumaa (Cosmology); (b) Waaqa (Undifferentiated-Being); and (c) Saffu (Human Ontology). The present article is a continuation of previous one.)

The Oromo mode of thought “denies” any distinction between thought and things. As a consequence, Waaqa is conceived of as being both transcendent and immanent. This is due to the Oromo concept of Uumaa — creation. Uumaa is a world-of-process. This act of creation — Uumaa — signifies Waaqa’s presence as a natural part of the entire created natural world in the form of Ayyaanaa, which, in turn, is responsible for the emergence of new creatures — uumama — at different epochs of human history. Ayyaanaa is thus something of Waaqa. In other words, Waaqa is at the same time one and many. In Oromo philosophical thought, therefore, a distinction between the universe of thought and the universe of nature is untenable.

In the absence of such distinctions, however, how to define human nature remains problematic. Such a philosophical question sets the scene for the concept of Saffu. This concept has its origin in the description of human “existence” as being related to one or another kind of human “activity”. As I argued in my pervious article, unlike other things, human “existence” is intrinsically linked to jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being. This “activity” can best be a result of having a knowledge of things in accordance with the place assigned to each of them by Waaqa. The Oromo notion of jireenya includes the idea that everything relates to nature outside of itself. As it would be absurd to have this notion about human reason, however, the concept of jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama was developed which enables one to interpret and balance the “paradox” posed by Uumaa versus Ayyaanaa.

Therefore, the concept of Saffu — human ontology — is not only about the Oromo’s moral philosophy, as some scholars have tended to argue. But, it is also an epistemological notion founded on the idea of the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being. The jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama essentially relates to the physical world as well as human society. The concept of Saffu — human ontology — is thus nothing other than a proper understanding and interpretation of one’s state of “existence” as s/he radically relates to both aspects of nature — physical world and human society. It is a critical reflection upon a relationship that ought to exist between each human being and Uumaa as well as Ayyaanaa, on the one hand, and between an individual and human society, on the other. (Raayyaa Horoo, 2008, p. 13)

The above epistemological assertion has two philosophical foundations: (a) seera Waaqa — the laws of Undifferentiated-Being and (b)seera Nama — the laws of human being. The former is not a complete form of knowledge. As I have already argued, the origin ofUndifferentiated-Being is wholly “unknown” to the human mind. Yet, coming to some sort of such knowledge is not impossible. This is due to the Oromo’s notion of Ayyaanaa. Ayyaanaa can be “thought of as fractions of Divinity [Undifferentiated-Being]: fractions which arise from the continuous Creation [Uumaa] by which God expresses himself and imposes structure on the world.” (Gudrun Dahl, 1996, p. 170) Hence, knowledge gained concerning the laws of “nature,” for instance, is attributed to Ayyaanaa. These laws are conceived of as fixedand eternal. They are thus immutable.

Seera Nama — the laws of human being —, on the other hand, are subject to change in the context of jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama —human “existence”. Although the seera Waaqa — the laws of Undifferentiated-Being — underlie every jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — at different epochs of human history, yet; the understanding and interpretation of the seera Nama — the laws of human being — may differ considerably between individuals. In the Oromo concept of Reality, however, this difference need not be seen as a “contradiction”; unless such an interpretation goes against the concept of Saffu — human ontology. That is to say, the denial of Saffu is the failure of the individual to keep a balance between seera WaaqaAyyaanaa — and seera NamaUumaa. This “activity,” as indicated already, is generally called thejiruu-fi-jireenya-nama. The clear assumption is that, although one has a considerable difficulty (in) overcoming this “contradiction,” there is always room for the interpretation and understanding of the case in question to keep a balance between all things: Saffu, which finally leads, to pluralistic interpretations of the universe, despite the fact that there is just one universe.

Accordingly, the Oromo have adopted and developed a philosophic method of enquiry to identify and determine the tenable form of interpretation whenever various competing interpretations arise. This mode of investigation is called an ilaa-fi-ilaamee — philosophic-mode-of-thought. With such foundations in mind, let us, in the following subsection explore the justification of this form of enquiry. In order to do so, I would single out Gumii Gaayo as justification of the case in point.

(to be continued)

Note: The responsibility for the article is entirely mine.

Galatoomaa!

——

References

– Baxter, P. T. W., Hultin, J., and Triulzi, A. eds. Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996.

– Dirribi D. B. Oromo Wisdom In Black Civilization. Finfinnee: Finfinne Printing and Publishing S. C., 2011.

– Geleta K. Hirkoo: English-Afan Oromo-Amharic Dictionary. Aster Nega Publishing Enterprise, 2008.

– Knutson, K. E. Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution Among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia. Gӧteborg: Etnografiska Museet, 1967.

– Lambert, B. Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand. Berlin, 1990.

– Leus, Ton. Aadaa Boraanaa: A Dictionary of Borana Culture. Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2006.

– Loo, J. V. D. The Religious Practices of the Guji Oromo. Addis Ababa, 1991.

– Raayyaa Horoo, Waaqeffannaa. Finfinnee, 2008.

– Sumner, Claude, Oromo Wisdom Literature. Vol.1 Addis Ababa: Gudina Tumsa Foundation, 1995.

——

The Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama (Part 3)

By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*

 

Part III

In one of my previous articles (Part II), I tried to demonstrate how the Oromo concept of jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being — has led to the conception ofSaffu, which enables one to interpret and balance the “paradox” posed by Uumaa versusAyyaanaa. It has been clearly indicated that the concept of Saffu — human ontology — is nothing other than a proper understanding and interpretation of one’s state of “existence” as s/he radically relates to both aspects of nature — physical world and human society. Suchunderstanding and interpretation of Reality (i.e. Uuma, Waaqa, Ayyaanaa) eventually leads to pluralistic interpretations of the universe. Consequently, the Oromo have adopted and developed a philosophic method of enquiry to identify and determine the tenable form of interpretation whenever various competing interpretations arise. This mode of investigation is called an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought. In the present article, I try to show and how this is the case. In order to do so, I would single out Gumii Gaayo as justification of the case in point.

To begin with, Gumii Gaayo — is the possible justification for an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought. It is one of the main and most critical institutions of the Gadaa System. Thus, I need to give clear and concise points on the latter first.

What is the Gadaa System?

“The Gada System is a system of gada classes (luba) or segments of genealogical generations that succeed each other every eight years in assuming political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual responsibilities.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 31; Asmarom, 1973, p. 81) It is the Oromo people’s central philosophical thought about the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being — which has “endured for at least four centuries of recorded history.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 30) Specifically, the Gadaa System is a political philosophy that necessarily characterizes individual men’s rights and responsibilities as each of them relates to all facets of human life from birth to death. (Yoseph, 2011, pp. 84-98)

First, in Oromo society, structural institutions are abstractly constructed in such a way that they in effect govern the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama. They essentially explain how everything that exists in the universe has to be assumed, understood, and interpreted in accordance with whatever changes that take place in the lives of individuals. This makes the Gadaa System extremely complex. This is the main reason why the very term Gadaa can neither be precisely defined (Mohammed, 1994, p. 9) nor given a univocal interpretation. (Asmarom, 1973, p. 81) In light of this difficulty, however, the best way to understand the Gadaa philosophical system is to know how the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama relates to the Oromo’s concept of time.

In Oromo philosophy, the concept of time and human “existence” are viewed as two sides of one coin. Time and human society are thus divided into grades and generational-“sets”, respectively. “The set or class is the group of people who share the same status and who perform their rites of passage together, whereas the grades are the stages of development through which the groups pass.” (Asmarom, 1973, p. 51) The full cycle of the Gadaa System has ten grades (Mohammed, 1994, p. 11): Daballe grade [0 – 8 years of age]; Folle orGame Titiqaa grade [9 – 16 years of age]; Qondalla or Game Gurgudaa grade [17 – 24 years of age]; Kuusa or Raba grade [25 – 32 years of age]; Raaba Doorii or Doorii grade [33 – 40 years of age]; Gadaa grade [41 – 48 years of age]; Yuba I grade [49 – 56 years of age];Yuba II grade [57 – 64 years of age]; Yuba III grade [65 – 72 years of age]; and Gadamojii grade [73 – 80 years of age]. (Gadaa Melbaa, 1985, p. 20)

Gadaa grade starts from the first eight years (0-8), counting every eight years till it reaches eleven which falls between 80-88, that is the person becomes an elderly. One Oromo stays in one Gadaa grade for eight years out of the total of his ages. In the course of his/her life time, one Oromo could not be out of these eleven grades. In each of the Gadaa grades, Oromo have their own clearly defined roles and responsibilities to be fulfilled, and there is a system or a ceremony when one passes from oneGadaa grade to the next. (Dirribi, 2011, p. 213)

The full cycle of Gadaa System is divided into two periods of forty years each. (Mohammed, 1994, p. 11) Each span of forty years is calledgogessa or mesensa — meaning “generation”. Thus, a “generation” lasts for forty years. Each “generation” consists of five parties. “A ‘generation’ is forty years long and there are five segments or gada classes within it.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 31) The five parties are theGadaa of the father (Melbaa, Muudanaa, Kilollee, Biifolee, Michille) and the gadaa of the son (Harmuufaa, Roobalee, Birmaji, Mullataa, Duulo). “The basic rule of the gada system is that the newly born infant boy always enters the system of grades exactly forty years behind the father, regardless of the age of the father. Father and son are five grades apart at all times.” (Asmarom, 1973, p. 50)

At the end, the relationship between TIME and HUMAN SOCIETY can well be subsumed under Asmarom’s words:

Here we find a society that is stratified into two distinct but cross-cutting systems of peer-group structures. One is a system in which the members of each class are recruited strictly on the basis of chronological age. The other is a system in which the members are recruited equally strictly on the basis of genealogical generation. The first has nothing to do with genealogical ties. The second has little to do with the age. Both types of social groups are formed every eight years. Both sets of groups pass from one stage of development to the next every eight years. (Asmarom, 1973, pp. 50-51)

Keeping a concise summary of the Gadaa System in mind, let us now examine Gumii Gaayo — in order to see what justification there is for an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought.

The Gumii Gaayo

Of all the ten grades, the most important, in the Gadaa cycle, is the sixth stage, i.e. 41 to 48 years. It is the kernel stage of the GadaaSystem. This stage is seen as a major landmark in the Oromo philosophical thought. This eight year period begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony known as baallii or jarra. (Asmarom, 2000/2006, 217) Baallii is the event that ends the Gadaa of the previous eight years and starts the new one. (Mohammed, 1994, p. 15) “Ritual leader and time reckoning agent (Ayyaantuu) decides when and where to transfer the ‘baallii,’ and creates favorable atmosphere to effect the transfer.” (Dirribi, 2011, 243)

After this formal power transfer ceremony, there is a discourse and a long debate on the substance of the new law. This discourse is the most inclusive event in the Oromo political life (Asmarom, 1973, p. 93); and consequently, the event is known as Gumii Gaayo. “Gumi means ‘the multitude’ because it is a very large assembly made up of many councilors (hayuu) and assemblies (ya’a) drawn from different sections of the Gada institution.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 97) Thus, the phrase “Gumii Gaayo” literally means “the national assembly.” Asmarom points out that the National Assembly or Gumii is “made up of all the Gada assemblies of the Oromo, who meet, once every eight years, to review the laws, to proclaim new laws, to evaluate the men in power, and to resolve major conflicts that could not be resolved at lower levels of their judicial organization.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 100) It is “the supreme juridical and formal legislative body” (Bassi, 1996, 155) or “the ultimate high court of” (Helland, 1996, p. 141) Oromo society. As Marco Bassi cautions, however, “it would be misleading to think of it in terms of a central and permanent legislative body on the model of a modern parliament. The Gumii Gaayoo only meets periodically, once every gada period (8 years), and the laws actually proclaimed during each general assembly are really very few.” (Bassi, 1996, p. 155) “The purpose of the meeting is not to promulgate new laws but by reviewing the existing ones to reinforce aadaa [custom], and occasionally to do away with some custom that is felt (usually due to external pressure) has become outdated.” (Leus, 2006, p. 237)

Here, my main concern is not to discuss either the political or the ritual aspect of Gumii Gaayo. Such a thorough discussion has already been carried out by many scholars of the social sciences – who should get all THE CREDIT in this regard. Rather, my central issue of investigation is to analyze and disclose the philosophical mode of thought being imbedded during the long debate and discourse during the major event of Gumii Gaayo as the justification of an ilaaf-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought. To begin with, this philosophical mode of thought has its origin in the Oromo philosophical distinction between seera — laws and aadaa — “custom”. Of the former one, Asmarom has pointed out:

One of the most interesting aspects of Oromo tradition is that laws are treated as a product of human deliberation not a gift of God or of heroic ancestors.

… the people view the laws as being their own, not something imposed upon them by a divine force, by venerated patriarchal lawgivers, by superior class of learned men, or by “Tradition” in the generic sense. (Asmarom, 2000/2006, pp. 208-209)

In the national assembly, for instance, the Gumii deliberately alter or reaffirm both old and new laws. The Oromo thought about laws is, hence, that they are not immutable. Unlike “customs,” the existing laws can be matter of faculty abrogated to make new laws. “In Oromo culture, laws are known as ‘sera’ customs as ‘ada’ and it is the laws that are subjected to deliberate change.” (Asmarom, 2000/2008, p. 108)

In contradistinction to laws, however, the concept of “customs” is virtually immutable. This is due to epistemological issues. In Oromo philosophical thought, “customs” are considered immutable NOT because they are reasonably justified, but rather because they are BEYOND human knowledge as Reality, with a capital R, cannot be directly observed in jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being. As a consequence, accepting the notion of there being a natural law is a necessary base in the Oromo concept of “customs,” for the simple reason that the latter cannot, unlike laws, be subjected to any deliberate change or interpretation. This notion is known as Dhugaa-Ganama, — “the” Primordial-Truth — which is to say “the” Absolute Truth. Any breach of the Primordial-Truth is considered a violation of the act of creation — Uumaa. To say the least, this is to go against the concept of Saffu.

As I have argued above, the whole concept of Saffu — human ontology — is one’s effort to keep a balance between Ayyaanaa andUumaa. Hence, in the Oromo concept of Reality, fatal flaws that exist in jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama — ontological characteristic of human being — are attributed to man’s failure to balance between “the” Primordial-Truth and the laws – rather than resulting from Waaqa’s very act of creation. “The Oromo believe that things go wrong because individuals or their parents might have gone out of the normal track (Safuu) and they advise the person who happens to be in a wrong direction to correct his mistakes and come back to the right track.” (Dirribi, 2011, p. 29) Therefore, what would deliberately be subjected to change is not the Primordial-Truth, which is absolute and eternal per se, but the laws. Yet, the latter ought to be founded on the former for its interpretation. The point is: the Primordial-Truth must be the ultimate ground of one’s interpretations of laws. “The concept Safuu embodies broader idea. Safuu is, in fact, about laws. However, not all laws are safuu. Man-made laws are temporary, they are made to address certain problems and they change over time. Saffu is not subject to change. Safuu is more of about the laws of nature.” (Dirribi, 2011, 75)

Despite this foundation, however, there are still various forms of interpretations. Eventually, this would lead to competing forms ofinterpretation. Hence, since Reality CANNOT be observed directly by an individual, in his/her jiruu-fi-jireenya, NONE of his/her interpretation is taken to be absolute and objective. This directly poses the epistemological problem of determining or identifying the correct or the tenable answer to the case in question. Moreover, the viable solution to the case in question might be obscured by the dominance of worn-out interpretations. At the end, this would blind the observer to an alternative solution to the case in question.

Accordingly, the Oromo have adopted a philosophical approach known as an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought to overcome such an epistemological problem. In many cases, this philosophical mode of thought has been widely manifested in the preliminary and main sessions of Gumii Gaayo. Initially, Gumii Gaayo was intended to provoke an intellectual discourse. “A remarkable aspect of the institution is that managing the assembly requires knowledge of laws, rituals, gada history, chronology and time-reckoning.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 211) The most important aspect of this intellectual discourse, however, is not the debates themselves which ensue. Rather, it is sober reflection in various discourses that is generated as a means of finding common ground for the meeting of minds.

Gumii is not a debater’s arena but a place for sober reflection. The basic guideline for the deliberations is simply this: Do not look for the worst in what others have said in order to undermine their position and win an argument; look for the best they have to offer, so as to find the common ground…There are many practical strategies that have been developed to help people approach that ideal. (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 213)

The main justifiable reason why the Oromo have adopted such an approach is due to their conception of Reality: Uumaa, Waaqa, andSaffu. The very term fi‘and’ — clearly indicates how human “existence” is essentially characterized by both ilaa — “objective” knowledge of an entity and ilaamee — one’s understanding and interpretation of that “entity”. It must be noted that both ilaa and ilaamee are technical terms that have been deeply embedded with philosophic concepts. Ilaa refers to peoples’ views of the “world” as presented and beingunderstood or interpreted in the systematic knowledge of the community. It is their “objective” view of the “world” or an entity in question, although not absolute per se. In Oromo philosophical thought, there is no possibility of having absolute knowledge, except in the case ofWaaqa. Yet, some basic ultimate principles, which universally govern the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama, are comprehensible to human reason by means of Ayyaanaa. Such knowledge is a priori to and independent of ilaamee.

Ilaamee, on the other hand, refers to one’s understanding and interpretation of these ultimate principles in the space-time world — Uumaa. Put simply, it is a critical explanation of one’s understanding of Uumaa in accordance with the ultimate universal principles — expressed inAyyaanaa. The main implication is that what an individual understands and interprets (i.e. ilaamee) must be essentially conjoined (i.e. —fi—) with “the” Absolute Reality” (i.e. ilaa) of the universe that ultimately rests upon Waaqa, or the Primordial-Truth, or Universal Reality, etc.

Hence, this approach has necessitated an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought on the grounds that NO interpretation can be absolute. In the Oromo philosophy, since the concept of the Primordial-Truth equally serves as the starting point (i.e. ilaa) for an individual’sinterpretation (i.e. ilaamee) of the universe, NO interpretation (I repeat! NO interpretation) is complete in itself. Hence, the tenable form of an interpretation to the case in question must be identified and determined carefully. In so doing, one should adhere to an ilaa-fi-ilaamee – philosophic-mode-of-thought to properly make such an identification as well as any determination. Let me explicate and show how this is the case!

(to be continued)

Note: The responsibility for the article is entirely mine.

Galatoomaa!

——

References

Asmarom L. Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. New York: The Free Press, 1973.

___________. Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System. Philadelphia, PA, RSP, 2000/2006.

Baxter, P. T. W., Hultin, J., and Triulzi, A. eds. Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996.

Bassi, M. “Power’s Ambiguity or The Political Significance of Gada.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires, eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 150-161.

Dahl, G. “Sources of Life and Identity.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires, eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 162-177.

Dirribi D. B. Oromo Wisdom In Black Civilization. Finfinnee: Finfinne Printing and Publishing S. C., 2011.

Gadaa M. Oromiya. Addis Ababa, 1985.

Gemetchu, M. “Oromumma: Tradition, Consciousness and Identity.” eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 92-102.

Helland, J. “The Political Viability of Boorana Pastoralism.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires eds. P. T. W. Baxter, Jan Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 132-149.

Geleta K. Hirkoo: English-Afan Oromo-Amharic Dictionary. Aster Nega Publishing Enterprise, 2008.

Knutson, K. E. Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution Among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia. Gӧteborg: Etnografiska Museet, 1967.

Lambert, B. Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia: An Attempt to Understand. Berlin, 1990.

Leus, Ton. Aadaa Boraanaa: A Dictionary of Borana Culture. Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2006.

Loo, J. V. D. The Religious Practices of the Guji Oromo. Addis Ababa, 1991.

Raayyaa Horoo, Waaqeffannaa. Finfinnee, 2008.

Sumner, Claude, Oromo Wisdom Literature. Vol.1 Addis Ababa: Gudina Tumsa Foundation, 1995.

Yoseph Mulugeta, “The Role of Negritude in Restoring an Indigenous Gada Oromo Political Philosophy for ‘Good Governance’ in Ethiopia.” M. A. Thesis. The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, 2011.

——

* Yoseph Mulugeta Baba received his B.A; M.A; and Ph.D. degrees in Philosophy from the CUEA. His research areas include Metaphilosophy, Oromo Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Post-colonial African Political Philosophy, Postmodernism, and Ethiopian historiography. Currently, he is completing his forthcoming book (CUEA PRESS) — on ‘The Ilaa-fi-Ilaamee Philosophical Method of Enquiry.’ He can be reached at kankokunmalimaali@gmail.com.

 

 

 

The Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama

By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*
Part IV
In an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-philosophic-mode-of-thought, what identifies and determines the possibility or the tenability of an answer to the case in question is not a form of an interpretation that an individual employs, but the case in question itself. InGumii Gaayo, the tenability of the solution has nothing to do with the form of an interpretation that one offers. It is, rather, determined by what the problem at issue is. When Gumii meet every eight years and a long debate is held between hayyu — councilors and ya’a — assemblies, what becomes apparent first is not the proclamation of or the interpretation of the new laws. Nor, is it the resolving of whatever major conflicts could not be resolved at lower levels of their judicial organization. It is rather, the reality of various forms of questions that essentially arise from a life-crises in the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama, crises which every individual and the community have experienced with in different Gadaa classes.
The Gumii sees and discusses what the Gadaa has done for the country during the last eight years. The Gumii shows the right direction to the Gadaa, and whenever they are on wrong ways, it suggests ways of filling the gaps observed in the duties of the Gadaa. The Gumii deposes the Gadaa who misuses the power of the people; and Oromo is governed or administered by the laws formulated by human beings (the rule of law) in contrast to the divine or religious rules; and there is no more witness than the function of Gumii for this. ( Dirribi, 2011, p. 258)
As such, each interpretation and its understanding must be radically based on the reality of the class then in leadership which will last for eight years. Hence, the period of eight years provides horizonsthrough which individuals must echo the life-crisis that they have gone through and experienced.
In this manner, whenever competing interpretations arise, one can clearly identify as well as determine the tenable mode of interpretation to the problem at hand. It would thus be absurd to try to offer a tenable answer without a proper knowledge of what the case at issue is. Therefore, the philosophical thought that characterizes Gumii Gaayo can be subsumed under three claims:
  1. A tenable solution to any problem is determined by the case in question that comes to be identified during every Gadaa class of eight years.
  2. The mode of interpretation used for the problem at issue is a determinant of the tenability of a solution to a life-crisis in the jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama— ontological characteristic of human being.
  3. Ergo, it is not impossible for the latter claim to be unconditionally determined by the former claim, but not viceversa.
As I have argued above, Gumii is not the debater’s arena but a place for sober reflection. The main reason is that once the case in question is identified, there should be little room for the radical mode of thought. A radical mode of thought is a peculiar fallacy that inherently involves defending or refuting any form of a thesis on the grounds that it was the answer when one’s own method of enquiry was used. However, ‘x’ or ‘y’ does so without admitting that, wittingly or unwittingly, a correct thesis can only be arrived at by the case in question rather than a method of enquiry of one’s choosing. 
Therefore, the assumption that the case in question essentially determines any form of interpretation and its tenability is the crux of an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-philosophic-mode-thought. Consequently, the mode of reasoning and an individual’s very intention is neither to justify his/her interpretation nor to dismiss that of the others. Rather, it is to give a proper and tenable form of interpretation in accordance with the case in question. As such, an individual should arrive at two judgments: (a) a decision to successfully dismiss any radical mode of though; and (b) a decision to impartially identify a tenable solution to the problem at hand. In this manner, one can dismiss some pseudo-epistemological assumptions inherent not only in one’s interpretation, but also in that of others. Asmarom is thus quite right when he explicitly affirms the basic principles that underlie Gumii: “Do not look for the worst in what others have said in order to undermine their position and to win an argument; look for the best they have to offer, so as to find the common ground for the meeting of minds.” (Asmarom, 2000/2006, p. 213)
Hence, in an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-philosophic-mode-of-thought, the central issue is not to take a stand, but to properly understand the case in question. It is not to win an argument. Nor is it an art of getting one’s own way. Neither is it an arguing for a desired outcome so that others get out of one’s way without being challenged intellectually. Neither is it a way to place Others under one’s mental bondage by forcing them to accept one’s understanding of Reality. Nor is it seen as a positive value to hold onto a rigid approach to the last dying effort. In contradistinction, an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-mode-of-thought involves becoming aware of alternative solutions based on whatever the case at issue is. For in reality there is nosuch thing as a solution without a consideration of the case in question, just as there is not any form of question without pondering a given life crisis in jiruu-fi-jireenya-nama.
Here the question arises whether Heidegger was always original in his way of conceiving Dasein i.e.jiruu-fi-jireenyaa-nama. According to Heidegger, the Dasein is a distinctive being (Sein) compared with all other beings (Seiendes); i.e. it is a being (Seiendes) whose Being (Sein) not only has the determinative character of existence, but also is endowed with the privilege of understanding Being. (Heidegger, 1978, p. 32) To do indigenous thinkers/philosophers justice, we need to take a closer look at the fundamental distinction which characterizes the thought of Oromo philosophy’s of jireenya—existence. This is the distinction between jiruu-fi-jireenyaa-nama and jireenya. As I argued in my previous articles, in Oromo philosophical thought, it would be meaningless or absurd to identify human “existence” with that of the existence of other entities. Man’s very “existence” differs by virtue of his/her “activity”. In contradistinction to all other entities—jireenya—the very jiruu-fi-jireenyaa-nama is endowed with understanding and interpreting his/her “activity”. It is capable of understanding Reality (UumaaWaaqa,Saffu) as this manifested in the systematic knowledge of the “world”—Ilaa.
In a similar vein, it is capable of interpretingIlaamee—one’s understanding in the space-time world—Uumaa. The jiruu-fi-jireenyaa-nama manifests itself in its temporality and everydayness has to be interpreted—IlaameeIlaamee is always a process of understanding and then interpreting the Ilaa. This is crystal clear in Gumii Gaayo where the period of eight years (Gadaa) provides horizons through which individual echoes the life-crises s/he has gone through and experienced. Therefore, Heidegger’s conceptions of Dasein and hermeneutic phenomenology can hardly be original, in a thorough sense.
(to be continued)

Note: The responsibility for the article is entirely mine.

Galatoomaa!

References

  • Asmarom L. Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. New York: The Free Press, 1973.
  • ___________. Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System. Philadelphia, PA, RSP, 2000/2006.
  • Baxter, P. T. W., Hultin, J., and Triulzi, A. eds. Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and   Anthropological Enquires. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996.
  • Bassi, M. “Power’s Ambiguity or The Political Significance of Gada.” In Being and Becoming   Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires, eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 150-161.
  • Dahl, G. “Sources of Life and Identity.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires, eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 162-177.
  • Dirribi D. B. Oromo Wisdom In Black Civilization. Finfinnee: Finfinne Printing and Publishing S. C., 2011.
  • Gada M. Oromiya. Addis Ababa, 1985.
  • Gemetchu, M. “Oromumma: Tradition, Consciousness and Identity.” eds. P. T. W. Baxter, John Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 92-102.
  • Heidegger, M. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.
  • Helland, J. “The Political Viability of Boorana Pastoralism.” In Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquires eds. P. T. W. Baxter, Jan Hultin and Alessandro Triulzi. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1996, 132-149.
  • Geleta K. Hirkoo: English-Afan Oromo-Amharic Dictionary. Aster Nega Publishing Enterprise, 2008.
  • Knutson, K. E. Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution Among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia. Gӧteborg: Etnografiska Museet, 1967.
  • Lambert, B. Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia:  An Attempt to Understand. Berlin, 1990.
  • Leus, Ton. Aadaa Boraanaa: A Dictionary of Borana Culture. Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2006.
  • Loo, J. V. D. The Religious Practices of the Guji Oromo. Addis Ababa, 1991.
  • Raayyaa Horoo, Waaqeffannaa. Finfinnee, 2008.
  • Sumner, Claude, Oromo Wisdom Literature. Vol.1 Addis Ababa: Gudina Tumsa Foundation, 1995.
  • Yoseph Mulugeta, “The Role of Negritude in Restoring an Indigenous Gada Oromo Political Philosophy for ‘Good Governance’ in Ethiopia.” M. A. Thesis. The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, 2011.

yoseph_mulugeta_baba*Yoseph Mulugeta Baba received his B.A; M.A; and Ph.D degrees in Philosophy from the CUEA. His research areas include Metaphilosophy, Oromo Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Post-colonial African Political Philosophy, Postmodernism, and Ethiopian historiography. Currently, he is completing his forthcoming book (CUEA PRESS)—on The Ilaa-fi-Ilaamee Philosophical Method of Enquiry. He can be reached at kankokunmalimaali@gmail.com.