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Posted by OromianEconomist in Africa, Sham elections.
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???????????Zenawi the tyrant still rules after death


By Tsegaye R Ararssa*  in   ADDIS STANDARD


Part I
1 . Introduction
Election fever is gaining momentum in Ethiopia. It is ‘Election 2015’, the 5th general election since Ethiopia’s formal adoption of the more (or less) liberal constitution of 1995 that ended the hesitant ‘transition’ from the Derg’s military rule to a western-style representative democracy[1]. The projected aim of the transition was to liberalize and pluralize the politics, to reform and resuscitate the economy, to restructure the state (through democratization and decentralization), and to transform the hitherto tenuous state-society relations. Through the constitution, the regime provided itself the legal edifice on which to ensure that transitional project is attained and a liberal democracy (expressed through representative and participatory institutions) is formally instituted. In a gesture of transforming the state, the constitution recognized national diversity, legalized collective rights such as the right to self-determination[2], and institutionalized federal non-centralization. Having ostensibly demilitarized politics [3], electoral contestation became the formal mode of contending for political power. The election fever that is steadily gripping the nation now is the symptom of that contention.
Over the last few weeks, controversy has progressively raged over the politics and the logistics of the upcoming election. Decisions pertaining to recognition by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) of political parties with the ‘right’ leadership [4], registration of ‘qualified’ candidates [5], and ensuring the proper adherence to the relevant rules of constitutional, electoral, and political party registration laws have provoked a lot of ire among some of the parties seeking to partake in the election. Rulings over who is qualified as a candidate and which party is qualified as a contestant have unleashed a conversation over the process and speculations over the outcome of the election. In the first election debate conducted live on public television, the major ideological fault lines between the three major political parties were outlined. In the same week, we heard that some of the parties (such as the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum, alias Medrek in Amharic) were denied access to the state media (Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, EBC) on the pretext that the parties’ criticism of the media’s bias towards the incumbent is an attempt to undermine the impartiality of the media. Their petition to the NEBE has not found a response yet. Not entirely unexpectedly, tension has started to build up.
As anyone familiar with Ethiopia and its histories knows, the tension around elections is only symptomatic of deeper issues that have roots in—but never contained by—the political contestations of the past. In this piece, I offer a reflection on what election means to the various sectors of the population in the Ethiopian polity in the light of that past. I will thus reflect on what election means to the incumbent, the opposition political parties, and to the electorate, north and south. Along the way, I will also reflect on the mood in the context of which the election takes place. By drawing historical parallels between 2015 and 1915 (historical moments when two dead leaders—Meles Zenawi and Menelik II, respectively -rule from the grave in spite of the place holders whose genealogies make them unlikely successors, namely Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Emperor Eyasu II, alias Lij/Abeto Eyasu, respectively), I will point to the continuity in the nature of the State in which the election takes place, irrespective of the appearance of change. Lastly, I will offer my points on what is beyond winning and losing this particular election, and how it affects the nature of the Ethiopian state.
The starting point of this reflection is that election is a language. It is the new language one speaks in order to secure democratic legitimacy. Posited within the confines of liberal constitutionalism, it is a particular language with the idiom and vernacular of modern representative democracy. Whoever is proficient in this language technically ‘wins’ the election. In this piece, in a rather iterative manner, I reflect on the ‘facility’ or ‘proficiency’ of the contestants in this language within the context of Ethiopia in order to imagine what is beyond winning (or losing) this election.
The thrust of my argument is that there is much more work to do about the state than partaking in the motion of election. There is more to Ethiopia than mastering the language of election. I suggest that to EPRDF election is a mode of securing a technical legitimacy. To its adversaries, it is a mode of resistance to hegemonic oppression. Some of its adversaries resist its hegemonic position if only to replace it with their own. Others resist it and the State form it embodies and represents. For this latter group, the election is, more than anything else, a gesture of negating the status quo, it is a talking back to power, an utterance of societal pain long suppressed and contained. It is a way of sustaining a lamentation. It is yet another moment of reminding Ethiopia that all is not well. For the protagonists in this election saga, especially for the ruling EPRDF, the election is merely war by other means. As such, for EPRDF, it is a mode of entrenching its power by eliminating its opponents through the technology of election. Consequently, the election has little to do with the desired transformation of the state-society relations in Ethiopia.
As a result, I argue, there is little the election can do to tackle outstanding political issues that are contained in the unfinished business of state-building. In particular, there is little it can do to expand citizenship to the subject peoples of the wider South. EPRDF’s anti-democratic posture to disallow a political space where deeply political issues can be discussed (by reducing everything down to the technicalities of law and economic governance) is a proclamation of closure of politics by relegating the discussion to the realm of techniques. Election is thus reduced to a mode of enhancing what the French philosopher Michel Foucault calls ‘governmentality’, a technical-ideological apparatus of controlling and regulating the population by eliciting acquiescence in their own control and regulation. EPRDF’s adversaries, especially the north-central ethio-political class, also play their own role in this proclamation and enactment of closure of politics by aestheticizing a heavily contested political issue. As I shall argue in subsequent sections, they engage in exoticizing and aestheticizing an essentially political issue of the past and the future. They engage in a double movement that also politically demonizes – and excludes – the essentially political questions (such as the question of diversity [sameness and difference], historical political violence/injustice, misrecognition, inclusion-in-citizenship, and co-equal (re)founding of the polity. They thus aestheticize the inaugural violence by iconizing the leaders of the past through a raft of artistic products (images and lyrics, pictures and songs, etc) thereby rehabilitating them from the tyranny and oppression they represented, the tyranny and oppression they were once criticized for. At the same time, they demonize what could probably be the most important political question of modern Ethiopia—the question of diversity—by presenting it rather negatively as “politicized ethnicity.”
By so doing, i.e., by removing the important issues from the realm of the political to that of the aesthetic, they do their own bit of closing the political space for discussing the irreducibly political questions politically. The combined effect of these closures (by both groups)—born chiefly out of insecurity of EPRDF as a Government, only symptomatic of the greater insecurity of the ever more fragile Ethiopian State it runs, manages, and embodies—causes our judgement of the process and consequence of the election to be pessimistic. The insecurity of the ‘eternal kingdom’ assumed to have been established by Menelik, Haileselassie, and Mengistu; the insecurity born out of the incomplete nation-building project, prompts EPRDF’s opponents of the Amhara constituency to aspire for similar closure of the political space through aestheticization and exoticization of the infinitely political questions.
2. The Mood: Hope and Anticipation, or Angst and Despair?
Election is time-bound. Its temporality is its essence. The intensity or lack thereof is the function of its being limited in time. As a result, its process, outcome, and significance are dependent on the ‘political ecology’ of the time. It is dependent on what is ‘in the air’, what is troubling the polity, and what is exercising the large majority of the electorate. This is because election needs a particular kind of ‘democratic ambience’, as it were, a (more or less) festive atmosphere imbued with hope and anticipation (the subtext of which is fear and anxiety). Election has its own ‘mood’, sort of a national ‘political labor’. Understanding the mood – capturing the pulse of the polity in the electoral moment – helps us situate the election (the process, the result, and the context) in proper perspective. This underscores the supreme importance of a ‘right’ ‘political ecology’ that can engender hope (of winning) and of security (in the event of losing).
Hope and anxiety attend to all elections, the hope of winning and the angst of losing. However, in as much as possible, it is important that a proper balance is stricken between hope and fear, anticipation and despair. After all, the hope of renewal – the promise of exercising creative agency among the electorate – is an important ingredient of a healthy electoral democracy.
What attends Election 2015 in Ethiopia? Two areas of the public life of Ethiopia must be considered in order to map the electoral mood, namely the civic-political space for active citizens who can engage in politics on the one hand and the ‘nature’ of the state and its relation with the society on the other.
2.1 Civic-Political Space in Decline
The civic-political space has been a subject of controversy, especially since the 2005 election, the election that revealed not only the outer limits of the public sphere but also the foundational cracks in the State form in Ethiopia. In the wake of the 2005 election, the regime started to stiffen the rules of procedure in the parliament thereby limiting the discursive space even within the EPRDF-dominated parliament. That was followed by a raft of legislations on the civic/public space available for dissent, or its discursive and institutional articulation. These legislations constrained freedoms that are instrumental for, and constitutive of, democracy at a time. The Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation (Proclamation N0. 590/2008), the Anti-terrorism Proclamation (Proclamation No. 652/2009), and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (Proclamation No. 621.2009) were the three major legislative acts deployed by the Ethiopian government to (re)occupy the already limited space for political dissent and consequent pluralism. These laws, for all their preambular commitment to expand and implement constitutional right to freedom of expression, press and association rationalized and perfected the pre-existing streak noticed in the regime’s intolerance of expressed dissent. Self-censorship has become a way of being, a way of life, among journalists and other writers as a result. The prohibitive punishment/fines in the media and press laws and the expansion of the anti-terrorism law to press products (art 6 of Proc. 652/2009) [vi] have effectively muted an overt criticism. The extensive use of surveillance [vii], the blocking of several websites (perceived to be in opposition to the regime in power), jamming of other press/media outlets has contributed to the increasing undermining of the expression of robust dissent.
The challenge of financial self-sustenance faced by civil society organizations working on causes related to human rights, democracy, and conflict, among otbers, owing to the prohibition of external funding above the 10 % maximum has not only forced such bodies to close or re-organize themselves as purely humanitarian organizations or relocate themselves as foreign or ‘resident’ NGOs, it also severely limited their voice as an alternative articulation of socio-economic challenges of the people from the perspective of daily lived experience [viii]. The government increasingly became the only source of information on vital socio-economic and political issues of various sectors of the society.
The invocation of the anti-terrorism law for trivial reasons such as having a contact with foreign journalists, international non-governmental human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch), or foreign diplomats and embassies has effectively smothered people into watching their contacts and relationships. People feel that their relationships and exchanges (physical and electronic) are monitored. The invocation of the anti-terrorism law in relation to the Muslim activists protesting government intervention in religious affairs [ix]and the ‘Zone 9’ [x] bloggers and journalists jailed and currently standing trial has unveiled to us how the law can be strategically deployed against those the government perceives as opponents. This and other cases have shown the extent to which one can freely and peacefully express dissent without harassment, intimidation, and the terror of standing trial under the anti-terrorism law.

The pattern of government denial of the right of assembly and peaceful political demonstrations, especially when organized by political groupings perceived as fierce opponents of the regime (such as the Semayawi Party), selective permission of such meetings to factions of parties the government seeks to weaken (e.g. the faction within Unity for Democracy and Justice, UDJ), denial of meetings even within the premises of private organizations such as hotels to some groups (e.g. UDJ at the Imperial Hotel, 2009), the constant outlawing of meetings and demonstrations by unreasonably exploiting the “notification” duty under the Freedom of Assembly Proclamation (Proclamation No-3/1991) – where the duty to notify the municipality is interpreted as the duty to seek and secure prior permission – have all contributed to the practical stifling of freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration. Through this strategy – and the rhetoric of averting “street action” and “color revolutions” [xi] – the government has effectively silenced political protest to its decisions, policies, and laws. This in turn has weakened and subverted participatory democracy envisaged in the constitution (art 8(3)). In practice, such violation of the right to assembly and peaceful demonstration has been repeatedly witnessed in the Muslim protest to the government’s unconstitutional intervention in the choice of leadership of, and doctrines for, the Muslim population (since 2011).
Freedom of association of political parties has repeatedly been violated in the process of political party registration by the NEBE. The recent intervention by the NEBE to ‘recognize’ the leadership of factions within the UDJ and the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) is not only meddling with the internal issues of political parties, but also unconstitutionally limiting the freedom of association of members and their right to a choice of the leaders they deem fit to lead them.
Apart from this, one can say that there is a healthy ‘electoral climate’ only when – in addition to the right to vote and be elected – citizens have the right to administrative justice, i.e., the right of access to justice in a free, fair, and impartial court or tribunal, in the event that these rights are violated or threatened. The voter intimidation historically observed in the process of voter-registration by the kebeles (often suggesting possible deprivation of vital social and public services sought from local offices) are violative of the very basic political rights that are constitutive of the very essence of democratic practice. At times such intimidations tend to forget that their right to elect includes the freedom not to vote. They forget that in Ethiopia, voting is a right, not a duty.
The enhanced developmentalist gestures of the incumbent which views individual civil and political rights as less important in the face of the colossal “war on poverty”; the unabashed emphasis on growth (even in the Growth and Transformation Plan, GTP); its increasing turning away from its ‘original’ (1991) commitment to liberal policies (also charted out in the constitution); its continued neglect, or deliberate weakening, and strategic and manipulative use of democratic institutions (i.e., institutions of representation [House of Peoples’ Representatives, HPR, and House of Federation, HOF], empowerment [NEBE, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman], and of accountability and monitoring [e.g. the judiciary, Anti-corruption Commission, Auditor General] are not helping to create an environment conducive for a free and fair election. To that extent, there are complaints, grumblings, and disaffection among most of the opposition political actors who have a stake in the election. So, the rules and rulings around the process suggest that the mood is less than ideal. But a more complete account of the mood is revealed only when we examine the contradictions that come from the state form in Ethiopia. In the next sub-section [which will come in the form of a second instalment in this series of reflection around Elections 2015], I will turn to considering these contradictions that emanate from the state form and the constraints they impose on electoral democracy.


*Tsegaye R Ararssa is a Constitutional lawyer currently in the process of completing his PhD studies at the University of Melbourne Law School. He can be contacted at tsegayer@gmail.com.

[1] The Transitional Charter of July 1991 starts with recognition of the supreme importance of the UDHR, especially civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, association. It explicitly made assertions about the need for comprehensive restructuring of the state by ensuring equality and sovereignty of the ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples” of Ethiopia and by foregrounding the right to self-determination as an organizing principle. It was negotiated principally among ethno-national liberation fronts (most centrally TPLF, OLF, EPLF but also others) who referred to themselves as “the peace-loving forces of Ethiopia”. See, Provisional Government of Ethiopia, ‘Transitional Period Charter,’ Negarit Gazetta, Proclamation No. 1/1991.

[2] Art 39 (1-3) entitles every “nation, nationality, and people” to the right to political, cultural, and economic self-determination.

[3] EPRDF was quick to work on disarming the army of the Derg and the fighters of the other liberation fronts that negotiated the Transition with it. It also proclaimed its TPLF fighters to serve as the Ethiopian Defence Force of the transitional period. The demobilization of some of the soldiers came later after the formal inauguration of the FDRE as per the Constitution. It is interesting that the first government-like institution set up everywhere immediately after the arrival of EPRDF on the scene was the “Peace and Stability Committees”. Most meetings it held in its attempt to build rapport with the people was invariably called “Peace and Democracy Conference”. The people who negotiated the Transitional Charter referred to themselves as “the peace Loving Forces of Ethiopia.” There was a rhetoric that privileged peace even in the leaders’ speeches/interviews on why relinquish Ethiopia’s right/interest over Eritrea without a fight. The climactic moment in this series of peace-venerating rhetoric came when a line is inserted even in the preamble of the FDRE Constitution to the effect that the constitution-makers are “determined to consolidate, as a lasting legacy, the peace and the prospect of a democratic order…” This flourish in rhetoric never matched with reality. The fact that TPLF’s army became the State’s national army and substantially remained to be so to date indicates not only the partisan nature of the army but also the fundamentally militarized nature of EPRDF’s politics that keeps a politicized guerilla fighters for a national army. Obviously, the needed separation of politics from (military) force in a democracy is absent in Ethiopia.

[4]  The NEBE made a blunder around the election of the leadership of the All Ethiopian Unity p party (AEUP), the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ).

[5] Some candidates of parties such as the UDJ and Semayawi (notably its leader Engineer Getinet Yilikal) were excluded allegedly because of the overcrowding of candidates that are running for elections in one electoral district.

[vi] Art 6 entitled “Encouragement of terrorism” reads as follows: “Whoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism stipulated under article 3 of this proclamation is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.” This article has been almost routinely (ab) used to arrest persons who run photocopy shops both in Addis Ababa and other towns.

[vii] Claire Lauterbach, “Ethiopia expands surveillance capacity with German tech via Lebanon” (23 March 2015). https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node%2F546

[viii] The law on Charities and Societies limits the amount of foreign money that goes into the budget of an Ethiopian (activist) NGO to a maximum of 10 % of the total. The reason given is to limit an external influence on the local organization’s agenda of promoting human rights, democracy, peace and security, etc. In principle, the argument goes, these issues of governance are a matter under the sovereign jurisdiction of the government of Ethiopia and are not items to be shaped by financing external forces. In order to get more funding, one should be registered as a ‘resident’ or a foreign/international NGO who, if it seeks to work on issues of political governance (e.g. elections, democracy, human rights, conflict resolution, constitutionalism and rule of law, prisons, access to justice, minorities etc), should get a specific permission from the government. This has made it necessary for many of the NGOs to recast the focus of their work shifting mostly from human rights to humanitarian causes and their approach from human rights based approach (HRBA) to needs-based approach (NBA).

[ix] The Muslim activists have been protesting peacefully against the government’s interference in their religious affairs. They particularly called on the government to desist from assigning teachers and determining the content of the teachings to be delivered in Mosques. They also sought to exercise their right to select their own religious leaders without any influence by the government. After the arrest and indictment of the leaders of these protests (and those government claims are associated with them), the protestors continued to demonstrate demanding the release of their leaders. Their peaceful protest has been met by a series of violence, arrests, and various forms of intimidation by the government’s police and security forces. The arrested leaders have been tried for terrorism since. Their case has gone has been debated before regular and constitutional tribunals (CCI/HOF) and is even presented to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Muslim protestors relentlessly insisted on a peaceful resistance throughout; when they are unlawfully forced to face trial, they tried to exhaust all the possible legal remedies both national and international with a hope that the government will have no excuse in accusing them of any form of violence let alone terrorism. By so doing, they are in effect putting the entire system on trial.

[x] In March 2014, six bloggers (whose blog is known as Zone 9) and three journalists were suddenly arrested and are now being tried for terrorism.

[xi] The term “Color Revolution” is often mockingly used in Ethiopia to invoke the memory of the Rose Revolution (of Georgia) and Orange Revolution (of Ukraine) and deny their possibility in Ethiopia. It is also used by EPRDF to suggest that, unlike the regimes in Georgia and Ukraine, they are too strong to be unseated by such street actions and unarmed/civilian struggles


The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) & Medrek Continue Campaigns in Oromia, the South and Elsewhere Despite Harassment by Ethiopian TPLF Regime May 12, 2015

Posted by OromianEconomist in Africa, Ambo, Oromo News, Oromummaa, Sham elections.
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???????????Oromo Federalist Congress election campaign

Wayyaaneen Tarkaanfi Abdi Kutannaa itti fuftee

Caamsaa 12 bara 2015 yeroo 2ffaaf kadhimamaa KFO kan ta’e Ob. ‪#‎Geetuu‬ Dhaadhii kabnoota fi hidhatoota OPDOtin Aanaa Warra Jaarsoo ganda Bobee Liban keessatti odoo duula filannoo gaggeessaa jiru sa’atii 6:30 irratti reebicha sukkaneessaa irratti raawwatamee! Miseensota keenya 1 Ob Salamoon Jimaa 2 Ob Tufaa Hundee kan jedhamanis reebicha cimaa irraan gahaniiru ! Gochaa kana kan qindeesse immoo kaabnee opdo kan ta’e Ob Iyyaasuu Gammadaa ta’un isaa bubatameera ! Akka waliigalatti dulaa filannoo Aanaa kanatti gageessuu hin dandeenyee. Haalumaa wal fakkaatun, Garee KFO kan gara Wollaggaatti bobba’an ilaalchisee humni woraana Woyyaanee tarkaaffii humna irratti fudhachuudhaan midhaa irraan ga’uun himameet ture. Garee gara Wollaggaatti bobba’e kana keessa 1. Ittii aanaa dursaa dura taa’aa (the first vice chairman) Baqqalaa Garbaa 2. Itti-aanaa paartii Ob Mulaatuu Gammachuu 3. Barreessaa Liigii Dargaggootaa Darajjee Margaa fi 4. Gazeexessaa Badhaasaa Hayiluu kan keessatti argaman yeroo Naqamte dhaqqanan a) woraanni woyyaanee fi poolisoonni federaalaa magaala keessatti bobba’uudhaan akka uummanni wolgayii hin baane Daandii cufanis uummanni reebichaa isaanii osoo hin sodaatin cabsee wolgayiirratti baayyinnaan argame. B) uummanni baayyinnaan hirmaachuu barraan ammoo videon akka hin woraabbamne video gazeexessa Badhaasaa Hayiluurraa saamuudhaaf yaalanis kunis hin milkoofneef. KFOn kora ajaa’baa kan uummanni 40,000 ol itti hirmaate jedhamee tilmaamamu gaggeesse. C) jila KFO kanaaf siree akka hin kireessine ajaja dabarsanis barbaasaa yeroo dheeraa booda siree qabataniiran. D) Kanaan milkaawuu dadhabnaan ammoo dargaggoo Darajjee Margaa fi gazeexessaa Badhaasaa Hailuu bakka isaan siree qabatamatti deemuudhaan meeshaa woraanaa qabdu / meeshaa barbaanna sababa jedhuun daree isaan kireeffatan keessaa baasuudhaan sakattaa irratti gaggeessan. Garuu womaa hin arganne. E) Gochi sossodaachisaa Kun sabboontota keenna duubatti hin deebifne. Daran qabsoo DNF finiinsuudhaan Gimbiirrattille kora aja’ibaa gaggeessuun himameera.  Wayyaaneen hawaasaa Oromoo ofitti kaakafti malee qabsoo keenyaa duubatti hin deebiftu jedha KFOn. Isin hoo maal jettu? Source: Social media  network


Ummanni Aanaa Midaa Qanyii Godina Lixa Shaggar,Gita Bittuu Mootummaa TPLF Jalatti Hin Bullu Jechuun Gamtaan Diddaa Dahgeessisan,Barattooti Oromoo 7 Ol Ta’anis Mana Hidhaatti Darbamuu Qeerroon Gabaase

Gabaasa Qeerroo Aanaa Midhaa Qanyii

diddaa9Caamsaa 9,2015 Godina Lixa Shaggar Aanaa Midaa Qanyitti uummatni Oromoo gita bittaa mmootummaa Wayyaanee Abbaa irree EPRDF/TPLF/ jalatti hin bulluu jechuun mormii isa jabeesse, Mootummaan Wayyaanee Qeerroo barattoota Oromoo qabee hidhaatti darbuun dararuu itti fufe.
Goototni barattootni Oromoo Aanaa Midaa Qanyii M/B Baallammii sadarkaa 2ffaa fi qopha’ina Oromummaan yakkamanii wajjiraa Poolisii Aanaa Midaa qanyiitti humna poolisaan qabamanii darbamuun dararama jiraachuun walqabatee diddaan uummata qonnaan bultoota haalan jabachuun dabbaalloota wayyaanee EPRDF/TPLF/OPDO gandoota baadiyaa keessa adeemuun nu filadhaa jechuun maqaa filannoo kijibaan uummata afaan faajjeessuuf walga’ii garaagaraa uummata baasuuf karoorfatan, uummatni mormii guddaan jaladhabbachuun f irraa arii’achaa jira.

Uummatni Aanaa Midaa Qanyii ifatti wayyaaneedhaan isin nu hin bulchitan nuti isinitti hin bullu, uummata Oromoos OPDO’n bakka bu’uu hin dandeessuu, nuti bilisummaa fi dimookiraasii dhugaa barbaadna jechuun dabballoota OPDO of irraa arii’ate jira. Ergamtootni Wayyaanee diddaa uummataa nu mudachaa jiru kanaaf sababaan guddaan Qeerroo barattoota Oromooti jechuu barattoota Oromoo dararuu fi hidhatti darbuu itti fufte jiraachuun ibsame.

Haaluma kanaan Qeerroon barattootni Oromoo badii tokko malee yeroo amma kanatti hidhatti darbamuun dararama jiran:
1. Barataa Addunyaa Birhaanuu barataa kutaa 9ffaa
2. Barataa Boruu Badhoo
3. Barataa Fayisaa Badhoo
4. Barataa Guutaa Girshaa
5. Barataa kuubaa Taakkalaa
6. Barataa Taarikuu Gusoo
7. Barataa Haptamuu Haptaamuu Caalchisaakanneen keessatti argaman
yeroo ta’u. Barattooti kuniswajjira poolisii Aanaa Midaa qanyii Baallammiitti hidhamuu madden Qeerroo Baallammii irraa gabaasan. Ummatni Oromoo hidhaa fi ajjeechaa, barnoota irraa arii’atamuu fi Oromummaan yakkamuun dimookiraasii miti, Mootummaan maqaa dimookiraasii jedhuun lafa dimookiraasiin hin jirreetti mirga keenyaa ukkamsaa na filadhaa jechaa jiruu dhaabuun yakka dalagaa jiruuf seeratti nuuf dhiyaachuu qaba jechuun kaabinoota ergamtuu wayyaanee uummata goolaa jirtu gaaffiin mataa hadoochaa jirachuun ibsame jira.


The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC/Medrek) campaigning: Dambi Doolloo, Oromia, 12 May 2015.

Caamsaa 12 bara 2015, Magaalaani Dambi Dolloo‬ akka waan bakkalchii biliisummaa irrattii bateetti callaqqiftee cululuqaa ooltee. Angaasuu KFO abbaa quba shani waliin. Uummataa kana hundatuu magaala kana keessa jira jechuun namatti ulfaata. Dargaggoo, shamarran, jaarsa jaarti tokkichi manatti hin hafne. Dhadannoofi sirbaan deeggarsa  KFOf qaban ibsachuun diina Oromoo afaan qabachiisan. Akkasi ijoollee Dambi!
Viva Dambi Dolloo! Viva KFO!

OFC criss crossing Oromia ,  Dembi Doolloo,  11 May 2015

Aangawoonni Tika Mootummaa Wayyaanee(TPLF) Magaalaa Naqamtee Keessatti Walgahuun Akkaataa Uummata Oromoo Shiraan Miidhan Irratti Marihachuun Isaanii Saaxilame.

Caamsaa 11,2015 Gabaasa Qeerroo Naqamte

IMG_20150509_060148Wayyaaneen filmaata sobaa dhufutti uummati Oromoo narratti ka’a sodaa jedhuun kan baarage guyyaa har’aa Caamsaa 11,2015 sa’aatii saddeetii hanga kudhaniitti barattoonni Yuunivarsiitii Wallaggaa FDG narratti qindeessu sodaa jedhuun deeppoo magaalaa Naqamteetti argamu keessatti wal ga’ii caasaa basaastotaa geggeesse.

Qaamni Qeerroo caasaa mootummaa keessaa fi kan magaalaa Naqamtee icciitii fi ijoo marii tikoota Wayyaanee kana akka saaxiletti, namooti lama man maqaan isaanii Yohaannis Abebee fi  Beekkataa fi akkasumas barattoota keessaa basaasaa beekamaan Yuunibarsiitii Wallaggaa nama Tsaggaa Ashaabbir jedhamu ta’anii namooti shan waltajjicha kan geggeessan yeroo ta’u, walgahicha irratti kan akeekamee fi irratti mariyatamee kan murtaaye  ukkamsitooti fi humni federaalaa uuffata sivilii uffatee uummata basaasus magaalaa Naqamtee fi Yuuniversitiilee irra akka tamsa’u irratti ta’uu Qeerroon saaxilee jira.

Kanuma waliin kaayyoon ijoon biro naannoo Yuunivarsiitichatti walga’uus barattoota Mootummaa Wayyaanee TPLF irratti FDG kaasan ykn  falmaniin akkaataa itti adamsanii uummati Oromoo utuu hin dhaga’in barattoota ukkamsanii fi kanneen jajjaboon hawaasa magaalaatiin qunnamtii qaban hidhamuu qaban,kana malees yaada barattootaa qoranii ilaaluu fi FDG(Gaaffii Mirgaa) yeroo hunda tasgabbeessuu dadhabameef kallatti maddichaa qoranii ilaaluuf akka mariirra turaniif dhumarratti eegumsa guddaa naannoo dhaabbilee barnootaatti akka taasisan irratti waliigaluu waltajji kana Warren hirmaatan ibsaniiru.http://qeerroo.org/2015/05/11/aangawoonni-tika-mootummaa-wayyaaneetplf-magaalaa-naqamtee-keessatti-walgahuun-akkaataa-uummata-oromoo-shiraan-miidhan-irratti-marihachuun-isaanii-saaxilame/

The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC/Medrek) campaigning for the upcoming General Election (scheduled to be held on May 24, 2015) has continued in the State of Oromia. On Saturday, May 9, 2015, elder statesman Bulcha Demeksa and OFC Chairman Dr. Merera Gudina were in Naqamtee and Shashamane, respectively, to campaign for OFC with an unprecedented huge turnout at each location.

Naqamte Gadaa Otaa

OFC criss crossing Oromia ,  Naqamte,  9 May 2015OFC criss crossing Oromia ,  Naqamte,  9 May 2015

Shashe Town

OFC criss crossing Oromia ,  Shashe Town,  9 May 2015

OFC criss crossing Oromia ,  Shashe Town,  9 May 2015

Viva DodolaOFC criss crossing Oromia , Dodola,  May 2015

Over the last several weeks, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) has been criss-crossing Oromia to campaign for the upcoming General Election on May 24, 2015; despite intimidation and harassment of voters as well as candidates by the TPLF regime (as reported here: http://wp.me/p4JW8b-3d5), there has been a huge turnout at each campaign rally, including Ambo (as reported here: http://wp.me/p4JW8b-375)

Here are some photos from Adama (dated May 8, 2015), and Ginchi and Gedo from the last week.

UPDATED (May 9, 2015): The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC/Medrek) campaigning for the upcoming General Election (scheduled to be held on May 24, 2015) has continued in the State of Oromia. On Saturday, May 9, 2015, elder statesman Bulcha Demeksa and OFC Chairman Dr. Merera Gudina were in Naqamtee and Shashamane, respectively, to campaign for OFC with an unprecedented huge turnout at each location.

UPDATED (May 11, 2015): The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC/Medrek) campaign tour has continued in small and big towns in Oromia. Most recently, the campaign train made a stop at Dodola in central Oromia; yet again, the OFC rally drew a crowd of thousands of potential voters, who braved the constant harassment and intimidation of Ethiopia’s TPLF regime to express their solidarity with OFC/Medrek. It is to be noted that Dr. Beyene Petros of the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party (ESDP/Medrek) revealed once again the ongoing abuses by the TPLF regime on Medrek voters and candidates, as reported by OMN over the weekend: https://www.oromiamedia.org/2015/05/amharic-news-may-9-2015/

OFC criss crossing Oromia 1OFC criss crossing Oromia 1OFC criss crossing Oromia 1

OFC criss crossing Oromia , Adama 8 May 2015

Dr. Beyene Petros of the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party (ESDP)/Medrek speaks about the unprecedented levels of intimidation and harassment his organization’s candidates are facing ahead of the May 2015 General Election (April 2015)

Africa Rising: From Burkina Faso to Burundi, Africa’s Cheetah Generation rises against corrupt and failed rule. #TPLF. #Ethiopia May 12, 2015

Posted by OromianEconomist in Africa, Corruption in Africa, Dictatorship.
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The greatest crisis facing Africa is a leadership crisis in all areas of people activity.In terms of natural resources, Africa is the world’s richest continent. It has 50% of the world’s gold, most of the world’s diamonds and chromium, 90% of the cobalt, 40% of the world’s potential hydroelectric power, 65% of the manganese, millions of acres of untilled farmland, as well as other natural resources.   Yet, despite this vast resource the bulk of African people live as if they were citzens of deserts. Despite being home to millions of skilled and talented innovators, African leadership struggles to stimulate and retain it strongest resource — the people: They either live in unnecessary frustration, hopelessness and poverty, die of preventable disease, or run to the West to gain appreciation. The greatest crisis in Africa is not due to HIV, religion, or famine, or even war. Because all of those things are tied to leadership in some capacity. The failure to produce an African brand from the billions of tons of raw material Africa exports to the West, is primarily due to the Faustian, myopic, selfish, backward type of non-progressive leaders who are planted as candidates in post-colonial empires. Top traits are either naive, vision-less, proxy implants, opportunistic/parasitic and totally compromised.

– African Holocaust Society


“The Cheetah Generation refers to the new and angry generation of young African graduates and professionals, who look at African issues and problems from a totally different and unique perspective. They are dynamic, intellectually agile, and pragmatic. They may be the ‘restless generation’ but they are Africa’s new hope. They understand and stress transparency, accountability, human rights, and good governance. They also know that many of their current leaders are hopelessly corrupt and that their governments are contumaciously dysfunctional and commit flagitious human rights violations.” George Ayittey, the distingushed Ghanaian economist.
 From Burkina Faso to Burundi, jobless young Africans rise against corrupt and failed rule

Pauline Bax,  Bloomberg

TALL ORDER: An extra 450 million jobs need to be created in the next 20 years to match expansion in the number of working-age people in the region.
Young people without opportunities are getting angry all over Africa - and there are hundreds of millions of them. (Photo/AFP).

PROTESTS from Burkina Faso to Burundi have been sparked by youthful populations with little hope of employment and by leaders who have in some cases ruled for decades.

The discontent, which began in Burkina Faso in October, spread to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in January, and has now crossed the continent to Burundi, prompting regional leaders to call an emergency meeting after two weeks of protests and at least 14 deaths. Mass demonstrations in Burkina Faso ended Blaise Compaore’s 27 years in power.

“Underpinning a lot of these protests is anger about stalled development, rising food prices and cutting fuel subsidies,” Clive Gabay, an expert on African politics at the Queen Mary University of London, said. “You have this youthful, unemployed population that has been sidelined.”

While sub-Saharan Africa has grown faster than every region except developing Asia in the past 10 years, there aren’t enough jobs for the 1 billion people on the continent. An extra 450 million jobs need to be created in the next 20 years to match the expansion in the number of working-age people in the region, the International Monetary Fund said last month.

About 40% of people in Africa are under 15 years old, the most of any region, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The unemployment rate for people 15 to 25 years old living in Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, is three times higher than the rest of the working population, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB).

Rwanda President Paul Kagame has warned that the violence in neighbouring Burundi threatens stability in East Africa. Youth have led two weeks of protests to prevent President Pierre Nkurunziza from seeking a third term in office next month. The Constitutional Court approved his request, despite the opposition claiming it violates a 15-year-old peace agreement that sets a two-term limit.

Protest risk

The nations that will likely watch closely what happens in Burundi are those with elections scheduled in the next two years, Yolande Bouka, a researcher on conflict prevention at the Institute for Security Studies in Johannesburg, said. Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania and Uganda all have polls during that period.

There is “serious discontent with the type of governance offered by the leaders,” Bouka said. Given the large youth population and unemployment rate “it is not surprising that people take the street to address unresponsive government.”

Burundi ranks eighth-lowest on the United Nations Human Development Index, which measures indicators such as income, child mortality and education. Congo is second-to-last on the 190-member list.

“In many countries it’s a risky thing to go on a protest and you’re not going to risk getting arrested or shot unless there’s something real at stake,” Gabay said. “There’s something else that’s propelling people onto the street and for me they’re economic issues.”

https://magic.piktochart.com/embed/6055699-africa-bombUsing social media like Twitter and Facebook, young activists can mobilise faster than in years gone by and can collaborate across borders. The movements in Congo and Burkina Faso draw inspiration from Senegalese artists, who began protests in 2011 against power outages. The Senegalese movement was key in mobilising youth to vote President Abdoulaye Wade, who had ruled for 12 years, out of power a year later.

Demonstrations erupted in Congo in January when lawmakers tried to change electoral laws in a way that could have delayed elections. That would have extended the 14-year rule of President Joseph Kabila, who took over when his father was assassinated in 2001.

Congolese activists met with artists and musicians from Senegal and Burkina Faso in March. The police arrested them in the Congolese capital and accused them of “promoting violence.” Kabila, who faced criticism from Human Rights Watch, said he will not run for office next year.

Presidents for life

While there are countries in sub-Saharan Africa with leaders who have been in power for more than three decades, including Zimbabwe, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, political opposition there says they are suppressed.

Rwanda’s Kagame, who has been president since 2000, also hasn’t faced popular opposition as he says he is open to staying another term. Parliament is reviewing a petition signed by 2 million people who support changing the constitution to allow for a third term.

“African people are tired of presidents who aren’t delivering to their people and they’re tired of presidents who want to stay for life,” Thierry Vircoulon, Central Africa director for the International Crisis Group, said by phone. “There’s a sort of exasperation because governments aren’t delivering.”

-With assistance from David Malingha Doya in Nairobi and Michael J. Kavanagh in Kinshasa.


Viva Oromia: Oromo Students at St Could State University May 12, 2015

Posted by OromianEconomist in Africa, Meroetic Oromo, Viva Oromia.
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OOromia OromiaViva Oromia, Oromo Student at St Could State University