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In the two months since the historic Oromo Leadership Convention (OLC), held in Atlanta, Georgia, November 11 – 13, 2016, the situation in Oromia has deteriorated precipitately. The Ethiopian government has unleashed the full array and fury of its security forces against Oromos. Several thousand innocent citizens have been herded to military concentration camps, hundreds gunned down and numerous people subjected to enforced disappearances. Unable to cover the mounting expenses of enforcing the State of Emergency it promulgated on October 9, 2016, the regime has essentially legalized confiscation of private assets and looting by soldiers. Click here and read more at (www. oromoconvention.org)
At the end of 2016 Amnesty International published a report titled Ethiopia Offline: Evidence of Social Media Blocking and Internet Censorship in Ethiopia. This report documented how social media and networks in Addis Ababa and the Oromia region were being blocked by the Ethiopian government. Among the more alarming findings is that AI and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), who co-authored the report, detected the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology, which can be used to monitor and filter internet traffic. The Ethiopian government appears to be using the technology for “mass surveillance internet censorship.” The government’s actions constitute a violation of Ethiopia’s obligations to protect freedom of expression under the African Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and also drastically restricts access to information for the Ethiopian people.The internet crackdown is linked to a brutal crackdown by the government in response to protests that started in the Oromo region in November 2015 against the Addis Ababa City Integrated Development Master Plan. This led to nationwide protests following a stampede in Oromia region on October 2, 2016 that followed attacks on foreign and local businesses. In response to the attacks and the protests, the Ethiopian government declared a State of Emergency (SOE) on October 9, 2016. The government declared that under the SOE they could “restrict freedom of expression where such freedom is abused”, and imposed a wide range of restrictions on internet access. The government also arrested more than 11,000 people charging them with “violence and property damage.”
Based on the standards of the ICCPR, the State of Emergency in Ethiopia has resulted in many derogations that fail to meet international human rights law. For example, the Ethiopian government established a Command Post whose purpose was to “stop any media, prohibit any assembly and search and seize any person or place.” Under the SOE, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter were either blocked or inaccessible in Ethiopia, especially in the Oromia region. Further, certain types of URLs were blocked, including news media, web pages of political opposition, LGBTI, calling for freedom of expression, and circumvention tools such as Tor and Psiphon.
The Ethiopian government continues to misuse the Anti-terrorism Proclamation (ATP) legislation to charge and arrest people critical of government policies or actions. Amnesty International believes that “the acts of censorship, conducted outside a clear legal framework, over several months and affecting dozens of websites and social media platforms as well as the State of Emergency itself – which is so broadly drafted violates Ethiopia’s international legal obligations and permits violations of numerous human rights.”
These violations include the arrest of a number of government critics such as Bekele Gerba, a leading Oromo human rights activist, Eskinder Nega a prominent journalist and a human rights defender. Who was sentenced to 18 years in jail after he wrote articles demanding freedom of expression and an end to torture in Ethiopia.. Yonatan Tesfaye, a prominent opposition figure facing a possible death sentence due to his Facebook post opposing a government plan to extend the capital’s administrative authority to the Oromia region and Merera Gudina, a human rights activist and leader in the Oromo community.
An untold number of Ethiopians are subject to human rights violations as a result of the State of Emergency, the Anti-terrorism Proclamation and other legislation that the government is using to impose order, and, according to the government, restore peace and security.
As 2017 begins however, the government of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn will face very stark truths. In can continue down the current path of increasing repression, and jail anyone who it considers unacceptable, creating a nationwide detention camp, or
it can display the leadership the country needs by ending the State of Emergency, allowing an independent commission of inquiry into the protests that have shaken the country for the last two years, repeal the draconian laws it created to silence opposition, and release the scores of prisoners that it will need to talk to and work with to address the governance and human rights challenges the country is facing.
Mr Mohamed Ademo, editor of the OPride news platform, shares his perspective on the importance of the mobilization of Oromo youth, or the “Qubee generation”, as he prefers to call it. Over the past year, Olympic athlete Feyisa Lilesa has been an important example of this generation, but he does not stand alone. Members of the Qubee generation were the first able to study in their native language and therefore developed a strong and resilient sense of identity. In the context of the state of emergency which turned Ethiopia into “a violent, repressive surveillance society” over the course of 2016, it is important to support and enable this generation of young Oromos to keep faith in the face of repression.
Mohammed Ademo, an Ethiopian journalist and editor of the OPride news platform, had a difficult time choosing the 2016 Oromo Person of the Year. In fact, Ademo admits in his end-of-year essay that he originally planned to write about Olympic athlete Feyisa Lilesa’s courage, and how Feyisa’s protest at the Olympic Games made visible the oppression of Oromo people that the world didn’t yet know it ignored.
Feyisa made the year-end lists of changemakers at Foreign Policy, Deutsche Welle and Huffington Post, Ademo wrote. But the more the Washington-based journalist thought about it, the more he realized that Feyisa is emblematic of a more powerful cultural shift. Feyisa represents an entire generation of young Oromo in Ethiopia – the Qubee, who were the first Oromo permitted to learn in their native language and thus described by an alphabetical feature associated with Afaan Oromo.
Essentially, they’re Oromo millennials.
“The Qubee generation appears ready to fight on until, in the words of Oromo leader Bekele Gerba, either all Oromos are jailed, killed and exiled, or until everyone is free,” Ademo writes. Even as Bekele Gerba, Merera Gudina and others remain imprisoned, the youth represent inevitable change.
Yet that change is coming at a cost that should shame the Ethiopian government as it strangles its own future under a violent, repressive surveillance society – and shame international leaders for their complicity. Because the Oromo are Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, numbering more than 35 million, and one that has historically felt marginalized and severely discriminated against by successive governments. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has held power for decades and has awarded power to elites from the minority Tigrayan ethnic group.
Last month, Human Rights Watch (HRW) praised the release of 9,800 prisoners participating in anti-government protests, many of them in the Oromia region. But they remain less than half of the 24,000 people who have been detained since Ethiopia announced a state of emergency in October. That decision followed the Irreecha massacre, in which the Oromo Federalist Congress puts the death toll at nearly 700, a number wildly at odds with official counts of just 52. OFC leader Mualtu Gemechu says there were up to 70,000 people who had been detained in recent months, not necessarily all Oromo protesters.
Their youth is emphasized in the December HRW report, which describes the harrowing experience of a 16-year-old girl from Hararghe whose father was killed, her brothers imprisoned and other family members disabled. She was banned from school after the military found a protest song, one of many recorded by Oromo’s young generation, on her mobile phone.
The Ethiopian teen told HRW that security agents went through her community “arresting every young person they could find,” and she refuses to return until the violence stops and the Oromo are heard.
“Many other young people have told me the same thing,” writes Felix Horne, author of the HRW report.
To say “young Ethiopians” is almost redundant, because one third of the population is under 25 years old. In 2014, almost half of all Ethiopians – 45 percent – were less than 15 years old. So it’s not that a new generation of Oromo don’t know the history or the sacrifices made by their elders, especially those active in organized political resistance that’s designed specifically for them. The reality is that they know that history all too well, and in an era of connectivity and engagement, they demand a different future.
Ethiopia is, in theory, governed under autonomous regional authorities aligned with ethnicity and historical homelands, although in practice that governance and self-determination are rarely true for some groups, including the Oromo. Although they are the largest ethnic group, and along with the Amhara account for a 60 percent majority among Ethiopia’s 100 million people, both groups are ruled by a coalition that’s dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
Through the Tigray minority, that Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition has retained power for decades that have seen Oromo excluded from opportunity in government, the economy and other avenues. Protests that began in November 2015 over land annexation in Addis Ababa, plans that would adversely affect Oromo interests, reflected decades of anger and frustration.
The leader of an Ethiopian Somali rebel group, Abdirahman Mahdi of Ogaden National Liberation Front, warned last May that tensions were about to boil over in the manner of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings – and his assessment was accurate. Yet Ethiopian officials rarely pay more than lip service to promises of change.
This week, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn again professed his support for “deep reforms” in government and society that he believes will be successful through public participation. His words are as hollow as those of Western leaders who profess their concern for Ethiopian human rights and the democratic process, while failing to insist that any reforms be implemented. That’s especially true of the United States and the need to protect an Ethiopian ally in combatting terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
While Hailemariam speaks of public engagement, the detentions continue and the disappearances remain unexplained. The trials and lengthy sentences of high-profile journalists, political activists and opposition leaders make more headlines. The draconian control of media and independent reporting has yet to see its well-deserved demise. Ethiopia’s promises are broken, but the world now sees the Oromo, whether through media outlets based in the diaspora like Ademo’s, or thanks to solidarity protests in Europe and America.
What Ethiopian officials must accept – and the world must ensure – is that in this young nation, this race toward freedom and equality is not a sprint but a marathon. Feyisa Lilesa understands this well, but he is not running alone. The Qubee generation runs behind and beyond him, and they will not be deterred.
Emergency fails to protect regime from biggest threat to 26-year grip on power
The Ethiopian regime has acted on its threat to crush any threat to its economic model.
Six soldiers burst into Beckham’s dormitory at Gondar university in northern Ethiopiaone evening without pausing to question the student.
“They grabbed me and beat me so hard, I’d have preferred it if they had killed me,” the undergraduate says of the November raid.
Beckham’s crime was to share with the world, via a diaspora network, how 104 other Ethiopian students had been detained for complaining about conditions on campus.
Despite the beating, the smiling Ethiopian, who is studying applied science, considers himself lucky because he is still alive.
Beckham was held in a police station rather than a military camp, unlike many of the tens of thousands of people detained under a state of emergency imposed last October to contain anti-government protests.
“After a few weeks the police let me go. They seemed to sympathise with our cause,” says Beckham, who asked to use the name of his favourite footballer for fear of reprisals.
Beckham is among hundreds of thousands who joined protests over the past two years in the biggest threat to the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Frontsince it seized power 26 years ago. The autocratic government has responded with force, sending troops and police to break up protests, in which more than 500 people have been killed, imposing the state of emergency and rounding up tens of thousands.
It has vowed to crush any threat to its economic model, which has been lauded by development experts and helped lure billions of dollars to one of Africa’s best-performing economies. Yet the protests have underlined the fragility of the economic success. They spread from Oromia region in the centre to the northern highlands around Gondar, for generations the seat of imperial power, drawing in Ethiopia’s biggest ethnic groups, the Oromo and Amhara.
Human rights groups, domestic and foreign, have documented repeated and widespread abuses by the security forces. They also reported increasing use of violence by the opposition, particularly before the emergency was imposed.
Protesters’ grievances include a lack of democracy, repressive rule, limited job opportunities and the dominance of the Tigrayan ethnic group, which accounts for 6 per cent of the population, in the state and ruling coalition.
“We have no freedom and no prospects unless we join a party in the EPRDF,” Beckham says. “We need change and so we have to fight for it however we can.”
Raised in the city of Ambo, 120km west of Addis Ababa in Oromia, Beckham, who is in his 20s, has experienced the manner in which the EPRDF crushes dissent.
The unrest began in early 2014 when the government announced it wanted to extend the capital Addis Ababa into Oromia. Locals considered it a land grab and protested.
“In Ambo 72 people were killed on one day,” Beckham says of a demonstration in April 2014. “I was there and saw them shot [by soldiers].”
The authorities say the highest number of fatalities in Ambo on any day during that period was eight.
Stung by the level of anger, the government offered to negotiate with the Oromo over the Addis Ababa master plan. No deal was reached and 18 months later, in November 2015, protesters took to the streets again.
Beckham was then studying in Gondar, 730km north of Addis Ababa, but rushed back to Ambo after his 16-year-old brother was killed by soldiers in one of the first protests.
“He had been shot once in the heart and hit on the head with a stick,” he says. “It was difficult to identify if it was him or someone else because he was beaten so badly.”
The capital expansion was scrapped but the protests morphed into a wider anti-government movement and spread north.
A further source of discontent was the annexation of Welkait, once part of Amhara, into Tigray more than two decades ago. Protests flared in Gondar in July after Tigrayan police tried to arrest Demeke Zewdu, a former colonel and leader of the self-styled Welkait Committee, which has agitated for the area’s return to Amhara.
“About 300,000 people took to the streets of Gondar when they tried to arrest Colonel Demeke and everything went from there,” says a university lecturer who asked to be called Sufi Seid. “For about 20 days shops did not open as a sign of protest and demonstrations continued.”
“In Gondar and a couple of other towns that I know of about 120 people were killed and many many were arrested,” says a café owner.
Hailemariam Desalegn, the prime minister, said in November the death toll since November 2015 might be 500. His ministers admit that more than 20,000 have been detained. Activists say those are huge underestimates.
The emergency has brought a semblance of calm to Gondar, although grenade blasts rocked two hotels last month and violence has been reported in nearby towns.
“The protests have not gone away. People are just waiting because they don’t want to get into trouble,” Beckham says. “And nothing is being done to address the roots of the problem. So some people are now fighting back with weapons.”
Ethiopia is 12 months in to a political crisis which has seen at least 1,000 people killed. But unless the government introduces significant reforms, it will get worse.
An unprecedented wave of protests has shaken Ethiopia since November 2015. These protests have revealed the fragility of the social contract regulating Ethiopia’s political life since 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg and assumed power. This tacit agreement between the ruling coalition and the Ethiopian people offered state-sponsored development in exchange for limited political liberalisation. After twenty-five years of EPRDF rule, frustrated with widespread corruption, a political system increasingly perceived as unjust and the unequal gains of economic development, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians have now descended into the streets, triggering a violent reaction from the state.
As we enter the twelfth month of the uprising, violence shows no sign of decreasing in Ethiopia. In its efforts to put down unrest, the government has allowed the security forces to use lethal violence against the protesters. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, more than one thousand people are estimated to have died as a result of violent state repression since last November. Thousands of people, including prominent opposition leaders and journalists, have been arrested and are currently detained in prison.
International concern
International institutions and non-governmental organisations have expressed major concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. The UN Human Rights Council called for “international, independent, thorough, impartial and transparent investigations” over the repression in Ethiopia, a request that was swiftly rejected by the government. Ethiopia’s Information Minister instead blamed “foreign elements” linked with the Egyptian and the Eritrean political establishments for instigating the rebellion and arming the opposition.
Rather than stifling dissent, state repression has contributed to escalating protests. Violent riots have increased after the events in Bishoftu on October 2, when a stampede caused by police firing on a protesting crowd killed at least 55 people. In the following days, demonstrators have vandalised factories and flower farms – including many under foreign ownership – accused of profiting from the government’s contested development agenda. An American researcher also died when her vehicle came under attack near Addis Ababa. Although protesters have largely remained peaceful and resorted to non-violent tactics, these episodes of violence raise concerns over escalating trends in the protest movement.
This map shows the number of reported fatalities in Ethiopia, November 2015 – October 2016. Image credit: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.
Unrest and repression
The geography of unrest is also telling of the evolving protest cycle in Ethiopia. The protests originated last November in the Oromia region, where the local population mobilised to oppose a government-backed developmental plan which would displace many farmers. The Oromo people, who constitute Ethiopia’s single largest ethnic group, accuse the EPRDF of discriminating against their community, and its local ally, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO), as being a puppet in the hands of the Tigray-dominated ruling coalition.
Until mid-July, the unrest had largely remained confined to Oromia’s towns and villages. Local tensions around the northern city of Gondar inaugurated a new round of protests in the Amhara region, where regionalist demands joined the widespread discontent with state repression. In the following weeks, protests spread further into the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’, the native region of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, as local communities began to stage anti-government protests. Episodes of communal violence and attacks against churches have been reported in Oromia as well as in other ethnically mixed areas of the country.
Despite increasing dissent, the government seems unwilling to mitigate its repressive measures. Internet access was allegedly shut down in an attempt to hamper the protest movement, which uses online media and social networks to disseminate anti-government information. On October 9, the government introduced a six-month state of emergency, the first time since the ruling EPRDF came to power in 1991. At least 1,600 people are reported to have been detained since the state of emergency was declared, while the Addis Standard, a newspaper critical of the government, was forced to stop publications due to the new restrictions on the press.
Polarised politics: government and opposition
These decisions notwithstanding, it is unclear how the EPRDF can manage to restore the government’s authority and preserve investor confidence by adopting measures that continue to feed resistance. After pressure from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Hailemariam pledged to reform Ethiopia’s electoral system, which currently allows the EPRDF to control 500 of the 547 seats in Parliament. These limited political concessions are unlikely to satisfy the protesters’ demand for immediate and substantial change, since the proposed reform would only produce effects after the 2020 general elections.
According to the opposition, this is the evidence that the Tigray minority, which dominates the upper echelons of the government and the security apparatus, is unwilling to make any significant concessions in the short term. By labelling the opposition’s demands as racist and even denying their domestic nature, the government is leaving little room for negotiation and compromise and risks contributing to the escalation of the protests.
For over a decade, Ethiopia has been one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Foreign investments – most notably from China – have funded large-scale infrastructure projects, including the recently inaugurated railway to the port of Djibouti.
The on-going unrest is likely to have a negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy, reducing the country’s considerable appeal among foreign investors and tourists. The demonstrations have revealed the growing discontent of the Ethiopian people, and especially of its disenfranchised youth, over the EPRDF’s authoritarian and unequal rule. The EPRDF therefore needs to implement far-reaching reforms and embrace dialogue with the opposition to prevent the current unrest from deteriorating.
Andrea Carboni is a Research Analyst at ACLED and PhD student at Sussex University.
This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of TransConflict.
In his interview with VOA, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tom Malinowski discussed the current Ethiopian situation and his concerns regarding human right protection. He said, “It’s a very difficult situation. The country is under a state of emergency, and a state of emergency by definition means that certain rights are suspended. Due process is suspended. And however much the government may feel that the state of emergency has brought calm temporarily to the country, it also brings with it certain risks. It risks adding a new layer of grievances to those grievances that initially led people in Oromia and Amhara to come out onto the streets. At first they were concerned about land seizures and lack of jobs and representation, all of which the government has acknowledge to be real and legitimate. But now they’re also upset about the arrests and the violence. And the longer this continues, the more those grievances are likely to build. At the same time, it risks giving greater power to the security apparatus in a way that could delay the introduction of the reforms that the Prime Minister and the government have, to their great credit, said are necessary.” Listen the first part of VOA interview at: http://bit.ly/2h3kmYO https://www.facebook.com/us.emb.addisababa/posts/1372399152802454
An Ethiopian government directive under a state of emergency contains overly broad and vague provisions that risk triggering a human rights crisis, Human Rights Watch said in a legal analysis. The government should promptly repeal or revise all elements of the directive that are contrary to international law. 31 October 2016.
“Internet mobile irrati fayadamuuf mali argameera… akkas agodhani qeeroon Setting..more network….mobile network… access network name…. harka mirgara + kan jedhu tuqu… name kanjedhu … et.wap… APN… et.wap…. proxy…10.204.189.211… port…9028…. authentication… PAP or CHAP kan jedhu guutu… kana booda qeerroon mirgaan galte Mobile jam Tplf irraa hanu… sanan fayadama jira amaan kana.” #OromoRevolution.
For those following the Feyisa Lilesa and #OromoProtests in Ethiopia: Sifan Hassan on his demonstration – “He’s my hero.”
#OromoProtests against TPLF (Liyyu Police) genocide in Eastern Oromia Mayyuu Mulluqee, 20 January 2017.
#OromoProtests during the Dubai Marathon January 19, 2017, Oromo nationals Tamirat Tola and Warqinesh Degefa are the winners in men’s and women’s races.
#OromoProtests, Arsi, Roobee, Oromia, 20 January 2016
In a rare undated photo taken from an Ethiopian prison compound, Mr. Bekele Gerba, the Oromo Prisoner of Conscience, is shown in a yellow prison jumpsuit with his characteristic calm yet resolute demeanor. He was arrested by the Ethiopian government nearly a year ago on December 23, 2015. At the time of his arrest, he was the Deputy Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), whose prominent top leadership, including its Chairman Dr. Merera Gudina, has been put into prison over the last year and half since the onset of the second waves of the Oromo Protests in November 2015. The OFC leadership has been accused, by the Ethiopian authorities, of igniting and leading the nonviolent Oromo Protests, which the authorities have labelled as “terrorist” actions. With Dr. Merera Gudina and Mr. Bekele Gerba, thousands of Oromo young and old citizens (including recording artists) are imprisoned for participating in and/or sympathizing with the Oromo Protests; several thousand others, including the victims of the Bishoftu Irreecha Massacre of October 2, 2016, have been extrajudicially murdered by the government. These abuses of the human rights and the human dignity of the Oromo person continue unabated inside and outside the prison camps in Oromia and Ethiopia. -Source: Amajjii/January 5, 2017 · Finfinne Tribune | Gadaa.com |
Amajjii 2 Bara 2017: Odeeffannoo Walloo kan dabalataa
“kan du.e ergamaa WoyyaneMahammadAlii jedhama kan madaa’e HasanBoru jedhama anaa harxummaa fursee bulshaa ganda raasati. Kan qeerroo keesa madaa’e shafii yasin jedhama.”
Amajjii 1 Bara 2017: Dhaamsa Gindabarat, laga Mogor irraa dhufe:
“Lola Kaleessaafi har’a Godina Shawaa Lixaa Aanaa Gindabar naannoo laga Mogor keessatti godhameen gara keenyaan Qeerroon lama yoo wareegaman gara Agaazii reeffa 6 agarree jira. Qabsoon hamma bilisummaatti itti fufa. Waan dandeessaniin nu bira dhaabbadhaa!!”
ETHIOPIA HAS BEEN in lockdown for months. There has been a state of emergency declared and there is little news coming in and out of the country. Social media and the internet have been outlawed, religious and cultural events banned, curfews imposed. Thousands of soldiers are roaming the streets.
It escalated after security services started killing people at the annual Irreechaa festival for the Oromos in Bishoftu in October 2016 This thanksgiving celebration of the Oromos is attended by millions from across Ethiopia and the diaspora. They wear traditional clothes and sing songs of resistance. As Ethiopia declares a state of emergency, Ismail Einashe explains some of the history to the current situation
For Oromos, Irreechaa is their most significant cultural event, and even though they are evenly split between Christians and Muslims, they all share ties to the original Oromo faith, Waaqefanna.
But at this year’s festival there was a stampede and attack by the Ethiopian police. The numbers killed are disputed – the government said 52 were killed, but activists from the Oromo Federalist Congress claim 678 people died.
And since pictures of the festival goers who were killed were published internationally, the state has shut down all access to the outside world. Behind the tragedy at Irreechaa is a long history of the Ethiopian state repressing Oromos, said Dr Awol Kassim Allo, an Ethiopian lecturer at the UK’s Keele University. “What is going on now in Oromia is a massacre in the name of emergency, terrorising civilian populations to force them into capitulation,” he said.
What is going on now in Oromia is a massacre in the name of emergency, terrorising civilian populations
He added: “The massacre at Irreechaa occurred before the state of emergency, although Ethiopia has always been under a state of emergency, the official declaration of emergency was a conclusive evidence that the state was losing control and that a large segment of the society has rejected the government’s authority to govern”.
Celebrating their traditions and wearing traditional dress, as the Oromos were doing at Irreechaa, has historically been part of the resistance to the government in Ethiopia, according to Mohammed Ademo, founder and editor of OPride.com, a multimedia news site focused on Ethiopia’s Oromo community, and now based in the USA.
Recently, many Oromos have begun to eschew Western attire completely and wear Oromo clothes. Oromo clothing has been more visible on the streets. This way of dressing is becoming a cornerstone of their identity and self- expression.
Traditional Oromo clothes consist of woya for men, which are toga-like robes, usually white, and a skirt called a wandabo for women. Oromo women also wear qollo and sadetta, cotton cloths traditionally hand-spun and hand-woven, and sometimes other garments are worn such as leather or animal skin robes.
On Facebook there are numerous groups now dedicated to dissecting the latest fashion styles of Oromo dress and there are popular style blogs that enjoy a huge following. Latest pop hits by Oromo artists heavily feature Oromo clothes – along with dances.
Peri Klemm, a professor in African history of art at the University of California at San Diego and expert on Oromo dress, said: “At times when identity is threatened, dress, particularly that of Oromo women who have always been the carriers of culture, becomes a way in which the Oromo maintain a sense of who they are.”
It is well known that areas in eastern and southern Oromia are already hit by drought and weakened. The people are deprived of water and food by the government and there is no adequate humanitarian assistance in the region. Using this opportunity, the paramilitary forces of the fascist Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) regime, Agazi and Liyu Police, are deployed alongside the border of Oromia and Ogaden region committing massacres. In the past four weeks alone, the Liyu Police slaughtered more than 200 innocent Oromo people. These paramilitary forces are engaged in ethnic cleansing through armed attacks against unarmed Oromo civilians, women and children. The barbaric Agazi and Liyu Police are burning down villages, displacing thousands of people from their ancestral land, and carry out pillage in several districts of Oromia, for instance Qumbii, Cinaaksan, Gursum, Mayyuu Mulluqqee, Miidhagaa Lolaa, Odaa Diimaa, and Hara Funaanni. It is to be remembered that, since 2008, the Liyu Police have committed similar massacres in villages in Hararge province of eastern Oromia repeatedly. These are undertaken by the Somali regional state Liyu Police under the Tigrayan fascist regime’s direction and instruction. The Liyu Police has been committing attacks on civilians in several villages in Ogaden region itself. The TPLF, spearheaded by the Liyu Police, had already committed genocide in Ogaden region, which is well documented by international human rights groups, including Genocide Watch. Now, the TPLF has unleashed the abusive force on Oromia with the pretext of the state of emergency it declared to crash a peaceful protest.
The newly re-elected Chairman of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Mr. Galasa Dilbo, addressed the Oromo nation in a statement issued upon the New Year 2017.
ADDA BILISUMMAA OROMOO
OROMO LIBERATION FRONT
2017 New Year Message from OLF Chairman Galasa Dilbo
Comrades and Compatriots,
Happy new year to you all! I hope you will celebrate the start of 2017 in good spirit with comrades, family and friends. As the new year is approaching, it is good to look ahead and think about what this year may bring us.
But, first a quick look back. 2016 was quite a year for all of us. We have been through many challenges; and the circumstances being most unfavourable for our nation. As the year ushered in, Oromia was in the midst of popular uprising spearheaded by our gallant youth. As the year progressed, our countrymen and women joined the peaceful resistance against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) occupying forces in masses in every part of our country. The response of the TPLF was brutal culminating in the October 2, 2016 massacre at the Irrechaa celebration in Bishoftu.
Addis Abeba, Jan. 18/2017 – When Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn indicated last week that a draft law was prepared on the “special interest” of Oromia in Finfinnee (aka Addis Abeba), discussions have resurfaced on the issue of the status of the city and its relations with Oromia. Last week, I had the privilege of discussing the matter in a couple of radio interviews where, inter alia, I was asked what the content of the special interest is, what I anticipate the content of the draft law will be, and whether passing the law would address the concerns raised in the Oromo protests that has rocked the country for over two years now. What follows is a set of reflections on some of these issues.[1]
This announcement about the draft being prepared on the ‘special interest’ comes at a time when the country is under a state of emergency the end of which is indefinite even according to the Prime Minister.[2] The announcement comes at a time when, in the wake of the Oromo protests against the Master Plan, at least over 700 people are killed by the regime and thousands more are injured. In particular, it comes after key Oromo political leaders—such as Bekele Gerba and Dr Merera Gudina–and tens of thousands of protestors have been sent to jail and military detention centers, respectively, for demanding the right to ownership of their Oromo land including Addis Abeba. The announcement comes at a time when the Oromia and Amhara regions are chiefly being administered by the Command Post in charge of implementing the state of emergency law. The Master Plan, which was once said to be repealed, is reportedly being implemented within Addis Abeba. The boundary between the city and its Oromo suburbs that are still within the administrative jurisdiction of Oromia is not delimited. The repression of all forms of dissent continues. This immediate political context is not without a precedent. In fact, one can say that it is only the continuation of a long-drawn historical context.
Before the advent of Art 49(5)…
Historically, it is now a well-known fact that the notion of Oromia’s ‘Special Interest’ entered the Ethiopian legal universe in 1992 through the instrumentality of the Proclamation that established National/Regional Self Governments (Proclamation No. 7/ 1992). This is the proclamation that set the blue-print for what came later to be the constituent units of the Ethiopian Federation. Adopted to give effect to the decentralization that was envisaged in the Transitional Charter – and to valorize the right of ethno-national groups to self-determination – it established 14 self-governing national regions. Accordingly, Oromia became one of the 14 self-governing States. Addis Abeba, like the City of Harar, was also a region in its own right. Oromia’s ‘special interest’ over both cities was first recognized in this piece of legislation (1).In Article 3 (4), it is provided that:
“The special interest and political right of the Oromo over Region Thirteen [Harari] and Region Fourteen [Addis Abeba] are reserved. These Regions shall be accountable to the Central Transitional Government and the relations of these Self-Governments with the Central Transitional Government shall be prescribed in detail by a special law.”
Very much like the provision in Art 49 (5) of the Constitution that came later, it envisaged a ‘special law’ (meant to clarify the relation of accountability to the Central Government), but such a law was never promulgated. It is interesting to observe that, unlike in the constitution, in this transitional period law, the Oromo has not just a “special interest” but also a political right over the two self-government regions. It is also important to observe that there is no attempt to delimit the boundary of the city. As a result, it was not clear as to where exactly the jurisdiction of the government of Addis Abeba ends and that of Oromia commences.
While it looked like a city-state in a federation, Addis Abeba was also seen as a city within a larger state, i.e., Oromia. In other words, administratively, it was an enclave falling outside of Oromia while also housing the Government of Oromia as its capital. In a sense, Addis Abeba is in Oromia, but not of Oromia. Oromia was a State governing from Addis Abeba without, however, governing Addis Abeba itself. While the meaning of ‘special interest’ was understood to mean much more than having a seat for the Oromia government in the city, for the entire period of the transitional times, this remained to be the only ‘interest’ Oromia could obtain.
The concept of Oromia’s special interest was thus injected into the language of public law in the country accompanying the shift away from a formerly unitary state to what was subsequently to become a ‘multinational federation’. Acutely sensitive to the rights of sub-national groups (called ‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’) in Ethiopia, this ‘ethno-federalization’ was a reaction, and a push back, to the goings-on in history. We can thus see its immense historical import in its potency to speak both to the past and to the future. The ‘special’ in the ‘special interest’ phrase hails not only from the mere fact of geographic location of Addis Abeba in Oromia but also from the implicit recognition of the essentially Oromo identity of the city. Historians have routinely described the fact that, until it was violently raided and occupied by the forces of the Shoan Kingdom in the 19th century, the city was inhabited by the Oromo.
When it was ‘founded’ as the capital of the modern Ethiopian Empire in 1886, it was set as a launching pad for the campaigns of imperial conquest on the peoples of the Southern, South-Eastern, and South-Western peripheries. With a violent beginning marked by conquest and occupation of the land; raid, massacre, and displacement of the population; and transformation of the cultural and environmental terrain by the soldiers, it started as a garrison town. A cursory glance at writings by William Harris[3], Alexander Bulatovich[4], and even Evelyn Waugh[5], indicates that the State operated in Addis Abeba as an occupying force of settler colonialists bent on pushing out and displacing the indigenous Oromo peoples. Because the settlers generally spoke Amharic and confessed the Ethiopian Orthodox faith and because of the disproportionate concentration of modern urban facilities in Addis Abeba, it became increasingly different culturally from its surroundings.
Consequently, it projected a cultural life that is different from that of the Oromo. The culture, identity, and language of the Oromo became the constitutive outside of the cultural life in the city. In time, the Oromo were effectively marginalized and otherized. For most of the 20th century, the Oromo, although historically the host, was forced to live like the alien and the guest in what was their own homeland. Informed by this memory and propelled by years of national liberation struggles, the politicians that negotiated the Transitional Charter (Proc. 1/1991) and made the law (Proc. 7/1992) sought to emphasize the need to acknowledge the Oromo presence in the city’s affair through the ‘special interest’. The ‘special interest’ package was thus a way of making up for the artificial (created or intentionally produced) absence of the Oromo. In other words, it was a method of presenting the absent, a way of bringing back the Oromo to its own.
What does the Law Say about the Special Interest?: The Legal Context
When the constitution of FDRE was finally adopted in 1995, the ‘special interest’ clause was more or less carried over into art 49(5). To understand the full textual context of the special interest package in art 49 (5), it is important for us to reproduce the entirety of article 49 in full. Accordingly, the provision in art 49 reads as follows:
Addis Abeba shall be the capital city of the Federal State.
The residents of Addis Abeba shall have a full measure of self-government. Particulars shall be determined by law.
The Administration of Addis Abeba shall be responsible for the Federal Government.
Residents of Addis Abeba shall in accordance with the provisions of this constitution, be represented in the House of Peoples’ Representative.
The special interest of the state of Oromia in Addis Abeba regarding the provision of social services, or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Abeba within the State of Oromia, shall be respected. Particulars shall be determined by law.
Owing to the unclarity of the clause in art 49 (5), coupled with the lack, to date, of the law constitutionally envisaged to enunciate the content, it became imperative for people to ask “just what is the ‘special interest’?” And what is so special about it? In this section, we make a close reading of the provision to explore what could be in the package.
Developments: Toward Articulating the Content of the ‘Special Interest’
It is important at the outset to underscore that Addis Abeba is a Federal capital city within a State. In this, it is more like Berne (of Switzerland) or Ottawa (of Canada). It is not a city-state (in the style of Berlin or Brussels). Nor is it a federal capital territory or a federal district (in the style of Abuja, or Canberra, or Washington DC). Once that is recognized, i.e., that Addis Abeba is a city in Oromia, one should have an explicit discussion and mutual understanding about what it means to be a federal capital because that automatically indicates that the Federal Government does not have a ‘natural’ right to be in the city. Unfortunately, that discussion did not happen. That was a historical blunder about a city mired in several historical misdeeds and mistakes.
That it was made accountable solely to the Federal Government was the second big blunder committed at the time of adopting the constitution. Given the fact that the city is Oromia and that it is also a ‘natural’ capital of the government of Oromia, it should have been made accountable to Oromia. Or, at the very least, it should have dual accountability to both the Federal and Oromia Governments. That did not happen. Commanding exclusive say on the administration of the city (in the name of ultimate accountability), the federal government ‘banished’ the Oromia government at will in 2003 and allowed it back into the city in 2005. In this, the federal government expanded and re-enacted the original violence of dispossession and displacement of Oromos from the city thereby perpetrating a new wound before the historical wounds could heal. Had it not been for this contemporary constitutive mistake, this ‘original sin’ of constitutional drafting in 1995, there wouldn’t have been anything special about the special interest of Oromia. If there would be ‘special interest’, it would have been that of the Federal Government or the non-Oromo residents of the city. These twin mistakes of recent history led to events of dire consequence that continue to claim lives and limbs to date.
The Host made a Guest
Having made a guest out of the host through the legal fiction of excision, i.e., by excising the city out of the political and administrative jurisdiction of Oromia, it became necessary for Ethiopia, almost as an afterthought, to ‘concede’ a lame ‘special interest’ to Oromia in Art 49(5). Over the years, the government of Oromia and Oromos in general hung on this provision more as a symbolic rallying point to interrogate Ethiopia for what is actually beyond the specific content of the Oromo interest in the city.
To the Oromo public, the city became the metaphor for what Ethiopia has made of the Oromo in general: an invisible, non-speaking, non-acting other who inhabits the interior of the territory but the exterior of the polity. It became the concentrated expression of the ‘life’ and the agony of the Oromo in the Ethiopian polity: their present-absence and their absent presence at a time.
Today, the Federal State presided over the coalition of four parties that make up the EPRDF became the new empire in a federal form, and the leaders became the new emperors in a democratic-republican garb. This forced the quip from many commentators that in Ethiopia ‘plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose’ (‘the more it changes, the more it remains the same’).
Hence, the wide Oromo discontent over the whole arrangement with regard to Addis Abeba. Taking advantage of the historic asymmetry in power, the city administration, mostly prompted by the federal government, has consistently acted in complete neglect or wilful defiance of the interests of Oromia and Oromos.
Legal Silence Exploited
Taking advantage of the undefined territorial boundary of the city, the administration continued to expand its competence over the suburbs surrounding Addis Abeba. Routinely, the Federal and the City Governments exploited the legal silence on the matter of special interest. Thus, the Addis Abeba Land Administration office often acted as the authority in charge of land administration in areas such as Labbuu, the Laga Xaafo-Marii continuum, Bole-Bulbula, Buraayyuu, Sabbata, Sululta, and districts beyond the Aqaqii-Qaallittii corridor (such as Galaan, Dukam, etc). The Federal Government continued to implement its industrialization policy by reserving Industrial Zones, Recreation Parks, and designated investment sites (much like Special Economic Zones). In doing all these things, the Federal Government and the city never took the trouble to consult with Oromia, much less the Oromo people. Evictions of farmers with little or no compensation became a routine practice.
Pollutions, Waste, Deforestation, Evictions
Pollutions from industrial emissions were sustained with no sense of accountability from the part of the city. Waste was dumped recklessly causing massive health risks. Deforestation and soil degradation was intensified in the neighboring districts, especially after the rise of investment in flower farms, dairy farms, and poultry farms. Homelessness of the evicted farmers and residents started to be felt among the people.
Oromia and Oromos Respond Resentfully: #Oromorprotests Emerges
The response from the Government of Oromia was late, but it did come in the form of a 2009 Caffee Oromia proclamation that established a Special Zone of 17 districts and 36 towns in the area. Its attempt at legislative articulation of the ‘Constitutional Special Interest of Oromia over Addis Ababa’ remained a draft to date. Its demand for enunciation of the content of the ‘special interest’ by the Constitutional Inquiry Council (CIC) was rejected on the ground that the CIC and the House of Federation do not give an advisory opinion in the absence of litigation.
Also, Oromo residents of the inner city resented the absence of Schools and cultural centers that operate in Afaan Oromo. The fact that the city has become anything but Oromo over the years made Oromo residents lament the complete cultural insensitivity to the needs of the Oromo in the city. Increasingly, the demand for schools in Afaan Oromo and cultural centers began to be vocally expressed in the last decade or two (resulting in efforts to construct an Oromo Cultural Centre and to open public schools that operate in Afaan Oromo)[6].
While such demands were gaining momentum steadily over the years, the Integrated Regional Development Plan (alias the Master Plan) was announced to the public in 2014. Immediately, it provoked a resistance in all corners of the Oromia region.
The day-to-day encroachment of Oromia’s jurisdiction with the informal expansion of the city; the general spill over effects of the city; its becoming the dumping ground for Addis Abeba waste for no gain; the pollution of the rivers, the soil, and the general environment of the surrounding districts and towns; the evictions with ‘compensations’ whose lower limits are legally left unregulated; the insensitivity to the cultural and linguistic needs of Oromo residents; the temperamental behaviour the Federal Government showed vis-à-vis Oromia’s claim to Addis Abeba as its capital city; these and other resentments fed the anger that emerged in the wake of the revelation of the Master Plan.
Apart from its violation of the principles of federalism and a healthy intergovernmental relation that should exist in a working federation, one of the reasons given for resisting the Master Plan was that it liquidates the ‘special interest’ of Oromia. As was noted above, the particulars envisaged to ‘be determined by law’ were never determined.
Giving Content to the ‘Special Interest’
According to art 49 (5), the articulation of the content of the ‘special interest’ is hoped to revolve around the meaning of four broad phrases:
‘Provision of social services’
‘Utilization of natural resources’
‘Joint administrative matters’
‘Other matters’ similar to provision of social services or utilization of natural resources.
In the endeavor to give content to the special interest clause, one is expected to interpret these phrases in a judicious manner that can also satisfy the popular discontent that was ignited into full manifestation in the protest to the Master Plan.
Social Services
In particular, we must identify the kind of social services that Addis Abeba should provide to Oromia. Normally, ‘social services’ connote services such as access to housing, education, health, water, transport, and other matters needed for achieving adequate living standards. From experience, we know that one of the unmet needs of Oromia in Addis Abeba is access to public buildings and properties for their offices and residential places for their officials and civil servants. And the need for designated plots of land on which to build houses for the employees of the state.
Organizing public schools that operate in Afaan Oromo is another kind of social service seen as a pressing need. Related but not often articulated is the need for building or making spaces for public libraries run in Afaan Oromo, exhibition centres, concert halls, theatres, museums, galleries, cinema halls, printing presses dedicated to the nurture and development of Oromo cultural lives, shows, performances, plays, memories, arts/paintings, movies, books, etc. This need to give attention to culture also requires the need for memorializing personalities and historical moments of the Oromo through naming streets, places, squares; and erecting statues. In addition, subsidizing Oromo arts and printing and publications as part of making the Oromo presence felt to anyone who comes to and inhabits the city is an important aspect of social service. In other words, the provision of social services also extends to the cultural representation of the Oromo in the life of the wider city.
Similarly, health facilities and other utilities such as public transport services that operate in Afaan Oromo should be considered part of the social services to be provided to Oromos. One way of addressing this could be making Afaan Oromo the co-equal working language of the City Government. The move to make Afaan Oromo and other languages to become working languages of the Federal Government will also help curb part of the problem of access to social services and facilities such as public transport, celebration and registration of vital events (birth, marriage, death, certification, authentication, licensing, etc).
Natural Resources
The proposed law must also clarify the type of ‘natural resources’ Addis Abeba has, resources that Oromia uses, and identify the modes in which it continues to use them. The effort to give content to this phrase becomes confounding when we note the fact that there is hardly any natural resource that the city offers to Oromia. Anything ‘natural’ in the city is ipso facto that of Oromia because the city itself is of Oromia anyway. The city actually is dependent on the natural resources of Oromia. Water, forest products, hydroelectric supply, minerals, sand, cement products, precious stones, food products, and everything else that Ethiopia (beyond and above Addis Abeba) needs come from outside of the city, Oromia and the other regions.
In the course of articulating this interest, one needs to consider the benefits Oromia should get from the delivery of these resources. One way of doing this is to agree on the percentage of income that should go back to Oromia’s revenue based on what is often called the principle of derivation in federal countries. If the federalism was properly functioning, this would have been handled through a negotiated channel of financial intergovernmental relations.
Joint Administration
The proposed law to be prepared must determine the scope and method of exercise of the envisaged ‘joint administration’. For this, we will first need to identify what tasks are matters for joint administration. Secondly, we need to decide who is responsible for what aspect of the administration. In the area of inter-jurisdictional roads (say maintenance); border management; managing trans-boundary forests, rivers, etc.; inter-jurisdictional legal cooperation (whose police takes responsibility for cross-border criminal activities); these and some such activities need to be spelt out.
One obvious area of joint administration is management of land. Because legislative power over land issues is a matter for the federal government and administration is for the States, issues such as town planning, mapping, cadastre, land redistribution among residents, designing construction regulations, etc should have been a matter for states, districts, and local/municipality governments. And in these areas, local governments of Oromia and the city administration (i.e., sub-cities and districts) could find some collaboration. Accordingly, the government of the state of Oromia and the government of the Addis Abeba City could coordinate their activities as they have overlapping jurisdictions (i.e., Oromia has a territorial jurisdiction while the city has a self-administrative jurisdiction) because the city is also the capital city of Oromia.
Ideally, ‘joint administration’ could have happened if the city was made accountable to the Government of Oromia rather than to the Federal Government. At the very least, joint administration could have been achieved through making the City government accountable to both the Federal and the Oromia governments. Settling on one of these options would mitigate the injustice of the original constitutional arrangement that: a) made Addis Abeba the capital city of the Federal government without the consent of Oromia and Oromos; and b) made the city’s self-government accountable exclusively to the Federal Government.
‘Other issues’
The meaning of the ‘other issues’ over which Oromia has a special interest is to be decided contextually on the basis of issues that rear their head in the course of day-to-day life experience. One cannot be definitive about the list of things to be included in this category.
However, twenty years of experience should have brought forth several such issues that may need to be specified while leaving others to the discretion of administrators subject to judicial review.
Who Takes Initiative?
Even assuming that the content of the ‘Special interest’ is clear, there is another issue left for us to determine: who comes up with the law that “determines” the “particulars”? Is it the Federal Government, the City Government, or the Government of Oromia? So far, the federal government had hesitated to legislate on the matter even in the face of a repeated demand by the government of the state of Oromia. That is of course because the federal government wants to exploit the ambiguity that remains because of the legal vacuum.
Legal silence is strategically deployed by the Federal and Addis Abeba Council to avoid their part of the obligation and to continue to enjoy what doesn’t rightfully belong to them in the absence of a law that proscribes it. Oromia’s attempt in the past (2006) to legislate on the matter could produce only a draft piece of legislation that couldn’t ultimately be presented to and passed by the Caffee Oromia.
Beyond the Content: Reconciled Relationship between the City, the Region, and the Country-Redemption via Relocation?
If there was an inclusive participatory constitutional moment that acknowledges the presence of the Oromo in the polis-to-be between 1992 and 1994, one or more of the following scenarios might have been negotiated:
a) Find a (new) site that is commonly agreed upon by all the constituent members of the Federation to be the Federal District Territory;
b) Designate another city in another State or in Oromia as the seat of the federal government accountable to that state;
c) Designate different cities that can serve as seats for the different branches of the Federal Government;
d) Agree to have a roving capital city for the federal government every decade or so;
e) Designate Addis Abeba as the capital city with a self-governing council ultimately accountable to Oromia—an essentially Oromo city in which the federal government may have some form of ‘special interest’
f) Designate Addis Abeba as a federal capital city whose self-governing council will be accountable to both the federal and the Oromia governments.
Towards a Redemptive Discourse
We all know that the constitution-making process was less ideal than one would hope for. It was marked by lack of legitimacy on procedural and substantive accounts.[7] The work required now, while attending to the immediate needs of giving content to the ‘joint administrative issues’, is to identify potential areas of constitutional amendments that would overcome the problems caused by original flaws in the constitution. This will force us to engage in—and engage the public with–what I called, elsewhere, a ‘redemptive constitutional discourse,’ a discourse that overcomes the deficits in original legitimacy, a discourse that ‘corrects’ the imperfect beginnings of the constitution by also attending to the trauma caused by inaugural violence with which the city was incorporated into, and made the capital of, the modern imperial Ethiopian state.
Relocating the Capital
While that is being done, the search for a lasting solution to the violent Ethio-Oromia relations, especially regarding Addis Abeba needs to begin and continue. In particular, it is imperative that we consider the possibility of relocating the Federal Government elsewhere. Removing the Federal government will help undo the trauma of the violent occupation at the moment of ‘founding’ and subsequent displacement of the Oromo through the ‘settlement’ of others. Relocation has the advantage of:
Dissolving the altercation over ownership of the city;
Securing the socio-cultural interests of the Oromo in the city;
Restoring full jurisdiction of Oromia over its territory;
Rescinding the legal excision of the city from the administrative jurisdiction of Oromia through the provision of article 49;
Enhancing the Oromo’s right to exercise of ultimate political power in the city;
Restoring the host, the Oromo, to its rightful position and securing the rights of the guests, the non-Oromo inhabitants, in a context of mutual recognition;
Arresting the continued lawless expansion of the city and the concomitant land grab, eviction, and ethnocide thereof;
Responding to, and thereby dissolving, the question of the so-called ‘special interests’ within the context of Oromia and Oromia alone;
Comprehensively responding to the demands of the #Oromoprotests whose rallying cry has been “Finfinnee belongs to Oromo” (“Finfinneen kan Oromooti!”).
The legal relocation of the Federal capital has more transformative potential for the entire polity than the obvious advantages outlined above. It is a restoration of Oromo agency and authority over the decision on what matters to their life in their land and in the wider country. The issue of choosing a negotiated site for a federal capital city is an opportunity to help the wider country to agonize over its history, its state system, its capacity to deal with historical injustice, and its hope of re-building the state on a fairer, more just, and more plural foundation. In short, it allows for a redemptive constitutional discourse to emerge.
It has to be explicitly stated however that to remove the Federal Government is not synonymous with removing the inhabitants of the city. The inhabitants will be part of Oromia and like all other people living in the wider Oromia, their rights shall be respected. Yes, there may be some people who work for the federal government institutions that may have to commute to and from work if they choose to continue living in Addis Abeba after the relocation of the capital. Yes, there will also be people who might move to the new capital altogether. But they don’t have to. No one has to. It is important to remember, incidentally, that not all the inhabitants of the city are employees of the Federal Government as such. The federal Government is merely its institutions, agencies, and its workers. That is not the (entire) population of the city.
Pending Redemption…Shift Accountability
Until that is done through constitutional revision or amendment, it may be necessary to consider the shift of accountability of the city government from the Federal to the Oromia government. It may be imperative for the Federal Government to start paying rent to the Oromia government as a token of acknowledgement to their being hosted by Oromia.
The quest for a lasting solution should start with identifying unconstitutional laws and policies that violate Oromia’s rights and special interests. Laws such as the one that promulgated the Addis Abeba Charter of 2003 (Proc. 361/2003, especially its article 5), the Investment Amendment Proclamation of 2014 (Proc. 849/2014, especially its provisions regarding ‘Industrial Development Zones), and projects like the World Bank sponsored Industrial Zone Projects (such as the Resettlement Action Plan [of] the Qilinxo Industrial Zone (April 2015) should all be rescinded.
New laws may need to be issued. An example is a proclamation that governs the lowest threshold for rates and modes of compensation awarded to a farmer in the event of eviction from her/his land. To be sure, there was a 2005 Proclamation (Proc. 455/2005) that provides for expropriation of land holdings and compensation. However, this proclamation, apart from enhancing the dispossessive regulatory and police powers of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, federal and local governments, and of several other agencies, it says little about the substance of the compensation, especially for collective landholdings (about which it says nothing). Needless, to say, as the actual practice of expropriation has routinely demonstrated, even the normative gesture in the law of providing a replacement remains to be more a legal rhetoric than an actual reality, more a juridical promise than a political practice.
Not so Special
Recognition of special interest is exception-making. Through a ‘special interest’ package, a rightful entity extends some rights, as part of underserved acts of grace, to another that cannot lay claim to these rights. To Oromia and Oromos, there is hardly anything special about the ‘special interest’. The city is naturally and intrinsically part of Oromia. As such, Oromos and Oromia have pre-eminence over the city. They lay claim over the city as their own natural territory. Oromo interests are not supposed to be granted to them by others as some kind of favor. They have the more fundamental right of an owner. As such, they do not need others to make exception in their favor in order to guarantee the protection of the interest of the Oromo in the city. If anything, it is the Oromo that should make exception to the other inhabitants in granting them, for instance, the right of self-government at the municipal level. In other words, if anything was to be ‘special’, it was the ‘interest’ of other peoples who live in the city that should have been so designated as to constitute the ‘special interest’ of non-Oromos in this inherently and primarily Oromo city.
However, owing to the legacy of imperial conquest and violent occupation of the city and the consequent dispossession and displacement of the Oromo from the city, it is now the guests that are extending (and so far denying) the ‘special interest’ of the hosts. This is a testament to the total lack of self-awareness on the part of the Federal and City Governments about the land they stand on. It is a testament to their moral blindness and (and the consequent incapacity) to pay attention, to see the original owners of the land, and to recognize their natural rights thereof. The result is the failure to understand the pain of dispossession and relentless quest of the Oromo for restoration.
The more consequential result is that this moral blindness is blocking the redemption of the relationship between the city (Addis Abeba), the Region (Oromia), and the Country (Ethiopia). That is why it comes as no surprise that the contestation over the city is pivotal to the making or breaking of the Ethiopian state in our own time. AS
ED’s Note: Tsegaye R Ararssa, Melbourne Law School. Email: tsegayer@gmail.com.
[1] The substance of most of these reflections were extensively discussed elsewhere. Here, in most sections, I present a rehash of those reflections. See Tsegaye Ararssa, “The Special Interest in Addis Ababa: The Affirmation of Denial,” Addis Standard (Jan 18, 2016) available at http://addisstandard.com/the-special-interest-the-affirmation-of-denial/.
[2] Technically speaking, this government which needed a special—emergency–measures to secure peace and stability, does not have a legal mandate to enact a law before repealing the emergency declaration and calling the army back to its barracks. Nor does it command a moral authority to make a legislation for the people it killed, maimed, arrested, detained, and tortured unaccountably only because they protested.
[3]William Harris, The Highlands of Ethiopia (1844).
[4] Alexander Bulatovic, Ethiopia through Russian Eyes: A Country in Transition, 1896-1898 (Richard Seltzer, Tr), (2000).
(Nairobi) – Ethiopia plunged into a human rights crisis in 2016, increasing restrictions on basic rights during a state of emergency and continuing a bloody crackdown against largely peaceful protesters, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2017. The state of emergency permits arbitrary detention, restricts access to social media, and bans communications with foreign groups.
Ethiopian security hold back demonstrators chanting slogans during Irreecha, the thanksgiving festival of the Oromo people, in Bishoftu town, Oromia region, Ethiopia, October 2, 2016.
Security forces killed hundreds and detained tens of thousands of protesters in Ethiopia’s Oromia and Amhara regions during the year. Many of those who were released reported that they were tortured in detention, a longstanding problem in Ethiopia. The government has failed to meaningfully investigate security forces abuses or respond to calls for an international investigation into the crackdown.
“Instead of addressing the numerous calls for reform in 2016, the Ethiopian government used excessive and unnecessary lethal force to suppress largely peaceful protests,” said Felix Horne, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Vague promises of reform are not enough. The government needs to restore basic rights and engage in meaningful dialogue instead of responding to criticism with more abuses.”
In the 687-page World Report, its 27th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 90 countries. In his introductory essay, Executive Director Kenneth Roth writes that a new generation of authoritarian populists seeks to overturn the concept of human rights protections, treating rights as an impediment to the majority will. For those who feel left behind by the global economy and increasingly fear violent crime, civil society groups, the media, and the public have key roles to play in reaffirming the values on which rights-respecting democracy has been built.
Government limitations on free expression and access to information undermine the potential for the inclusive political dialogue needed to understand protesters’ grievances, let alone address them, Human Rights Watch said.
The tens of thousands of people detained in 2016 include journalists, bloggers, musicians, teachers, and health workers. Moderates like the opposition leader Bekele Gerba have been charged with terrorism and remain behind bars, education has been disrupted, and thousands have fled the country.
The Liyu police, a paramilitary force, committed numerous abuses against residents of the Somali region in 2016, and displacement from Ethiopia’s development projects continued, including in the Omo valley.
The crackdown during 2016 followed years of systematic attacks against opposition parties, nongovernmental organizations, and independent media, effectively closing political space and providing little room for dissenting voices.
Nearly three months into the state of emergency declared by Ethiopia, the atmosphere on the streets of its bustling and impressively modern metropolis and capital, Addis Ababa, feels tense.
At 2 355m above sea level, the climate is pleasantly mild most of the year. Its broad thoroughfares are studded with magnificent cultural attractions. These are infused with the glow of an ancient yet resilient civilisation that could withstand both Jesuit and Wahhabi encroachment.
Yet, at present, tourists are understandably few and far between. There have been reports of hundreds of deaths in districts surrounding the capital in recent weeks. But these have been played down as an exaggeration by Prime Minister Heilemariam Desalegn.
Violence broke out during an Oromo religious festival, and in some instances foreigners seem to have been targeted. In response, the predominantly ethnic-Tigrean government clamped down on social media, took a few TV channels off the air, and restricted the movement of the opposition leader and foreign observers.
For the past few years, Ethiopia has been able to partly shed its association with abject poverty and famine. Arguably inspired by China, the country became a developmental success story and one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. At much the same time, Addis Ababa was able to capitalise on being the gateway to the politics of the African continent and foreign aid.
It is evident just how rapidly China’s stakes here have grown over the past few years. Just as evident is China’s different approach to development as compared with the West. It is also easy to see why the recent instability in Ethiopia is a real test to China’s approach.
Behind the veneer of Ethiopia’s parliamentary federalism lies an authoritarian system of state-led development that is preferred by Beijing over the country’s ragtag opposition forces. The question is whether the fruits of fast economic growth can be distributed sufficiently effectively in Ethiopia so as to forestall ethnic rural unrest.
Showcase infrastructural projects
Rather than providing grants directly aimed at poverty alleviation or promoting civil society, Chinese state-owned enterprises have been busy erecting showcase infrastructural projects. The aim is to attract further private business investment and to boost tourism.
The new sparkling African Union conference centre in Addis was fully funded by China. A new six-lane 87km highway to Adama has cut travel time from three hours to just one hour. And the international arm of China State Construction will soon give the capital a state-of-the-art stadium and upgrade its airport.
But perhaps a more persuasive productivity-booster is Addis Ababa’s new light-rail network completed in 2015 by China Railway Engineering Corporation. Often, the Chinese developmental approach is portrayed as construction frenzy ahead of genuine consumer demand.
Yet, far from being at risk of becoming a white elephant, it is already heavily used by local commuters just over a year after inauguration. In a city where taxi fares are exorbitant and buses are often in bad repair, the network is making a real difference to ordinary people’s lives.
But Beijing also runs a real risk here. In 2007, for example, 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese expatriates were murdered by Somali separatists in an attack on a Sinopec-run oilfield in the east of the country. There is clearly a strong case for Heilemariam to broaden his government’s ethnic support base and heed various regional and rural concerns about disenfranchisement as a result of foreign investment.
No zero-sum game between the US and China
Unlike the Chinese Foreign Affairs ministry, the US State Department has expressed concern over the imposition of the state of emergency.
But the Ethiopian government is likely to remain in the US’s good books. This is primarily because of its role in countering the spread of fundamentalist terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In fact, it is that role that has helped endear Ethiopia to the world, and facilitated Western relief aid.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to conclude China’s growing stakes in Ethiopia immediately offset Western interests. For one thing, Ethiopia’s recent troubled history suggests the enemies of government often denounce oppression. But they do not necessarily champion human rights when they seize power themselves.
In addition, Western aid is still far greater and more vital to the running of the country than anything China provides. For all the speculation about the Chinese currency replacing the US dollar as global reserve currency soon, most hotels here do not seem to readily exchange China’s currency for Birr yet.
There is, in short, no zero-sum game between the US and China over Ethiopia, at times quite to the contrary. Neither power is interested in Ethiopia purely for exploitative colonial-style mineral extraction, or is purely motivated by altruism. The budding, somewhat desultory Chinatown in Addis Ababa’s Rwanda Vegetable Market hardly comes across as an insular colonial outpost. And the Chinese embassy compound is vastly outsized by the American one.
What plays out instead are perhaps different approaches to the low-income world where the US has prized the diffusion of individual freedoms and human-rights norms and China has prized collective economic betterment. And both the US and China are set to lose out if chaos spreads in the Horn of Africa.
China’s approach may be benefiting Ethiopia
Amid capital scarcity, China’s different approach seems to benefit Ethiopia. Put simply, it opens up another avenue for development where the World Bank and IMF doctrines have until recently been the only show in town.
In concrete terms, it means Chinese companies nowadays bid for projects often with concessional terms – where, in the past, only Western companies had the technological capacity to deliver.
Hydro-electricity is perhaps the best example for that: a healthy competition seems to be building up between Italy’s Salini Impregilo and Sinohydro when it comes to damming Ethiopia’s rivers. Local and foreign NGO oversight would still be vital in order to minimise the dislocation and environmental degradation that both companies can cause.
But, at the same time, with better planning, the untapped potential of hydro-power might mean cleaner and lower-cost energy in a part of the world where power cuts are all too common.
Source: SBO SBO (OLF Radio) status update from Adami Tulu, E Shoa Jan. 5, 2016:
An agriculture complex owned by a TPLF higher official is destroyed by “Special Force” on Dec. 31, 2015 in Adami Tulu District [Woreda], E Shoa. Among destroyed are:
– 5 water tanker trucks,
– 1 tractor,
– 1 corn peeling machine,
– 5 iron (qorqoorroo) houses
Abdii fi Gaachanni Ummata Oromoo WBOn gartuun Humna Addaa Godina Bahaa Amajjii 03, 2016 magaalaa Harar keessaa bakka Dakkar jedhamutti basaasaa fi tika olaanaa gartuu abbaa irree wayyaanee kan ta’e Haayluu G. Tsaadiq kan lammummaan Tigree ta’e irratti tarkaanfii xumuraa fudhateen ajjeesuu Ajaji WBO Godina Baha Oromiyaa beeksise.
Tiki wayyaanee kun waraqaa eenyummaa (ID) kan Itophiyaa, Jibuutii, Somalilandii fi Puntland kan qabu oggaa ta’u, biyya keessa dabalatee biyyoota kanneen keessa naanna’uudhaan ilmaan Oromoo Oromummaan ykn miseensota ykn deggertoota ABO ti jechuun akka hidhaman, ukkaamfamanii fi ajjeefamaniif yakka hiriyaa hin qabne kan raawwataa ture ta’uun beekameera.
Humni Addaa WBO Godina Bahaa tika olaanaa wayyaanee Haayluu G. Tsaadiq irratti kan tarkaanfii fudhate konkolaataa inni ittiin deemaa ture dhaabsisuun oggaa ta’u, shugguxii tokkoo fi maallaqa Itophiyaa 9000s irraa booji’uu Ajaji WBO Godina Bahaa dabalee beeksiseera.
Qabeenyi qondaala wayyaanee tokko barbadaa’uun gabaafame.
Naannoo magaalaa alamganaatti kan argamu warshaan oomishaa meeshaalee ijaarsaa kan obboo Gabruu walda amaanu’el kan jedhamu barbadaa’uun isaa oduun amma as bahe ni hima. Kan hafes haa gubatu
Gootichi WBO Godina Bahaa Amajjii 05, 2016 Har’a Ganama Ona Xuulloo Keessatti Lola Waraana Gabroomfattuu Wayyaanee Waliin Taasise Irratti Loltoota Diinaa 13 Ol Hojiin Ala Godhe.
Mirga Abbaa Biyyummaa fi Bilisummaa Oromoo deebisuuf falmaa hadhawaa gochuu irratti kan argamu gootichi WBO, Amajjii 05,2016 guyyaa har’aa ganama Lixa Harargee Ona Xuulloo naannoo Masalaatti waraana gabroomfattuu wayyaanee kan ummata keenya gaaffii mirgaa finiinsaa jirutti roorrisaa ture haleeluun 8 yeroo irraa ajjeesu, 5 ol ammoo akka madeesse Ajaji WBO Godina Bahaa ifa godheera.
Humni WBO lola kana geggeesse diina irraa meeshaalee gara garaa akka booji’es gabaafameera.
Tarkaanfiin diinaa fi farreen QBO ta’an irratti fudhatamu karaa hundaan haala kennate mara keessatti ciminaan kan itti fufu ta’uu Ajaji WBO Godina Bahaa mirkaneesseera.
Feyisa Lilesa caught the world’s attention when he raised his arms in solidarity with the Oromo people as he crossed the finishing line at the Rio Olympic games. He tells Julian Keane what the gesture has cost him.
Al Jazeera: #OromoProtests, the defining moments of 2016
My Oromo Personalities and Athletes of the Year 2016 Olympian Feyisa Lilesa and Paralympian Tamiru Demisse….These two Athletes Defied the Ethiopian Regime at a World Stage With Courage #OromoProtests.- Journalist Yassin Juma
My Most Influential Eastern Africa Personality of the year 2016 goes to Jawar Mohammed. When the regime blocked the world from observing the reality on the ground he together with many of the foot soldiers defied and fed us with the Truth. With 1M + followers on Facebook he has been able to influence the direction of “The Course” #Respect. – Journalist Yassin Juma
For inspiring and moving the world with their disciplined courage and bravery in the face of relentless state brutality, for bringing the dream of freedom ever closer to being realized, for their bold commitment to a cause greater than self, for finally forcing the world to pay attention to the plight of Oromo people and for rejuvenating and energizing the Oromo movement and bringing it to the cusp of victory, the Qubee Generation is OPride’s Oromo Person (s) of the year 2016.For over a year, Ethiopia teetered and tottered to contain protests roiling the Oromia state, home to the Oromo people, the country’s largest ethnic group. The grim year not only tested the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF’s, quarter-century stranglehold over the country but also the limits of human perseverance against determined state action.
Although similar demonstrations have taken place in the Amhara state, Oromia remained the epicenter of the widespread and sustained anti-government protests throughout 2016. Few, if any, of Oromia’s 560 towns and 180 districts, escaped the growing anger and revolt of ordinary citizens against the central state.
From Ginchi to Ajje, Guliso to Nekemte, Awaday to Dallo Mana, and anywhere in between, students, parents and teachers as townsfolk and farmers fought side by side to challenge the social, economic and political marginalization of the Oromo people in Ethiopia. The Oromo constitute nearly half of Ethiopia’s 100 million people, but they remain marginalized.
For the first 10 months of 2016, millions across Oromia took to the streets, demanding an end to forceful dispossession of their ancestral land, the land grab, the release of political prisoners, and the rule of law as opposed to the rule by the gun and prison. Ethiopian security forces responded to peaceful protesters as they always do: Using an excessive and disproportionate force, including live bullets as a standard crowd-control tool. But the state’s extraordinary measures only engendered more anger and inspired more street protests.
In fact, both the protests and the official brutality were unprecedented, even by EPRDF’s checkered history of violence. Security forces killed more than 1,000 people in Oromia alone in 2016. Hundreds were wounded. And the besieged state saw record levels of arrests with legions disappearing in the maze of military training facilities acting as a concentration-like prisoner holding camps. Tens of thousands, including nearly all top leaders of the only “legal” Oromo opposition party, the Oromo Federalist Congress, remain incarcerated on dubious terrorism charges.
The protests began in November 2015, initially over opposition to an urban master plan that sought to expand the boundaries of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, gobbling up Oromo towns, farmlands, and villages.
Sheer horror
The year’s biggest tragedy took place on the sacred grounds of Hora Arsadi, in Bishoftu, about 25 miles southeast of Addis Ababa. On Sunday, October 2, an estimated 2 million people made the annual pilgrimage to Bishoftu’s ancient crater lake to observe Irreechaa, a premier Oromo thanksgiving holiday that has become the symbol and celebration of Oromummaa (the Oromo identity) itself.
On the millennia-old Irreecha celebration, the Oromo give thanks to their creator (Waaqa) for the bountiful harvests of Birra (spring) and to renew their hopes and aspirations for future after a dark, rainy winter season.
But 2016 was not an ordinary year for the Oromo. The mood ahead of this year’s Irreechaa was predictably tense. Staying true to tradition, the youth arrived in Bishoftu from across Oromia fervently singing resistance songs and chanting anti-government slogans. The protesters’ impatience was palpable even the night before Irreechaa. While there were no major incidents for much of the morning, it was clear that the sea of youth came to Arsadi to make a stand — a statement. Early in the afternoon, as the chorus of protests grew louder, a standoff ensued near the main stage where officials give speeches and traditional leaders offer blessings.
Image: The Guardian
What happened next was tragic beyond words: sheer horror ensued as security forces fired tear gas and live bullets into millions gathered in a confined space. The crowd was surrounded by heavily armed security forces, a lake, deep gorges and ditches. As shots began to ring out from above the crater, festival goers ran for their lives. But they had no way out, encircled as they were by gun-toting officers from the left and shrub-covered ditches on the right side, and a deep lake from below.
At least 678 people died in the ensuing stampede, according to OFC officials and hospital sources. It’s the darkest hour in contemporary Oromo history. Innocent lives were lost on a day they came to celebrate their culture and heritage. The day will forever be remembered as the “Irreechaa massacre,” an extraordinarily savage and horrific tragedy in which the Ethiopian security forces caused the death of hundreds of Oromos.
The bravest act at the Rio Olympic
Unsurprisingly, the turmoil in Ethiopia received marginal media coverage for much of the year. That changed in August. No other event — not even the Irreechaa massacre — had the effect of mainstreaming and raising global awareness about the repression of the Oromo people than Feyisa Lilesa’s defiantly heroic Olympic protest.
On Sunday, August 21, as he approached the finish line, winning a silver medal in the men’s marathon, Feyisa crossed his wrists over his head, forming an X, a popular gesture of protest used by the Oromo youth in Ethiopia. With that simple protest, dubbed “the bravest act at the 2016 Olympics,” which he repeated at the post-race press conference, Feyisa both inspired and implored the world to pay attention to the horrific tragedy taking place in Ethiopia.
Feyisa faced a potential loss of his medal and a grave danger to his life as well as family. But he gave no hoot. “I don’t want to look at my children any different from the children of other people in my country who are being killed,” he later told reporters. “They face the same fate and the same destiny like all other children in Ethiopia.”
Feyisa, 26, was born in West Shewa, Jaldu District in 1990, a year before the EPRDF regime took power in Ethiopia. Growing up in Jaldu about 120km west of Addis Ababa near the border of Macha and Tulama, Feyisa witnessed the injustices and indignities faced by Oromo people. As an elite athlete, he faced a significant dilemma. “I could not join my peers in the streets if I were going to have the chance to compete at all,” he told reporters in September. “I had to leave the country a lot in order to compete overseas, so I knew that if I protested with the ordinary citizens, I would be blocked from ever leaving the country again.”
But the country’s political troubles and blatant violations of human rights affected him deeply for a long time. He recalls visiting friends, former classmates, and acquaintances in prisons. In Addis Ababa, he helps young people from Jaldu and other places who run away from home to escape arrest and have become homeless. This is why his Olympic protest did not come as a spur of the moment decision. It was informed by his own lived experiences. He quietly but meticulously planned and prepared for it months in advance. “I made the decision to protest in Rio three months before the Olympics,” he said. “As soon as the Ethiopian Athletics Federation selected me for the marathon, I decided to work hard and make a stand if I won and got a good result.” The rest, as they say, is history.
The fact that the Oromo, a nation that gave birth to some of the finest long-distance runners in the world, including the great Abebe Bikila, Mammo Wolde, Darartu Tulu, Almaz Ayana and what not, had to wait until 2016 to savor such a demonstration by one of its sons speaks volumes that the current generation had it enough with the marginalization of the Oromo in the Ethiopian state.
Feyisa knew it would be the biggest moment of his life. He anticipated it to be one of the most-watched sporting events in the world. But, he admits, he did not expect the outpouring of the global support he received and the remarkable impact his gesture had in creating awareness. Feyisa’s protest in Rio and his subsequent press conference in Washington, DC, where he spoke to more than 30 journalists from 25 media organizations, generated far more press coverage than the year-long protests in which over 1,000 innocent lives were savagely cut short.
His name will forever be mentioned alongside two legendary African-American athletes —Tommie Smith and John Carlos — who made history by raising the black power salute during the U.S. national anthem at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. Other notable comparisons include Muhammad Ali, who famously denounced the Vietnam War, and Billie Jean King, who championed women’s equality long before it was in vogue.
Feyisa has already won international recognition for his defiant protest. Earlier this month, the Foreign Policy magazine named him among the 2016 top 100 global thinkers. He was recognized as a challenger, “for breaking the rules of the games in order to call attention to the brutal actions of his country’s security forces.” Feyisa was also included in the Huffington Post’s list of “athletes who inspired off the field in 2016.” Deutsche Welle featured him in its top ten stories that moved Africa in 2016.
Down, Down Wayane
Feyisa’s was not the only uncommon act of courage by an Oromo in 2016. The defiant protest at Irreechaa in October was the clearest evidence yet of a generation that’s determined to end the Oromo people’s marginalization. As if Feyisa’s wasn’t enough, the generation’s resolve and defiance of authoritarianism were illustrated in one courageous act by Gemeda Wario Wotiye.
Gemeda, 20, came to Bishoftu the morning of the Irreechaa festival with his friends from Shashamane. He was angry, like all of his peers, about the killings of peaceful protesters, the endless arrests of Oromo leaders, the hegemonic domination of ethnic Tigrayans over the country and EPRDF’s deepening authoritarianism. But Gemeda had no special plans other than being part of the Irreechaa festivity and the protests. It was his first time attending the annual event.
The native of Siinqillee town in the restive West Arsi zone grew up in Shashamane. He helped organize protests at his preparatory school. He was detained and held at Sanqallee military camp for more than a month. But until then he was still like any ordinary 11th-grader. Nothing, except his uncommon courage, could have prepared him for what transpired next. As the standoff between the protesters and the attending officialdom heated up that afternoon, Gemeda made a spur-of-the-moment decision and jumped onto the stage. Video footage from the scene shows Gemeda snatching a microphone from one of the emcees who was unsuccessfully pleading with the protesters for calm.
Microphone in hand, Gemeda stretched out his arms toward the sea of protesters gathered below, and started shouting, “down, down Woyane, down, down TPLF.” (Woyane is a moniker for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the kingmakers in the hodgepodge EPRDF coalition.) Gemeda’s neck veins bulged as he led the crowd in the now famous chant. The crowd went wild with jubilation responding to his chant with earth shattering chants of their own and by repeating it numerous times over, with wrists crossed above their head, and finally breaking out into a pandemonium of cheers and jeers.
Gemeda was quickly booted off the stage but his extraordinarily brave act boosted the protesters’ morale, much to the chagrin of the officials and security forces. This provoked the trigger-happy federal security forces to unleash their brutal massacre. Gemeda’s chant, which he blurted out almost accidentally, and the resounding response by the protesters made one thing unmistakably clear: that the only remaining source of legitimacy for the EPRDF government was its monopoly of the forces of violence.
Gemeda’s courageous act quickly gained attention on social media, becoming the most widely shared rallying cry of protesters in the aftermath of that tragic day. The regime simply stepped up its repression. In retaliation, protesters began torching government buildings and gutting foreign-owned business installations. Among the casualties was an American researcher.
The changes in the protesters’ tactics made the region virtually ungovernable, prompting EPRDF to declare a six-month state of emergency on October 9. Following a massive manhunt, Gemeda fled to Egypt after weeks of hiding. He crossed the Sahara desert on foot, retracing a treacherous route increasingly being used by hundreds of young Oromos looking for a safe haven and better opportunities. It is worth noting here that, for the Oromo, the calamity at home in the past year was compounded by the loss of more young lives at the high waters of the Mediterranean, where in one April boat tragedy alone some 180 Oromos perished.
Our rationale: #OromoProtests is a generational revolt
Without a doubt, both Feyisa and Gemeda qualify to be OPride’s Oromo Persons of the Year. They were disruptive to unjust power; they challenged both our assumptions and the status quo, and they became instant heroes to millions of young Ethiopians by defying the odds and gods. Praise songs have been written to extol their bravery and honor their courage.
All told, we initially set out to write an individual profile of Feyisa and honor his once-in-a-generation protest. But a common thread emerged as we researched our much-anticipated, year-end feature story. It was a difficult decision indeed, but in recent years we have also made a tradition of honoring those whose names and selfless deeds are known only unto God. 2016 gave us too many such unsung heroes. The list includes Mustefa Hussein, Adam Dima, Haji Guye Dula, and countless others. But, in the end, we settled on Qubee generation because the Oromo protest is, by and large, a generational revolt.
“If you suffocate people and they don’t have any other options but to protest, it breaks out,” Ambo University lecturer and now certified torture survivor, Seyoum Teshome, told the New York Times in August. “The whole youth is protesting. A generation is protesting.”
Seyoum was right. Gemeda’s defiant protest at Irreechaa 2016 and Feyisa’s brave act at the Rio Olympics epitomize the valor and gallantry of a generation revolting.
Even in a grim year that saw such an unspeakable tragedy, the remarkable Qubee Generation provided hope, to young and old, that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”
Even in a grim year that saw such an unspeakable tragedy — from a mother in Burayu who, after losing her newborn child, had to bury alone because the father was detained in Qilinto prison and she couldn’t rally her neighbors because of the state of emergency; to a wedding party in Ajje that was shot at for simply playing a music that authorities did not approve of; to the devastated parents in Sirka, East Arsi, whose three children were lost to a senseless and random execution by the Agazi force — the remarkable Qubee Generation provided hope, to young and old, that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”
Who are the Qubee Generations?
There is no standardized age range to define this generation, but the term generally refers to those born in the early 1980s onward. In terms of age, the Qubee generation is what a millennial is in the United States. It takes the prefix Qubee from the Latin alphabet that’s adopted in the 1990s for writing in Afaan Oromo. In 1991, when Qubee was formally adopted and Afaan Oromo became the official language of Oromia, the 80s kids were entering middle school, becoming the first generation of Oromos to go to school and learn in their native language.
The Qubee generation now consists of college students, recent graduates, and students in high school and middle schools. Unlike their parent’s generation, the Qubee generation studied in their mother tongue, Afaan Oromo. They are keenly aware of Oromia’s boundaries. This is true in Oromia as it is elsewhere in Ethiopia’s nine linguistic-based pseudo-federal states. This generation grew up singing their respective region’s anthems as opposed to the national anthem. Few, if any, can actually recite Ethiopia’s national anthem by heart. In Oromia, informed by long-standing national grievances toward the central state, the Qubee generation exhibits a pure and unadulterated allegiance to the Oromo question, a demand for the end of Oromo people’s marginalization in the Ethiopian state.
An estimated 71 percent of the Ethiopian population is under the age of 30. In 2014, Ethiopia had a total of 19,382,000 pupils enrolled in primary and secondary education. In the 2013/14 school year, some 627,452 students were enrolled in Ethiopia’s higher education system. More than half a million students enroll in public secondary schools across Oromia every year. This means that the overwhelming majority of today’s protesters are members of the fierce and fearless Qubee generation.
This generation is also acutely aware of their basic rights, as enshrined in the country’s little-practiced constitution — rights that are so callously trampled upon by the EPRDF regime. This is in part because they were taught civic education at an early age. The Qubee generation is by far the most connected thanks to the proliferation of mobile phones.
The adoption of Qubee is one of the enduring legacies of the struggle and sacrifices of the preceding generations. They blazed the trail with blood, literally, so that the Qubee generation can, even with the absence of the full freedoms they fought for, can proudly and unapologetically proclaim, I am Oromo first and I am proud of it. The pioneer generation should also be celebrating as this is in away the fruits of their hard labor. Waqo Gutu, Tadesse Birru, Elemo Qilxu and their contemporaries must all be smiling, even from beyond the clouds.
The soundtrack of the revolution
Artists and singers have long been the vanguard of Oromo nationalism. However, the indomitable spirit of the Qubee generation is best gleaned from the plethora of music singles released over the past year. The incumbent regime has exiled more Oromo singers and artists than any other professional group, including journalists, for which it is often censured. Until recently, there were more professional Oromo singers in the diaspora than inside the country. Oromo singers are known for embracing the principle that, in the words of Toni Cade Bambara, “the role of the revolutionary artist is to make the revolution irresistible.”
The Oromo singer is at once a provocateur, social critic and an inspiration and outlet to a generation suffocated by a deep state hell-bent on clinging to power through the barrel of the gun.
Oromo musicians released more than 100 #OromoProtest singles in the past year alone. One common thread that runs through all of these songs: A disdain and nonexistent fear for authority and a call for an end to Oromo people’s marginal status. The Oromo singer is at once a provocateur, social critic and an inspiration and outlet to a generation suffocated by a deep state hell-bent on clinging to power through the barrel of the gun.It’s worth noting here that female singers had been at the forefront of this lyrical fight, bucking established norms that deem Geerarsa is the sole domain of male artists, which in and of itself is a form of protest. The list is long but it includes moving clips by Hawi Tezera, Seenaa Solomon, Mulu Bekele, and Keeyeroon Darajjee to mention only a few. These and many other artists, including Haacaalu Hundessa, Caalaa Bultume, Jafar Yusuf, Galaana Garoomsaa, Jireenya Shiferaw, Ittiqa Tafarii, Teferi Mokonnen and Jambo Jote, provided the soundtrack for the revolution.
Hawi, Seenaa, Jireenya, Teferi and many other artists, too many to list here, have been in and out of prison. Caalaa Bultume and a handful of other artists including Shukri Jamal, Kadir Martu, Zerihun Wodajo, Addisu Karrayyu and Yanet Dinku were forced into exile.
Again and again, a thread that binds these disparate protests — on the streets, at the Olympic stage, on social media, and through music — is their membership in the fierce and fearless Qubee Generation. They share a universal disdain and mistrust for authority, a desire to be free, respect for their basic rights and an acute ethnic self-awareness.
Economic grievances
To be sure, as with young people all across Africa, the Qubee generation also has real and everyday economic grievances. Youth unemployment continues to run high. The lowest paying public service job requires party membership or deep connections to those in power. Even the lucky few who are employed lack avenues for upward mobility. The hundreds of thousands of yearly college graduates lack well-paying quality jobs. The gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening. The cost of living continues to soar amid persistent inflation. The youth loathe EPRDF’s suffocating Orwellian model of surveillance — known as one to five — which has made life unbearable, reaching down to the village level.
Endemic corruption, cronyism and a heightened focus on ramping up school enrollment to meet global millennial development goals, rather than improving instructional quality, has wrecked the educational system. This is evident in Ethiopia going from having only a handful of universities two decades ago to now boasting more than three dozen public universities. The effects of the plummeting quality of education may not be apparent just yet. But as Ethiopia looks to become a regional manufacturing hub and amid continental efforts toward more regional integration, Ethiopian students are likely to have difficulty competing for jobs and other opportunities. The signs are beginning to show already. Recent college graduates report growing stigma for having spent 16 years going through the school system to only end up working in road construction, breaking cobblestones for Chinese investors.
The way forward: ‘Organize, organize, organize’
Ethiopia’s main challenge today is not corruption or the lack of good governance as the regime often alleges, but its inability to meet the aspirations and grievances of an increasing assertive generation and a new breed of youth, made up mostly of middle and secondary school students, who are determined to decide their fate and shape the destiny of their communities.
The Oromo protests have proved far more disruptive than anything done in the past to address longstanding Oromo grievances. Using social media as an outlet, in a nation where only 4 percent of the population is online, no less, Oromo activists forced the cancellation or postponement of Ethiopia’s secondary school exit exams by leaking test answers to diaspora-based agitators. Official meetings have been recorded and leaked to the media, creating mistrust at the highest levels of government to a point where authorities felt compelled to mandate government ministers, parliamentarians, and regional officials to turn off their cell phones during important meetings.
In spite of all these developments, the EPRDF regime continues to ignore the writing on the wall, instead choosing to play an embarrassing game of cat and mouse with an unpredictable and a horizontally organized movement. The cosmetic changes at the top of the pyramid, including the recent cabinet shuffle, and promises of “deep reform” continue to sidestep the very real issues that are pushing an entire generation toward the edge.
Every day that the EPRDF regime tries to explain away popular, grassroots revolt as machinations of few bad actors from abroad, the tide continues to turn against its brutal and repressive rule. For every athlete or activist that’s forced into exile, there are hundreds more determined to expose the regime’s excesses, promising to keep the story in the media limelight. It will only be a matter of time until rank and file Oromo bureaucrats, the Oromia police, merchants and Oromo members of the armed forces join the budding revolution — for they too belong to the gallant Qubee Generation. Ethiopia’s history suggests that that would herald the end of EPRDF and yet another bloody transition in a country that has never seen a single peaceful transfer of power.
Ethiopia continues to run headlong into the abyss at a fast pace. Its phony federalism, promises of self-governance, and claims of economic miracle have been exposed as a sham from beginning to end. The state of emergency may have temporarily quelled the street protests but the deeper discontents remain. The Qubee generation appears ready to fight on until, in the words of Oromo leader Bekele Gerba, either all Oromos are jailed, killed and exiled, or until everyone is free.
Global trends such as the shocking Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president suggest that the establishment in Addis Ababa will have a hard time prevailing against Oromo protesters. But in our view, much remains to be done to dislodge the entrenched EPRDF regime. The loose coalition appears shaky. It is badly wounded from within and without. But it is still the biggest and even formidable obstacle blocking the winds of change in Ethiopia.
One thing is for sure: Unlike previous generations of Oromo revolutionaries, the Qube Generation has outwitted the ruling party time after time. Thanks to its resourcefulness and resilience, the regime had to retool itself from time to time simply to catch up with the speed and creativity of the protesters. It is not doubted that Oromo activists are using the remaining months of the state of emergency to ponder next steps.
This holiday season, as we celebrate the visions and victories of Feyisa’s generation, both big and small, we must remain mindful of the incessant need for a broad-based and multi-prolonged campaign to create a durable peace in Ethiopia. Beyond individual acts of heroism, transformative change comes communally from the ground up. Diaspora activism has been key in echoing and amplifying the voices of the protests. But our storytelling — in words, songs and art — must continue to be grounded not in our grandiose political ambitions or positionings, but in the real, everyday grievances of those at home who are staring down the barrel of a gun.
In his keynote address at the 2016 Oromo Studies Association annual conference in August, imprisoned veteran Oromo leader, Merera Gudina, recalled a popular slogan from his student days. At the inauguration of the last leadership of the University Students Union of Addis Ababa, Eshetu Chole, veteran student activist and later professor of Economics there, now deceased, shouted out three slogans to the roaring sound of thousands of university staff and students:
One organize
Two organize;
Three organize
In Merera’s words, “in this regard, there is a clear gap we (the Oromo) should fill.”
Will the Qubee Generation finally bridge this gap?
A luta continua, vitória é certa. Happy Holidays to all!
The construction cranes towering above the building sites on Ras Abebe Aragay Street in central Addis Ababa are tangible evidence of Ethiopia’s lofty ambitions to transform its capital into a modern hub.
In two years’ time this should become a boulevard of gleaming skyscrapers, home to leading banks and others attracted by Ethiopia’s state-led development model. And with sub-Saharan Africa’s only electric light rail network outside South Africa passing nearby, Addis Ababa will be able to project a much more developed image than any of its regional rivals.
Foreign investors, notably from China, have this year ploughed $2.5bn into an economy that has experienced double-digit annual growth over most of the past decade. But behind the façade, cracks are appearing in the model that helped Ethiopia become one of Africa’s star economic performers.
The consequence for the authoritarian government, which derives much of its legitimacy since taking power 25 years ago from delivering development in the absence of many basic freedoms, is unprecedented uncertainty, analysts say.
Ethiopia is in the third month of a state of emergency imposed to quell demonstrations against the regime, with hundreds of people killed in a brutal crackdown on protests that began more than a year ago. Foreign-owned businesses, particularly in textiles and flower farming, have been targeted in attacks that have caused tens of millions of dollars of damage.
By sacrificing rule-of-law and predictability to achieve short-term stability, the Ethiopian government has damaged its reputation
A few companies have left while others have put expansion plans on hold. Government promises of compensation for the damage have been extremely slow to materialise, adding to investors’ wariness.
Diplomats warn that the government, dominated by the Tigray ethnic group which comprise just 6 per cent of the population, is not addressing the protesters’ underlying grievances of inequitable growth, lack of democracy and perceived rampant nepotism.
“By sacrificing rule-of-law and predictability to achieve short-term stability, the Ethiopian government has damaged its reputation by reinforcing the perception that it is more authoritarian than democratic,” said a western diplomat who engages with foreign companies.
For visitors to Addis Ababa, the most noticeable impact of the crackdown is the complete lack of mobile internet and severe disruption to online services. Deloitte, the global advisory firm, has estimated the shutdown is costing the economy $500,000 a day.
“It has become more than annoying, my business is suffering,” says an engine oil salesman in Addis Ababa, who asked not to be named because of his criticisms of the government. “I like to do a lot of sales on the move, but it’s now very inconvenient. Does the government realise the effect of what it’s doing?”
The country’s growing tourism industry has also been hit, with tour operators reporting lost earnings of $7m in the weeks after the state of emergency was imposed in October. Western governments have lifted travel advisories for most of the country but people in the hospitality industry predict it will take time for visitors to return.
“We have some foreign tourists staying but far fewer than usual,” says the manager at an Addis Ababa hotel who asked not to be named. “And there are practically no western business travellers. The Chinese are still coming though.”
Roger Lee, chief executive of TAL, a Hong Kong-based company which produces clothes for brands such as Banana Republic, says despite the unrest, he would not be reversing the decision to open a factory in Hawassa, 275km south of Addis Ababa.
“It’s not the first time it’s happened in a country we work in,” he says, adding: “It’s very hard to find a developing country with no issues.”
The Ethiopian economy is still growing strongly — by 8 per cent this financial year according to official data. Although three percentage points lower than previously forecast it has come against the backdrop of a bad drought.
The International Monetary Fund also predicts continued robust growth, driven by an industrial base that is set to expand as more infrastructure and low-cost manufacturing, much of it financed by China, come on stream.
But there are also myriad worrying signs. The IMF warned in October that Ethiopia’s current account deficit, the amount by which imports exceed exports, “is not sustainable” at more than 10 per cent of gross domestic product for a second successive year. The resulting pressure on foreign exchange availability is adding to investors’ concerns.
David Cowan, Citi’s chief Africa economist, believes the reality is worse and questions an IMF prediction that foreign direct investment will be $4.45bn in 2016-17, nearly $1bn more than its previous estimate.
“I don’t see where the increase in FDI is going to come from,” he says. “I don’t see it from the multinationals, many of which are in a consolidating mode.”
Many are also pessimistic about how the country can create enough jobs when non-Ethiopians continue to be banned from investing in the banking, telecom and retail sectors.
“Successful economies have deep and diverse private sectors and Ethiopia’s just isn’t there,” said one investor, who asked not to be named. “It’s doing some things well but the gaps in its strategy — both economic and political — are glaring and I don’t see any inclination to address them.”
Image copyrightAFP. Image caption The Oromo style of protest, arms crossed above the head as if handcuffed, has become famous
Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups, the Oromo and Amhara, were using these hashtags for months to bring attention to their protests over economic and political marginalisation.
They accused the government of killing hundreds of demonstrators and arresting thousands in brutal crackdowns.
But in August, when Ethiopia’s Olympic marathon silver medallist Feyisa Lilesa, himself an Oromo, crossed his hands above his head in a gesture of protest as he crossed the finish line in Rio, the world’s media sat up and took notice.
“The Ethiopian government is killing my people so I stand with all protests anywhere as Oromo is my tribe. My relatives are in prison and if they talk about democratic rights they are killed,” he said.
One Ethiopian activist on Twitter compared Lilesa’s actions to the famous black power salute made by two American athletes at the 1974 Olympics, when they staged a silent protest against racial discrimination:
Image copyrightTWITTER
Lilesa was named in Foreign Policy Magazine’s top 100 global thinkers for 2016, which praised him for “breaking the rules of the games” by staging a protest at the Olympics.
He is now living in exile in the US, having said he feared he would be killed or imprisoned if he returned home.
But protests have continued in his home country, with more than 24,000 people arrested since the government introduced a state of emergency in October – half of whom remain in custody.
Verfolgt, geflohen und aufgenommen. In Oberkotzau trifft sich regelmäßig eine Gruppe junger Menschen der Oromo-Ethnie aus Äthiopien.
Junge Oromo mit der verbotenen Flagge ihres Oromo-Landes: Sie sehnen sich nach einem friedlichen Leben.
Oberkotzau– Eine große, bunte Gruppe junger Menschen ist diese Woche Gast im Bürgertreff Oberkotzau gewesen. Leiter Peter Braun hatte erfahren, dass sich in Hof die Gruppe Oromo Family unter der Obhut von Monika Lauterbach zusammengefunden hat. Seit etwa einem Jahr und beginnend mit einem Sprachkurs begleitet die Hoferin Monika Lauterbach die jungen Leute auf ihrem Weg der Integration in eine für sie völlig neue Welt.
In Oberkotzau wurde vor einigen interessierten Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen eingangs die geografische Lage Äthiopiens und der Hochebene Oromo gezeigt; ergänzend dazu berichteten die jungen Oromo von der politischen Situation. Das berichteten sie: Das fruchtbare Ackerland auf der Hochebene ist begehrt, die Rechte der dort ansässigen Bauern und Arbeiter spielen keine Rolle mehr. Es soll an ausländische Investoren verkauft werden, manches ist schon verkauft. Es werden lieber Blumen und Ölsaaten angebaut und keine Grundnahrungsmittel und Kaffee. Wer sich gegen Übergriffe wehrt, wird erbarmungslos verfolgt, eingesperrt, gefoltert und verprügelt. Viele Menschen verschwinden einfach. Dagegen gehen die Menschen auf die Straße und halten Demonstrationen ab, die aber blutig niedergeschlagen werden.
Die äthiopische Regierung achtet die Rechte der Bevölkerung nicht, so der Bericht, und verfolgt die Ethnie der Oromo, sie setzt mit Gewalt und Willkür ihre Ansprüche durch. Das sind die Gründe, warum viele junge Menschen ihre Heimat verlassen müssen, wenn sie überleben wollen. Wenn sie an Demonstrationen teilgenommen, sich gegen die Wegnahme ihrer Farmen gewehrt haben, werden sie gesucht, eingesperrt, getötet. Die Farmen haben die Menschen von ihren Eltern übernommen oder geerbt, das Land, das sie bebauen, gehört dem äthiopischen Staat.
Auf abenteuerlichen und gefährlichen Wegen sind die Oromo vielfältigen Gefahren ausgesetzt, ehe sie in Europa ankommen. Unterwegs haben sie viele Menschen sterben sehen. “Deutschland – das bedeutete für uns Gerechtigkeit, Demokratie und Freiheit”, berichtete einer der Oromo-Jungen. Wir sind von Land zu Land geflohen auf der Suche nach Sicherheit und Leben.
“Erst in Deutschland haben wir eine menschenwürdige Behandlung erfahren. Selbst in Italien mussten wir – Jungen wie Mädchen wie Kinder – auf der Straße schlafen, ohne Decke, ohne Essen und Trinken. Wir wollen hier lernen, und wenn es möglich ist, zurückkehren in unsere Heimat, um unser Wissen weiterzugeben.” Für die Frauen allerdings bedeutete Italien einen ebenfalls schwierigen Teil der Reise – sie waren allen Angriffen schutzlos ausgeliefert und hatten kaum eine ruhige Nacht.
Monika Lauterbach lernte die Gruppe als “freundlich, wohlerzogen und sehr höflich” kennen. Einmal wöchentlich trifft man sich. Als Dolmetscher hilft ein Landsmann, der schon länger in Hof ist und die deutsche Sprache gut beherrscht.
Inzwischen begleitet Lauterbach die jungen Menschen auch zu den Anhörungen nach Zirndorf. “Es ist gut, wenn jemand dabei ist, der Beistand leistet und bestimmte Dinge erklären und klären kann,” betont sie. Wie kann man erklären, dass ein Oromo keinen Pass besitzt? “Nicht viele Menschen in Äthiopien besitzen Pässe, Oromos bekommen Pässe zu den gleichen Bedingungen wie Ausländer – sie werden diskriminiert. Sie erhalten Pässe erst nach dem 18. Geburtstag, Geburtsurkunden gibt es in den seltensten Fällen.”
Gute Erfahrungen macht Lauterbach in der Zusammenarbeit mit der Stadt Hof, der Arbeitsagentur und der Volkshochschule in Hof. Vereinbarungen auf Regierungsebene zwischen Deutschland und Äthiopien sind ihrer Meinung nach höchst gefährlich, weil nicht mit offenen Karten gespielt wird. Die äthiopische Regierung hat nicht vor, die Rückkehrer beziehungsweise die ausgewiesenen Landsleute freizulassen und ihnen ihr Land zurückzugeben. Sie würden in Gefängnissen verschwinden.
Fast alle in der Gruppe haben in Äthiopien die Schule besucht. “Aber es reichte, dass ein Familienmitglied an einer Demonstration teilgenommen hat oder in der Freiheitsbewegung war, schon wurde die ganze Familie verfolgt”, berichtet einer der jungen Männer. Nun sind bereits zwei Kinder in Deutschland geboren. Eines besucht in Hof einen Kindergarten, das zweite ist noch ganz klein. Einige Gruppenmitglieder absolvieren Praktika, sind in der Berufsschule, manche haben bereits feste Arbeitsplätze, sie spielen Fußball in Vereinen. Sie sprechen Deutsch und sind auf der Suche nach Frieden und Normalität, wollen arbeiten und lernen und in Handwerksberufen Lehren machen.
People from the Oromo group block a road in Ethiopia after protesters were shot dead by security forces in Wolenkomi, about 35 miles west of Addis Ababa in December 2015. (AFP/Getty Images)
METI, Ethiopia — Earlier this month, hundreds of high school students in the small Ethiopian town of Meti gathered for a demonstration.They were supposed to be celebrating the country’s Nations and Nationalities day, which commemorates the much-vaunted equality of Ethiopia’s 80 ethnic groups. Instead, they defied a two-month-old state of emergency to voice their anger over stalled political reforms and endemic corruption.
The protest was quickly dispersed and arrests were made, locals said, and calm returned to the village. But the incident is a sign of the simmering resentment that threatens to shatter Ethiopia’s enforced quiet.
The United States, one of Ethiopia’s biggest backers, is urging the government to address the widespread dissatisfaction and open up the country’s politics before it is too late.
“We feel it has reached an inflection point where some hard decisions are going to have to be made,” said Tom Malinowski, the assistant secretary of state for human rights, in an interview during a recent visit to the capital, Addis Ababa. “Otherwise, a lot of the achievements could be jeopardized, and we know from the country’s history what a true crisis could look like.”
It is difficult to overstate the importance of Ethiopia to Africa’s stability. It has the continent’s second-largest population — nearly 100 million people — one of its fastest growing economies and a powerful military that helps stabilize a string of troubled countries around it.
The United States — and many other countries — have invested extensively in aid programs to help the Ethiopian government wrest the country out of poverty and bring it to middle-income status. If it succeeds — and becomes a democracy as well — it could be a model for developing nations everywhere.
Ethiopia has witnessed double-digit growth in the past decade. But this rapid economic expansion has resulted in strains, especially when new factories and commercial farms are being built on land taken from farmers. The central Oromo region, which has historically felt marginalized — despite having the largest segment of the population and some of the richest farmland — has been particularly hard hit.
Protests erupted there in November 2015 over the land grabs, corruption in the local government and lack of services such as running water, electricity and roads. The demonstrations later spread to the northern Amhara region, which has grievances of its own with a government that residents maintain is dominated by the Tigrayan minority group.
It has been the worst unrest in Ethiopia since Tigrayan-led rebels overthrew the Marxist government in 1991. Amnesty International estimates at least 800 people have died in the suppression of protests over the past year.
People have also increasingly singled out Tigrayans for their woes, accusing them of getting the best jobs and dominating the economy. There have been cases of attacks on Tigrayans in the north of the country, and there are fears the unrest could take on a more ethnic dimension.
After dozens were killed during a botched attempt to disperse a crowd at an Oromo religious festival in October, mobs attacked factories and commercial farms across the country and the government declared a state of emergency. Violence has since dropped off, and the government has said it is addressing grievances and has already made significant progress, especially in the Oromo region.
“The reform in Oromia has been far ahead when compared to other regions,” insisted government spokesman Negeri Lencho in a recent news conference. “Ethiopia is in a state of reform — the reform began at the cabinet level . . . and is now continuing at other government levels to the lowest levels.”
But a dozen people interviewed by The Washington Post in the Oromo region said there have been no changes.
“The previous officials are still in office,” complained an old man walking with a cane from a weekend market in the town of Ejere. Like everyone else interviewed, he spoke on the condition of anonymity because of concerns for his safety.
He paused under an acacia tree overlooking his village to complain how nothing had improved. There had been no effort to address calls for paved roads and the installation of electricity, he said.
“The people are resentful of the local officials and don’t want to discuss things with them,” he said. The local administrator also had not shown much interest in talking to the people, he said, although he admitted a potential reason: Villagers burned down his house last year.
A middle-aged woman dressed in a floral print dress and white shawl interrupted. “We need the government to respond to the demands of the people,” she said, her voice rising. “What we need is for the killings and imprisonments to stop.”
Villagers described a climate of fear, with late-night raids targeting young people who had been accused of protesting. Few doubted that demonstrations will resume once the state of emergency is lifted. The government has promised a new electoral system with proportional representation so that opposition politicians have a chance to be elected. Currently, the opposition has no seats in the parliament or on local councils.
“What the government says is simply astonishing, what they are saying is totally different from what we see on the ground,” a young Oromo said in a village not far from the capital.
“On one hand, they talk about a dialogue with the opposition. But on the other hand, they are arresting the head of the main opposition party,” he added, referring to the Dec. 1 arrest of the country’s most prominent Oromo opposition leader, Merera Gudina.
Most of his party’s top and midlevel leaders have also been imprisoned over the past year despite the government’s talk of the need for dialogue with all political parties.
“The effect of the state of emergency counteracts the aspirations they have articulated,” Malinowski noted. He acknowledged that while the Ethiopian government is suggesting reforms, little has materialized. “The problem is they haven’t done any of it yet, and even with unqualified commitment and speed, these things are going to take quite some time to achieve.”
As the countryside seethes, time is not on the government’s side. The United States has urged a number of confidence-building measures such as releasing opposition figures.
The government may be starting to respond. Following Malinowski’s visit in mid-December, it released 9,800 of the nearly 25,000 people detained during the state of emergency.
But years of overwhelming election victories by the ruling party and its allies have left people deeply cynical about the possibility of change.
“During the past elections, those that came to power were not the ones chosen by the people,” said a 32-year-old farmer standing by the side of the highway near the town of Ambo. “We don’t know where the ballots of the people go.”
With opposition groups in the Ethiopian diaspora often preaching violence, Malinowski said the people must be shown that peaceful change within the political system is still possible.
“If they lose faith in that, they are not going to stop asking for change; they will just be more likely to listen to people who seek more extreme goals by more extreme means,” he warned.
The main purpose of this article is to provoke discussions on the “sacred”, yet very important issue of this country-the Question of Nationalities. The article as it was prepared for a special occasion (where detailed analysis was due time and other inconveniences impossible) suffers from generalizations and inadequate analysis. But I still feel it is not mediocre for a beginning. I expect my readers to avoid the temptation of snatching phrases out of their context and capitalizing on them. Instead every point raised here should be examined in the light of the whole analysis.
We have reached a new stage in the development of the student movement, a level where Socialism as a student ideology has been taken for granted, and reaction with all its window dressing is on the defensive. The contradictory forces are no more revolution versus reform, but correct scientific Socialism versus perversion and fadism.
The Socialist forces in the student movement till now have found it very risky and inconvenient to bring into the open certain fundamental questions because of their fear of being misunderstood. One of the delicate issues which has not yet been resolved up to now is the Question of Nationalities-some people call it ridiculously tribalism-but I prefer to call it nationalism. Panel discussions, articles in STRUGGLE and occasional speakers, clandestine leaflets and even tete-a-tete groups have not really delved into it seriously. Of course there was indeed the fear that it may alienate certain segments of the student population and as well the fear that the government may take advantage of an honest discussion to discredit the revolutionary student movement.
Starting from last year, a small minority began to discuss this delicate issue for the most part in secluded places. Discussions, even private, leak out and because they were not brought into the open they normally led to backbiting, misunderstanding and grossly exaggerated rumours. I think students are mature enough to face reality even if they are very sensitive. And the only solution to this degeneration, as witnessed from some perverted leaflets running amock [amok] these two weeks, is open discussion.
What are the Ethiopian peoples composed of? I stress on the word peoples because sociologically speaking, at this stage, Ethiopia is not really one nation. It is made up of a dozen nationalities with their own languages, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity. And what else is a nation? It is not made of a people with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, particular history, particular social and economic organization? Then, may I conclude that, in Ethiopia, there is the Oromo Nation, the Tigrai Nation, the Amhara Nation, the Gurage Nation, the Sidama Nation, the Wellamo [Wolayta] Nation, the Adere [Harari] Nation, and however much you may not like it, the Somali Nation.
This is the true picture of Ethiopia. There is, of course, the fake Ethiopian Nationalism advanced by the ruling class, and unwillingly accepted and even propagated by innocent fellow travelers.
What is this fake Nationalism? Is it not simply Amhara and to a certain extent Amhara-Tigre supremacy? Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian language is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian music is? Ask anybody what the “national dress” is? It is either Amhara or Amhara-Tigre!!
To be a “genuine Ethiopian” one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity and to wear the Amhara-Tigre Shamma in international conferences. In some cases to be an “Ethiopian”, you will even have to change your name. In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (to use Fanon’s expression). Start asserting your national identity and you are automatically a tribalist, that is if you are not blessed to be born an Amhara. According to the constitution you will need Amharic to go to school, to get a job, to read books (however few) and even to listen to the news on Radio “Ethiopia” unless you are a Somali or an Eritrean in Asmara for obvious reasons.
To anybody who has got a nodding acquaintenance with Marxism, culture is nothing more than the super-structure of an economic basis. So cultural domination always presupposes economic subjugation. A clear example of economic subjugation would be the Amhara and to a certain extent Tigrai Neftegna system in the South and the Amhara-Tigre Coalition in the urban areas. The usual pseudo-refutation of this analysis is the reference to the large Amhara andd Tigrai masses wallowing in poverty in the countryside. For that matter during the heydays of British imperialism a large mass of British Workers had to live under inhuman conditions.
Another popular counter argument is that there are two or three ministers of non-amhara-Tigre Nationality in the Cabinet, one or two generals in the army, one or two governors and a dozen balabats in the countryside. But out and out imperialists like the British used to rule their colonies mainly by enlisting the support of tribal chiefs, who were much more rich than the average citizen of the British Metropolis. The fact that (Houphet) Boigne and Senghor were members of the French National Assembly and the fact that they were even ministers did not reduce an iota of Senegalese and Ivory Coast [Ivoirians] loss of political independence.
Of course the economic and cultural subjugation by the Amharas and their junior partners the Tigres is a historical accident. Amharas are not dominant because of inherent imperialist tendencies. The Oromos could have done it, the Wellamos [Wolaytas] could have done it and history proves they tried to do so. But that is not an excuse for the perpetuation of this situation. The immediate question is we must declare a stop to it. And we must build a genuine national- state.
And what is this genuine national-state? It is a state in which all nationalities participate equally in state affairs, it is a state where every nationality is given equal opportunity to preserve and develop its language, its music and its history. It is a state where Amharas, Tigres, Oromos, Aderes [Harari], Somalis, Wollamos [Wolaytas], Gurages, etc. are treated equally. It is a state where no nation dominates another nation be it economically or culturally.
And how do we achieve this genuine democratic and egalitarian state?
Can we do it through military? No!! A military coup is nothing more but a change of personalities. It may be a bit more liberal than the existing regime but it can never resolve the contradiction between either classes or nationalities. The Neway brothers and Tadesse Birus could not have done it. Talking about Mengistu and Tadesse, one cannot fail to remember the reaction that the Mengistus coup though a family one and at that by a sector of Shoa Amharas (with few exceptions, of course among the Workeneh) was very popular just because it was staged by “Ethiopians”-Amharas. With Tadesse, it was automatically a tribalist uprising. Why? Tadesse an Oromo cannot stage a nationalist coup but Oromo Supremacist.
I am not equivocal in condemning coups, but the Tadesse coup had at least one significant quality and a very important one too. It gave our Oromo Brothers and Sisters self-respect. And self-respect is an important pre-requisite for any mass-based revolution. Even the so-called revolutionaries who scoffed at the coup just like the mass of the student body, could not comprehend this quality. You can clearly see in this instance the power of the Amhara-Tigre supremacist [supremacist] feelings. They clearly proved that they were nothing more than the products of government propaganda on this question.
Can the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Bale armed struggle achieve our goal? Not with their present aims and set-up.
Both these movements are exclusive in character, led by the local Bourgeoisie in the first instance and the local feudal lords in the second. They do not have international outlook, which is essential for our goal. They are perfectly right in declaring that there is national oppression. We do not quarrel with them on this score. But their intention is to stop there. They do not try to expand their struggles to the other nationalities. They do not attempt to make a broad-based assault on the foundations of the existing regime. They deliberately try to forget the connection of their local ruling classes with the national oppression. In short these movements are not led by peasants and workers. Therefore, they are not Socialists; it would only be a change of masters for the masses. But for the Socialists the welfare of the masses comes first.
The same can be said for the Gojjam uprising. But I would like to take this opportunity once again to show how much Amhara supremacism [supremacism] is taken for granted in this Campus.
To applaud the ELF is a sin. If anything favorable is written out, it is automatically refuted by both USUAA and NUEUS. But the Gojjam affair was different. Support for it was practically a show of identity to the so-called revolutionaries.
Mind you, I am just saying that these movements are not lasting solutions for our goal-the set-up of a genuine Nationalist Socialist State. I am all for them, the ELF, the Bale movements, the Gojjam uprising, to the extent that they have challenged and weakened the existing regime, and have created areas of discontent to be harnessed later on by a genuine Socialist revolution.
One thing again is certain. I do not oppose these movements just because they are secessionists. There is nothing wrong with secessionism as such. For that matter secession is much better than nationally oppressive government. I quote Lenin, “…People resort to secession only when national oppression and national antagonisms make joint life absolutely intolerable and hinder any and all economic intercourse. In that case the interests of the freedom of the class struggle will be best served by Secession. I would also like to quote the resolution on the question of nationalities from the London International Socialist Congress of 1896 attended, supported and adopted by the Bolsheviks who brought about the October revolution, “This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination and expresses its sympathy for the workers and peasants of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism.”
As long as secession is led by the peasants and workers and believes in its internationalist obligation, it is not only to be supported but also militarily assisted. It is pure backwardness and selfishness to ask a people to be partners in being exploited till you can catch up. We should never dwell on the subject of secession, but whether it is progressive or reactionary. A Socialist Eritrea and Bale would give a great impetus to the revolution in the country and could form an egalitarian and democratic basis for re-unification.
To come back to our central question: How can we form a genuine egalitarian national-state? It is clear that we can achieve this goal only through violence, through revolutionary armed struggle. But we must always guard ourselves against the pseudo-nationalist propaganda of the regime. The revolution can start anywhere. It can even be secessionist to begin with, as long as led by the progressive forces-the peasants and the workers, and has the final aim the liberation of the Ethiopian Mass with due consideration to the economic and cultural independence of all the nationalities. It is the duty of every revolutionary to question whether a movement is Socialist or reactionary not whether a movement is secessionist or not. In the long run Socialism is internationalism and a Socialist movement will never remain secessionist for good.
To quote Lenin again, “From their daily experience the masses know perfectly well the value of geographical and economic ties and the advantages of a big market and a big state.” From this point of view of the struggle as well, a regime like ours harassed from corners is bound to collapse in a relatively short period of time. But when the degree of consciousness of the various nationalities is at different levels, it is not only the right but the duty of the most conscious nationality to first liberate itself and then assist others in the struggle for total liberation. Is that not true of Korea? We do support this movement, don’t we? Then, what is this talk of tribalism, secessionism, etc…..?
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Wallelign Mekonnen Kassa was born on March 22, 1945 in Debresina Woreda, Wollo, Ethiopia.
In 1965, he joined the Haile-Selassie I University and studied political science. He was one of the devoted university students who struggled to emancipate the Ethiopian workers and peasants from tyranny. Wallelign and his comrades were imprisoned by the Ethiopian government and released after five months. Wallelign was suspended from university by the administration.
The articles he wrote include, “The Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia”, which states the national repression and the solution for this problem, “Le Awaju Awaj”, an article in response to the emperor’s address in the radio regarding the university students, “Ye Azinaraw Eseregan” (Prisoner’s Azinara ) and “Message to Professor Afework Gebereyesus”.
Walelign acquired the love for his country from an early age, and he dedicated his life to Ethiopia until the moment he was assassinated, December 9, 1972.
The African Union has expressed concern about Ethiopia’s current State of Emergency against the upcoming Heads of State Summit in the capital Addis Ababa in January 2017.
The concerns were raised by the Chairperson Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who met with the newly appointed Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the AU Headquarters on Tuesday.
The minister Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu allayed the fears of the AU chairperson by assuring that “the situation had now calmed down substantially and nothing untoward was anticipated to occur that could disrupt the Summit proceedings”.
“The Government was fully engaging the people, with a view to find solutions to the teething issues, such as the persistent problem of youth unemployment which gives way to the exploitation of idle hands,” a statement from the AU quoted the minister.
He also expressed hope that the relationship between Ethiopia and the African Union to remain solid and assume its position as the capital of Africa.
Dlamini Zuma praised the cooperation of the Ethiopian government.
Ethiopia declared a state of emergency on October 9 to curb the unrest which turned violent leading to damage of properties including those of local and international businesses.
Before the State of Emergency was imposed, over 50 people died on October 2 in a stampede at a festival in Bishoftu after police fired teargas and warning shots to disperse protesters at the event.
At least 500 people have been killed and thousands arrested in the wave of anti-government protests in the Amhara and Oromia regions over the past months.
International bodies including the United Nations and the European Union have called on the Ethiopian government to exercise restraint against protesters.
The European Parliament (EP) has officially written to the Ethiopian government seeking clarification on the arrest of an opposition leader, Dr. Merera Gudina.
The EP President, Martin Schulz, in a letter to President Mulatu Teshome said they were disturbed about the arrest of the Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) leader. The EP also reiterated its call for the charges against Gudina to be made known.
‘‘It appears that Dr Gudina was arrested by Ethiopian authorities upon his return from a short stay in Brussels in early November, during which he also met with Members of the European Parliament,’‘ the letter read.
I would like to remind you, that the European Parliament is a House of democracy, where different voices can be heard, from foreign governments as well as representatives of opposition groups.
The letter stated that the Ethiopian ambassador in Brussels had said the Gudina’s detention was connected with contacts he had with individuals Addis Ababa deemed as ‘terrorists.’ It added that it was ‘rather unfortunate that his arrest is linked to meetings he had with the European parliament.
‘‘I would like to remind you, that the European Parliament is a House of democracy, where different voices can be heard, from foreign governments as well as representatives of opposition groups,’‘ the letter added.
Late last month, Ethiopian security forces arrested the academician who is the chairman of the OFC, shortly after his arrival in the capital Addis Ababa.
Prof. Merera was returning from Brussels where – together with other Ethiopian activists and the Olympian athlete Feyisa Lellisa – he had had a meeting with Members of the European Parliament on 9 November 2016.
The state-affiliated FANA broadcasting corporate however quoted authorities as saying that Gudina was arrested because he had flouted the State Of Emergency currently being enforced nationwide.
According to FANA, the Secretariat of the Command Post said Gudina violated an article of the law which prohibited any communication with banned terrorist organizations and anti-peace groups. “He is under investigation for violating this article,” the Command Post said.
The European Parliament adopted an urgency resolution on the violent crackdown on protesters in January 2016, which requested that the Ethiopian authorities stop using anti-terrorism legislation to repress political opponents, dissidents, human rights defenders, other civil society actors and independent journalists.
Since January 2016 the human rights situation in Ethiopia has not improved at all. Human Rights Watch reports that security forces have killed more than 500 people during protests over the course of 2016.
The long distance athlete became famous during the just ended Rio Olympic games after he made an anti-government gesture at the end of his track event. He crossed his arms above his head as he finished the event as a protest against the Ethiopian government’s crackdown on political dissent.
He won the silver medal in the men’s marathon after finishing the 42 kilometer race. He later claimed that his life was in danger. He sought for asylum in the United States and has been living there since leaving Rio.
Given the fact that the Olympic Charter bans political propaganda, demonstrations are a rarity at the games. Nevertheless, Ethiopian runner Feyisa Lilesa snubbed the rulebook in order to call attention to the brutal actions of his country’s security forces.
Under the title, ‘‘For breaking the rules of the games,’‘ FP wrote about Feyisa: ‘‘Given the fact that the Olympic Charter bans political propaganda, demonstrations are a rarity at the games. Nevertheless, Ethiopian runner Feyisa Lilesa snubbed the rulebook in order to call attention to the brutal actions of his country’s security forces.
‘‘As the marathoner approached the finish line in second place, he crossed his arms over his head—an attention-grabbing gesture to show solidarity with his Oromo tribe. In the weeks before the race, the Ethiopian government had cracked down on protests by the embattled indigenous group and killed dozens.
They went on to quote him in an interview with AP news agency as saying, “If I would’ve taken my medal and went back to Ethiopia, that would’ve been the biggest regret of my life.” Adding further that “I wanted to be a voice for a story that wasn’t getting any coverage.”
Feyisa like the twelve others listed in his category were recognized for challenging the status quo in order to put their views across. ‘‘These individuals showed that agitation takes myriad forms,’‘ the FP said.
Aside Feyisa, another African was listed in the same category. Pastor Evan Mawarire of Zimbabwe who championed the #ThisFlag protests through the use of social media platform, Twitter. The FP listed him ‘‘For initiating a democratic movement.’‘
Olympic silver medalist Feyisa Lilesa (Fayyisaa Leellisaa) finished fourth in his first debut after Rio Olympic protest. He clocked 2:15:57 in Honolulu men’s marathon, December 11, 2016. Feyisa walked the last 100 meters with his famous hands in ‘X’ in silent protest. His compatriot Oromo athlete Deribe Roba finished third clocking 2:13:43.
Lawrence Cherono set a course record of 2:09:39 to win ahead of fellow Kenyan Wilson Chebet (2:10:48), who was also under the previous course record.
Kenya’s Brigid Kosgei won the women’s race in 2:31:11 ahead of American Lindsey Scherf (2:34:05) and pre-race favourite Oromo athlete Buzunesh Deba from Ethiopia (2:35:34).
The official result:
Men
1. Lawrence Cherono – 2:09:39 – RECORD
2. Wilson Chebet – 2:10:50 – RECORD
3. Deribe Roba – 2:13:43
4. Feyisa Lelisa – 2:15:57
5. Tatsuya Itagaki – 2:19:24
As the state of emergency in Ethiopia continues, the East African country remains a powder keg and unrest is brewing, particularly in Oromia, where the central government crushed down most brutally on anyone who dares voicing dissent. Some of the failures of the government to respect and integrate minorities are historical, while others are linked to the current leaders’ refusal to accept dissenting voices. Despite a positive economic and development track record – at least on paper – Ethiopia shuns diversity in political opinion by cracking down on opposition parties and jailing it members. The 2015 election, for instance, produced a parliament without any opposition, partly due to freedom of expression being strictly curtailed, leaving opposition groups hardly any room for manoeuvre.
No longer are bands of young men marauding on the outskirts of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, trying to set fire to foreign-owned factories. Nearly two months into Ethiopia’s six-month state of emergency, it appears to be having the desired effect: protests rocking its two most populous regions have subsided.
It remains to be seen, though, whether this is the beginning of a sustained period of calm or a temporary break in the most persistent and widespread protests this country has seen since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling party came to power following a revolution in 1991.
At that crucial juncture Ethiopia embarked hopefully on a struggle to emerge in the modern world on its own terms. It succeeded in doing so by employing a unique political model that is “an alloy of revolutionary theories, pragmatic neoliberalism and intrinsically Ethiopian customary practices”, says historian and long-term Horn of Africa expert Gérard Prunier.
While that political experiment has brought significant economic growth to the country, many claim it has failed the Ethiopian people, who are now voicing that fact.
“This government came into being with the support of the rural poor,” says Abebe Hailu, a human rights lawyer who was in college during the student movement that precipitated the 1974 downfall of emperor Haile Selassie, and who lived through the ensuing military dictatorship that eventually fell in 1991 to the rebel-founders of the EPRDF. “Now it is the rural poor that is against them – this is the irony,” he says.
When Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa crossed the finishing line in the Rio Olympics in August he crossed his forearms above his head in a widely adopted gesture to protest his government’s violent crackdown on ethnic protests seething since November 2015, leaving upwards of 600 dead, according to rights groups.
Those protests went against the grain of Ethiopia’s hermetic history, which has long seen numerous uprisings dealt with internally, away from prying eyes.
Ethiopia has long been a land of contradictions. On the one hand, the EPRDF has the most impressive economic and development-driven track record of any Ethiopian government in modern history.
But set against that, during the past two decades it has shunned diversity of political opinion, repeatedly cracking down on opposition parties, putting their politicians in jail or forcing them into exile. The 2015 election produced a parliament without a single opposition representative. Freedom of expression in Ethiopia is strictly curtailed, and as a result an independent civil society no longer exists.
At the same time, Ethiopia’s citizenry is increasingly angry at seemingly never-ending government corruption, while a mushrooming youthful population means the number of young unemployed men across the country irrevocably rises. Many sit idly on streets, their thoughts and frustrations turning toward the centre of power that is Addis Ababa.
“The immediate causes for the various groups protesting are different but they have the same demands: deliver the right kind of leadership,” says Yilikal Getenet, chairman of the opposition Blue Party.
Initially months of protests remained largely within the Oromia region, home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, constituting about 35 percent of the country’s nearly 100 million population.
But then in August [2016] violence broke out among the Amhara – at 27 per cent, Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group – in northern Ethiopia’s famed city of Gondar, a popular tourist attraction because of its ancient castles.
Violence even came to the usually serene lakeside Amhara town of Bahir Dar, another popular tourist destination and weekend getaway known for its palm-lined avenues and island monasteries. An initially peaceful anti-government demonstration there on August 7th escalated to violence after a security guard fire into a crowd, leaving at least 30 gunned down by security forces.
At the same time as the Amhara protests, co-ordinated demonstrations occurred in more than nine towns in Oromia, resulting in about 100 deaths, according to Human Rights Watch.
The most recent tragedy came a week before the state-of-emergency declaration on October 9th [2016], when more than 100 people drowned or were crushed to death during a stampede following clashes between police and protesters at a traditional annual Oromo festival at the volcanic lake town of Bishoftu, about 50km southeast of the capital.
Together the Oromo and Amhara represent more than 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population, hence their resentment of an EPRDF perceived as having been usurped for 25 years by one of its key founding entities, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is drawn from an ethnic group that makes up only 6 per cent of the population, and which in addition to government dominates business and the security services.
“The TPLF has manipulated the multi-ethnic federation to divide and rule forever,” says Birhanu Lenjiso, an Ethiopian research fellow at Radboud University in the Netherlands. “The people are now asking for genuine multi-ethnic federation in the country.”
Addis Ababa, the hub of political power and the engine of Ethiopia’s economy, which exists as an autonomous city state within the federation, is surrounded by Oromia. Overall, the city has remained relatively cocooned from the tumult. But that hasn’t stopped some talking of its iconic Meskal Square in the heart of the city waiting to serve as its Tiananmen Square.
Ethiopia has long been a development darling in the eyes of the international body politic. After the world was shaken by images of Ethiopian famine in 1984, the country turned around its fiscal fortunes and it now has one of the fastest growing economies in the world.
Against the abject failure of international assistance in Somalia, Ethiopia is often held up as a heartening example of indigenous government and international partners succeeding in reducing poverty and mortality rates.
But many critics say the statistics that have wowed the international community have hidden the more complex reality in which most Ethiopians, while not as susceptible as in the past to famine and disease, are still utterly stifled in their lives’ endeavours.
“The oppressed stay silent but eventually you reach a critical mass and then it boils over,” Yilikal says. “Hundreds have been killed but they keep protesting. They go to protests knowing the risks. So what does that tell you?”
Ethiopia, famously described by historian Edward Gibbon as the country that slept a thousand years while the world ignored it, has now firmly plugged itself into the global network. Satellite dishes dotted all over residential areas in towns and cities beam in news from around the world – including from Ethiopian diaspora news channels that are potently anti-government – while mobile phone ownership and access to the internet follow a steep upward curve.
“More than 50 per cent of the Ethiopian population was born under this government,” says Robert Wiren, a French journalist writing about the Horn of Africa for the last 15 years. “This young population does not compare the present system with its predecessors but receives news from abroad which contradicts the governmental rhetoric. People in the street know that journalists and opponents are jailed, that the security forces kill demonstrators. There is a real danger of ethnic hatred against the Tigrayans.”
Matters aren’t helped by the fact that wealth from the surging economic numbers has failed to trickle down to the vast majority of Ethiopians, who eke out the daily grind while wages stagnate, and inflation and living costs rise.
All the while, rank corruption results in a select few monopolising lucrative deals in the economy, to be then observed splashing out on oversized shiny pick-up trucks and drinking bottles of Black Label whiskey in the capital’s swanky new hotels, which seem to pop up daily.
“Since Ethiopia’s economic growth is due to a centralised driven process, a lot of non-Tigray people suspect the Tigray elite to be the only beneficiary of the economic boom,” Wiren says.
History always matters, but especially in Ethiopia, where people take the long view. Ethiopians cherish their history – one of the world’s oldest Christian traditions; the only African country that wasn’t colonised – and recall and tell the associated stories spanning the centuries; at the same time they remember the tragedies and atrocities committed among the country’s various ethnic groups, all of which exerts a powerful influence on the present.
“What’s happening [now] is a combination of everything: historical marginalisation and present marginalisation,” says Merera Gudina, chairman of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress Party. “It’s a revolt against minority rule and its policies.”
The EPRDF was preceded by two authoritarian centralised regimes: emperor Haile Selassie and then military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. Both were viewed as Amhara-centric, and the federal constitution created by the EPRDF in 1991– and held by many, including critics of the government, as an effective fit for Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups – was meant to mitigate that fact, accommodating Ethiopia’s diversity and competing claims.
But from the start, the EPRDF has been criticised for allowing the TPLF to hog the limelight and power in the new Ethiopia that has existed since 1991.
“The TPLF has trapped itself by ethnicising political life without accepting a real autonomy for every regional state,” Wiren says. “It is an open secret that behind each regional state leader there is a kind of unofficial political supervisor.”
This style of governance has alienated especially the Amhara (who recall when they used to call the shots) and the Oromo (who feel they have always been excluded, first by the Amhara, and then by the Tigrayans).
“They only know how to talk, they never listen,” says one Addis Ababa resident. “You have a group of Tigrayans in government deciding the fate of 100 million people who aren’t allowed to say anything.”
A major problem for the country’s protest movement is the lack of an organising body to guide it and of a central leadership to engage on its behalf with the EPRDF.
The political opposition in Ethiopia is in disarray. It has suffered and been weakened through government harassment, but has also been criticised for not matching its anti-government rhetoric with discussions of effective policy.
“What does the Ethiopian public want? Firstly peace, secondly stability, thirdly prosperity,” says one Addis Ababa-based foreign politico. “In most cases the Ethiopian opposition have conflated opposition with opposite. When asked for details of the programme for achieving those three needs they revert to type and complain about how difficult it is to be in opposition.”
To compound matters, ever since opposition MPs squabbled in the aftermath of Ethiopia’s crucial 2005 election – the country’s first genuine contest – with some choosing not to take their seats due to allegations of vote rigging, the opposition has remained split among myriad parties that appear unable and unwilling to coalesce into a single effective voice for today’s protests.
At the same time all sides, from government to opposition, whether in Ethiopia or acting overseas, appear hobbled by how the vocabulary of Amharic, the lingua franca of Ethiopia, doesn’t lend itself to terms such as negotiation and compromise. The polarisation of US politics pales in comparison to the mire found in Ethiopia: here you are either with the government or against, there can be no middle ground.
Nevertheless, many point out that it is the EPRDF, as the holders of power, who need break the deadlock.
“They must bring all concerned Ethiopian opposition political groups both home and abroad to the negotiation table,” says Endalk Chala, a prominent Ethiopian blogger studying in the US, who is unable to return to Ethiopia following the arrest in Addis Ababa of his fellow Zone 9 bloggers. “That is what I call a reform and all the rest is nonsense.”
Geopolitical considerations mean Ethiopia is held by the likes of the UK and US to be an important peace and security bulwark in the Horn of Africa, a region troubled by failing states.
Ethiopia also provides large numbers of troops to the internationally funded African force battling al-Qaeda-linked militants in Somalia, as well as to peacekeeping forces in South Sudan and Sudan. Then there’s Ethiopia’s crucial economic role in the region.
“Ethiopia is the region’s locomotive,” says Dawit Gebre-Ab, senior director of strategic planning for the neighbouring Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority. “With its expansion in manufacturing, Ethiopia could become the China of Africa.”
Djibouti, another key part of the West’s anti-terrorism apparatus in the region, in addition to guarding one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, relies for a significant proportion of its GDP on business with Ethiopia.
To Djibouti’s south, Somaliland is banking on a €400 million refurbishment of its underused and underdeveloped Berbera port to alleviate its economic woes, with the next-door market of Ethiopia’s continually growing population – Africa’s second largest, and set to reach 130 million by 2025 – forming a key part of its ambitions to keep it safe from the fate of Somalia to its south.
Were Ethiopia’s internal fissures to worsen, its hitherto economic juggernaut might well be impeded – unsettling the region’s hitherto stabilising process of economic integration – or even derailed.
“Ethiopia has been the only reliable country in the Horn of Africa,” says Lidetu Ayele, founder of the opposition Ethiopia Democratic Party. “If Ethiopia is not strong, other countries will suffer. This government has used the threat of regional terrorism to its own advantage, but that threat is very real.”
“People need to be calm and patient,” Abebe says. “And we need acceptance by the government about making real reforms.”
The government conducted a significant cabinet reshuffle at the end of October, bringing in non-party-affiliated technocrats to deliver change, while promising reforms. But for a country with millennia of centralised, autocratic rule, that’s much easier said than done.
Since 1991 western observers and governments have been calling on the Ethiopian government to deepen its commitment to democratic reforms, but it hasn’t previously shown much interest in listening. Hence many aren’t convinced of either the government’s sincerity or ability to make this happen.
“This government has failed the people not once but 1,000 times, and they’ve broken promise after promise,” says Merera, who, like many others, notes the left-wing revolutionary genesis of the EPRDF. The prevailing accusation is that this ideology still guides the party, which as a result remains fundamentally anti-democratic, believing in a Leninist single-party approach, and is thereby unable to countenance reform.
Opinions about where Ethiopia is heading cover a range of scenarios. It is feasible that a renewed uprising could prove successful, or its attendant pressures result in the internal disintegration of the EPRDF. Both appear unlikely, however, certainly in the short-term. Honed by decades of experience fending off rebellions, Ethiopia’s security apparatus is ruthlessly effective – hence the apparent success of the state of emergency. If judged necessary, an even more blistering government crackdown can’t be ruled out.
Ethiopia doesn’t have to fear, according to observers, a military coup: the army is professional, well trained and its higher echelons respect the constitution and harbour no ambitions to rule. But how they might react to some of the worst-case scenarios predicted – Ethiopia descending into civil war or a failed state torn by ethnic strife – is another matter.
Most observers suggest the best way to avoid the worst case scenarios would be to, at a minimum, release all political prisoners, unshackle the media and allow freedom of expression, and begin reforming key institutions that have been found wanting, such as Ethiopia’s judicial system.
When it comes to the EPRDF’s future role in all this, opinions vary. Some say it has lost every shred of legitimacy and must immediate make way for a transitional government. Others say is not feasible nor in Ethiopia’s best interests. Rather, the EPRDF should, in addition to carrying out meaningful reforms, establish a new electoral commission that would guarantee the next local elections in 2018 and national elections in 2020 were freely contested.
“That is the best course of action as it would provide a solution that isn’t orchestrated by the government but which is chosen by the Ethiopian people,” Lidetu says.
It is now more than a year since the Oromo Protest for justice and democracy began in Ethiopia. It reverberated throughout Oromia and exposed the regime’s use of brutality to suppress and silence dissenting voices. But instead of waning, the struggle gained momentum when the Amhara youth in Gondar and Bahir Dar came out not only to demand justice for themselves but also carrying slogans asking the regime to stop the killings, arbitrary imprisonments, the torture and forced disappearances of innocent Oromo civilians.
Such protest is not only the first of its kind to vehemently challenge the quarter century uncontested rule of the TPLF dominated EPRDF in Ethiopia, but also has significantly shifted the overall power balance, mindsets and political dynamics in the country. It also inspired other peoples of Ethiopia to rise up for their rights and engaged all Oromo from east to west and from south to north irrespective of age, gender or religion. (The streets in Oromia were overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of protesters including a 77-year-old grandmother who went out with her stick in a brave act of defiance against the regime’s brutality.)
Because the protest has, beyond its initial call against land dispossession, evolved into a struggle for freedom, a resistance against injustice, and a longing for a dignified life, no amount of force or of coercion was able to suppress it, let alone stop it. A year on, it is now safe to conclude that this nationwide protest has already planted itself in the hearts and minds of millions of oppressed people as the most significant event of the year.
The protests and the public debates that followed have also impacted others’ views on the long-standing plights of the Oromo and the Amhara, the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Prior to these protests hardly anyone understood, much less publicly recognized, the sacrifices paid by the Oromo and the Amhara to live a dignified life in their own country. Above all, it exposed how successive regimes in Ethiopia have marginalized, denied and robbed these two groups of their ability to develop and flourish as human beings in their own country.
What a demanding public exposed
Inspired by these protests, currently, Ethiopians all over the country are asking their government to protect and respect their economic, social and cultural rights as well as their civil and political rights. But at the same time, the government’s response is helping the people of Ethiopia to realize that it has almost no leadership capacity to respond to their demands. Ethiopians now see that their government is dysfunctional and its leadership in crisis; what exists and functions is a dissonant leadership that exacerbates conflict, driving the society into a downward spiral from frustration to resentment, and perpetuates antagonism and hostility.
Throughout the year, the ruling party has demonstrated no notable leadership capacity; not one political leader has spoken authentically to the hearts and the minds of the people in order to solve the common problem amicably. Instead of making an effort to lead through this crisis and face the challenge by creating an accommodating environment for all Ethiopians, the ruling party cliques have remained empty demagogues who keep on sending divisive messages and wielding their power by fear-mongering techniques.
Beyond the call for freedom and justice, the Oromo and Amhara protests, as well as the defiance in various parts of the country including from the people of Konso in the south and Tigray in the north, have exposed the truth about EPRDF’s leadership capacity, which was mystified by ‘*seventeen years of relentless struggle and tested leadership to defeat the largest military in Africa*’. It is now clear that it is nothing more than an empty ideological rhetoric and a means to frighten, belittle and silence people who ask difficult questions and challenge the system. But that doesn not mean than the rest of Ethiopians do not recognize and appreciate the sacrifices and the agony the Tigray people have paid for seventeen years to oust the military dictatorship. However, it is not hard to see that the TPLF, which was born out of this struggle and had led this protracted war to victory, and the regime it dominates, have turned out to be an authoritarian regime.
There for good or bad
Although the yearlong nationwide protests led by the Oromo and the Amhara, as well as others to various degrees, have exposed the regime’s inability to bring in meaningful political leadership, for good or bad, the TPLF dominated EPRDF is the government in power which, for now, will determine the course of actions to respond to the current struggle for justice and democracy.
There is a possibility that the TPLF dominated EPRDF might take one of the following two courses of actions. Both have a potential to direct or misdirect the current call for democracy and justice in two mutually exclusive directions.
First course of action: road to democratization and peace
The first direction and course of action the TPLF dominated EPRDF may consider is the road to democracy and sustainable peace. However, reversing the current dire political condition and responding to the needs of the people requires it to recognize and understand the need for change; it requires embracing the change and transformation the people want to realize through a democratic process.
Hard as it may be, the following course of actions should precede any other course of action to start the democratization process.
Restore the constitution – build trust and confidence of citizens around the constitution by making it a practical document. Arguably, this means the regime itself should begin respecting the constitution and lead by example.
Scrap laws and policies which are against the constitution and which prevent citizens from exercising their democratic rights enshrined in the constitution. These include, but not limited to, scrapping the Anti-Terrorism Law, which is so far mainly used to silence citizens and violate their rights than persecute suspected terrorists; amending the draconian press law, which is so far used to violate citizens’ right to freedom of expression and access to information; scrapping the Civil Society and Charities Law, which is prohibiting the growth of independent civil society organizations which are the pillars of non-state actors in the development of democracy and human rights in the country.
Release all political prisoners unconditionally. Obviously, once the laws and procedures, which often undermine the constitution, are lifted there is no reason to keep people in prison.
Reform, among others, the justice system, the police, security forces and prison administrations as well as the election board, the anti-corruption commission, the human rights commission, and the state-controlled media.
Possible impact
The ruling party would lose nothing for taking this revolutionary action. In fact, it would help it to breath; to objectively address its current leadership crisis and reemerge as a legitimate political force. It would also provide it with the opportunity to think strategically.
Change is a natural state, which we cannot completely control or make predictable. It is overwhelming and chaotic, but rewarding at the end. The most important step to start the process of change is by being bold, letting go of the old and rigid ways of thinking and governing. The regime in Ethiopia has to come out of its fear of change and see the bigger picture; it should relax its grips on old practices, which did not contribute to its own growth or to that of the rest of the country for the last 25 years.
There is no question that by taking such bold actions, the TPLF dominated EPRDF has a comparative advantage over other political groupings currently operating in the country. As it has shown in the past it can rehabilitate itself quicker than others and appear as a viable political organization in the years to come.
Above all, this action ensures the continuity of the democratization processes by engaging citizens to determine their own future and relieves the existing state-citizen tensions. If this is done, the healing process, as well as the peace and reconciliation process will be relatively easier. Ultimately, this approach also guarantees the existence and continuity of Ethiopia as a nation home to all its citizens.
Implications for a protesting nation
This peaceful democratization process can bring change and transformation to the people of Ethiopia in general and the Oromo in particular, who are the largest ethnic group in the country and have been the driving force of the nationwide protests. As a result, the Oromo struggle for democracy and justice might fall under one of the following two scenarios.
First is the scenario in which Oromo elites, by the virtue of being a middle class, by affiliation to any Oromo-related organization, or by their prior personal experience come together and create a consortium, a democratic front, or a party to lead a meaningful struggle. This may, in turn, render irrelevant disorganized struggles, which often hamper or even take hostage the Oromo struggle for freedom and justice.
The physical and emotional separation and distance of the Oromo elites from the struggle on the ground may at times prevent them from sensing and living the struggle itself. Unless the democratic process on the ground creates room to accommodate all dissenting voices both from within and abroad, those who have the leadership capacity and the necessary political know-how cannot provide adaptive leadership or have the empathetic capacity to connect to the mass, particularly with the young generation that is both leading and shouldering the brunt of the struggle.
The second is a scenario in which the need to phase out the old and replace it with the new thinking and political organization both within the country and abroad takes precedence. The Oromo Protest and the current awakening is a painful form of labor to give birth to a new dynamic and profound political organization fit for the 21st century.
For this new Oromo organization to be born and to become the vanguard of the struggle, all old Oromo organizations, which were and still are trying to contribute under different names and ideologies, have to die a natural death and give way to new thinking and new possibilities. The new will have the energy and capacity to unify and transform the Oromo to a higher level and lead the struggle to victory. Like the TPLF, all Oromo organizations which existed for decades and have tried to contribute, albeit less successfully, have reached their maximum limit and are in need of reform.
The struggle between the old and the new is natural – even our cells are continually dying and being reborn. The Safuvalue, which is unique to Oromo culture and psyche, reaffirms this natural process, which urges the old to peacefully pass the scepter to the new.
Qeerro, the emboldened youth (as the name implies) is currently filling the leadership gap and taking the responsibility of leading the resistance against the current government, even as they are met with brutal responses. The Qeerro is successful in amplifying the struggle to all corners of Oromia and beyond, as well as inspiring all Oromos irrespective of age, religion, gender, class and locality. It has also unified the Oromo under the motto of ‘Tokkummaa’ (oneness or unity) and the ‘Say No’ or ‘Diidnee’ slogan.
Above all, by flying the resistance flag (not the OLF flag) the Qeerro demonstrated that the flag is the sign of freedom for which all revolutionary Oromos sacrificed their lives even long before OLF was created. It has raised this flag because it embodies hope and reminds all Oromos about those beautiful young people who died flying it. Therefore, to lead the struggle to its final destination, the current Qeerro movement is in the stage of development to come out with the new leadership and organization from within its rank and file. Many think that Qeerro is just the network of youth from colleges, high schools, and elementary schools who are just driven by social media. But the fact is there are engineers, professors, medical doctors, businesspeople, and other professionals who are part of the rank and file of the Qeerro.
When the situation is ripe and there is a favorable political environment, the Qeerro can easily transform into a political organization. It is this organization and leadership of the Oromo which can navigate the ship towards freedom through the storm and onto its final destination. It is time this passion gets a new leadership it deserves.
Status quo: The second course of action for TPLF/EPRDF
The above scenario is in the event that the ruling party takes the course to democratize through reform. The second course of action is about maintaining the status quo. But it is a dangerous choice; a choice of war. It is about TPLF/EPRDF refusing to bring change from within itself and the country as a whole.
This is also a choice that looks for easy answers; but it is not the easy way out of the current quagmire. It is easy because it does not require critical thinking and having difficult conversations. This course of action is a decision to repress and silence the current cry for democracy and human rights through the barrel of the gun. It is about war and involving its armed force, intelligence, federal police and militia in the internal issues of the country to brutally suppress the uprising. By doing so, it will only intensify the conflict to a higher level and bring human and property losses to the level the country and the people of Ethiopia can no longer endure.
Unfortunately, this is what we are witnessing today; military forces killing, arresting and torturing citizens on behalf of a regime in power. The impending consequence is that they will never be regarded as a national army delegated to protect the constitution, and will be labeled only as the enemy of the people.
In addition to its military solution to the conflict, TPLF/EPRDF is getting into its age-old habit of manipulating and drawing other nations and nationalities into a civil war; perpetuate religious conflict in different places by pitting one religion against the other; and create conflicts between rural people/farmers and urban dwellers. But it should be known that this will benefit no one, including the ruling party itself.
What is next?
Inspired by the yearlong Oromo and Amhara protests the rest of Ethiopians have made it loud and clear that they need a fundamental change; they have been saying so for 25 years, too. Ethiopians have tried with all their might and used every means possible to make their voices heard and have time and again proclaimed a moment of reckoning for a paradigm shift. Alas, instead of objectively and purposefully responding to this popular demand, the government is stuck into its old tactics of blaming, accusing, and intimidating people.
Now in a frantic act to quell and pacify the protests and silence the voices of the oppressed, in October this year the government declared a state of emergency for six months. However, the state of emergency is doing more harm than good and its implementation is driving millions to the edge of bitterness. The sooner the ruling party realizes that such techniques are only good to temporarily pacify rising public demands, the better. The only road to bring lasting solution is the road that begins by protecting the constitution and striving to build a democratic country with respect for human rights and the rule of law. This is also true for opposition political organizations, which are operating both in the country and abroad.
The underlying cause for the current protest and uprising is the struggle between the old and the new. The old is trying to do everything in its capacity to extend its life while the new is striving to shape and realize the new world it is envisioning.
For the good of all, the old (self and system) has to be courageous enough to accept and let go of its old organization, thinking, and power; it has to accept the inevitable.
The people of Ethiopia in general and the Oromo youth in particular, are determined to leave the past behind and move forward. They don’t want to be chained to and distracted by the past, which contributes less for the wellbeing of today and humanity of tomorrow.
Only when the old gives way to the new do citizens develop trust and confidence in a political system and themselves to take the responsibility of contributing to a democratic society and prosperous nation.
A painting of Silver Olympian Feyisa Lelisa crossing the finish line at Rio Olympics showing the symbol with crossed arms.It’s symbolizes the oppression of the Oromo people showing how their hands are tied without the need of handcuffs. This courageous act done by Lelisa has brought attention to the protest that is going on in Ethiopia by the Oromo and Amhara people. This painting was by the Oromo Student Union at the University of Minnesota Twin Cities Washington Avenue Bridge. Photo: Asanti Bekele
Oromo and Ethiopian Oromo South students are in grief and sadness over the government corruption that is going on back home. Some have migrated here only a few years ago and some have been born here, but the impact breaks the heart either way. It’s a devastating time in the history of Ethiopia, as the long time hidden oppression has been revealed to the world.
It was November of 2015, and the Oromo people of Ethiopia said enough and started to protest. Oromo people are the biggest ethnic group in Ethiopia and they have been the oppressed region over land, politics and even language since the start of the current government. According to BBC News, as of August 2016, over 500 people have been killed by the government and more than 10,000 have been arrested.
Ethiopia is a country located in the horn of Africa with 9 different regional states and with over 80 different ethnic groups. The main participants in this protest are in the Tigray and Oromia region. Tigray is located in the northern part of Ethiopia and is the 5th most populated region with over 5,000,000 people. This region has a government party named Tigray Peoples Liberation Front.
Oromia is located in the west and central part of Ethiopia. The capital city of Ethiopia which is called Addis Ababa is located in the heart of Oromia. The land of the city is owned and controlled by the government of Ethiopia. Although it’s the biggest ethnic group in the country, the people don’t have much say in the government actions.
As an Oromo student in America that lived in Ethiopia for more than half of my life, I have not been able to voice my opinions about the government until I came here. Part of the problem was that I never knew that the government was corrupt until I was 12 years old. In school, my classmates and I were always taught about the constitution, what rights we have and how we were free to practice them.
The things I learned in school and the things I saw in my community didn’t correspond. I used to go to a k-8 school and the high school students were protesting and the security forces were beating and nearly killing the students. I was taught that people can protest about anything and were free to address their worries about the government, but when I asked why isn’t anybody protesting or voicing their worries the response I got from my teacher was “because the people don’t see any wrong in the system, they are happy,” and I believed it.
I was taught to believe that the system was perfect but there was no way to find out if it’s really true. Every time there would be an anti-government event going on, the news would report that the civilians were the one who did wrong. The government controls anything and everything that is released to the public. Among other things, the government controlled any opposing parties too.
Oromia also has a government party named Oromo Liberation Front. This party was banned in 1992 by the government, to prevent and discourage the voices of the Oromo people in the parliament. The government then created a different party called the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization. Although this party was supposed to represent the Oromo people, events show that they have not been successful.
The anti-government demonstrations started when the government announced that the so-called “Master Plan”. This “Master Plan” concept was to expand the capital city, without the consideration of the Oromo people’s lands. This plan could have displaced many people and would have taken the farm lands that are essential to the people’s survival. According to The Guardian, in January 2016, two months after the protest, the government called the plan off after talking with representatives and stated that they have “huge respect” for the protesters who were opposed to the plan.
“They have a constitutional right to protest but the government started shooting at these people,” said Sophomore Ayantu Hundessa.
Hundessa is an Oromo student at South. She was born and raised in Ethiopia and only came to America in middle school. Hundessa has been interested in the problems back home and has tried acting on it by creating a humanities project focused on this topic to inform her peers and teachers and to bring attention to this injustice.
The violence in Ethiopia has had a strong impact on Hundessa and her family.
“There are times when we watch little 5-year-old kids covered with blood on the news and cry,” said Hundessa.“I mean looking at any kid, no matter his identity covered with blood is very disturbing. My family would give up their life to stop this genocide.”
Although the “Master Plan” was called off, there were bigger problems that were the root cause of the protests. There was still questions about the actions the government took while the protests against the plan. Before they called it off they had already killed and arrested over 140 people. They didn’t address that in the statement they made when canceling the plan. After a while, the second ethnic group, the Amhara joined the demonstration.
The bigger problem in the country of Ethiopia is that the same government party called Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front has been in power for over 20 years. This particular party is the second edition of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front party, so that makes the majority of the government officials, the Tigray people. With the Oromo people making up 34.4% of the population and the Amhara people making up 27%, the Tigray people are still in power of the whole country despite only making up 6% of the population.
Although Ethiopia is recognized as a country which has democracy, the actions of the government says otherwise. Every time a civilian has tried to practice their human rights that are also written in the country’s constitution, they face unacceptable consequences.
According to a Humans Rights Watch report, since 1992 the security forces have arrested 10,000 of Oromo people accusing them of supporting or being a member of the Oromo Liberation Front. These prisoners are now known as terrorists, since the former Prime Minister passed the draconian anti-terrorism law in 2011.
Most of the world has only been hearing about this issues since the summer of this year during the summer Olympics in Rio. After crossing the finish line in 2nd place, an Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa held his hands in a crossed sign. Crossed hand signs have been the symbol that is used for the Oromo protest. Lilesa is considered a hero to speak about this topic while knowing what kind danger he’s in.
Lilesa has stated in various interviews that he will not plan to go back to Ethiopia because people like him who speak out, get killed or arrested. “I know I can’t go back to Ethiopia after this,” said Lilesa in a Washington Post interview. “The government has said I would be safe if I return, but I know I will be killed, arrested, or blocked from leaving the country ever again.”
The family and friends of the South students are still living in Ethiopia and are being killed in their fight for survival. “I’m so worried for the people. I’m so sad that protesting is costing people their lives,” said Senior Tinsae Mekonnen. “The government has such little respect for their people and are willing to be reckless with lives. It also makes me mad that they can’t exercise their rights to speak freely on issues that concern their own homes and families.”
Mekonnen is a first generation immigrant, meaning her parents have come to America before she was born here. Mekonnen identifies as Amhara, and Ethiopian. She has visited Ethiopia several times.
Although the reasons to for the government to act this way toward its own people is complicated, some experts think that the government will do anything to not lose the power they once won over. The opinions of the South students deliver much deeper reasons.
In my opinion, the reason to why the government keeps acting this way is because they have been bloodthirsty for power before and still are. They think they are somehow superior to the people of other tribes than Tigray. They think if they won once, they deserve to be entitled to win each time. They have set their goal once will never stop until they reach it. Whether they have to destroy every single body in front of them or even destroy a whole group.
The killings in Ethiopia have been just an everyday occurrence to the government. “It’s become dirtier and I feel like they’ve become desensitized to the killings and serious damage they’ve done to their people,” said Mekonnen.
The government has been using the resource found in the Oromia region and have not given any kind of benefits to the Oromo people. Even before the protest “the government has been using resources found in the Oromo region and [the] Tigray Liberation Front has been leading for 25 years, so the Oromo people didn’t really have a voice in the government,” said Hundessa. “After this happened I think abusing their power and their actions are very cruel and brutal.”
Recently, according to Al Jazeera, nearly 100 people were killed in the Oromia and Amhara region in a recent three-day protest by security forces and over 50 people killed at a religious celebration in Oromia on October 2. Over 20 prisons, were dead because of a fire accident as reported by the government. Critics say it’s just a cover up for the actual group responsible, security forces.
The biggest platform for the movement in Ethiopia has been social media, especially Facebook. Many participants in the protest who are currently living in and outside Ethiopia have used the #oromoprotest to spread awareness. As of August,2016 another ethnic group has joined the protest and has been known with the #amharaprotest.
Ethiopia declared a state of emergency on October 9, 2016. Since then, internet access has been banned, people cannot watch certain TV channels, especially the ones that are about Ethiopia but are created in another country. The government has also has banned most forms of protest, and people are not allowed to show a political gesture as Lelisa did at the Olympic finish line, along many other restrictions.
Having these restrictions has made it harder now to shine attention on the genocide in Ethiopia.This historical event in Ethiopia has just begun and there still is much to do before it’s resolved.
This topic at South has not been discussed nor brought up in anyway. Having nobody noticing what is going on back home, what our families back home are dealing with is sad. Hopefully after this article, the student body and the staff can take time to recognize that their classmates are grieving inside while showing a normal face in class.
“Our social media outlets are a big tool, when I talk about it out loud, I see that not really that many people care,” said Mekonnen.
“It feels like such an ignored topic and since it doesn’t concern America, it’s been put on the burner. We need to let our friends know then let those friends talk about it more and spread our ideas through that way.”
The State Department continues to warn U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Ethiopia due to the potential for civil unrest related to sporadic and unpredictable anti-government protests that began in November 2015. The U.S. Embassy’s ability to provide consular services in many parts of the country may be limited without warning due to the government’s restrictions on mobile and internet communications and the unpredictable nature of the current security situation. This replaces the Travel Warning of October 21, 2016.
The Government of Ethiopia declared a State of Emergency effective October 8, 2016 that includes provisions allowing for the arrest of individuals without a court order for activities they may otherwise consider routine, such as communication, consumption of media, attending gatherings, engaging with certain foreign governments or organizations, and violating curfews. Additionally, the Government of Ethiopia routinely does not inform the U.S. Embassy of detentions of U.S. citizens in Ethiopia. The full text of the decreeimplementing the State of Emergency is available on the U.S. Embassy’s website.
Internet, cellular data, and phone services have been periodically restricted or shut down without warning throughout the country, impeding the U.S. Embassy’s ability to communicate with U.S. citizens in Ethiopia. You should have alternate communication plans in place, and let your family and friends know this may be an issue while you are in Ethiopia. See the information below on how to register with the U.S. Embassy to receive security messages.
Avoid demonstrations and large gatherings, continuously assess your surroundings, and evaluate your personal level of safety. Remember that the government may use force and live fire in response to demonstrations, and that even gatherings intended to be peaceful can be met with a violent response or turn violent without warning. U.S. citizens in Ethiopia should monitor their security situation and have contingency plans in place in case you need to depart suddenly.
If you are living in or intending to travel to Ethiopia, please refer to the Safety and Security section of the Country Specific Information for Ethiopiafor additional useful information.
Due to the unpredictability of communication in the country, the Department of State strongly advises U.S. citizens to register your mobile number with the U.S. Embassy to receive security information via text or SMS, in addition to enrolling in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP).
Contact the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, located on Entoto Street in Addis Ababa, at +251-11-130-6000 from 7:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. Monday-Thursday. After-hours emergency number for U.S. citizens is+251-11-130-6911 or 011-130-6000.
Call 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States and Canada or 1-202-501-4444 from other countries from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
International Oromo Lawyers Association (IOLA) Press Release on the Arrest of Professor Merera Gudina
5 December, 2016
The International Oromo Lawyers Association (IOLA) expresses its deepest concern over the detention of prominent Oromo/Ethiopian opposition leader professor Merera Gudina, a Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Vice-Chairman of the Coalition of Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (MEDREK)).
The Ethiopian government detained prof. Gudina, upon his arrival from Europe where he was addressing the European Parliament in Brussels. He was invited by the EU parliament to brief the MPs on the current situation in Ethiopia in general and the effect of the recently declared state of emergency in particular.
According to the information available to us from the official government media outlet, prof. Gudina was arrested because of his violation of Article 1 of the country’s two-month old State of Emergency decree which, in total contradiction to the nation’s constitution, seriously curtailed citizens’ fundamental right to freedom of expression and assembly. Allegedly, Prof. Merera, was accused of meeting at the EU with official of the so called “terrorist organization” namely Ginbot-7, who was also invitee of the EU MPs.
IOLA is of the opinion that Prof. Merera committed no crime but exercised his fundamental freedom to movement, freedom of expression and assembly as guaranteed in the Constitution of Ethiopia. But invoking terms of the Martial law to detain and subsequently prosecute a citizen is contrary to letters and sprits of international Human Rights Conventions governing aspects of state behaviors during emergency situation.
The imprisonment of Prof. Merera is not an exception. Almost the entire party officials of Oromo Federalist Congress – OFC, has already been imprisoned including the Deputy Chairman of the party, Mr. Bekele Gerba who is in his second round of detention for no other reason than exercising his fundamental human rights as guaranteed in the Constitution.. During his speech at the European Parliament, Prof. Merera also indicated that over 60,000 innocent Oromo civilians are currently detained in several military camps in different parts of the country, following the declaration of state of emergency.
It is with this in mind that IOLA calls on the Ethiopian government to immediately release prof. Merera without any precondition unless otherwise it is proven that he indeed committed a common crime, in which case, the government has to officially charge him with such a crime and bring him to justice.
IOLA calls on friendly government and the international community to intervene in whatever possible means to ensure that prof. Merera’s fundamental human rights are respected as stipulated in the nation’s Constitution of 1995 and demand his release without delay.
OLA stands ready to provide necessary professional support needed in this respect.
Demonstrators flash the Oromo protest gesture during the Irreecha festival, where dozens died in a stampede on Oct. 2. Top Oromo politician Merera Gudina was arrested on Nov. 30. (Tiksa Negeri/Reuters)
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — A top opposition politician from Ethiopia’s restive Oromo ethnic group was arrested after he spoke out against the country’s state of emergency in front of the European Parliament, a colleague said Thursday.Police arrested Merera Gudina and three others from his home in Addis Ababa late Wednesday shortly after his return from Europe, which included a Nov. 9 speech in front of the European Parliament in which he said tens of thousands have been arrested under the state of emergency.“We don’t know his whereabouts,” Beyene Petros, head of the Medrek coalition of opposition parties that includes Gudina’s Oromo Federalist Congress, told The Washington Post. “In terms of political leadership, he has been around and operating above board, peacefully.”Government spokesman Negeri Lencho said he had no information about the arrest.
Gudina appeared in front of the European Parliament with Rio Olympics marathon silver medalist Feyisa Lilesa, who sensitized the world to the demands of Ethiopia’s Oromo people when he crossed his arms in protest as he ran across the finish line in July.
Also present was Berhanu Nega of the Patriotic Ginbot 7, an armed rebel group fighting the Ethiopian government, which prompted calls for Gudina’s arrest by pro-government media.
The Oromo ethnic group, the largest in the country, have been protesting for the past year over their historic marginalization as well as corrupt local government and the confiscation of their farm land for factories. At least 700 have died in the ongoing crackdown.
On Oct. 2, a protest during an Oromo cultural festival turned into a deadly stampede when police fired tear gas into the crowd killing more than 50, according to the government — though the opposition maintains the toll was 10 times higher.
The incident was described as a massacre and prompted riots around the Oromo region and attacks on foreign and government-owned factories, farms and hotels doing millions of dollars of damage.
A state of emergency was declared a week later and since then the government said 11,000 people have been detained.
In a briefing of foreign diplomats on Nov. 17, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said that the country has largely returned to calm since the emergency was declared and promised reforms to address grievances, including a more representative parliament.
There are no opposition members in the current parliament, which was elected in 2015.
Local and international rights organizations, however, have condemned the string of arrests accompanying the state of emergency, including that of journalists and politicians.
Two members of the Zone 9 blogging collective were rearrested after the state of emergency, as well as a newspaper editor.
Gudina spoke frequently with international media, including The Post, about the plight of the Oromo. While hundreds of his party members and most of his key deputies have been arrested, he felt he was safe because of his high profile and because he stayed within the narrow political bounds allowed.
“That’s what all of us are trying to do, play by the rules,” said opposition leader Petros. “What is different now from what he has been doing over the last 20 years?”
An Ethiopian government directive under a state of emergency contains overly broad and vague provisions that risk triggering a human rights crisis, Human Rights Watch said in a legal analysis. The government should promptly repeal or revise all elements of the directive that are contrary to international law. 31 October 2016.
“Internet mobile irrati fayadamuuf mali argameera… akkas agodhani qeeroon Setting..more network….mobile network… access network name…. harka mirgara + kan jedhu tuqu… name kanjedhu … et.wap… APN… et.wap…. proxy…10.204.189.211… port…9028…. authentication… PAP or CHAP kan jedhu guutu… kana booda qeerroon mirgaan galte Mobile jam Tplf irraa hanu… sanan fayadama jira amaan kana.” #OromoRevolution.
UNESCO has recognized the ancient Gadaa system that is a democratic system practiced by the Oromo nation. The Gadaa system classifies the Oromo society according to age. During each age classification certain skills are taught in order to gain experience and prepare for leadership of the Oromo society. UNESCO has acknowledged that the Gadaa system is one of the foundations of international democracy.
SOUTHWEST OROMIA: Jimma, in the county of Limmu Saqqa government officials are in the process of reshuffling positions. Detrimental human Rights abuses have continued and government representatives have refused to finding satisfactory solutions for the demands of the Oromo people.
CENTRAL OROMIA: More than 7 Ethiopian Military (Agazi) vehicles were sent to Central Oromia in the county of Jarso. These military personnel have been terrorizing locals. In this same area, the county of Ginda Barat Agazi Militants are exploiting, harassing and human rights abuses have intensified.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have taken more than 150 Oromo refugees from Yemen to Djibouti. The Djibouti government have finalised their preparation to deport the refugees to their homeland. These Oromo refugees have informed OMN that being deported to their homeland will only place them in great danger as the Ethiopian government is targeting Oromo people
Waraanni kun callisee mana Nyaataa Daandii kan Mucayyoo Nuuraa Aadam jedhamutti ssenuun mana nyaataa kana keessaa namoota nyaataa jiraniifii haadha mana nyaata Daandii kan taate Durbee Nuuraa Aadam wajjin ukkaamsee jira
Fincila Qeerroo battala kana mudateen dargaggoo fi hawaasa mara magaalattirraa funaanii hidhuun,manneen nyaataa naannoo bakka calqaba fincila kanaa ta’es cufsiisuufi namoota hedduu isaanii hidhuunis beekameera
Obboleessi ishee Duulaa Aadam Magaalaa Finfinnee keessaa bakka Askoo jedhamutti qabamee mana hidhaa maa’ikelaawwii kan jiru yeroo ta’u, isheenis mana nyaataa cufuu akka qabdu firootni mootummaa wayyaanee ilmaan Oromoo mana isheetii fayyadamanii adeemsa geggeessitooti siyyaasa Oromoo dhaaman galmaan gahaa jirti jechuun wayyaanee itti duulchisanii jiru
Yeroo ammaa kana hawaasi Oromoo magaalatti keessatti akka itti bahee galu dhabee jiraachuun isaas barameera
Roorroon hammaatus ni injifanna!
https://www.oromiamedia.org/2016/11/10/omn-oduu-sad-9-2016/addis-standard-special-edition-on-irreechaa-massacre-oct-2-2016P. 5 – #IrreechaMassacre: The day that changed the game (By Addis Standard staffs)“I saw people who had fallen inside ditches and deeper pits. I saw people who had no one to pick them up. I saw people suffocated by the smoke of the tear gas”P.8 – A survivor’s account (By Bekel Atoma Boruu)“Those who ran to save their lives from the teargas bombs and the gun shots pulled themselves and one another to the nearby 6 meters long ditch in front of the podium. The tear gas bomb thrown at the mass increased the number of people running to the ditch not seeing what is in front of them; besides they were blinded by the heavy smoke from tear gas”P.10 – Irreecha is sacred! We cannot let them take it away (By Ayantu Ayana)“I keep asking myself how dare they kill on sacred grounds and on a sacred day. How dare they? All those people muddied and bloodied in their beautiful and colorful clothes. All those lives lost. Should mourning be all we do these days? “P. 13 – Into the heart of Irreecha: Why is it so important to the Oromo? (Buli Edjeta Jobir, Guest Writer)“An amazing part of the Irreecha ceremony is its absolute orderliness, the reigning of absolute peaceful aura, the showering of love and mutual respect, the sense of oneness and unity. In all the Irreecha ceremonies recorded over the last two decades, after its first rejuvenation, there has never been a single stampede or injury recorded.”
P. 17 – Irreecha: A defining moment in a hallowed land (By Prof. Ezekiel Gebissa, Special to Addis Standard)
“In 2016, it was clear that the largest gathering of Oromos from Oromia’s all corners would be a scene of expression of anger in the wake of the government’s brutal crackdown of Oromo protests during the preceding ten months.
#OromoRevolution: Sadaasa 9 bara 2016: Godina Horroo Guduruu Wallaggaa Suluulaa Fincaa’aatti hojjettootni Warshaa Sukkaaraa Fincaa’aa hiraarsaa Waraana Wayyaanee Koomandii Poostii bahuu fi galuu dhorkamnee Ajjeefamaa, reebamaa fi hidhamaa hin jiraannu jechuun guyyaa har’aa guutummaatti hojii dhaaban. Waraanni Wayyaanee Yakka duguuginsa sanyii Uummatarratti rawwachuun uummata daranuu gara of ittisuu fi FXG jabaachuutti kan murteeffachiise takkaa waraanaan akka duubatti deebi’uu hin dandeenye uummatni fi Qeerroowwaan diinaaf mirkaneessa jiru.
FINCILA DIDDAA GABRUMMAA
Fincila roorroon dhalchu, fincila aadaa gootaa,
Ittisaa roorroo alagaa, tiksaa mirga dhalootaa.
Ni fincilla gurmoofnee, ni didanna gabrummaa,
Cunqursaa dhabamsiisnee, gonfachuuf bilisummaa.
Itti hin lakkifnu diina, saamichaan nu quncisuu,
Lafa keenya gurguree, abbaa biyyaa buqqisuu.
Addunyaattis ni himna, deebisnee deddeebisnee,
Daba diinaa saaxiluuf, dhugaa keenya beeksisnee.
Ijaaramnee falmannee, jilbeenfachiisna diina,
Diddaa keenya cimsinee, sirna gabrummaa diigna.
Daandii dhugaa irra jirraa, bilisummaa gaafannee,
Alagaa jala hin bullu, haqa keenya haalamnee.
Addunyaa dharti mootee, dhugaan yeroof qallattus,
Gaaffiin haqaa dhiibamtee, abbaa humnaaf bal’attus,
Abdii kutnee mohamnee, gabrummaaf hin hoggollu,
Bakka jirruu murannee, mirga keenyaaf haa lollu.
Rakkoo qabsoo obsinee, roorroo alagaa faccisnaa,
Ulfinaa fi bilisummaa ilmaan keenya dhaalchisna.
Mirga keenyaaf finciluun sirrii tahuu hin shakkinuu,
Mootummaa gabroomfataa hanga of irraa darbinuu.
Akka roorroon dhabamee sirni haqaa gad dhaabbatuu,
Amma illee ni fincilla diddaan keenya hin laaffatu ! (2)
Hamilton’s Oromo community may be small, but they want it known they are standing with their brothers and sisters back home.
A group of about 20 members of the Oromo Community of Hamilton stood outside City Hall Friday, holding signs with photos of struggles faced by people in Ethiopia’s largest region, Oromia.
Canada is known for its tradition of peacekeeping and contributing to the United Nations, said Abraham Turem, 51.
“I hope this government will follow that line of thinking to advocate for peace in that country.”
The gathering commemorated the first anniversary of the “climax” of peaceful demonstrations in the region, which is home to most of Ethiopia’s estimated 40 million Oromo, said Solomon Germossa. The Oromo are the country’s largest ethnic group.
Since November 2015, the government has used “excessive and lethal” force against what is largely peaceful unrest started mainly by students, says a Human Rights Watch report.
The demonstration was initially a response to authorities’ decision to clear an environmental area for a development project, the report says. Protesters feared the plan would further displace Oromo farmers, many of whom already lost land for similar projects over the past decade, it says.
The plan was cancelled in January, but the unrest has continued and now reflects broader concerns shared by many Oromo, the report says. As of June, it was estimated more than 400 people had been killed, thousands injured, tens of thousands arrested and hundreds — “likely more” — taken from their families.
Friday’s group said thousands of people have been killed and tens of thousand are in prison.
Germossa, a registered nurse, said he hasn’t been able to reach his 11 brothers and sisters in Ethiopia since last month.
“We are extremely worried about our family at this point,” he said. “Even when we go to work, our mind is always there.”
The Ethiopian government restricted use of social media so connecting with family members has been impossible, he said.
“We don’t know if our mothers, our brothers, our sisters are alive or in jail,” Germossa said. “We are almost in the dark.”
There are about 50 to 60 Oromo families in the Hamilton area, he noted.
Remembrance: 11 years ago today, on November 11, 2005, the TPLF regime massacred hundreds of protesters on streets of Addis Ababa. The protesters were rallying against the rigged election and Meles Zenawi ordered his Agazi forces to mow them down. The regime admitted 193 people were killed but the number was believed to be many folds higher.
#OromoProtests #OromoRevolution Australian MP Andrew Wilkie addresses the parliament speaking about the plight of Oromo people
“On Tuesday 15th of November 2016. We the Australian Oromo Community of Tasmania invited our independent MP Honourable Andrew Wilkie & expressed the shocking truth of human rights abuse, massacre and mass incarceration & today he is standing in Solidarity with the Oromo people in the parliament of Australia we deeply appreciate for becoming a voice for the voiceless.”
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission), meeting at its 59thOrdinary Session held from 21 October to 4 November 2016 in Banjul, Islamic Republic of the Gambia;
Recalling its mandate to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in Africa under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter);
Mindful of the obligations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as a Member State of the African Union, and State Party to the African Charter and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as well as other regional human rights instruments;
Recalling that one of the objectives of the African Union is to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter, and to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
Reaffirming the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 19 of the African Charter which guarantee the right to be protected from discrimination, the right to equal protection of the law, the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, the right to personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest, the right to a fair trial, the right to receive information and to freedom of expression, the right of assembly, the right to participate freely in government and the right to equality of all peoples;
Further reaffirming the standards and principles stipulated in the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa, the Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa, General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Right to Life, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, and the Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa;
Deeply concerned by the deterioration of the human rights situation in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia following the protests which began in November 2015;
Concerned by the use of excessive and disproportionate force to disperse protests, resulting in the deaths and injuries of several protestors, as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of many others;
Alarmed by reports of a fire outbreak in Qilinto Prison in Addis Ababa, on 4 September 2016, leading to the deaths and injuries of a number of inmates, including detainees;
Deeply concerned by reports that more than fifty-five people were killed and several hundreds injured in a stampede, following police attempt to disperse the crowd in a break-out protest, at a religious festival on 2 October 2016;
Concerned by allegations relating to the arbitrary arrest and detention of members of opposition parties and human rights defenders;
Alarmed by the loss of lives and the destruction of property resulting from violence perpetrated by some protestors;
Concerned by the declaration of a state of emergency on 9 October 2016, which restricts fundamental human rights and freedoms;
Further concerned by restrictions on movement, assembly, media access, internet services as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of many people following the state of emergency declaration;
Noting reports of the release of 2, 000 persons who were detained on suspicion of engaging in protests;
The Commission:
Condemns the deteriorating human rights situation in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, in particular the undue restrictions on fundamental human rights and freedoms resulting from the state of emergency.
Calls on the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to:
ensure that fundamental human rights and freedoms are respected and upheld during the state of emergency;
lift the ban on movement, assembly, media access, and internet services;
ensure due process of law for persons arrested and detained in connection with protests, in accordance with regional and international standards, and release persons arrested and detained without charge;
refrain from the use of excessive and disproportionate force against protestors and, more generally, take the necessary measures to guarantee the security and safety of its population;
initiate prompt and impartial investigations into these alleged human rights violations and ensure that the perpetrators of these violations are held accountable and subjected to appropriate sanctions reflecting the gravity of the offences, in accordance with relevant international and regional standards;
comply with the letter and spirit of the African Charter and other regional and international human rights instruments to which it is a party and, more particularly, the instruments referred to in this Resolution;
ensure that victims of the above violations and their families obtain full and adequate redress, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and
authorise the Commission to undertake a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia.
Calls on protestors to exercise their rights with due regard to the law and the rights of others;
Calls on all actors, particularly leaders and members of opposition parties, other stakeholders and the population in general, to refrain from any form of incitement and all other acts of violence.
Done in Banjul, Islamic Republic of the Gambia, on 4 November 2016
Oct.2,2016.Members of the Oromya Regional Special Police with protesters in Bishoftu, in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. STR/Press Association. All rights reserved.
Almost exactly a year ago, Ethiopia entered its worst crisis since the arrival of the regime in 1991. Last month, a state of emergency was proclaimed. These two events have generated a flood of commentary and analysis. A few key points, sometimes underplayed if not ignored, are worth closer attention.
“Mengist yelem!” – “Authority has disappeared!”
People waited in vain for the government to react other than by brute force alone to the opposition it was facing and the resulting chaos. The unrest in Oromya, Ethiopia’s most populous state with 35% of the country’s total population, began on November 12, 2015; the uprising in part of the Amhara Region, the second largest by population (27%), on July 12, 2016.
For 11 long months the government was content to quell protest and to release information in dribs and drabs, the epitome of one-sided doublespeak. A handful of cryptic press releases repeated the same platitudes ad nauseam. When in June 2016 the ruling power finally realized the severity of the crisis, launching a series of internal deliberations, these took place in total secrecy. This pseudo-communication destroyed its credibility and in turn lent credence to the sole alternative source of information, the diaspora, which itself is often hyperbolic to the point of implausibility. On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly.[1]On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly.
People have stopped taking notice of anything the ruling power says, seeing it as incapable of handling the situation. In short, trust has gone. “Itis not even able to listen… It has lost its collective ability to reach the collective mindset of the governed”.[2] The general view is that Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn “always promises but never delivers”.
Both in central government and in the regional authorities, or between one and the other, authority has dramatically deflated. A multitude of anecdotes confirm that it is being ignored – officials simply turn their backs – or even mocked, right up to the highest levels. The man in the street could only conclude: “Mengist yelem !” – “Authority has disappeared!”. This perception, initially confined to the cities, is increasingly reaching into the rural areas as they open up more and more.
An even more serious indictment is spreading. The government’s primary role is to maintain law and order, and it has proved incapable of doing so; worse still, the violence of repression is further fueling discontent. In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt.In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt.
“Meles left with the password”
Why this impotence and loss of credibility?
Under Meles Zenawi, the all-powerful Prime Minister who died suddenly in August 2012, the system of power was like a pyramid. Meles sat enthroned at the summit, and below him, every tier – executive or legislative, political or economic, national or regional, even local – was simply a transmission belt from the top. Party and State were inextricably intertwined. This profoundly centralized and vertical system, intensifying over the years, hung on him alone.
For most observers, the smooth succession from Meles Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn proved the robustness of the regime and the reliability of its institutions. However, Hailemariam lacks what it takes to “fill the boots” of his predecessor. Most of his authority comes not from his own resources but has been handed down to him through a constellation of powers – baronies one might call them – characterized not just by their diversity, but also by the rivalry, or even conflict, between them. In short, Ethiopia is left with a system of power tailored for a strongman and filled accordingly, but which now lacks a strongman. “Meles left with the password”, the joke goes.
The succession couldn’t be a change of personnel only. The whole power system too needed reshaping, and this is in full swing. Hence the misfires in response to the crisis.
People used to say that Ethiopia was like a plane on autopilot, controlled by the Meles software (“Meles legacy”). To pursue the metaphor in current circumstances, the more turbulence the plane encounters, the more ineffective the software has proved to be. It is noteworthy that constant references to that legacy have practically disappeared from official rhetoric. So the software has been disconnected, but no pilot – whether individual or collective – has been able to take over the controls.
Three big sources of the crisis
The weakening of central authority – Addis Ababa – has thus released centrifugal – regional – forces that had been steadily stifled in Meles Zenawi’s iron grip. The first source of the current crisis is the trial of strength between central authority and the peripheral powers that it originally created – a sort of bid for emancipation from the father – as well as between the peripheral powers.
At stake is the sharing of powers and resources, notably between the regions and Addis Ababa, where Tigrayans are perceived to be overrepresented, wrongly in their view, quite obviously according to all the other ethnicities.
In other words, what is at stake is the place that should be assigned to the “people’s fundamental freedoms and rights” enshrined in the constitution, collective rights. How can the country make the transition from a bogus and ethnically weighted federalism to real decentralization, which would bring about a more authentic and ethnically fairer federalism, or even confederalism? The immemorial “national question” remains as acute as ever: what will the name Ethiopia come to refer to? In other words, why should and how can an Ethiopian state exist, and on what basis?What will the name Ethiopia come to refer to?
This question has deep historical roots. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the economic centre of gravity shifted from the North – Abyssinia – towards the Centre. But power always remained Abyssinian. At stake in the current crisis is a historic break that would also shift power to the Centre, i.e. to Oromya. Despite their internal divisions, this claim unites the vast majority of Oromo, justified by their numbers and their major contribution to the economy. It is generally agreed that a genuine application of the constitution would be sufficient for this claim to be satisfied.
For the Amhara, whose elite dominated Abyssinian power for more than a century, the challenge is to revamp their identity. They have to say farewell to their historical ascendancy and accept that their place in the Ethiopian state should reflect their numerical and economic importance, no more, no less. In other words, the only way out of the undoubted ostracism they suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo. The assertion of “Amhara-ness” – legitimate as it is – cannot become a cover for the aspiration for a return to an “Ethiopianness” based around Amhara, with the other ethnicities in a lesser role. This metamorphosis is under way, but not yet complete. Nonetheless, many Oromo and even more Tigrayans deny that anything has changed, convinced that this elite has not abandoned its “chauvinism” and “revanchism”,and that the federal system that they defend tooth and nail could therefore never satisfy its deeply cherished ambition.The only way out of the undoubted ostracism [the Amhara] suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo.
These ethno-nationalisms have become inflamed and even paranoid. Today, “all the politics is revolving around ethnicity”, a former senior TPLF official told me, and in a previous remark: “what I see now dominantly… is the proliferation of racial or ethnic hatred”.[3] It is focused on the Tigrayans, not only because of the major role of the Tigrayan Peoples’s Liberation Front (TPLF), but because both Oromo and Amhara equate Tigrayan silence in the face of repression with approval. “The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here”, opines one social scientist, a man familiar with the grass roots of the country.
The second source of the crisis relates to what might be called “democratic aspiration”. In this respect, Ethiopia’s leaders are right to talk about the price of success. Economic growth has brought the emergence of a new middle class, not just urban but also in the countryside, which has seen the rapid enrichment of an upper tier of farmers. In parallel, education has dramatically expanded. This upper tier has opened up to the outside world, in particular through social media. However, the aspiration for “individual rights” runs up against a system of power which, everywhere in Ethiopia, from the summit of the state to the lowliest levels of authority, from the capital to the smallest village, shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization.
Finally, the third source of the crisis relates to collateral damage from super-rapid growth. Such damage is inevitable, but has been exacerbated by the type and methods of development pursued. First, forced imposition through ultra-centralized and secretive decision-making, and brutal execution. “Land grabbing”, and more generally almost instant evictions with absurd levels of compensation, are commonplace. Second, the overwhelming role of the ruling power through the “developmental state” has produced an ever more powerful and arrogant oligarchy embedded in the Party-State. The stakes in the crisis are not only political: they directly concern the mobilization, distribution and therefore the accumulation of resources in the hands of the ruling power, and hence the division of the cake between central and peripheral authorities and/or oligarchies, but also between these oligarchies and the population in general.
The present crisis is particularly acute because these three factors reinforce each other. The demonstrators chant “we want justice” and “we want freedom”, but also “Oromya is not for sale” and “we want self rule” or, in Gondar, the historic capital of the Amhara, “respect for Amhara-ness”.[4]“The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here.”
“Alarmists” and “complacents”
In this poisonous climate, the vigour and scale of the protest accentuated the “crisis of leadership”.[5] It was the first factor responsible for the government’s paralysis, as confirmed by one participant in the last meeting of the Central Committee of the TPLF, in early October. He ascribes it first of all to pure and simple “power struggles”, leading to a tussle that is all the more confused in that these conflicts run through every regional party, the relations between those parties, and between those parties and the centre, while on the same time the centre originates from the peripheries: the supreme decision-making body is the Executive Committee of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), composed equally of representatives of the TPLF, ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation) and SPDM (Southern People’s Democratic Movement).
These conflicts are first of all personal in nature, based on local affinities, religious solidarities, family connections, not to mention business interests. However, the crisis triggered a new and crucial division, between “alarmists” and “complacents”, the former advocating a rapid shift from the status quo, the latter seeing neither its necessity nor its urgency.
The “old guard” is the backbone of the “alarmists”. It consists of the survivors of the founding group of the TPLF, including the heads of the army and the security services, Samora Yunus and Getachew Assefa, plus some old comrades in arms such as Berket Simon, guiding light of the ANDM. They became involved in politics in the early 1970s, within the student protest movement against Haile Selassie. Their long journey together gives them an experience, a maturity, and a cohesion greater than that of any current within the EPRDF. Concentrated in the centre, in Addis Ababa, most of them were sidelined from official positions as Meles imposed generational change. Returning in force behind the scenes after his death, they are the strongest backers of Hailemariam Dessalegn
They ascribe the crisis to the breaking of the bonds between “the people” and the party. In their view, those most responsible are the regional parties, starting with their new leaders. The urgent priority is to restore those bonds and to reinforce central power, to compensate for the failures of the regional authorities.Everywhere in Ethiopia… shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization.
Hailemariam expressed the anxiety of this group when he said that the issues facing the regime are a matter of “life or death”,[6] and that Ethiopia is “sliding towards ethnic conflict similar to that in neighbouring countries”.[7] Abay Tsehaye, said to be the most political head of the TPLF, raised the specter of a genocide even worse than Rwanda’s.[8] Bereket Simon warned the leadership of his party that the country was sliding towards the abyss. In vain.
In contrast, Debretsion Gebremichael, member of the Politburo of the TPLF and until recently Deputy Prime Minister, one of the foremost of the second generation of leaders, retorted that there had simply been a few, geographically limited “disturbances”, that they did not reflect the overall situation in the country, that “there is no mobilization against Tigrayans anywhere”. And even, dogmatically: “It is not possible to have people to people [i.e. ethnic] conflict in Ethiopia”.[9]
The “complacents” are usually described as “technocrats” and “careerists”. They are considered to be “apparatchiks”, lacking any political fibre, owing their position and the privileges and advantages – often undeserved – that they enjoy, entirely to it.
They will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker. Any opening up, any movement towards a little good governance, transparency, and accountability, would be the end of them. They are also haunted by the implacable rule of “winner takes all” that has accompanied every previous regime change. However, their attitude is ambivalent. On the one hand, they are tooth and nail defenders of the EPRDF’s monopoly of power, and therefore equally implicated in the repression.The ‘complacents’ will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker.
On the other hand, they ascribe responsibility for the crisis to excessive central power, claiming that it hinders regional authority. In order to reverse this imbalance, and thereby strengthen their own positions, they are taking advantage of the outbreaks of ethno-nationalisms, notably by attempting to exploit the corresponding popular demands to their own advantage, up to and including the serious slide into anti-Tigrayan sentiment.
“The fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery”
In Oromya, at least part of the OPDO, right up to leadership level, encouraged the opposition to the Addis Ababa Master Plan, the scheme to extend the capital’s administrative scope into adjacent areas of Oromya, which triggered near universal unrest across the whole State.
The same actors then did everything they could to prevent Oromya being placed under military command from Addis Ababa and then, having failed, to put a stop to it. At least locally, the authorities – necessarily members of OPDO – and the militias – under their sole control – went so far as to lend the protesters a hand.
This ethno-nationalist outbreak contributed to the appointment of Lemma Megersa and Workneh Gebeyehu to the leadership of the OPDO, after the forced resignation of numbers one and two Muktar Kedir and Aster Mamo, who were seen as puppets of Addis Ababa. The new duo are long-time members of the security services, but are said to be protégés of Abadula Gemadah, the OPDO’s only strongman, hence formerly sidelined by Meles Zenawi. The main thing is that the OPDO was able to assert its autonomy by electing leaders without external pressure or diktat.
In the Amhara region, it is equally unquestionable that the big initial demonstrations, though officially banned, were held with the support or tacit approval of part of the ANDM. At least at local level, the authorities and the security forces allowed “ethnic cleansing” against Tigrayans to take place, prompting 8000 to flee to Tigray.[10] Gedu Andergatchew, ANDM strongman, who is accused of having at least turned a blind eye, is still in place.
Even in Tigray, the regional authorities – “TPLF Mekele” – are playing the nationalist card. Abay Woldu, President of the region and Chairman of the TPLF, went so far as to declare that the integrity of Tigray was non negotiable, in a clear allusion to Tigray’s retention of the Wolkait area, whose restoration is demanded by some Amhara, and despite Addis Ababa’s call for the Amhara and Tigrayan governments to negotiate this long standing issue.
This firmness played a big part in the shift in at least part of Tigrayan opinion, expressed with rare vehemence by some circles. They vilified the “TPLF Mekele”, despised for its lack of education and impotence. They placed all their hopes in the Tigrayan old guard, “TPLF Addis”. According to them, only this old guard could bring about the democratization essential to the survival of the regime and, in the long term, the Tigrayan minority’s control over its own affairs. The same old guard, they now complain, has doubly betrayed the Tigrayan people: by evolving into an oligarchy that neglects the latter’s economic aspirations; and by turning its back on their national interests.
On the first point, they rightly emphasize that Tigray still lags behind in terms of development. But at the same time Tigrayan businessmen are said to earn exorbitant profits from undeserved privileges. In fact, the paradox is only apparent: there is so little potential in Tigray that they invest elsewhere.
Regarding the “national betrayal”, these critics highlight the old guard’s loyalty to its Marxist past, claiming that they remain “internationalist”, “cosmopolitan”, and “universalist” out of political ambition and material interest. Addis Ababa offers positions and advantages that Tigray, poor and small as it is, would be hard put to provide. The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become. In short, the view is that the old guard has yielded to a centuries-old tradition of Ethiopian history: letting itself be “assimilated” by the centre and prioritizing the latter’s interests over those of the periphery. As the historian Haggai Erlich has written, “a central position” in Addis Ababa has always been preferable to remaining a “chief in a remote province”.[11]The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become.
In consequence, these Tigrayans feel they have no other choice than to take charge of their own destiny and count only on themselves, i.e. something like building a “fortress Tigray”. It is up to the new generation to take over from the old, which has given up, even if this means embracing the “narrow nationalism”of which its critics accuse it. This goes as far as to see a re-emergence of the hope of reunifying Tigrayans on both sides of the Ethiopia/Eritrea border into a single nation state.
In this view, the other regions’ demands for self-rule should therefore be heard. Central government should be content with “regulating”, “balancing”, “moderating”, “arbitrating”, “coordinating”, etc. That it should be headed by an Oromo prime minister would be in the natural order of things, since Ormoya has the largest population, and would help to calm feelings in the region. In short, one Tigrayan intellectual has joked, a new Age of the Princes would be established, but one in which the Princes did not fight amongst themselves,[12] more seriously going on to express the wish that, for the first time in history, “the fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery”.
State of emergency
The indignation aroused by the carnage in Bishoftu during the traditional Oromo annual festival (October 2),[13] the widespread destruction that followed the call for “five days of rage” in response, made the ruling power’s paralysis even more untenable. At the same time, the series of internal consultations within the EPRDF was coming to an end. The package of measures announced on October 9 reflects the shakiness of the snatched compromise. However acute their lack of mutual trust, the political currents and/or the ethnic components of the EPRDF had to arrive at an agreement: they knew that they had “to work together or else to sink together”.
The state of emergency was proclaimed in order “to deal with anti-peace elements that… are jeopardising the peace and security of the country”.[14]Commentators see it as evidence that the regime was “overwhelmed”. But it adds little, whether to the existing legislative arsenal,[15] or to the operational capacities of the security forces since, in practice, they have never seen themselves as severely restricted by the law.
The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty, especially as several provisions are so vague that they can be interpreted in almost any way. They are now in everyone’s mind. For example, for the first time, long-standing informants have cancelled interviews because of the potential risk.The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty.
The second objective is to give the military the legal sanction that army chief Samora Yunus was demanding as a condition of continuing to maintain internal order.
However, this proclamation also demonstrates that the centre has won a round in its trial of strength with the peripheries. The state of emergency places all the forces of order under the authority of a federal Command Post, with Hailemariam Dessalegn at its head and the Minister of Defense as its secretary. They thus control the mono-ethnic Special Regional Police in each state, who with 80,000 members far outnumber the Federal Police (around 40,000), and even more so the Army Special Force (the famous Agazi red berets, around 4000). The 500,000 or so militiamen also come under their authority. That is why the proclamation encountered ferocious opposition within the OPDO and ANDM.
Essentially, however, the state of emergency is a show of strength. Not only to try to reassure increasingly nervous foreign investors,[16] but above all to convince the population of the regime’s determination to recover total control of the entire country by any means – the obsession of any Ethiopian ruling power worthy of the name – and, at the same time, to make its promise of reforms credible. Otherwise, it would have been perceived as a capitulation. Sebhat Nega, patriarch of the TPLF, explained that the purpose of the state of emergency was “to create a situation to make us able to reform”.[17]
Ultimately, the aim of the compromise reached within the party was to drive a wedge between the “violent, extremist and armed struggle” – to be repressed through the state of emergency – and the “democratic peaceful engagement” expressed by so many demonstrators – holding out a hand via reform.[18]
“Leadership has miserably failed”
Interviews with senior officials cast light on the analysis that the leadership as a whole finally agreed upon. Emollient though it may be, they are all now sticking by it and keeping their previous disagreements to themselves.[19]
The analysis goes as follows: the spirit and letter of the constitution are perfect, as are therefore the federal structure, the format of the institutions, the political line. The latter is not “based on ideology but on the natural laws of development”, as it previously was on Marxist “science”. “Show me a developing country anywhere in the world which has a political strategy and guidelines as well articulated as Ethiopia!” This perfection has accomplished “miracles”. The current crisis is simply “the price of our successes”. It was preceded and will be followed by others, because it is nothing more than a stage, unremarkable and inevitable, on the path that will undoubtedly culminate in the nation catching up with developed countries in the next few decades.
However, this stage, like any other, requires “adjustments”, especially as the society – richer, more educated, more mature – has become a “demanding society”. The young in particular, the spearhead of protest, are making demands that are socio-economic rather than political. The regime is facing “challenges” for having failed to make these adjustments in time.
The main problem is deficiencies in implementation. In sum, things have gone off the rails because of human failings. Yielding to corruption, bad governance, lack of accountability, etc., “leadership at various levels of the government structure has miserably failed to fully and timely[sic] address the demands made and the questions raised by the people”.[20] The response to the crisis must therefore take two forms. First a massive purge at all levels of the Party, regional governments, the administration. Then, “to delineate” – the new watchword – the Party from the government, from the Assemblies, from justice, etc. in order to develop a system of checks and balances, since the self-correcting mechanisms within the Party have proved inadequate.The essential thing is “to discuss… with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “debating platforms”, “assemblies”, “fora”, but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF.
For youth employment, a “Mobile Youth Fund” funded to the tune of 500 million dollars – some 4% of the annual budget – will be created, though the details are vague and it will take several years before its effects are felt. Above all, it is part of a largely endogenous strategy of industrialization, focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) on the edge of the rural areas, whereas heated debate continues within the leadership with those who advocate prioritizing foreign investment in “Industrial Parks”.
Angela Merkel and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn at the national palace in Addis Ababa, Oct. 11, 2016. The German Chancellor visited Ethiopia to discuss the country’s newly declared state of emergency. Mulugeta Ayene/Press Association. All rights reserved.In strictly political terms, “our democratization process is still nascent. It is moving in the right direction, but it has not yet come up with inclusive engagement”, stated the PM.[21] Electoral law will be reformed to introduce an element of proportional representation into majority rule. However, the next elections are in 2020, and the dozens of opposition MPs present before the 2005 elections could do almost nothing to temper the authoritarianism of the regime. The essential thing is “to discuss… with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “debating platforms”, “assemblies”, “fora”, but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF. A promise reiterated year after year, without impact. One of the essential causes of the crisis, its federal dimension, is covered in a single short sentence in the 15 pages of President Mulatu’s speech: “more should be done for the effective implementation of the federal system”. In any case, “Ethiopia is an idol… and exemplary for the world for peaceful [interethnic] coexistence”, declares the State Minister for Federal Affairs.[22]
Anticipating the worst
What emerges from all the interviews with nonofficial contacts is that the expectation of a symbolic gesture, one that would be significant and have immediate impact, proving that the regime had grasped the essence of the crisis and wishes sincerely to address it, has not been met.
According to them, the regime is relying first on repression, and on reforms only as a “footnote”. Merera Gudina, a long-standing leader of the opposition, sums up the general sentiment: “too little, too late”.[23] Nothing has been done to reach out to either the main opposition forces, even the legal opposition, nor the civil society or the media, quite the contrary. This could be envisaged only after the end of the state of emergency, Hailemariam is said to have told one figure from the international community.
These interlocutors share the dark pessimism of an editorial in the Washington Post: “the state of emergency will bottle up the pressures even more, increasing the likelihood they will explode anew… It won’t work”.[24] According to this view, the chances of a genuine opening up on the part of the regime are so small that there is a high probability that the worst will happen: a threat to the very survival of the country, the only question being when this dislocation would occur.Washington Post: “the state of emergency … It won’t work”
While the official media bang on about the “strong commitment” of the leadership “to make its promise of deep reform a reality”,[25] interviews with top officials provide hints of the form and scope of reform, which remain consistent with the official analysis of the crisis.
Focus on “service delivery”
There is no urgency: change will be “an ongoing endless process”. The first specific deadline is in seven months, in June 2017, to report back on the purge and examine a document currently in preparation, on what the EPRDF should become in the next ten years.
In this view, the crisis is not systemic. So neither the constitution, nor the institutions, nor the political line will be touched. How could the latter be challenged since it obeys universal “laws”? For that reason, regardless of all the promised “discussions”, no convincing reasons are given for the much touted opening up to entail any restructuring of the political arena.
The EPRDF alone, as sectarian as ever, has understood and applies these “laws”, whereas the opposition parties oppose or reject them. The EPRDF alone has the near monopoly of skills needed to implement them, skills that the other parties lack. In short, the opposition is still not “constructive”. If the regime needs to become more inclusive, it is essentially in material terms, by sharing the cake more fairly through improvements in “service delivery”.
To do this, it is necessary and sufficient to put an end to individual erring through the self-reform of the EPRDF, i.e. reform by and for the Party itself. To achieve the famous “delineation”, MPs, judges, ministers, civil servants, etc. would split themselves in two, remaining obedient to the Party but putting their mission first. Why would they do this, given that they never have before? “Because they have become aware of the crisis”, is the explanation. So responding to the crisis requires no systemic reshaping through the establishment of independent counterforces. A U-turn in individual behaviour will be enough.Why would they do this, given that they never have before?
The EPRDF sticks to the same age-old paradigm. Since Ethiopia is still at a precapitalist stage, the intelligentsia is the only social group capable of setting the path to follow and leading the way. The EPRDF contains its best elements. Ethnic identities continue to be society’s main structuring factor. The EPRDF alone represents them. As one senior official confirmed, it is not until the country enters a capitalist stage that pluralism will imposed itself: with the emergence of social classes, each will construct its own political party to express its interests. What the EPRDF is still seeking is not simultaneous development AND democracy, but development THEN democracy.
In this respect, the arrival of technocrats – brandishing the indispensable PhD and with no major party position – was widely interpreted as evidence of a new openness in the cabinet reshuffle. Yet it perpetuates the monopoly rule of the “intellocracy”.
The paradox of the strongman
The consensus reached on October 9 is fragile and hence precarious. Nothing proves that the “reformers” have won the long-term game, though they have scored a point. Deep down, they do not share the same views. They lack a standout personality to act as a leader.
They have a clear view of where they want to go, which is to apply the constitution to the letter, but over a very long timescale and with no precise and concerted idea of the steps needed to get there. As for their rank-and-file adherents, they make no secret of still embracing the same paradox: we need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them, for fear that they will otherwise lead to chaos.We need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them.
On the opposition side, all the Oromo we spoke to emphasized the generational gap between the educated youth, broadly aged 16 to 25, spearhead of the protests notably in Oromya, and their elders. The latter are ambivalent. They feel a sincere empathy for the grievances and aspirations of the younger generation, but have reservations, even hostility, regarding the violent methods sometimes employed. In some cases they even physically opposed attempts at destruction during the “five days of rage”.[26] They remain traumatized by the Civil War under the previous regime, the Derg. Then they acquired military know-how that the young activists don’t have.
The latter also lack coordination and leadership. For all these reasons, a historian of armed popular uprisings in Ethiopia in the twentieth century has concluded that it is unlikely that the protests could become a significant guerrilla campaign, or that a sustained armed peasant upsurge – a “jacquerie” could occur.
As for the pockets of insurrection that have appeared in the Amhara region, they mainly affect areas where the authorities’ control has always been weak, even essentially formal.
Ethiopian history teaches that a regime only falls if its forces of repression, or at least part of them, turn against it. Today, apart from a few unconfirmed incidents, cohesion seems to be holding, say experts close to them. It might only break down if the EPRDF became divided to the point of being torn apart by centrifugal forces. However, the military command has always let it be known that it would intervene before this happened, as ultimate saviour of the regime. Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario.
Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario. Without any substantive resolution, the regime could re-establish law and order, as the first effects of the state of emergency seem to suggest. The reforms would not tackle the core problems. The ruling power would remain contested and delegitimized but, in the absence of an alternative, Ethiopians would toe the line. Investors would remain cautious, not to say skittish, affecting economic growth. But neither of the two opposing camps would gain the upper hand, any more than they would reach a constructive compromise. Ultimately, what might possibly occur is a classic scenario in Ethiopian history: the demise of one strongman, followed by a period of great disorder until a new strongman takes up the reins.
[2] Unless otherwise specified, all quotations are taken from interviews conducted in October 2016 in Addis Ababa and Mekele, with people who, for obvious reasons, wished to remain anonymous.
[11] Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula, Ras Seyum, Tigre and Ethiopia integrity, p. 364, Proceedings of the Eight International Conference on Ethiopia Studies, Vol. 1, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, Froebenius Institute, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 1988.
[12] During the Age of the Princes (1769-1855), the Emperor’s power was purely nominal, and local warlords, in constant conflict, ruled the provinces.
Feyisa, 26, was born in West Shewa, Jaldu District in 1990, a year before the EPRDF regime took power in Ethiopia. Growing up in Jaldu about 120km west of Addis Ababa near the border of Macha and Tulama, Feyisa witnessed the injustices and indignities faced by Oromo people. As an elite athlete, he faced a significant dilemma. “I could not join my peers in the streets if I were going to have the chance to compete at all,” he told reporters in September. “I had to leave the country a lot in order to compete overseas, so I knew that if I protested with the ordinary citizens, I would be blocked from ever leaving the country again.”
Microphone in hand, Gemeda stretched out his arms toward the sea of protesters gathered below, and started shouting, “down, down Woyane, down, down TPLF.” (Woyane is a moniker for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the kingmakers in the hodgepodge EPRDF coalition.) Gemeda’s neck veins bulged as he led the crowd in the now famous chant. The crowd went wild with jubilation responding to his chant with earth shattering chants of their own and by repeating it numerous times over, with wrists crossed above their head, and finally breaking out into a pandemonium of cheers and jeers.
Every day that the EPRDF regime tries to explain away popular, grassroots revolt as machinations of few bad actors from abroad, the tide continues to turn against its brutal and repressive rule. For every athlete or activist that’s forced into exile, there are hundreds more determined to expose the regime’s excesses, promising to keep the story in the media limelight. It will only be a matter of time until rank and file Oromo bureaucrats, the Oromia police, merchants and Oromo members of the armed forces join the budding revolution — for they too belong to the gallant Qubee Generation. Ethiopia’s history suggests that that would herald the end of EPRDF and yet another bloody transition in a country that has never seen a single peaceful transfer of power.
Oromoon gaafa lolaaf ba’u “lafee jedhee “nyaata” waliin nyaata namni nyaata sanatti akka tasaa dhaquyyuu dhiisee galuun qaaniidha…….
Muudamni Itti Fakkeessii Mootummaa Faashistii Abbaa Irree Wayyaanee gola Paarlamaa Sobaa Keessatti Har’a Gaggeesse Diramaa jechuuf Illee Diramaan hojii ogummaa artii waan ta’eef, 
Oromian Economist 
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