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“Too little attention was paid to characters like Asaminew, who were licensed to act from expanding islands of power amid the breakdown of party structure and control.”
Ethiopia’s prime minister oversaw the chaotic release of thousands of prisoners, including many ethnonationalist militants. His amnesty may now be coming back to haunt him.
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia—Former comrades in arms described retired Brig. Gen. Asaminew Tsige, who was shot dead on June 24, as a mediocre soldier and a poor administrator. Asaminew was gunned down by government forces two days after allegedly masterminding the assassination of three senior officials of Ethiopia’s Amhara state, including its president—events labeled part of “an orchestrated coup attempt” by the Ethiopian prime minister’s office.
Asaminew had a long history in Ethiopian military circles—and in rebel movements. He was an ex-rebel fighter in the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement in the struggle that in 1991 felled the Derg, a Marxist junta that preceded Ethiopia’s current ruling system. Asaminew met in 2009 with leaders of the banned opposition movement Ginbot 7 in Dubai, according to members of that movement. On April 24, 2009, the National Intelligence and Security Service and Federal Police Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force arrested 35 people allegedly involved in plotting a coup against Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government; most were members of the military or the police. Asaminew was one of them, and he was imprisoned for nearly a decade.
Last February, Asaminew emerged from prison, having allegedly faced solitary confinement and torture, among tens of thousands of prisoners released following a 12-point reform plan handed down by Ethiopia’s ruling politburo in December 2017.
The effort to release and reintegrate former rebels who had once sought to overthrow the federal government was widely hailed as a bold reform effort. But it has also unleashed forces that Abiy may no longer be able to control.Under Abiy Ahmed, who became Ethiopia’s new leader in April 2018, Asaminew was honorably retired with full pension rights—and he was appointed by Amhara state later that year to head its administration and security bureau. The effort to release and reintegrate former rebels who had once sought to overthrow the federal government was widely hailed as a bold reform effort. But as the high-profile June 22 killings have shown, that policy has also unleashed forces that Abiy may no longer be able to control.
Tremors have already rippled through the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), the federal army, whose manpower mirrors the ethnic makeup of the country’s ruling coalition and has been increasingly involved in internal peacekeeping amid innumerable conflicts that have over the last year turned Ethiopia into the world’s largest source for internally displaced persons associated with conflict.
Abiy has brokered an anarchic political opening, leading the four branches of the ethnically-based ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—Tigrayans, Oromos, Amharas, and ethnic groups from the south—to undertake a grandiose personnel restructuring and rebranding. Asaminew’s own appointment to the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) central committee in October 2018 was part of that trend.
According to security insiders, Asaminew relied on hardliners affiliated with the Amhara Democratic Forces Movement, who, after returning from Eritrea amid an historic peace deal between the two countries, agreed last November to merge with the ADP. One of his two deputies in the Amhara security bureau, Alehubel Amare, had fled to Eritrea and formed the ADFM with other military defectors after the alleged coup plot of 2009, and another, the retired Brigadier-General Tefera Mamo, had been imprisoned with Asaminew.
Abiy’s intention was, in December 2018, to broker a merger between the ADP (which is part of the EPRDF) and the more radical National Movement of Amhara, or NAMA (which is not). This trend was replicated in Abiy’s native region of Oromia with a planned merger between the Oromo Democratic Front, an opposition movement returning from exile, with Abiy’s own Oromo Democratic Party, which is part of the EPRDF.
Just as the communist nomenklatura in the former Soviet republics survived through adopting nationalist rhetoric when the Soviet Union began to face a crisis due to rising regional nationalism, the EPRDF’s ADP absorbed existing undercurrents of radical Amhara ethnonationalism in an effort to refurbish its damaged credentials
Just as the communist nomenklatura in the former Soviet republics survived through adopting nationalist rhetoric when the Soviet Union began to face a crisis due to rising regional nationalism, the EPRDF’s ADP absorbed existing undercurrents of radical Amhara ethnonationalism in an effort to refurbish its damaged credentials
by appeasing hard-liners in advance of competitive elections intended for 2020.
This ethnonationalist revival in a federal state has unleashed pre-Derg forces seeking to revive a world of feuding dynasties and provincial lords with their own armies competing for dominance based on who has the most weapons while seeking incorporation of so-called ancestral lands into Amhara state, including irredentist claims in other regional states and even in neighboring Sudan.
Prior to his death, Asaminew was overall commander of Amhara state’s special police forces, police, and militia, over which he had direct influence; he did not have a command role in the ENDF. Such militias historically played a pivotal role in Ethiopia’s internal security during the era of princes, between the 18th and 19th centuries, during which nobles had their own militias from their respective communities to defend their territory and security in the absence of any effective central authority.
They were also present during the Red Terror under the Derg, when so-called people’s militias were established largely from the peasantry and empowered to act against so-called anti-revolutionary individuals and groups. In Amhara state, after the Eritrean-Ethiopian War of 1998-2000, residents of North Gondar and the military and police faced attacks from insurgents linked with Eritrean-supported groups. As a result, militias were increasingly entrusted to operate at the grassroots level as local first responders to lawlessness.
The ADP selected Asaminew to its central committee as part of a pivot toward the incorporation of returning opposition forces. The party’s decision to then crown Asaminew as the head of Amhara state’s administration and security bureau—a role accountable to the regional president and supervising all regional security organs—was seen as a way of absorbing and neutralizing hard-liners. But it ended up fueling a bitter power struggle at the core of a fragmenting EPRDF and threatening the survival of the federal coalition’s constituent branches.
Fractious forms of ethnonationalism are now emerging all across Ethiopia—a country of more than 80 ethnic groups—raising the perilous prospect of a Yugoslav-style breakup.
Fractious forms of ethnonationalism are now emerging all across Ethiopia—a country of more than 80 ethnic groups—raising the perilous prospect of a Yugoslav-style breakup.
Mutual animosity between regional states is contributing to a national crisis, with a race to strengthen regional security forces amid rising distrust of federal forces—similar to the distrust of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army by Slovenes and Croats in the early 1990s, as they built up their own territorial defense forces.
As regional nationalism grows, competing irredentist claims are on the rise. One of Amhara state’s borders is with Tigray state. Amhara nationalists want to reclaim the districts of Wolkait and Raya, which they say were annexed to Tigray after the Tigrayan-led EPRDF came to power. Amhara nationalists also want part of Oromia, Al-Fashaga in Sudan, and the federal capital, Addis Ababa—and NAMA labels the EPRDF’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (which governs Tigray) as a “terrorist group,” according to Christian Tadele, a NAMA politburo member—riling neighboring Tigrayan nationalists.
Millions of people gathered at Hulluuqo kormaa (Meskel square), in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) and across the country to take part in a peaceful solidarity rally in support of PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s reform agenda. #March4Abiy #AbiyAhmed #Ethiopia #OromoProtests
For the first time in decades, the ban on the type of flag Ethiopians want to carry was lifted many felt free to waive the flag they cherish. "I cannot tell you the hope that sparks in me when I see you Ethiopians who have come together for love, and for forgiveness" PM Abiy pic.twitter.com/nNUkHMlqgi
More than 24, 000 volunteers have come together to organize the rally in #AddisAbeba, where PM #Abiy is expected to appear to thank the millions marching for him. Here a deacon from Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church carried a placard "We thank God for giving us a leader" pic.twitter.com/nDqlydP3N2
Not losing sight of the sacrifices of thousands who were killed, maimed, jailed, and made to disappear without a trace during the 4 yrs protests in #Ethiopia, PM #AbiyAhmed paid tribute to them saying: "They could have lived without us, but we can not live without them!" pic.twitter.com/vosnz7CAYQ
Update: The explosion occurred shortly after PM #AbiyAhmed finished his speech and the MC was introducing a "short program to follow". Organizers said the PM has already left the stage. A police officer at the scene told AS the "explosion was very minor & only a few were hurt" pic.twitter.com/0d0BOfKGPs
@OromiaMedia reports the explosion happened behind the stage just as PM Abiy Ahmed finished his speech. Several casualties reported. The Prime Minister is confirmed to be safe. #Ethiopiapic.twitter.com/H7qtaKiJrn
— Ethiopia Live Updates (@Ethiopialiveupd) June 23, 2018
We will overcome hate with love. Some whose heart is filled with hate attempted a grenade attack. HE PM Abiy is safe. All the casualties are martyrs of love & peace. HE PM sends his condolences to the victims.The perpetrators will be brought to justice. #Ethiopia ፍቅርያሸንፋል
Dozens injured in a deadly blast at a support rally for Ethiopia’s PM Abiy Ahmed, OP
Beyond gloomy headlines due to casualties, #March4Abiy was historic and unprecedented. As this aerial image shows, it's -by far- the largest public demonstration of its kind. The myriad images, messages, and symbols in the crowd indicate broad-based support and hunger for change. pic.twitter.com/byDpzVERca
MM Abiy Ahimad: ‘Yaadni hammeenyaa keessan isiiniif hin milkoofne’, BBC Afaan Oromoo
“This is the list of patients we currently have at tikur anbessa hospital following the bombing incident today. Others are at other hospitals. Please share so their loved ones know their status. We have not had any in… https://t.co/leWceZwTar
PM #AbiyAhmed visited "victims, families & responders at BL. He offered his heartfelt encouragement. He told them they represent the true spirit of love, forgiveness & togetherness. They all are our inspiration, our courage & a true reminder of what is good in us," @fitsumaregaapic.twitter.com/U9eAlhPn3F
In a related development, the parliament has elected a new speaker, replacing Aba Dulla Gemeda, who was the speaker for the last six years. Accordingly, Muferait Kemil, former Minister at the Women Affairs Ministry, is now the new speaker of the House of people’s Representatives, making her the first female speaker of the house. Her appointment will also make the position of both the speaker and the deputy to be held by women. Shitaye Menale is the deputy speaker. AS
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has today formed his new cabinet members. The Prime minister presented sixteen names, of which ten are new names for ministerial positions, while the six were recycled from one ministry to another.
However, all members of Parliament who were given the chance to ask questions have expressed their concerns, reservations and objections to the proposed list on various grounds. Among the reservations expressed by MPs is the lack of women members of cabinet. Out of the sixteen, there are four women cabinet members, higher proportion compared to previous experiences. They are: Hirut Woldemariam (PhD), Minister of Works & Social Affairs; Yalem Tsegaye, Minister of Women and Children Affairs; Ouba Mohammed, Minister of Communications & Technology; and Fozia Amin, Minister Culture and Tourism.
Update – List of new cabinet members presented by PM #AbiyAhmed approved by the majority MPs. Two of the 16 new members of the news cabinet are absent and the 14 have just been sworn in. #Ethiopiapic.twitter.com/kbQumrx56H
Addis Standard@addisstandard
Today’s major change is the appointment of Teshome Toga , Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the EU to become minister at Public Enterprises ministry. He replaced Dr. Girma Amente, who is now the Head of the urban development and housing bureau of the #Oromia regional state. #Ethiopiapic.twitter.com/alOQiKn3wc
The other concern raised by an MP was the replacement of Dr. Girma Amente from the Ministry of State Enterprises by Teshome Toga, who was Ethiopia’s Ambassador the EU. The MP defended Dr. Girma’s track record at the Enterprise said she objected his replacement. Dr. Girma moved to lead the urban development and housing bureau of the Oromia regional state.
But the most critical argument raised by three different MPs is the decision to merge Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources with the Ministry of Livestock and Fishery. MPs expressed their concerns that given the abundance resources of livestock and fishery in the country, the sector needs its own ministry. In addition, an MP also raised concern that the attempt was previously tried but has failed. The decision to merge the two was however approved by the house. Accordingly, Shiferaw Shigute, deputy chairman of SEPM and Secretariat of the EPRDF will be the new minister leading the Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock Resources.
PM #AbiyAhmed defending the decision to merge; he said Livestock and Fishery, led by Prof. Fekadu Beyene, was performing 56% of its capacity. He also said the merge was not at the expense of Livestock & Fishery. The decision is approved by majority vote; 3 against, & 1 abstain pic.twitter.com/VgdyuoSs6w
Addis Standard@addisstandard
Update: MPs are questioning, expressing reservations and their oppositions to the list of new cabinet members introduced by the PM #AbiyAhmed on various grounds including an opposition against the decision to remove Dr. Girma Amente from Public Enterprises ministry. pic.twitter.com/0iuEYjGRRY
After responses by PM Abiy Ahmed to the questions and concerns raised by MPs, the parliament has approved the new cabinet members who were sworn in before end of the 21st regular session of the parliament.
Accordingly, the new list of members of the Prime Minister’s cabinet is comprised of the following sixteen ministers:
– Shiferaw Shigute, Minister of Agriculture & Livestock Resources
– Siraj Fegessa, minister of Transport
– Brehanu Tsegaye, Attorney General
– Ubah Mohammed, Minister of Communications & Technology
– Teshome Toga, Minister of State Enterprises
– Hirut Woldemariam (PhD), Minister of Works & Social Affairs
– Amir Aman (PhD), Minister of Health
– Meles Alemu, Minister of Mines & Energy
– Ambachew Mekonnen (PhD), Minister of Industry
– Ahmed Shidie, Minister of Government Communications
– Motuma Mekassa, Minister of Defense
– Fozia Amin, Minister of Culture & Tourism
– Umar Hussien, Director General of Revenues & Customs Authority
– Yealem Tsegaye, Minister of Youth & Women
– Melaku Aebel, Minister of Trade
– Janterar Abay, Minister of Urban Development & Construction
For live update from the parliament’s session and background information on some of the appointees, please refer to the following thread:
Good AM! #Ethiopia‘s PM #AbiyAhmed is to announce a limited number of cabinet reshuffle. Based on info confirmed by AS, the following people will take new positions. Comm’n Affairs Minister replacing Dr. Negeri Lencho will be Ahmed Shide of Ethio-Somali People’s Democratic Party
#Ethiopia – #Oromia regional state reshuffles 23 senior positions; elevated the highest number of women in to top position. Reshuffle saw Shashemene Mayor Tayiba Hassen become V. president of Oromia; Gov. Commu'n affairs head Dr. Negeri Lencho became Oromia commun'n affairs head. pic.twitter.com/6iZ4OgDAB2
The United States Congress on Tuesday passed a human rights-centered resolution against the Ethiopian government amongst others calling for the respect of human rights and inclusive governance.
Despite a late pushback led by one Senator Inhofe – a known ally of the government, to get Congress to reject the resolution, the motion according to Congress records did not even need to be voted upon as it adopted by voice vote.
Congressmen and women took turns to give brief comments about the importance of the resolution with each touching on the political crisis that has rocked the country. Others also pointed to the cost in terms of human lives and loss of properties as a result of government highhandedness and an ever-shrinking democratic space.
A Summary of the resolution by Congress policy website stated as follows:
“H. Res. 128 recognizes Ethiopia’s efforts to promote regional peace and security, and its partnership with the U.S. to combat terrorism, promote economic growth, and address health challenges. In addition, the resolution expresses concern about human rights abuses and contracting democratic space, and condemns excessive use of force by Ethiopian security forces.
“The resolution calls on the Government of Ethiopia to lift the state of emergency, end the use of excessive force, release wrongfully imprisoned protesters, and improve transparency, while at the same time urging protesters and opposition groups to use peaceful discussion and avoid incitement.
“The resolution calls on the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development to cooperate and strengthen ties with Ethiopia, condemn human rights abuses, and promote accountability.”
Below are some reactions of activists on social media
Eritrea says Ethiopia must move to deal with its chronic internal security crisis instead of finding scapegoats from outside.
This is the position of Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel in a response to an email query by the Bloomberg magazine. Ethiopian authorities were reported over the weekend to have said neighbouring Eritrea was partly to blame for its internal security headache.
“The regime is desperately trying to deflect attention from its intractable domestic crisis — of its own making — and find external scapegoats,” Yemane said describing the claims as false and one that did not merit a serious response.
The state-owned Ethiopia Broadcasting Corporation late last week quoted the federal police chief as saying Eritrea was trying to destabilize the country by sponsoring anti-peace forces.
Ethiopia is currently under a six-month state of emergency imposed on February 16, 2018. It followed the resignation of Prime Minisiter Hailemariam Desalegn, barely 24-hours earlier.
The government said it was necessary in the wake of spreading violence across the country. The measure was controversially ratified by the parliament in early March in a vote fraught with claims of rigging.
It is not the first time that Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of such acts, neither is it the first time Eritrea is rejecting such claims. The two continue to trade blows over a border demarcation process which dates back to 2002.
Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after decades of armed struggle. In 1998, the two neighbouring countries fought a two-year long war over their disputed border which claimed the lives of at least 70,000.
The two countries have had tense relations as a peace deal signed in 2000 to end the war has never been fully implemented.
In just over a week, nearly 10,000 Ethiopians have sought asylum in Kenya, underscoring the ethnic tensions and internal problems facing the Horn of Africa nation and posing a direct challenge to the ruling coalition.
The refugees fled the restive Oromia region following a botched military operation targeting members of the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front. During a raid on the villages, the government said faulty intelligence led soldiers to “mistakenly” kill nine civilians and injure 12 others. Since then, the unrest and fear has forced thousands—including 600 expectant mothers, disabled, and elderly persons—to flee into the border town of Moyale in Kenya and establish makeshift camps. The UN refugee agency said it was difficult to assess how many more people had fled since many were being housed by friends and relatives.
The outbreak of violence comes weeks after the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s council imposed a six-month a state of emergency amid mass anti-government protests. The grassroots opposition to the government largely stemmed from the Oromos and Amharas, who for over two years now have decried systematic exclusion, land grabs by the minority Tigray-dominated state, besides limited representation in senior government posts.
The government reacted to these protests with force, drawing sharp criticism from its allies in the West. The unrest also jeopardized the nation’s booming economy and its place as an important center for global apparel sourcing.
Representatives from @UNHCR_KENYA, @UNICEFKenya, WFP, @IFRCAfrica, Refugee Affairs Secretariat and Kenya #RedCross, visit Moyale to see first-hand the situation of the over 9000 displaced persons from Ethiopia.
In January, in a move described as a salve for the Oromo, the government announced it would close an infamous detention center and release political prisoners, including those awaiting trial. And in a corollary gesture, prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned in mid-February, opening up a succession game and bitter internal wrangles. Opposition figures insisted that tepid reforms or half-hearted concessions won’t solve the country’s problems, calling for the system of governance to be overhauled.
The EPRDF is set to meet soon to choose its next leader. Chris Suckling, a senior analyst with IHS Markit, says Abiy Ahmed who leads the Oromo party that makes up the ruling alliance “is the most likely successor as prime minister.” Suckling said Ahmed was a favorite given his close relationship with Oromo youth and the country’s political and security agencies.
In Moyale, meanwhile, the displaced refugees continue to arrive daily, narrating stories of horror from the villages straddling the border on the other side.
The number of Ethiopians who fled to Kenya following the killings of 10 civilians in the border town of Moyale has reached 9,600 according to the organization’s Kenya Branch Office spokes person, Peter Smerdon, as cited by DW Amharic. The spokesperson added that most of the refugees are women and children.
The refugees are in need of food aid and housing. Some are said to be in need of medical assistance as well. Kenyan Red Cross distributed some food yesterday.
“The number could rise,” says Peter, “due to the situation in Ethiopia.” UNHCR is poised to send a mission to Moyale to assess the situation.
On the other hand, Ethiopian authorities claim that effort is underway to return the thousands of Ethiopians who fled to Kenya after what government claimed was an accidental killings of civilians.
Government disclosed that yesterday when Federal Police Commissioner, General Assefa Abiyu, appeared on state Television,Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, “to share update on the state of emergency.” It is,however, unclear as to how the government is coordinating the matter with the government of Kenya, which reportedly closed the border with Ethiopia after Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) rebel groups attacked military convoy.
The Command Post arrested Oromo regional state Justice department spokesperson, Taye Denea, for remarking, during an interview with DW Amharic, that the killing in Moyale does not seem to be accidental based on information he has.
Days after the Ethiopian government claimed the killing in Moyale as a “mistake”, a ten years old boy was killed which some understood it to be a reckless and deliberate killing. In view of that, doubts are surfacing if the regime in power would be able to secure the repatriation of Ethiopians who fled to Kenya since last Friday.
Related (Oromian Economist sources):
Nearly 10,000 Ethiopians seek asylum in Moyale, Kenya following violence back home.- UNHCR Kenya
“I was really scared, so I decided to cross the border with my family to Kenya for safety”
By: Rose Ogola | 19 Mar 2018
Balanish Tadese, an Ethiopian mother of two, walks through a makeshift refugee camp in Moyale, Kenya, with a bundle of personal belongings strapped to her back. Her 6-year-old son, Abdi, and 9 year old daughter, Sarah, follow close behind, clutching personal belongings in their hands. They’re looking for something to eat or drink and somewhere to stay.
This family is among around 9,700 asylum seekers that have arrived in Moyale over the last week from the Oromia region of Ethiopia. The refugees allege 13 people were killed when Ethiopian soldiers attacked their villages, in a raid on opposition areas. Oromia has been the scene of protests and violence before.
Tadese explains what she saw.
“One of my neighbours was shot and killed during the day as he came from a school meeting in our village. The following day, another neighbor was strangled as he went to the shops in the evening. I was really scared, so I decided to cross the border to Kenya for safety”
There are over 600 expectant mothers.
More than 80 per cent of those that fled are women and children, nearly 1500 are under age 5, with one child being just 6 days old. There are over 600 expectant mothers. Some disabled and elderly persons also fled.
The asylum seekers are staying in two makeshift camps in the Somare and Sololo areas of Moyale. They are in urgent need of food, water, sanitation facilities, shelter, and some have medical needs.
Tadese says her and her children have not eaten well for days. She’s worried that her children will become ill if they do not get help.
Tadese and others who fled with her say they are worried about the security situation back home, and fear being situated in camps close to the border with Ethiopia. So it’s not clear how long the asylum seekers might stay in Moyale.
UNHCR’s partner Kenya Red Cross Society responded immediately to provide shelter material, blankets, kitchen utensils as well as medical, water and hygiene services. The County government also provided emergency food assistance to the asylum seekers.
Other UN and humanitarian organisations are also collaborating in the multi-agency emergency response by providing various life-saving services.
The Kenyan Government is looking at reducing the number of makeshift camps, so UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency in Kenya, the Kenya Red Cross, and others can meet the needs of those that have arrived more effectively. UNHCR is also helping the Government of Kenya register the asylum seekers, while ongoing assessments are being made about what to do long term.
One of the challenges is that some of the asylum seekers are staying with relatives and friends in Moyale, so it’s difficult to know precisely how many more have fled and are affected, and what their needs might be.
Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Law: A Tool to Stifle Dissent, authored by lawyers from leading international law firms, provides an in-depth and damning analysis of Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. The report examines how the law, enacted in 2009, is a tool of repression, designed and used by the Ethiopian Government to silence its critics.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein has expressed concern over the reinstatement of a state of emergency (SOE) in Ethiopia – the second in the last two years.
Zeid was delivering his remarks on global update of human rights concerns at the 37th seccion of the Human Rights Council on March 7, 2018.
Whiles applauding reforms started announced in January 2018 and which was being rolled out by way of prisoner releases, the U.N. human rights chief said recent reports of killings needed to be investigated and perpetrators brought to book.
I am concerned about the declaration of a second State of Emergency last month. Reforms can only be carried out successfully through truly inclusive dialogue and political processes.
“In Ethiopia, I welcome the release of more than 7,000 detainees in January and February, including several high profile figures.
“I urge the authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for recent killings in the country, and I reiterate my request for access to affected regions,” he said.
He also weighed in on the need for government to commit to reforms and to do so in the spirit of inclusive dialogue. The country is currently under a six-month state of emergency imposed to quell spreading violence. The government has admitted a violent fightback of the measure especially in the Oromia region.
The SOE was imposed barely twenty four hours after the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. The ruling EPRDF is set to pick his successor over the weekend. Desalegn who took the post in 2015 says his decision is to allow the party to fully pursue reforms.
“I am concerned about the declaration of a second State of Emergency last month. Reforms can only be carried out successfully through truly inclusive dialogue and political processes,” Zeid who visited Ethiopia last year stressed.
Police officers walk among civilians at the Meskel Square in Addis Ababa. Picture: Tiksa Negeri/Reuters
Never have the stakes in Ethiopia been so high – political tensions are at a knife-edge, and the future stability of the country and its prospects for development hang in the balance.
Up until the last few weeks, most of the country’s opposition leaders and many of their supporters have been locked up as political prisoners. But with the groundswell of popular discontent and burgeoning street protests, the government was compelled to release more than 6 000 political prisoners last month, another 700 two weeks ago, and a further 1 500 on Wednesday. Famous journalists Eskinder Nega and Andualem Arage, as well as prominent Oromo opposition leaders Bekele Gerba and Merera Gudina were among those recently released.
The glue that has held the autocratic ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) together is finally becoming unstuck. The EPRDF has ruled as a multiethnic coalition since 1991 and includes four ethnically based parties.
The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is the party which has dominated the coalition for more than two decades despite the fact that Tigrayans account for only 6% of the population. The TPLF was the ethnic guerrilla organisation that brought Meles Zenawi to power in 1991, toppling the communist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Zenawi governed for 21 years until his death in 2012, and while he pushed the country’s developmental agenda forward, he was accused of authoritarian tendencies and presiding over extensive human rights abuses.
The popularity of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) within the ruling coalition has continued to rise to the detriment of the TPLF. The Oromos are the most populous ethnic group in the country, based in the largest and richest region – Oromia. The Oromos have historically complained of political marginalisation. The OPDO has been perceived in some quarters as having been a puppet of the TPLF.
The third ruling coalition partner is the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), representing the Amhara which are the country’s second-largest ethnic group, which has also historically complained that they are under-represented in the corridors of power. The fourth coalition partner is the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM).
The governing coalition started to lose its grip on power in the face mass of protests following the 2015 elections which the opposition claimed were rigged. The government responded with repression by passing restrictive laws, intimidating and imprisoning the opposition, independent media, and civil society leaders. While political adversaries were crushed, the government tried to co-opt the elites.
Hundreds of people were killed in the ensuing two years of protests that rocked the two most populous provinces of Oromia and Amhara. The situation became so grave that the presidents of the two provinces recently announced that they supported the protests, and demanded an end to Tigrayan dominance.
Ethiopia has now reached a point of no return. Even the usually quiet suburbs in the capital occupied by the business and political elite have been rocked by protests. Prime Minister Hailemariam announced on February 15th that he was stepping down in order to create political space, something unprecedented in modern day Ethiopia. Actually, he had been instructed by his party to step down after the EPRDF’s executive committee blamed the current leadership for its poor governance, the unrest and failing to protect civilians.
Former Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn announces his resignation during a press conference in Addis Ababa. Picture: AP
The unravelling of the EPRDF’s grip on power was too much for the old guard who supported the declaration of a six-month state of emergency which was imposed a day after the PM’s resignation. Far from regaining control, the security measures only served to embolden protesters demanding the release of all political prisoners and fresh democratic elections.
The potential for chaos and ethnic bloodshed in the country is real, and Ethiopia needs a political way out of this crisis. There seems to be only one way forward – for the ruling coalition to call early elections ahead of 2020. Elections would reduce tension and marginalise the extremists that threaten to let the genie of ethnic violence out of the bottle. The caveat, of course, is that they would have to be free and fair.
If Ethiopia is to preserve and build on the developmental milestones it has achieved, it needs to start the process of political rebuilding in order to regain the confidence of the electorate. The window of opportunity to find a peaceful solution could close very quickly, which requires visionary leadership to chart a new path forward.
WILL THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT BE OPEN TO DEMOCRATIC REFORMS DESPITE THIS WEEK’S EMERGENCY DECLARATION? – ACLED
Prof. Beyene Petros, Medrek deputy chair & foreign relations head calls for all inclusive political change. Medrek, an Ethiopian opposition political coalition, says the ruling party, #EPRDF, is not in a position to solve the current #EthiopiaCrisis. https://t.co/AvGVZRVTRi
Security forces/Ethiopian Defense Forces fired on unarmed & defenseless civilians in Nekemete city in Western Oromia. The entire city has been under siege for the last 3 days https://t.co/2O6LGKZ4D3
Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn quit last week after years of public protest against the regime and open discord within the coalition It is tempting to call it an “African spring”. In a matter of months, in countries as disparate as Angola and Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and South Africa, entrenched leaders have been falling like ninepins. Last week, it was the turn of the Ethiopian prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, who quit after years of public protest against the regime and increasingly open discord within the coalition that has run the country since 1991. His sudden departure came just a day after, half a continent away, Jacob Zuma finally agreed to resign as president of South Africa to make way for Cyril Ramaphosa. Those dramatic events followed the even more unexpected fall of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who many thought would die of old age before he was pushed from office. Instead, he took the hint that it was time to go when tanks rolled on to the streets of Harare last November. And just two months before that, in an orchestrated but still highly significant change of leadership in Angola, João Lourenço took over as president from José Eduardo dos Santos, whose 38 years in charge beat Mr Mugabe’s stint by a year. What on earth is going on? Should African leaders be shaking in their boots as renewal sweeps across the continent? Africa, as people repeatedly point out, is not a country. It is a complex continent of diverse nations whose histories, languages and political cultures make them hard to meaningfully compare. There is no reason to believe that events in one have any connection to happenings in another. Yet that doesn’t mean there are no common themes. After all, countries in entirely different continents — take the Philippines, Hungary and the US — may be prone to the same forces of populism or nationalism. One thing Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have in common is they are run by liberation parties that have ossified in power for between a quarter and a half a century. In Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has run the country since the Portuguese left in 1975. In Zimbabwe, Zanu-PF, which led the armed struggle against white minority rule, has been in power since 1980. Similarly, Mr Desalegn’s Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front has ruled since 1991, although he has been prime minister only since the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012. And in South Africa, yet another liberation movement, the African National Congress, has dominated power since apartheid crumbled in 1994. In each case, these liberation parties are seeking to renew themselves after a generation or more in charge. The transition from exile to government has not always been easy. Power means money. In the case of Angola, huge oil exports and massive Chinese investments have meant a bonanza for the top party cadres, especially for anyone bearing the name dos Santos. In Zimbabwe, socialist rhetoric yielded to the reality of a destroyed economy for the many and rich pickings for a few party hacks loyal to Mr Mugabe. In South Africa, too, particularly in the Zuma years, the righteous task of spreading wealth to the black majority morphed into the less righteous one of spreading it to an ANC-connected black elite. Change now is partly driven by the pent-up frustration of the millions left out. The public has found its voice, pushing the ruling elite to shuffle leaders in the cause of survival. In South Africa, by far the most democratic of the four, ANC support has skidded in successive elections and the party has lost control of four of the country’s most important cities. But even in the other three countries, where elections are far more controlled, opposition forces have found a way to express themselves, both through the ballot box and on the streets. Will new leaders bring genuine change? In Ethiopia, Mr Desalegn’s resignation was followed by the imposition of a state of emergency, hardly a sign of democratic opening. In Angola and Zimbabwe, the ruling parties have probably done enough to present the semblance of a new direction, though whether that translates into more inclusive policies is not yet clear. In South Africa, Mr Ramaphosa is seeking more than cosmetic changes in the interests of restoring both the ANC’s moral and electoral standing. Still, in each country the ruling elite has engineered a personnel change in the interest of self-preservation. More than revolutions from below, they are party reorganisations from above. Other leaders on the continent will be watching, some fearfully. But “African spring” does not capture what is going on. You could call it instead the season of the palace coup.
Related (Oromian Economist sources):
In this video Hailemariam Desalegn admitted that he is making decisions without all the facts.
#Ethiopia's hardliners appear to be reasserting themselves after the most politically tumultuous week for years. After the shock resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, another state of emergency, to last an initial six months, was declared. https://t.co/IKNMLE7cei
The resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn triggered the imposition of martial law. But continued authoritarianism in the face of fierce and determined protests will be futile, argue @OPride and @AbbaKayo. https://t.co/lgXO7hcRLa
(Africa News) — Sweden says it is concerned about Ethiopia’s reinstatement of a state of emergency (SOE) in the midst of reform efforts initiated by government.
Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister, Margot Wallstrom, in a tweet said as an ally, Sweden was ‘following development in Ethiopia closely.’
Continued reform efforts, inclusive dialogue, respect for rule of law and human rights, including freedom of expression should be a priority, her tweet further tasked the government.
Following development in Ethiopia closely. As a long-time partner, Swe is concerned about reinstatement of the SoE. Continued reform efforts, inclusive dialogue, respect for rule of law and human rights, including freedom of expression should be a priority.
The February 16 state of emergency was imposed after a meeting of Council of Ministers supposedly to curb spreading violence across the country. It is the second such measure in the last two years.
The country spent the the first eight months of 2017 under a SOE imposed in October 2016. The recent measure was declared barely 24 hours after PM Hailemariam Desalegn resigned his post. The ruling coalition is set to name his successor at a Congress.
Most western allies including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany have all spoken on the move, tasking the government to soldier on with political reforms and respect for the rights of opponents.
"Following development in #Ethiopia closely. As a long-time partner, [#Sweden] is concerned about reinstatement of the SoE.Continued reform efforts, inclusive dialogue, respect for rule of law & human rights, including freedom of expression should be a priority."@margotwallstrompic.twitter.com/JhJQBohAM5
‘As a good friend and strategic partner of Ethiopia I was concerned when learning of the re-imposition of a State of Emergency in Ethiopia, so soon after the last State of Emergency was lifted,’ said Minister of Foreign Affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide.
The reinstatement of the State of Emergency was introduced 16 February for a period of six months.
‘The sustainable political and economic development as well as stability of Ethiopia is important to Norway. It is essential that the recent State of Emergency will not reduce the Ethiopian government’s commitment to ongoing reform processes, including multiparty dialogue, release of prisoners and the dialogue with civil society. These processes, which aim for a more inclusive political environment, are important for the development of democracy. In this respect, I would urge the government of Ethiopia to implement the State of Emergency in a proportional manner and in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ said Eriksen Søreide.
Capsizing: The system of government introduced in 1991, and monopolised by Meles Zenawi from the early 2000s, is irremediably dead. It had been in its death-throes since Meles’s sudden demise in 2012. The snap resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn on February 15 marked the serving of the official death certificate.
What is urgent is to bring down the tension by focusing the hopes and energies of the activists on a political way out, in the form of a tested, unchallengeable mechanism.
Recently resigned Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn speaking in China, May 15, 2017. Lan Hongguang/Xinhua News Agency/Press Association. All rights reserved.
The crisis in Ethiopia has suddenly gained momentum and reached a tipping point. Things could go either way. The country could dig itself even deeper, with consequences that don’t bear thinking about. Or there could be a broad realisation that Ethiopia is “at the precipice”, bringing a surge of realism and pragmatism that would finally start a process of political rebuilding on solid, inclusive and lasting foundations.
This will require compromise, an attitude that is, to say the least, somewhat unfamiliar in traditional Ethiopian culture. All the actors will have to find a balance between what they would like to get and what they can get, between the short-term and the long-term. But time is short, numbered in weeks, maybe days.
Capsizing
The system of government introduced in 1991, and monopolised by Meles Zenawi from the early 2000s, is irremediably dead. It had been in its death-throes since Meles’s sudden demise in 2012. The snap resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn on February 15 marked the serving of the official death certificate.
He had privately indicated his intention to resign, but not until after the planned spring congress of the governing coalition of the four major ethnic parties: the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organisation (OPDO), the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM).
The reason he gave for his resignation, as “vital in the bid to carry out reforms that would lead to sustainable peace and democracy”, is particularly open to question in that he was a well-known reformist. Did he quit because he was pushed or because he had become aware of his powerlessness? In the midst of the worst storm that the country has experienced for decades, he was the official captain of a crew that had become so disparate, divided and disloyal that his vessel was pitching and yawing wildly.
Hailemariam probably did not want to be held responsible in the event that it should capsize. He may also have hoped that his departure would back the ruling coalition into a corner and leave it with no other alternative than to set a course out of the storm and form a new crew capable of following it.
Hegemony?
In parallel with this decline in central power, the respective strength of the coalition’s regional parties, starting with the OPDO, has continued to rise to the detriment of the TPLF, which had dominated the coalition for more than two decades despite the fact that Tigrayans account for only 6% of the nation’s population. And alongside this centrifugal movement, opposition forces – both legal and illegal, national and anchored in the diaspora – were growing in power, after long years of repression had kept them in the wilderness.
As the body politic fragments and levels out, the protests show no sign of abating, mainly in Oromya, even though not a week goes by without its death toll of victims of the security forces. Oromo complaints of marginalisation have gradually shifted towards claims of what they believe they deserve as the country’s most populous and richest region: to be at the top.
The home strike on February 12 and 13 paralysed Oromya as far as the gates of Addis Ababa, demonstrating that a blockade of the capital would not be inconceivable. Unprecedented crowds in multiple cities celebrated the return of the most prominent political prisoners: around 6,000 have been freed since a gradual amnesty announced at the beginning of January. Buoyed up by its successes, the street – at least in Oromya – could misinterpret the disarray of the EPRDF to the point that it could believe itself to have achieved an hegemonic position that none can deny it.
However, this popular movement, mostly spontaneous and therefore loosely organised, has its shadow side, at least on the margins. While the primary responsibility for the forced displacement of almost a million people – mostly Oromo, a minority Somali – essentially since September 2017, described as “interethnic clashes”, is attributable to the Somali authorities, at grassroots level it has stirred up ethnic tensions that were previously latent, or at most sporadic and sparse.
Ethnic clashes and nationalist hysteria
The frequent claim that multi-ethnic communities have lived in peace for centuries is both true and false. “Ethnic clashes” have always taken place around basic issues: land, pasturage, water. They have flared up with all the major upheavals and subsequent power vacuums of recent decades, such as the agrarian reforms of 1975 and the introduction of the federal system in 1992-1993.
The national parties, mainly OPDO and ANDM, have backed the quest for “national identities” and claims of “national rights” in order to assert themselves vis-à-vis the TPLF and ride the wave of protests. Some of their leaders have even given their imprimatur, at least through inaction, to outbursts of nationalistic hysteria that itself also masks well-known interests, ultimately leading to “ethnic cleansing” accompanied by dispossession and pillaging.
Recently, thousands of Tigrayans, identified with their governing elite, whose powers and resources are disproportionate, were driven out of the Amhara region. Members of the Kemant, a subgroup of the Agwa ethnicity, were massacred there. Students have had to flee their universities to escape a sometimes murderous wave of “ethnic purification”.
“Ethnic clashes” are proliferating. In some cases the regional or local security forces do nothing to stop them. A symptom of this odious climate: on websites accessible in Ethiopia , especially in the comments sections, overtly racist interethnic attacks, which would be an offense anywhere else, are flourishing as never before.
Fundamental divide
Finally, in parallel with this threefold process – disintegration in the system of power, continuing protests with sometimes violent outbursts, and rising ethnic hysteria – a fundamental divide is forming, even if it does not reach the light of day. The ultra-dominant official rhetoric is reformist, founded on a key expression: “deep renewal”. However, websites (like Aigaforum.com or Tigraionline.com) that say out loud what is only whispered in certain circles of the TPLF, insist that the only effect of the government’s acts of appeasement is to make the protesters even more demanding and exacerbate the disorders.
In this view, the only way to put an end to both is to employ every possible means in a trial of strength. In addition, questions remain about some interventions by federal forces – army, police, the elite Agazi unit – carried out without the prior agreement of the regional authorities, a legal requirement, and frequently accompanied by the use of disproportionate violence. These forces are disciplined and battle hardened, so individual excesses or blunders are highly unlikely. These cases of autonomous and brutal conduct, running counter to official policy, are undoubtedly commanded, or at least tolerated, by the heads of these units, although they cannot be unaware that they are an essential contributor to escalations in radicalisation and violence.
How to draw back from the precipice
Drawing back from the “precipice” requires an urgent Copernican revolution. It can be built on four cornerstones.
– Apart from a few very marginal elements, no one fundamentally questions the Constitution. It can therefore provide the frame of reference for any change.
– None of the members of the ruling coalition envisages putting an end to it, however formal and forced its perpetuation may be. They all know that the coalition’s official collapse could devour them all. At least in the short term, it is hard to find any sign of any alternative coalition that could form, let alone govern. If the EPRDF broke up, the probability that Ethiopia would become a “failed state” is very high. However weakened it is, there would still be one hand on the helm.
– At no point, so far, has the spearhead of protest in Oromya, the Queerroo (youth), called for armed struggle. This is a major change: in the history of Ethiopia, power has always come through the barrel of a gun. However, there is a growing radical fringe which believes that taking up arms will be sufficient to put an end to the regime.
– Finally, even the opposition, which was calling for the immediate formation of a transitional government of national unity, has more or less abandoned this demand. It was unrealistic. The EPRDF has just rejected it. If it had agreed, its divisions and the scattered nature of the opposition would have bogged down the formation of such a government in interminable bargaining and one-upmanship and, once in place, would have condemned it to impotence.
However, the longer the power vacuum continues, the closer the “precipice” approaches. Regardless of its divisions, the EPRDF must at all costs make the internal compromises needed to appoint a credible prime minister and government, and then actually support them so that they can take back the helm. Of course, the appointment of Lemma Megersa, although he cannot legally occupy this position, would satisfy Oromo protesters. However, it would require such major concessions in the light of what we know about the balances of power, that another Oromo or Amhara figure, or even a southerner, would seem more feasible, a remake of the compromise reached for Meles Zenawi’s successor.
State of emergency
The proclamation of the state of emergency on February 16 caused an outcry, prompting the US Embassy to issue a statement of a severity unprecedented in contemporary US-Ethiopia relations, almost an ukase (“We strongly disagree with the Ethiopian government’s decision to impose a state of emergency… (This) undermines recent positive steps… We strongly urge the government to rethink this approach”).
According to the Minister of Defence, it was decided unanimously by the Council of Ministers, and therefore by its OPDO and ANDM members, who reportedly came on board after first having vigorously rejected it. If this is true, what compromises were required? At present we don’t know the terms, any more than we know what is debated behind the scenes on all the different issues, making the state of emergency just one aspect of a global negotiation. There is still much to play for.
Does it signify that political openings have been rejected and the priority placed on repression, in other words a major victory for the “hardliners”? This will also depend on its scope, those enforcing it and their behaviour. The only indication comes from the official agency press release, which states that the purpose is “to protect freedom of movement and the rights of citizens to live wherever they choose as well as build assets”, in other words first and foremost to put an end to the “ethnic based attacks” mentioned a few lines below.
It is noteworthy that it makes no mention of restrictions on political activities. If, and only if, future information on the state of emergency confirms this analysis, and if, and only if, the federal forces show a minimum of restraint in their behaviour, the government will have taken the decision incumbent on any government facing the risks of an explosion of violent excesses, including ethnic unrest on this scale.
That may perhaps be why OPDO and ANDM, which had condemned the ethnic attacks, was ultimately able to accept the state of emergency. Under these circumstances, it can also be assumed that Parliament might approve it.
However, intervention by the security forces alone will not suffice to prevent this threat if nothing changes elsewhere. They were overwhelmed during the previous state of emergency. Ethiopia has around 15,000 rural communities (kebele), each with a few dozen militiamen. In other words, probably 400,000 armed men who owe their loyalty to the leader of the kebele. There is no proof that these leaders would be willing or able to hold back ethnic attacks perpetrated by a majority of inhabitants.
At this level of crisis – breakdown in the system of government, dispersal and weakness of the legal opposition, protest that is increasingly heated, disparate in its organisation and simultaneously extreme and nebulous in its goals, proliferation of ethnic clashes – it is unrealistic to think that time and resources are sufficient for a big negotiation, a sort of “national conference”, even one that brought together the main stakeholders in and outside the country, to be able to start everything afresh and rebuild a global alternative system step-by-step.
What is urgent is to bring down the tension by focusing the hopes and energies of the activists on a political way out, in the form of a tested, unchallengeable mechanism that will be as speedy, practical and unifying as possible. The mechanism that would meet these criteria is early general elections, held well ahead of the current schedule of spring 2020.
Early general elections
First, they would clarify the political landscape. Each force would be required to present voters with its flagship measures for rebuilding the system of political, economic, military or security power. The goal would not simply be a change of regime. It would include the distribution of powers and resources within the federation, hence the famous “nationalities question” that lies at the heart of the current crisis and for almost two centuries has undermined the capacity of Ethiopians to live together.
Following the elections, this landscape could be structured and hierarchized on clear and transparent foundations, and the inevitable alliances would be formed first around their respective weights and projects. Since these foundational elections would be legislative, Parliament would finally acquire the primary role assigned to it in the Constitution. The verdict of the electorate, founded on universal suffrage, would make the outcome unchallengeable.
Finally, elections would channel protest that is both vigorous and inchoate into a concrete, tangible and decisive goal. The Queerro who favour a shift to armed struggle remain a very small minority, but they have the wind in their sails. All the voices that count in Oromya and in the diaspora continue to call for calm, for patience, arguing that change is now inevitable but needs to be given time. If they are listened to and if, moreover, the undertaking to hold these general elections could reduce the tension, defuse the reasons for protesting and therefore the risks of outbreaks, there would be a greater chance that the most extreme elements would become isolated and ethnic clashes less probable.
Free and fair
However, this scenario can only work on one condition: that these elections are “free and fair”. For this to happen, a supreme authority needs to be established, emanating from all the main stakeholders, whether government, opposition or civil society, in Ethiopia or abroad.
The former head of the military, General Tsadkan, even proposed that, in order to guarantee its independence from the current government, no member of the EPRDF should be able to be part of it, though it would be difficult for the coalition to agree to submit to the authority of a body that would resemble a weapon directed against it.
This authority would be vested with the powers needed to guarantee the ability of all the competitors to organise and express themselves freely, including the power to put on ice laws that contravene it and that it would be formally impossible to repeal rapidly.
Finally, it would set a realistic date for elections. The oppositions must have a certain amount of time to build their electoral machines, but the date should be as soon as possible. In the meantime, the government would continue to deal with day-to-day matters.
It may be objected that the formation of this supreme authority and its mandate would encounter the same kinds of difficulties as a transitional government. However, there is one big difference in scale and scope: whereas the purpose of the latter would be nothing less than to govern, the former would be restricted to a single goal: to organise and manage elections. Still unrealistic? Possibly, but probably the least unrealistic scenario to enable the country to step back.
The United States embassy in Ethiopia said on Saturday it disagreed with the government’s decision to impose a state of emergency to calm political unrest the day after the prime minister’s surprise resignation.
The statement came after the council of ministers imposed yet another six months nationwide state of emergency last night, which defence minister Siraj Fegessa, said would include a ban on protests and publications that incite violence.
‘‘We strongly disagree with the Ethiopian government’s decision to impose a state of emergency that includes restrictions on fundamental rights such as assembly and expression,’‘ the statement said.
We strongly disagree with the Ethiopian government’s decision to impose a state of emergency that includes restrictions on fundamental rights such as assembly and expression.
The prime minister’s resignation followed a wave of strikes and demonstrations successfully demanding the release of more opposition leaders.
‘‘We recognise and share concerns expressed by the government about incidents of violence and loss of life, but firmly believe that the answer is greater freedom, not less,’‘ it said.
Under a previous state of emergency, declared in October 2016 and lasting 10 months, thousands of Ethiopians were arrested by the military.
The current state of emergency has to be approved by the national parliament, which is currently on recess, giving the council 15 days to enforce the emergency rule until parliament reconvenes.
The statement urged the government in Ethiopia “to rethink this approach and identify other means to protect lives and property while preserving, and indeed expanding, the space for meaningful dialogue and political participation that can pave the way to a lasting democracy.”
Related:-
Ethiopia’s authoritarian regime backtracks on reforms. With an economic record at risk, Ethiopia is sacrificing democracy, FT
Crowds waiting for Bekele Gerba, February 13, 2018
The protest movement playing out in Ethiopia is one of the most consequential conflicts on the African continent – more than any other, it has the potential to upend US policy in the Horn of Africa. It could disrupt counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and reduce the number of peacekeeping troops in South Sudan. But alarmingly, it has barely registered in Washington policy discussions or in the American press.
Ethiopia’s Oromo population is celebrating a victory today that is probably unprecedented in African history. Without extensive violence or bloodshed, and while almost all of its leading voices languished in jail, a grassroots protest movement has managed to force one of the most powerful regimes in Africa to surrender to its demands. As an organized strike involving tens of thousands of Oromo youths drew closer to the capital city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopian authorities agreed to release a host of important political prisoners, including Bekele Gerba, a compelling activist whose release from prison the government has fiercely resisted. (Just the week before, Bekele had been sentenced to an additional half-year behind bars, for the crime of singing a protest song in front a judge.)
In honor of Bekele Gerba’s release, the Oromo strikes were suspended, and the crowds in the street turned jubilant. Then, on February 14, authorities stunned and delighted the protestors further by releasing other extremely prominent dissidents (including among others the blogger Eskindir Nega, opposition leader Andualem Aragie, former Gambella Governor Okello Akway, and the Muslim religious freedom activist Ahmedin Jebel), some of whom had been imprisoned on “terrorism” charges for years.
Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalagn had promised the release of a large number of political prisoners in early January, and did later release a number of political activists, including opposition leader Merera Gudina. Government officials claimed at the time that the move was intended to widen the political space and foster a genuine dialogue with the political opposition and with the ethnic-based protest movements. But skeptics (including the majority of protestors) saw the move as largely symbolic, and perhaps even calculated to sow discord within the opposition, as some individuals were released and not others, and particularly as the most influential figures remained behind bars.
After the events of February 13 and 14, however, there can be little doubt about the seriousness of the Ethiopian authorities. The severity and persistence of the protest movements have clearly become an existential threat to the regime, and the need to diffuse the protests’ momentum is imperative enough, apparently, to overcome differences of opinion between the so-called “moderate” and “hardliner” factions with the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is the most powerful faction with the ruling party.
The TPLF’s alarm is well-founded; the only question is whether its belated concessions to the protestors, after years of growing unrest, may be too little, too late. Anger at the perceived economic and political dominance of the small Tigrean ethnic faction is a moving force behind the protests, and the threat of a genocide or other targeted ethnic violence against Tigrean individuals appears to be escalating. Fearful Tigrean citizens have reportedly relocated in large numbers from the Amhara and Oromo regions of the country, and attacks on Tigreans (a rarity in the past) are reported. At the same time, violent clashes between other ethnic groups, particularly the Oromo and Somalis, have dramatically increased. Tensions are high across the board; the protestors are flush with victory; and the newly-released scores of political dissidents may vie for prominence. Is there any chance of the protests subsiding?
Probably not, though it is surely the TPLF’s hope that Bekele Gerba, Ahmedin Jebel, Eskindir Nega and their colleagues will prove to be wise and moderating voices in the coming dialogue. They have in the past not only been decisively less radical, but have been firmly committed to non-violence – unlike the radio and social media personalities, some of the based in the diaspora, that have risen to prominence in their absence and are now driving the opposition discourse in real time.
Having achieved so much through protest, it is unlikely that the Ethiopian people will accept half-hearted reforms. Speculation is rampant, for example, that Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalagn – who is not Tigrean but is widely regarded as an instrument of the TPLF elite – will be replaced with an Oromo at the ruling party’s upcoming conference in three weeks’ time. (Lema Megersa, president of the Oromia Regional State, is a prime focus of this speculation.) These rumors are mere speculation, but have taken on the force of expectation, and disappointment could easily lead to another round of protests. Another round of civilian deaths at the hands of Ethiopian security forces, or the declaration of another state of emergency, could have the same effect. Next time, the Ethiopian government’s concessions may not be enough to halt the protests. If dialogue fails, and the security forces are unleashed, the resulting conflict will be bloody and awful – and will certainly not succeed in ending the uprising.
Implications for US Policy
Washington, of course, has every incentive to avoid such a scenario.
The United States has much at stake in Ethiopia, whose troops and cooperation have been essential to Washington’s efforts to stabilize Somalia and South Sudan. American strategy in the Horn of Africa is deeply flawed and is demonstrably failing to achieve its objectives (as the situation in both countries continues to deteriorate). But no alternative policy proposals are on table, and a sudden collapse of Ethiopian capacity to support American policies with African boots on the ground would be catastrophic. The African Union mission in Somalia, already on its last legs, would probably not survive a sudden and wholesale withdrawal of Ethiopian forces – and countless civilian lives in Southern Sudan would be endangered. A disordered Ethiopia is of course more vulnerable to incursions by the al Qaeda-linked Somali terror group, al Shabaab, which has already managed to establish a vibrant offshoot in Kenya amid similar social conditions (a large population of unemployed youths, a disenfranchised and villified Muslim population, and rampant police brutality).
Unfortunately, few countries are more poorly positioned than the United States to play a constructive role in Ethiopia’s future. This stems from Washington’s long history of providing budgetary support to the Ethiopia’s ruling party, the close cooperation between the two countries’ military and intelligence services, and the long-standing refusal of American officials to criticize the human rights record of the regime or to challenge the imprisonment of thousands of civilians.
Washington’s silence on Ethiopia’s deteriorating human rights and security situation is a result of many factors. First and foremost, of course, the Ethiopian regime has served as Washington’s indispensable partner in the “war on terrorism” since the early 2000s. Second, the former prime minister and architect of the ruling party, Meles Zenawi, cultivated warm personal friendships with senior American policymakers who subsequently championed the regime and shield it from public criticism. Third, as is the case in Rwanda, Western policymakers paraded Ethiopia as an “African success story” as a means of facilitating continued aid and investment to the continent, and drawing attention to the human rights narrative was inconvenient. Fourth – and not least important – public criticism of the Ethiopian regime was found by American diplomats not to work very well: over the years it has resulted in numerous journalists, diplomats and American non-governmental organizations being expelled from Ethiopia over the years, without causing a whiff of improvement in the regime’s conduct. And Ethiopia’s ability to restrict access to the African Union (AU headquarters are located in Addis) has led many otherwise reputable analysts and journalists to practice self-censorship. Ethiopia has also proved very willing to retaliate against diplomatic pressure by holding American security interests hostage: in September 2017, for example, when the House Subcommittee on African Affairs attempted to pass a resolution drawing attention to Ethiopia’s human rights abuses, Ethiopia’s then-ambassador to the United States, Girma Birru, visited the Subcommittee members and threatened to withhold counterterror cooperation in Somalia. Faced with this threat, the Subcommittee immediately abandoned the resolution. (The Subcommittee threatened yesterday to bring the resolution to the floor for a vote on February 28, unless the Ethiopian government gives UN investigatory teams access to the country.)
The most credible voices among the protest movement have already condemned US inaction, and would not consent to a dialogue with US officials – indeed, they argue that engaging with Washington would erode their credibility, and they are probably right. Washington can of course attempt to pressure or persuade the TPLF to undertake credible and meaningful reforms – but Washington’s chequered diplomatic history with Addis suggests that such efforts are unlikely to bear fruit. It is also unclear what reforms would appease the public: while there have been calls for Ethiopian security forces to leave the Oromo and Amhara and other regions (including the Somali or “Ogaden” zone), absolutely no one is demanding fresh elections (which have historically been heavily rigged) or other staple democratic measures to restore the peace.
The next month, and days, will be decisive. The Ethiopian regime will either commit to its current course and expand on its commitment to reform, signaling this commitment perhaps by offering the prime ministership to an Oromo leader. Or it will double down on its previous course, and declare a state of emergency. But this would be a deadly decision, as a new state of emergency would surely be regarded by opposition leaders and the protestors as a declaration of war.
Ethiopia’s only hope for peace is a series of rapid and sincere concessions by the TPLF elite, which must certainly involve a meaningful redistribution of political and economic power. The Ethiopian public has tasted its power, and one way or another, the status quo will not survive.
Bronwyn Bruton is deputy director and director of programs and studies in the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.
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Simannaa obbo Baqqaalaa Garbaa Adaamaa- Obbo Baqqaa is a wise leader, Kichuu
Ethiopia: Top Oromo Opposition Leader Freed from Prison, Democracy Now, HEAD LINE FEB 14, 2018
Ethiopia’s Oromia region celebrates release of political detainees, Africa News
Washington puts Ethiopia’s human rights abusers on notice, The Hill
The release of Ethiopian political prisoners, Addis Standard
Ethiopia: The relentless protests that forced the Prime Minister to resign, African Arguments
Ethiopia’s prime minister resigns amid political turmoil, WP
Ethiopia ‘at crossroads’ after Hailemariam resignation, Al Jazeera News
Ethiopia: Prisoner Release Should Be First Step, Freedom House, 14 Feb. 2018
#BekeleGerba says the number of prisoners released is way less than those who are left behind. His co-defendant #DejeneTafa spoke about countless prisoners, especially from the #Amhara regional state, as old as 80 year old elder still left in dark rooms https://t.co/4Kb61RLsT4
WHAT DOES UNREST IN OROMIA SIGNIFY?
By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard*, The Institute for Defense Analyses , Africa Watch
In mid-December, a series of violent clashes between ethnic Oromo and ethnic Somalis in the Oromia region of Ethiopia resulted in at least 61 fatalities. This outbreak of violence followed the deaths
of 16 protesters who were shot by state security forces on December 12 in Chelenko, located east of Mulu in [Eastern] Oromia. Ethiopia was previously under a state of emergency from October 2016 to August
2017 in response to waves of protest that originated in Oromia and swept the country beginning in 2014. What is driving the recent spate of violence in Oromia, and is it indicative of potential larger unrest?
Origins of Unrest
Despite commonalities in language, religion, and culture, Oromo and ethnic Somalis have experienced
intermittent conflict for at least the past 25 years. Their two regional states, Oromia and Somali, share a border that is poorly demarcated. Much of the conflict between the Oromo and Somali groups has historically centered on access to resources and land.
Both ethnic groups complain about being marginalized by the Ethiopian government, which has been
dominated by the Tigray ethnic group. Ethiopia is ethnically heterogeneous, with more than 80 recognized ethnic groups. The Tigray are one of Ethiopia’s smaller ethnic groups, representing about 6 percent of the total population.
The members of the country’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, which comprises an estimated 35 percent to 40 percent of the population, feel particularly underrepresented by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.
Although tensions between the Oromo and ethnic Somalis are long-standing, the most recent conflict needs to be contextualized against the backdrop of previous unrest in Oromia that began in 2014. After the announcement of a development scheme in 2014 (detailed in the August 25, 2016, issue of Africa Watch) that would have enabled the government to incorporate parts of Oromia into the capital city, Addis Ababa, protests broke out across Oromia.
During the initial phases of the project, Oromo leaders accused the government of taking over land and forcibly evicting families. Protests continued and the grievances expanded to include concerns over human rights abuses, political representation, and limitations placed on freedom of expression. The government ultimately abandoned its expansion plan in January 2016 in response to the unrest, but anti-government protests continued to spread to the Amhara community, Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group, and the capital. The government imposed a state of emergency in October 2016.
Current Conflict Details are sparse about the most recent clashes, but reports indicate that members from the Oromo ethnic group were killed first, which then triggered reprisal killings of ethnic Somalis. The clashes are alleged to involve the Somali Special Police, the Liyu. The Liyu are a paramilitary group created by the government in the mid-2000s to deal with a previous secessionist group located in the Somali region, the Ogaden National Liberation Front. The Liyu have been accused of using excessive force and engaging in extrajudicial killings. Coincidentally, in October, government forces
were accused of killing four people in Oromia who were protesting the delivery of a shipment of arms to the Liyu.
While some are attempting to define the recent clashes as primarily ethnic in nature, activists in Oromia claim that the involvement of the Liyu indicates that it is actually state-sponsored violence.
The opinions expressed in these commentaries are those of the authors and should not be viewed
as representing the official position of the Institute for Defense Analyses or its sponsors.
Links to web sites are for informational purposes only and not an endorsement.
The December 2017 clashes appear to be part of an escalation of violence and protest in the region. From
October 1 to November 30, around 118 violent events took place in Oromia, almost 50 percent of which were protests.
An estimated 200 fatalities occurred and tens of thousands are believed to have been displaced. This increase in violence follows a lull from April to July. Roughly 30 percent of all conflict activity in 2017 has involved the Liyu in some capacity; almost 50 percent has involved state security forces
(military or police).
Government Response to Unrest
The Ethiopian government responded to the 2014 Oromia security situation with a heavy hand. Ethiopian police were responsible for hundreds of deaths during protests from 2014 to 2016. In 2016, at the height of the conflict, more than 1,000 fatalities were reported in Oromia. The government arrested protesters en masse and attempted to control the flow of information into and out of Oromia. During the state of emergency, at least 29,000 persons were arrested, many of whom are still awaiting trial. The government arrested scores of journalists and frequently jammed nonstate news sources to prevent them from broadcasting. According to Human Rights Watch, the government also routinely cut cell phone service in areas where the military was deployed, presumably to prevent information about the military’s actions from being publicized widely.
Conclusion
The Ethiopian government announced in August 2017 that it was lifting the state of emergency due to an
improved security situation, but recent events suggest a resurgence of violence and protest in Oromia. The uptick in violence may signal the beginning of renewed unrest in Ethiopia. This should serve as a reminder that the core issues underlying the previous unrest, namely state repression and political representation, were never adequately addressed.
An Ethiopian – born business mogul has been named in an anti-corruption crackdown by the Saudi Arabia government over the weekend.
Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi, 71, was detained along with 11 princes, four current ministers and a number of former ministers. Saudi-owned Al Arabiya television said the probe is headed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Al Amoudi is an Ethiopian – born business man who holds both Saudi and Ethiopian nationality. According to Forbes, as at 2016, his net worth was approximately $10.9 billion.
His investments are linked to oil and global commodities. He is also listed as Ethiopia’s richest man and the second richest Saudi Arabian citizen in the world. He is one of two businessmen detained, the other is one Saleh Kamel.
His two main businesses are Corral Petroleum Holdings and MIDROC. MIDROCdescribes itself as “a global investment group, wholly owned by Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi.
“It has substantial interests in petroleum, agribusiness, property, industry and industrial services, engineering and construction, tourism and trade and investment, largely in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa.”
Al Amoudi is said to have migrated from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia when he was 19 and became a full citizen of the Kingdom in 1965. He built up a private fortune in construction and property before diversifying into the downstream energy sector with major refining and retail investments in both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
MIDROC has an international focus with three main operating companies: MIDROC Middle East (based in Saudi Arabia), MIDROC Europe (based in Sweden) and MIDROC Africa where the company’s focus is heavily on Ethiopia. It also has separately managed and significant petroleum interests.
His influence is remarkable. His people are loyal and will not do anything to antagonize him or the regime. If one has close relation to his circles they are guaranteed success. There are many Ethiopians that oppose the regime but will not dare utter a word for fear of alienation.Therefore, the news of his arrest is a huge deal. It is significant event in the history of the region and Ethiopia. This is an event that will quicken the demise of the TPLF as he was a significant player and ardent supporter. Al Amoudi has openly bragged that he is Weyane. But, what is the impact of his arrest and its repercussions? It is the biggest disruption that the TPLF has ever seen.
Sums of money that appear to be linked to corruption cases will be reimbursed to the Saudi state’s General Treasury. (Shutterstock)
Saudi authorities have announced that they will be freezing the bank accounts of suspects detained in the kingdom on corruption charges.
Officials said that there is “no preferential treatment” in the handling of their cases.
The Saudi Center for International Communication, an initiative of the Ministry of Culture and Information, said that sums of money that appear to be linked to corruption cases will be reimbursed to the Saudi state’s General Treasury.
The Saudi anti-corruption committee, which was set up on Saturday by King Salman’s royal decree and chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, had arrested a number of princes and ministers.
More ….
The former Saudi billionaire, Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi, is under strict security guard in a room on the top floor of one of the most luxurious hotels in the Saudi capital after the Saudi authorities issued a decision to arrest him for his involvement in corruption cases inside and outside Saudi Arabia. And a group of former Saudi businessmen and officials.
For the last 26 years, Ethiopia has been suffering from a super centralized TPLF autocratic, barbaric and terroristic rule.
It is beyond dispute that the recent event witnessed in Eastern and Southern Oromia is nothing but TPLF’s last ditch futile effort at the triangulation and expansion of the conflict in the face of the ongoing broad based and persistent opposition to its repression. The Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Wolayita and the other Ethiopian peoples are saying NO, in one voice, to the decades of repressions, killings, incarcerations, humiliations, displacements and robberies of their resources by the TPLF junta. The Ethiopian people are rising in unison to break out of the shackles of slavery and fear the TPLF has put them in.
It is a well established fact TPLF’s longstanding strategy of diffusing bipolar conflicts between itself and the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Sidama or Gurage people –just to mention the major heavy weights in Ethiopian politics in terms of shear demographic size – is triangulation of the conflict. For instance, the TPLF always attempts to add a front to the real conflict between itself and the Oromo people and between itself and the Amhara people by inciting (fabricating) conflict between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. Based on this strategy, the TPLF has been attempting incessantly for the last 26 years to incite conflicts mainly between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. Fortunately, the diabolical efforts by the TPLF has been rendered for the most part pre-emptively ineffective thanks to the long history of peaceful coexistence between the two peoples.
Moreover, the massive demonstrations held in Oromia and Amhara States over the recent years put, in no uncertain terms, the final nail to the coffin of this TPLF’s savage strategy triangulating the conflict as TPLF-Oromo-Amhara conflict. The dumb-founded TPLF was left with nothing but to whisk a few bribed Somali elders carrying a “10 million birr donation check” to Mekele instructing them to tell the people of Tigray that they are not alone in this and that the Somali people are by their side. This was intended not only to calm the Tigray people who have been growing increasingly isolated, nervous and uncomfortable by the latest cascades of erratic and impulsive reactions by the TPLF to suppress the popular demands but it was also to officially declare that the efforts to triangulate the conflict is moving East. It is obvious that since the strategy of triangulation of the TPLF-Oromo people bipolar conflict or TPLF-Amhara people bipolar conflict has been dealt a final blow, TPLF was forced to play what it thought was its next best card from the few diminishing cards left in its hands. In a very interesting twist of events, Seye Abraha, a rebel commander-turned-defense minister who was a member of the Politburo of the TPLF and who is believed to be one of the main authors and architects of the TPLF war doctrine went to the same place, Easter Ethiopia, in 1991 in relation to the TPLF-Oromo conflict and bragged something to the effect of “…TPLF can create a war let alone winning a war….” Fast forward – we are here today. Alas, terrorist TPLF is at it again – trying to transplant the vortex of conflict at Oromia-Somali border in order to open a new front on the Oromo people for being on the forefront of the struggle of the Ethiopian people for peace, freedom, justice and democracy. So it is evidently clear that what we are seeing unfolding right in front of our eyes in Eastern Oromia today is nothing but that strategy of the triangulation of conflict at work.
The current horrendous situation the barbaric and kleptomaniac dictatorial TPLF regime has put Ethiopian in has brought the debate on ethnic based federalism back into the spotlight. Nowadays, barely a minute goes by without hearing or seeing the opponents of the ethnic based form of federalism in Ethiopia attempting to pound on ethnic federalism to gain the maximum political capital possible out of the bad situations and the suffering of the innocent victims of the TPLF led state terrorism. The veteran as well as the newly minted opponents of ethnic federalism are shouting at the height of their voices using any platform they can find that the ongoing war perpetuated by the TPLF regime against the Oromo people, particularly in Eastern and Southeastern Oromia, is yet another irrefutable proof for the failure of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. They even go as far as arguing that ethnic federalism has failed in Ethiopia in and of itself out of its own shear weight and inherent nature and not because of the failure of the TPLF to implement it whole-heartedly. The way the opponents are trying to frame the debate betrays their frantic jubilant mood as if their longstanding dream had come true.
Before I delve into the counter arguments made by the proponents of ethnic federalism, allow me to throw in a few sentences about the war the TPLF is waging against the Ethiopian people of Oromo origin in Eastern Oromia. It is beyond dispute that the recent event witnessed in Eastern and Southern Oromia is nothing but TPLF’s last ditch futile effort at the triangulation and expansion of the conflict in the face of the ongoing broad based and persistent opposition to its repression. The Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Wolayita and the other Ethiopian peoples are saying NO, in one voice, to the decades of repressions, killings, incarcerations, humiliations, displacements and robberies of their resources by the TPLF junta. The Ethiopian people are rising in unison to break out of the shackles of slavery and fear the TPLF has put them in.
It is a well established fact TPLF’s longstanding strategy of diffusing bipolar conflicts between itself and the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Sidama or Gurage people –just to mention the major heavy weights in Ethiopian politics in terms of shear demographic size – is triangulation of the conflict. For instance, the TPLF always attempts to add a front to the real conflict between itself and the Oromo people and between itself and the Amhara people by inciting (fabricating) conflict between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. Based on this strategy, the TPLF has been attempting incessantly for the last 26 years to incite conflicts mainly between the Oromo and Amhara peoples. Fortunately, the diabolical efforts by the TPLF has been rendered for the most part pre-emptively ineffective thanks to the long history of peaceful coexistence between the two peoples.
Moreover, the massive demonstrations held in Oromia and Amhara States over the recent years put, in no uncertain terms, the final nail to the coffin of this TPLF’s savage strategy triangulating the conflict as TPLF-Oromo-Amhara conflict. The dumb-founded TPLF was left with nothing but to whisk a few bribed Somali elders carrying a “10 million birr donation check” to Mekele instructing them to tell the people of Tigray that they are not alone in this and that the Somali people are by their side. This was intended not only to calm the Tigray people who have been growing increasingly isolated, nervous and uncomfortable by the latest cascades of erratic and impulsive reactions by the TPLF to suppress the popular demands but it was also to officially declare that the efforts to triangulate the conflict is moving East. It is obvious that since the strategy of triangulation of the TPLF-Oromo people bipolar conflict or TPLF-Amhara people bipolar conflict has been dealt a final blow, TPLF was forced to play what it thought was its next best card from the few diminishing cards left in its hands. In a very interesting twist of events, Seye Abraha, a rebel commander-turned-defense minister who was a member of the Politburo of the TPLF and who is believed to be one of the main authors and architects of the TPLF war doctrine went to the same place, Easter Ethiopia, in 1991 in relation to the TPLF-Oromo conflict and bragged something to the effect of “…TPLF can create a war let alone winning a war….” Fast forward – we are here today. Alas, terrorist TPLF is at it again – trying to transplant the vortex of conflict at Oromia-Somali border in order to open a new front on the Oromo people for being on the forefront of the struggle of the Ethiopian people for peace, freedom, justice and democracy. So it is evidently clear that what we are seeing unfolding right in front of our eyes in Eastern Oromia today is nothing but that strategy of the triangulation of conflict at work.
Apologies for digressing more than I initially wanted. Going back to my main theme of this writing, the proponents of ethnic federalism are also making their point by arguing that what is certain to have failed in Ethiopia is not the ethnic federalism form of state but the absolute centralism that has bedeviled Ethiopia for over a century. They argue that the absolute unitary dictatorship (one language and one religion policy, among others) had been tried fiercely and in earnest (whole-heartedly with absolute commitment, giving it all they had and to the fullest extent possible) in Ethiopia from Menilik to Haile Selassie to Mengistu for over a century but it failed and failed miserably. The TPLF has continued the same old tired unitary militaristic dictatorship with a thinly veiled facade of federalism. If there is anything that makes the TPLF regime different from its predecessors, it is its pretension and con artistry to create an illusion of change by marginally changing the form without changing the substance an iota, none whatsoever.
Ethiopia has never tried federalism of any form nor democracy in its history. How can we conclude that something has failed when we have not tried it whole-heartedly in the first place? What type of experimentation is that? I believe the opponents of ethnic federalism know very well that what exists in today’s Ethiopia is not any form of federalism but an absolutely centralized TPLF dictatorship. They are blaming the form instead of the substance. They are attempting to use the current TPLF war on the Oromo people in Eastern and other parts of Oromia as an opportune moment and the casus belli for the war they have already declared anyway on ethnic federalism. It is hard to fathom but one dares to ponder that the opponents of ethnic federalism are so gullible that they would believe that Ethiopia’s multifaceted and multilayered complicated problems would vanish in one day were the TPLF take off its veil of fake federalism and come out naked for what it truly is; namely, the worst dictatorial centralist regime Ethiopia has ever known. The elaborate TPLF spy network that has been installed throughout Ethiopia spanning from the TPLF politburo all the way down to the infamous one-to-five (1-2-5) structure is an irrefutable testimony to the absolute dictatorial centralism under which the TPLF regime has been ruling and plundering the Ethiopian people since it controlled the state power in May 1991. This is the truth in the today’s Ethiopia.
However, the truth doesn’t matter for the opponents. They have the propensity to kick the truth aside if it is doesn’t serve their political purposes. Their untenable and feeble argument about the failure of federalism (whatever its form may be) in Ethiopia falls flat in the face of the reality on the ground in Ethiopia. The reality in Ethiopia has been out there for everyone to see with his/her naked eyes without any need for a visual aid. For the last 26 years, Ethiopia has been suffering from a super centralized TPLF autocratic, barbaric and terroristic rule.
The opponents’ argument makes sense if and only if we accept a hypothetical premise that Ethiopia has had a democratic system for the last 26 years. Otherwise, how can we blame ethnic federalism as the cause of the crises we are seeing unfolding in Ethiopia today or for the last 26 years for that matter because federalism never works without democracy? If we don’t accept the premise that Ethiopia is a democracy today, then blaming ethnic federalism for the country’s crises is not only absurd but it is also like indicting someone who has nothing to do with the crime. In fact, pointing finger to the ethnic federalism is in tune with what the terrorist TPLF propagandists are attempting in vain these days to hoodwink and make us believe with a vivid intent of deflecting the focus away from the real issue – themselves. In a nutshell, the opponents’ argument doesn’t stand to reason nor to any meaningful scrutiny. It is rather an intentional misrepresentation of the facts on the ground in order to divert our attention away from the real problems the country has been facing and their immediate and longstanding causes.
Just for the sake of argument, let us assume that what the opponents say is true and agree to abandon our efforts to institute a genuine ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. If that is the case, then it automatically begets that we have to also abandon our struggle for democracy because democracy has also failed in Ethiopia today. I hope the opponents would not argue with the same zeal as they do against ethnic federalism that democracy is flourishing in Ethiopia under the TPLF rule. If the opponents are arguing that the democratic experimentation has succeeded but it is only the ethnic federalism that has failed in Ethiopia today, then it is worth considering going to other forms of federal systems.
However, if the opponents of ethnic federalism agree that democracy has also failed in Ethiopia today, then there is a fallacy in their argument because true federalism (whatever its form may be) cannot be implemented without democracy. Democracy is an essential pre-requisite for any form of federalism. If the opponents of ethnic federalism accept the premise that democratization has failed in the TPLF ruled Ethiopia, are they also telling us with the same breath to forgo our struggle for democracy and leave Ethiopia and the Ethiopian people at the mercy of the barbaric, plunderous terrorist TPLF? Otherwise, if they accept the glaring truth that there is no democracy in Ethiopia, then they have to shift their accusing fingers to the failure of the democratization process and the TPLF instead of the non-existent ethnic federalism. There is an Amharic saying that goes something like ‘searching for dung where no cow has been”.
I would like to conclude by stating the obvious at the risk of sounding redundant and repetitive. The reality is that what have failed in Ethiopia over and over again for over a century are dictatorship and centralism. Ethnic federalism is the only realistic antidote not only for the birth defect and chronic ailments Ethiopia has been suffering from since its inception but for its unique multicultural nature and its recorded history of ethnic repression as well. We understand that the pre-TPLF Ethiopia for which the opponents of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia are nostalgic was a heaven for them but that doesn’t mean it was the same for everyone. The pre-TPLF and the TPLF Ethiopia is the same hell for the majority of the Ethiopian people. We, in the freedom camp, are striving to create an Ethiopia that is free, fair and just, an Ethiopia that treats all its citizens equal, an Ethiopia that is democratic, multicultural and ethnic federalist that we all call home and be proud of.
“Wako” fled Ethiopia for Kenya in 2012, after his release from prison. He had been locked up for two years after campaigning for the Oromo People’s Congress, an opposition party that has often been targeted by the government.
In Kenya, he hoped to be safe. But six months later Ethiopian officials kidnapped him in Nairobi and brought him to Ethiopia’s notorious Ziway prison, where he was mistreated and tortured, before being released. He fled to Kenya a second time.
When I spoke to him in Kenya, he said he planned to travel overland to South Africa. He hoped for better safety there.
Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of harassment and threats against Ethiopian asylum seekers in Kenya and elsewhere since 2010. In a recent letter to the Kenyan police, to which they have not responded, we describe how asylum seekers were assaulted, detained, and interrogated before Ethiopian officials in Nairobi, and forced to return to Ethiopia. Many also received threatening phone calls and text messages from Kenyan and Ethiopian phone numbers.
In private, some Kenyan police told us that Ethiopian Embassy officials in Nairobi have offered them cash to arrest Ethiopians. Ethiopian refugees said Ethiopian officials tried to recruit them to inform on others, promising land, protection, money, and resettlement to the US or elsewhere.
Threats to fleeing Ethiopians are not limited to Kenya. Community leaders, social media activists, opposition politicians, and refugee protection workers have been harassed in other countries. Human Rights Watch has documented abductions of Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers from Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, and elsewhere.
High-profile opposition figures with foreign citizenship have also been handed to Ethiopian authorities without a legal process, including a British citizen detained in Yemen, a Norwegian citizen in South Sudan, and a Somali national handed over last month by Somalia’s government.
In Somaliland, we recently spoke to 10 asylum seekers who were forced back to Ethiopia during one of the frequent roundups of Oromo in Somaliland. Eight said they were tortured upon their return to Ethiopia. Many described harassment from Ethiopian embassy officials and indifference from the UN refugee agency.
All this creates a climate of fear and mistrust amongst Ethiopian refugees, preventing them from living normal lives, going to working or even applying for asylum.
The UN refugee agency and host countries should work harder to ensure Ethiopians fleeing torture and persecution can safely access asylum processes and be safe from the long reach of Ethiopian officials.
The situation in Ethiopia has been declared by some bloggers (see for instance Prof Chris Blattman) as the most under-reported conflict in the world right now. This is rather true. Though some media outlets reported on the recent political turmoil in Ethiopia, such as some German press in the context of the recent visit of Chancellor Merkel to Addis Ababa, generally very little has been reported on the unrest.
Already in November 2015, the first protests against the Ethiopian Government unfolded in the Oromia region when the government wanted to expand the margins of the city of Addis. As this implied the resettlement of the local Oromo population -the largest ethnic group in the country- this was seen as a further expression of political and economic marginalisation.
The situation calmed down a little over spring 2016 and erupted again in the summer when the Amhara people in the North started anti-government protests. The military was deployed and further unrest unfolded again in the Oromia region – and for the first time an alliance between the Oromo and the Amhara was built. Since November 2015, at least 500 people have been killed by security forces and tens of thousands have been arrested, according to Human Rights Watch. What started as a protest against the expansion of Addis turned into an expression of general dissatisfaction with the government’s authoritarianism and lack of political and economic participation for more than two and a half decades.
On 9th October, the Ethiopian Government declared the state of emergency for the first time in 25 years. This was after more than fifty people died at a religious festival of the Oromo people close to Addis. A week after, further details on the state of emergency were made public. Now, the government can arrest and detain for six months (the duration of the emergency state) any person breaching emergency laws and conduct searches without a court warrant. There are now severe restrictions to the freedom of assembly and protest, and any communication with foreign governments or foreign NGOs “that is likely to harm sovereignty, security, and constitutional order” (translation provided by Horn Affairs) as well as any communication with “anti-peace groups” is prohibited. Moreover, the Government can monitor and restrict “messages transmitted” through different sorts of media outlets. This is reflected in cutting off the internet via the mobile network for two months – a major internet access route in Ethiopia – as well as the similar disconnections for social media.
Shortly after declaring the state of emergency (on 15th October), the Ethiopian Government also announced reforms, including changes to the electoral system from ‘first past the post’ to a proportional system. A change of cabinet has already taken place and tackling corruption has been declared a priority.
So why are these developments in Ethiopia the most under-reported conflict of the world, to stay with the initial phrase?
To reiterate: Ethiopia is experiencing political unrest over an extended period of time and the state of emergency has been declared for the first time in 25 years. This should be reason enough to report on the situation, but there is more: Ethiopia has the second largest population in Africa with nearly 100million inhabitants, only topped by Nigeria. Secondly, Ethiopia’s GDP grew rapidly over the last few years at a rate of 9.6% in 2015. Thirdly, Ethiopia is considered as a bulwark against Jihadist Islamist movements in the Horn of Africa. Despite recently retreating some forces, Ethiopia has sent it troops to fight al-Shabab – the official al-Qaeda branch in Somalia.
These economic and security features of Ethiopia are at the same time a factor, if not the main reason why the West reports so little on the current political situation. Though the low coverage of Ethiopia is also related to the fact that other issues happen in the world and dominate Western media, the situation in Syria and Trump’s election to name a few. It is likely that Ethiopia’s importance to the West heavily contributed to the lack of coverage. Looking at the ever increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels to Ethiopia by Western states, most notably the US and the UK, it seems as if the West buys into two arguments of the Ethiopian Government: political participation and democratic rights are less important than Ethiopia’s economic development and regional stability in the fight against terrorism. This is also reflected in the US and UK’s national focus on the ‘war on terror’ and their own balancing of national security in relation to human rights. A similar dynamic exists with regard to the World Banks and other donor priorities of poverty reduction over issues of political governance when they decide on Ethiopia’s ODA levels.
Though it has to be mentioned that the US, amongst others, expressed that they were ‘deeply concerned’ over the situation in Ethiopia, actions speak louder than words. It needs to be seen whether or not Western ODA levels continue to grow. And in the same manner, we should report on whether or not the Ethiopian Government will really deliver on its reform promises.
Washington’s Closest Ally on the Horn of Africa Has a Terrible Human Rights Record
ayyaantuu.net 11 July 2016
Tiny Djibouti is a key U.S. ally in the “war on terror.” But that doesn’t mean Washington should stay silent on its abuses.
On the Horn of Africa, tucked between quarrelsome neighbors who receive the lion’s share of the regional spotlight, lies the nondescript and mostly forgotten Republic of Djibouti. The country rarely makes its way into international headlines — and this is exactly what the government and its allies, namely the United States, prefer. Washington has been content to keep its close collaboration with the government in Djibouti City under the radar, thereby avoiding the need to publicly defend its alliance with a highly repressive regime.
The United States’ investment in the country — which amounts to over $70 million per year, including economic aid — has everything to do with its strategic location on the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, what Djibouti lacks in size (it is about the size of Massachusetts and has a population of about 900,000) it more than makes up for with its status as a “geographical goldmine.” The government is a key contributor of troops to the African Union force in Somalia, which combats Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. It is also an important staging area for attacks against suspected terrorists, especially through its role as host of a base for U.S. drones that operate in the region. In March 2014, President Obama announced plans for a “Binational Forum” in which senior officials from both countries committed to building a “vibrant 21st century strategic partnership grounded in friendship, mutual trust, and common security.”
Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, has been a regular guest in the White House.
Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, has been aregular guest in the White House. They also explain why his government has managed to dodge criticism of its dismal record on human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law.Guelleh has quietly ruled Djibouti since 1999 (his uncle, who had reigned since 1977, personally anointed him) and he stands today as one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-serving leaders. Like some of his fellow autocrats, Guelleh appears to have no qualms about openly and violently rigging his country’s so-called “democratic elections” in his favor, often winning absurdly unrealistic majorities. This April, Guelleh and his ruling coalition, the Union for the Presidential Majority, reportedly won 87 percent of all votes cast. This impressive showing surpassed the 80 percent he won in 2011 after the country’s National Assembly amended the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in office.
Guelleh will leave office only “when he feels like it.” His government has repeatedly been accused of myriadhuman rights abuses, including documented cases of torture and arbitrary detention of opposition supporters, as well as the denial of fair public trials, severerestrictions on freedom of the press, deliberate targetingof human rights activists, and high levels of corruption. Most recently, during the lead-up to the presidential election in April, authorities used deadly force to break up public demonstrations, including an incident in December 2015 during which 19 people were reportedly killed after police opened fire. To its credit, the United States condemned the disproportionate and deadly use of force, and also called for the release of opposition leaders who were unjustly detained in the country.
In what has become a routine defense of the indefensible, authorities justified the killings by blaming the victims, claiming the peaceful protesters had tried to “destabilize our nation.” The rationale for gunning down citizens in broad daylight was also premised on combating “armed individuals from abroad” (subtext: terrorists). Of course, this designation is no accident. It is meant to placate the international community and particularly the United States, which since 2009 has headquartered its East African Terrorism Task Force at Camp Lemonnier on the outskirts of the capital, Djibouti City. The base is so crucial to U.S. military operations in the region that, in 2014, the Pentagon signed an agreement to secure its lease through 2044. Since 9/11, the base has grown in “almost every conceivable fashion,” with more than$600 million allocated or already awarded for related projects.
All told, Djibouti is a classic case of how a fundamentally undemocratic and abusive government can appeal to the so-called “war on terror” to justify its repression and secure its legitimacy. As recently as May 2014,
President Obamapraised the Guelleh regime and expressedhis “strong support” for its“leadership in the Horn of Africa.”
President Obama praised the Guelleh regime and expressed his “strong support” for its “leadership in the Horn of Africa.” By turning a blind eye to Guelleh’s attempts to seal off avenues of democratic participation, the United States is raising the prospects of future unrest in Djibouti — the very outcome that it and other shareholders in the country, and region writ large, are ostensibly working to prevent. Indeed, the Fund for Peace, which publishes the annual Fragile States Index, already registers Djibouti as having a “very high warning” risk of state collapse.
The U.S. government should reject the notion that allying with brutal regimes in the short-term somehow protects our long-term national interests. Blank checks to repressive governments who abuse their own citizens, often under the guise of “anti-terror,” often backfire (see:Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda just for starters). This flawed strategy fails to take into account the resentment that will ultimately boil over when a people’s legitimate grievances are not addressed.
The antidotes to these problems — genuine democratic governance, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and support to civil society and human rights activists — should be key planks of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. Only investments in these key sectors can counter the heightened repression, undue consolidation of political power, and manipulation of the courts that breed extremism.
To be sure, the United States must tread carefully as it calibrates its relationships with strategically important allies, including Djibouti, that have poor records on governance and human rights. But it’s long past time to stop shaking hands with retrograde strongmen and rolling out the red carpet for the likes of Ismail Omar Guelleh, and other African leaders, whose time has come and gone.
Press Release on the occasion of 14th Commemorative anniversary of Sidama Loqqee Massacre and the Massacre of the other civilians.
May 30, 2016, London
The repeated massacres and genocides of past 25 years that the TPLF’s barbaric regime has committed on unarmed civilians of all regions-and the ongoing indiscriminate massacres it is committing now are likely to continue unabated for a long time if the peoples in Ethiopia remain fragmented, divided and refuse to take the responsibility of confronting and stopping this criminal regime. Failure to do so has already unquestionably contributed to the longevity of the regime.
We, the PAFD member organizations envisage a dynamic and flexible approach with potential of accommodating the interests of all stakeholders without any differences and without actually dictating our own agendas for all the peoples in Ethiopia. This will allow all to move forward in unison in their strides towards justice, democracy and genuine self-determination, which is practically denied by the current regime. Moreover, we strongly believe that this is the only way forward to stop the ongoing genocide, to restore the rule of law, human dignity and pride and democratic order in Ethiopia.
To be able to do so, all the peoples in Ethiopia and their respective organizations must put their differences aside and unite strategically in order to end the suffering of all perpetrated by the TPLF led EPRDF’s brutal regime.
Today’s Sidama Loqqee massacre 14th commemorative anniversary isn’t unique to Sidama nation and isn’t a past history. It has been committed on tens of thousands of civilians in Ethiopia from Amhara, Afar, Benshagul, Hadya, Kambata, Ogaden Somali, Omo, Oromia, Sidama, Shakicho and the rest of regions of Ethiopia. And it is ongoing in Oromia, Ogadenia, Gambella, Konso, Omo Valley and the rest of regional, Zone and district levels.
Unconditionally condemning the past and ongoing genocides and massacres, the PAFD calls upon all organizations and peoples in Ethiopia to be united, move forward and stop the regime brutalizing them all.
PAFD also urges the international and regional communities to stand on the side of the people in order to stop the ongoing blatant human rights violations and hold the perpetrators into account both locally and in the international arena
PAFD salutes the indefatigable and resilient spirits of the Sidama Loqqee martyrs and all the other civilians who have been the victims of past and ongoing massacre by current callous regime in Ethiopia.
Finally, PAFD promises that all those wronged souls may rest in peace and that their valuable lives will be not be lost in vain. It will continue fighting for justice and democracy and righting the wrongs committed against them and the other living multitudes. PAFD will never forget your courageous and honorable sacrifices for generations to come.
, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the EU to become minister at Public Enterprises ministry. He replaced Dr. Girma Amente, who is now the Head of the urban development and housing bureau of the #Oromia regional state. #Ethiopia pic.twitter.com/alOQiKn3wc
OromianEconomist 
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