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A Chronological Summary of Oromian Student Movement Led by Qeerroo Bilisummaa: November 2013 – November 2014
Compiled by Daandii Qajeelaa November 7, 2014
In memory Oromo students who lost their lives during the November 2005 and April/May 2014 Oromo student movement known as Fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa (Revolt against Subjugation).
Introduction
In recent years an Oromo youth wing known as “the National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy (NYMFD)”, widely known among the Oromo as “Qeerroo Bilisummaa” or simply “Qeerroo”, has reinvigorated the struggle of the Oromo nation for freedom, democracy and justice. From the publications and public statements of the group, one can easily see a strong connection or affiliation of the group with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). For example, the radio of OLF, Sagalee Bilisummaa Oromoo (SBO), routinely reports the movements of Qeerroo, and conversely, Qeerroos radio, Sagalee Qeerroo Bilisummaa, also routinely reports the military activities of the OLF army. However, the chairman of OLF, Mr. Daud Ibsa Ayana, was reluctant to disclose the apparent affiliation of his organization with Qeerroo in a recent interview he made with Oromia Media Network (OMN). Perhaps he refrained from doing so for obvious reasons.
While considered as the “youth wing” of the OLF, “Qeerroo” has been vibrant and visible than the OLF itself in just few years of its formation. To see the validity of this statement, it will be enough to look at the volume of information provided by Qeerroo website www.qeerroo.org, frequently updated each day, since the formation of the group in 2011. When an incident such as Oromo student protest, unlawful arrest of Oromo nationals, school dismissals related to student unrests, incidents of land grab and eviction of Oromo farmers, and so on occurs at any corner of Oromia, it is usually this youth group (its website and web-based radio) that reports first from every corner indicating that the group is well organized and widely spread not only in Oromia but also throughout the entire Ethiopia. For example, during the widespread Oromo student protests in spring 2014, it was only this group who managed to compile a list of 61 Oromo students killed 903 others languishing in several prisons in all corners of Oromia, East, West, North, and South. It is remarkable how a single youth group managed to compile all these names, not to consider all the details: school/university the student was attending, major subject the student was in, year (1st year, 2nd year, etc.), place of birth, and so on virtually from everywhere in the region. In many cases when Oromo students are killed by the regime, it is this youth group that makes the names and in some cases the pictures of the victims public. This has been happening continuously over the last four years. What is more remarkable is that the group managed to compile all these data under tight security machine of the regime and with almost no known financial or material support.
Inspired by the 2011 revolution of North Africa and the Middle East known as Arab Spring, this Oromo youth group Qeerroo Bilisummaa was formed in 2011. At first, very few people paid serious attention to it. Many believed it to be just another bluffing of desperate groups opposing the government from the Diaspora. But soon enough the group showed itself on the ground that it is for real. The movement of the group started showing itself mainly in universities and higher educational institutions in Oromia. A series of Oromo student protests broke out in several universities and colleges soon following the formation of the group.
On April 7, 2011, following the founding declaration of Qeerroo, Oromo students of Mizan Tepi University revolted. The government federal police fired live ammunition on the protesters in which 114 Oromo students were reported to have been wounded and hospitalized. 50 others have been abducted from their dormitories the next night and taken to unknown location. On April 12, 2011 Oromo students of Haromaya University staged a peaceful protest demanding the release of their classmates who have been abducted from their dormitories. Their protests however resulted in more arrests and more abductions. On April 15, 2011 Oromo students protested in Arba Minch University, SNNP regional state, which resulted in arrest of several students. On May 2, 2011 Oromo students of Jijjiga University, Ogaden regional state, protested. On May 15, 2011 Oromo students of Fiche Preparatory School, Northern Shoa, protested. May 19 – 21, 2011 Oromo students of Adama University protested. These are just few of the incidents of protests and the response of the government following the formation of Qeerroo in 2011.
Oromo student protests continued on and off, but non-stop throughout the years 2011-2014 in Oromia, apparently under the [underground] leadership of this youth group “Qeerroo Bilisummaa”. The government suppression also continued. The most wide spread and bloodiest of all the protests is the series of protests that occurred in the spring of 2014. At one time alone Qeerroo managed to compile the list of some 61 Oromo students that were killed in mainly Ambo, Gudar, and Robe (Bale zone), but the actual number of Oromo students that have been killed by the forces of the regime in the months of April and May, 2014 is probably several hundreds and those arrested are estimated in tens of thousands.
Some of the students killed in Ambo – April 30, 2014The purpose of this report is to compile and document the most visible movement of the Oromo youth movement against subjugation (Fincila Diddaa Gabrummaa), led by Qeerroo Bilisummaa, of the year 2013 – 2014, in the English language. Almost all of the report is taken directly from Qeerroo website www.qeerroo.org. While I have taken the liberty to ignore some reports which are incomplete or ambiguous, I have made no effort to verify the validity of any of the information provided. However, the fact that such details of the information presented on a large scale from every corner, it is easy to see that most of the information and data given in this report are largely true. In the report, I have attempted to document the day-to-day activities related to Qeerroo in a chronological order. On a given day, I have translated only headlines of the item(s) I considered are significant. I have provided the link to the incident for those who want to verify for themselves from the source. It has to be noted that, due to the high volume of information given on the website, only the most relevant and a small fraction is presented in this report.
Ethiopian government soldiers firing at unarmed and defenseless Oromo students
While I have been closely following [and reporting] the Oromo student movement in general, and that of Qeerroo Bilisummaa in particular in recent years, it has to be known that I am not a member of this group Qeerroo. Nor am I involved in the activities of this group in any shape or form.
Headlines of Qeerroo’s Activities and the Response of the Government
Nov. 2013 – Nov. 2014
Date
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government esponse
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
November 15, 2013
Oromo students of Arba Minch University staged a peaceful protest aginst the regime. The regime’s forces used live ammunition to disperse the students during which a 4th year electrichal engineering Oromo student Samuel Dessalenyi was severely injured.
Oromo students of Gondar University, Amhara regional state, staged a peaceful protest. The government used live ammunition to disperse the protest during which a 3rd year marketing Oromo student named Anteneh Asfaw Legesse was shot and severely wounded. The student died in the hospital few days later. Several students have been arrested.
40 Oromo nationals, including a 13 year old child have been arrested and tortured in Ebantu district, Hinde town, East Wollega zone, for allegedly having connection with the OLF and for opposing the construction of the so called “Renaissance Dam”. The list of those arrested can be seen in the link provided to the right.
An estimated 3000 Oromo students staged another peaceful protest in Gondar University, when the news of the passing away of Oromo student Anteneh Asfaw, wounded by live bullet during the November 26 protest was spread in the university campus. New wave of arrest followed the protest.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government esponse
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
December 7, 2013
The Administration of Gondar University expelled 36 Oromo students who are accused of leading the peaceful protest of November 26 -30 and gave warning to 150 others. Among the 36 students, 8 are dismissed completely, 9 are suspended for two years, and 19 others are required to pay money and hence not to return to the university until they pay in full.
Oromo youth of Alibo town, Jardaga Jarte district, Horo Guduru Wollega zone, staged a peaceful protest. The government forces arrested 6 government employees accusing them of having connection with the youth (qeerroo) protest.
A new radio program “Oromo Voice Radio” started broadcasting to Oromia three days a week on Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday at 7:00 PM (Oromia time) at 16 MB or 17850 kHz.
Internet radio, “Radio Sagalee Qeerroo Bilisummaa” started broadcasting. Here is the link to the first broadcast.
Date
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government esponse
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
January 4, 2014
Oromo students of Mattu University, Ilubabor zone, staged a peaceful protest. At least two students have been severely wounded by government forces.
Qeerroo Bilisummaa Singers Group released an inspirational song (a response to a popular Amahara singer Teddy Afro, who is known for praising King Minilik II through his song) on YouTube by a popular young Oromo singer Shukri Jamal.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government esponse
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
January 12, 2014
Qeerroo Singers Group released another revolutionary song named “kunoo akkasi yaa lammi koo garaan na ciise reefuu” (yes my fellow countrymen (Oromos), I am now happy [that you continue fighting]) on YouTube.
13 Oromo students of Mattu University are expelled from the university as a consequence of their opposition and protest against Beddellee Beer. (Many young Oromos protested against Beddelle Beer factory because the owner of the brewery sponsored Teddy Afro who is known for his song of praising King Minilik II which Oromos consider as “Hitler of Africa” for the genocide he committed on Oromos and other peoples of Southern Ethiopia during the 2nd half of the 19thcentury).
Oromo students of Ambo university showed disobedience by making a hunger strike demanding for the armed forces of the regime leave the University campus. 3 Oromo students are arrested.
Oromos residing in Sululta (vicinity of Finfinne [Addis Ababa]) revolted against the repressive policy of the government by singing revolutionary songs and distributing leaflets of Qeerroo. In response the government arrested at least 5 Oromos out of which 3 are members of the ruling OPDO party.
Oromo students of Haromaya University revolted in the university campus by chanting slogans, signing revolutionary songs and refusing to eat food. In response the government arrested at least 4 employees of the university. In Jimma University, Qeerroo leaflets have been distributed.
Armed forces of the regime continued terrorizing Oromo students and other Oromo nationals in Ambo university and other towns of West Shoa zone. At least 5 have been arrested.
Oromo students of several middle schools and high schools in East Wollega zone protested against the government in their respective school campus. Among several schools in which student protests took place are Haro Limmu, Leqa Dullacha, Jimma Arjo, and Kiramu high schools.
Oromo students of Mattu university staged a peaceful protest demanding the return to school of 15 Oromo students who were expelled from the university.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
March 2, 2014
Renowned Oromo vocalist Hirpha Ganfure released an inspirational revolutionary song named “Ka’I dubbiin booree taatee” meaning roughly “stand up for your right” through YouTube.
Oromo students in West Shoa zone, Midaqanyi and Chaliya districts staged a peaceful protest in Gedo town. At least six Oromo students have been abducted in connection to the protest and disappeared.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
March 10, 2014
Renowned Oromo vocalist Elemo Ali released a YouTube Song (video) about the cruel “hand and breast cutting” (harma mura Anole) of Oromo men/women by King Minilik entitled “Maali Mallisaa” meaning “what is the solution”.
Oromo students of Shakkiso Secondary and Preparatory school, Guji zone, staged a peaceful protest against the illegal gold mining project of the Shakkiso area while the region remains deprived of services and infrastructure. Students are reported to have been beaten by the armed forces of the regime and at least 30 have been severely wounded. Many others have been thrown into jail.
A young Oromo vocalist Fesel Haji released a new video on YouTube entitled “Anis Oromoo dha” meaning “I am Oromo too”.
Oromo students of Shakkiso Secondary and Preparatory School staged another peaceful demonstration opposing the exploitation of Gold from the area by the government and the selling of their natural resources to the so called “investors”. Government armed forces fired live ammunition on protesters seriously wounding at least 23 students. The names of the students who are wounded is given in link to the right.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
March 20, 2014
Oromo students of Jimma University staged a peaceful demonstration in the University campus following a cultural show event by singing revolutionary songs recently released by Shukri Jamal “Minilik nuuf diina” (Minilik is our enemy) and by Qamar Yusuf “Minilik bineensa” (Minilik is a beast) and revolutionary songs of several other Oromo Artists such as Hacalu Hundessa (suma Abdiin koo Qeerramsoo koo), Amin Hussen (Abba Biyya hoo), Hirpha Ganfure (Ka’ii Qeerroo), Haylu Kitaba (Qeerroo Loli), Adnan Mohammed (Baala Adaamii) and more.
Oromo students of Haru Chululle School, South West Shoa zone, staged a peaceful protest demanding the return to school of a 12th grade student named Gabbisa Tammiru who has been expelled from school because of being accused of “promoting the work and agenda of the OLF”.
About 100 Oromo students who became jobless after graduating from different universities and colleges staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the zone police commission in West Shoa zone, Ambo town.
“Baandii Tokkummaa” or “Unity Band” has shown inspirational revolutionary songs (including the famous “Minilik is our enemy” song by Shukri Jamal) in Haromaya University firing up Oromo students of the university.
Students are seen carrying the singer in the video released later by Qeerroo. See part of the YouTube video here:
The Central Committee of Qeerroo Bilisummaa released a statement calling Oromo youth and the entire Oromo nation for revolt against the repressive Ethiopian regime in general and against the so called “Master Plan” in particular. One can see that this call was the beginning of the Oromia wide revolt that spread in the region in the months of April and May, 2014. The full statement in Afan Oromo can be seen here:
20 Oromo students of Adama university have been arrested while they were traveling to Arsi zone to commemorate the “breast cutting” of King Minilik at Anole, Arsi zone. See the names of the students in the link provided to the right.
Oromo students of Jimma University staged a huge protest in the university campus chanting slogans such as “Oromo land belongs to Oromos”, “The Statue of King Minilik should be removed from Finfinne (Addis Ababa)”, “Minilik is our enemy”, “Finfinne (Addis Ababa) belongs to the Oromo”, and more. Watch a brief YouTube video posted by Qeerroo Bilisummaa here:
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
13, 2014
Renowened Oromo vocalist Jafar Yusuf released his famous revolutionary song called “Finfinnee” (Addis Ababa) on YouTube denouncing the eviction of Oromo farmers around the capital and opposing the expansion of the capital (through the so called “Master Plan”).
“Qeerroo Bilisummaa Singers Group” (Hawwisoo Qeerroo Bilisummaa) released a new collective song about Oromo Martyers Day (Guyyaa Gootota Oromoo) on YouTube.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
16, 2014
Oromo students of Adama Science and Technology University staged a protest inside their campus by chanting slogans, singing, and denouncing the TPLF led Ethiopian government and some Habasha singers and publishers who are engaged in tarnishing the history and diginity of the Oromo people.
Oromo students of several universities and high schools in Oromia organized under Qeerroo Bilisummaa commemorated “Guyyaa Gootota Oromoo” (Oromo Martyrs Day): Hawasa University, Wollega University (Nekemte, Shambu, Ghmbi), New Generation College (Nekemte), Ambo University, Gedo [high school], Tikur Hinchini [high school], Waliso, Walqixxe, Haromaya University (Haromaya), Haromaya University (Chiro), Finfinne (Addis Ababa) University (“kilo” 4, 5, 6, and Kotebe), Mattu, Jimma, Robe (Bale) universities, and several other places.
Many students who are members of the ruling OPDO party also are reported to have participated on this commemoration (although the event is done underground without the knowledge of the authorities).
Popular Oromo Artist Jafar Yusuf was arrested by the TPLF-led Ethiopian “security” forces because of his revolutionary song “Finfinne” (Addis Ababa) which he released five days ago (on April 13). He was taken to a military camp and severely beaten for several days after which he was hospitalized and taken to ALERT hospital. After his release he is reported to have been forced to go into exile. Here was his song:
Oromo students of Jimma University stood in unison, went to Jimma Police station and demanded the release of their classmates which were arrested earlier. This bravery of the students created a surprising and unseen turn of events when the police station unexpectedly accepted their demand and released 10 Oromo students. The students returned to their dormitories happy and singing. The names of the released students can be seen from the link provided on the right.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
20, 2014
Oromo students’ protest in Jimma University is renewed and intensified. A protest is also broke out in Mattu University, Illubabor zone. In both places the studdents protested mainly against the so called “Addis Ababa Master Plan”. The government military force was dispatched to both universities and has beaten several students and also was seen firing live ammunition at the students. Especially, Jimma University was reported to have looked like a war zone.
The popular Oromo singer Shukri Jamal released another inspirational revolutionary song on YouTube known as “abbaan lafaa dhabe lafasaa” (the owner lost his land). It is a song which opposes the land grab and also the expansion of the capital [Addis Ababa] to Oromia. Here is the video:
At least 12 Oromo students of Jimma University have been abducted and arrested by the government police for participating on the peaceful protest of students of the university. Meanwhile, all the four campuses of Jimma University are filled by Federal police and students are prohibited to move from place tp place in those campuses.
Oromo students of Jimma University organized in Unison again and went to Jimma police station and bravely demanded the release of their classmates. This time the Jimma Police station released 8 students. The names of those released are given in the link provided to the right.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
25, 2014
Oromo students of Ambo University staged protest this time coming out of their university campus in which the residents of the town also joined, chanting slogans such as “Minilik bineensa” (Minilik is a beast), “Finfinneen keenya” (Finfinne [Addis Ababa] is ours”, and more. At least 15 students have been arrested on the protest. Below is the audio of the protest recorded and released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa:
At the same time Oromo students of Haromaya University staged a huge protest getting out of their campus in which many residents of Haromaya city joined. At least 5000 students are said to have been participated on the protest. The students were chanting slogans such as “Finfinne is ours”, “Sebeta is ours”, “Oromia shall be free”, “Oromo need freedom”, “Jafar Yusuf should be released [from jail]”, and many more. The president of Haromaya University Dr. Girma Lammessa tried to calm the students but was rejected by the students. The audio of the speech of the university president was recorded and released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa:
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
26, 2014
Oromo students of Wollega University staged a huge and historic protest defying the order of the regime’s police and getting out of their campus and moving in the [Nekemte] city. The so called Federal police of the regime attacked the students with live bullet. Several students were injured and hospitalized and several others have been arrested. Some of of the slogans of the students were: “Finifinne is ours”, “Today it is Bishoftu[taking of Oromo land], tomorrow it is Jimma”, “Minilik’s Statue should be removed from Finfinne (Addis Ababa)”, and more.
The audio of the student protest was recorded and released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa as follows.
Oromo students of Wollega University continued protest for the 2nd day. The Agazi force of the government [special police force of the Federal government known for its cruelty] wounded several students by beating as well as by live bullet fired directly at students peacefully protesting. At leat 6 were wounded severely and taken to Nekemte Hospital.
Oromo students of Adama Science and Technology University staged a peaceful protest chanting the same slogan that Oromo students of other universities were chanting. The regime arrested at least 10 students.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
29, 2014
Continued
Oromo student protest spread to several places all over Oromia. Students in all places were more or less chanting the same slogan indicating that all these protests are well planned and coordinated [by no other entity than “Qeerroo Bilisummaa”, Oromo youth group]. All happening on the same day, at the same time.
Ambo University, all schools in Ambo town and the people of Ambo staged a historic demonstration. An estimated 25, 000 people participated on the protest. The government forces initially used tear gas to disperse the crowd but later used live bullets shooting and killing protesters.
Adama Science and Technology University staged a historic protest in the Adama city. At least 10 arrested. Qeerroo’s video is here:
Alibo Preparatory Secondary School, Jardaga Jarte district, Horo Gudru zone
All school in Nekemte town, East Wollega zone (students were seen burning the Habasha/Woyane flag)
Schools in Shambu town, Horo Gudru zone
Oromo student protests intensified in Dembi Dollo, West Wollega zone; Gudar, West Shoa zone; Mattu University, Ilubabor zone [second day].
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
April
30, 2014
A historic and bloody day in the history of the struggle of the Oromo nation for freedom. Oromo student protest spread to all parts of Oromia.
The biggest and bloodiest of all the protests took place in the city of Ambo, West Shoa zone, where the peaceful protest turned into violence when government so called Agazi force shot and killed a 9thgrade student. Cars and buildings were ablaze on fire. The protest included all people of the city. Several people were killed hundreds wounded. Ambo looked like a war zone. BBC reported at least 30 people were killed by live bullet including 8 students. Listen to live report recorded (interview, live from the scene):
Oromo students of Dire Dawa University staged a peaceful protest.
Listen to audio interview by Radio Qeerroo Bilisummaa Oromoo:
Oromo students of Balami Secondary School, Mida Qanyi district, West Shoa zone staged a peaceful protest.
Oromo student protests continued in several universities, including Addis Ababa [Finfinne] University, colleges, high schools and middle schools and towns.
Oromo people of Alibo town, Horo Gudru zone, completely controlled the city chasing away the local government officials.
Oromo students of Madda Walabu University, Robe Town, Bale zone, staged a historic and blody protest. The notorious government Agazi force fired live ammunition on protesting students and several students were killed.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
1, 2014
Continued
A huge protest was held in Gudar town, West shoa zone. Government forces fired live ammunition and killed several students. With the brutal killing of the regime’s forces, the protesters turned to violent action. The military camp of the regime located in the town was burned.
In Ambo town the whole town remained closed. Government forces went house to house and arrested several people, including three school teachers several students.
Oromo students of Finfinne [Addis Ababa] University staged a peaceful protest. Video recorded and released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa:
Oromo student protests are reported to have continued in Haromaya, Jimma, Madda Walabu, and Shambu universities.
Oromo student protests continued spreading to several other universities and high schools, middle schools throughout Oromia:
In Mida Qanyi district, West Shoa zone, the intensified protest of the Oromo students and people led by Qeerroo forced the administrator of the district, Shumi Lata, abandon his government and surrender to the people. The protesters controlled the administration office and the police station.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
2, 2014
continued
Student protest intensified in Mandi town, West Wollega zone. In this video recorded and released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa, the Federal police is seen directly shoting at protesters.
Oromo students of Ayira Gulliso, West Wollega zone staged a peaceful protest. Audio of the protests in Ayira, Mandi, Mida Qanyi, and Haromaya is released by Qeerroo Bilisummaa as follows:
Oromo students of Arba Minch University continued protest for the third day in a row.
Oromo students of Gindabarat and Xuqur Hincinni districts, West Shoa zone, staged peaceful protest
Oromo students of Haromaya University continued protesting in Haromaya town.
Oromo students of Ganji Secondary School, West Wollega zone, staged a peaceful protest.
Oromo students of Burrayyu Secondary School, Finfinne Special zone, staged a peaceful protest.
Oromo student protest continued in several towns in Oromia:
In Horo Guduru zone, Jardaga town, protesters chased away the police and local armed forces of the regime and controlled the town.
Protests continued in Horo Guduru Wollega zone, Kombolcha town.
Oromo student protests continued in the following cities on this day: Shambu, Horo Guduru Wollega; Sibu Sire, East Wollega; Bakko, West Shoa; Wal Qixxe, Wanchi, Taji, Sabata, Sadan Sodo, Ammaya, South West Shoa zone.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
5, 2014
Student Protest Continued in Mida Qanyi district, West Shoa zone. Agazi force is sent to the area and terrorized the civilian population.
The regime arrested four commanders of its police force in Nekemte town, East Wollega, accusing them of having connection with the OLF.
Oromo student protest intensified in several places of East Wollega: Haro Limmu, Limu Gelila, Guto Wayyu, Guto Gidda, Kiramu, Gidda Ayana, Ebantu, Gatama, Sibu Sire, Nunu Qumba, Bako, Billo Boshe, Guttin, Arjo Guddattu, and Digga Sasigga.
Protests expanded to several places of West Wollega zone: Inango, Nedjo, Dongoro, Ghmbi, Ayira, Gulliso, Gidami, Begi, Gidami, Jimma Horo, Qebe, Qaqe, and Haro Sabu.
Oromo student protests also continued in Horo Guduru Wollega zone at places such as Jardaga, Jarte, and Agamsa.
Popular Oromo singer Addisu Karayyu released his famous revolutionary song named “Ka’ii Loli” meaning “Stand up and fight” on YouTube.
Oromo students of Dembi Dollo town, West wollega zone staged a huge protest. Government Agazi force is reported to have beaten the students with stick and used tear gas, but also used live bullet to disperse the protest. Qeerroo reported that 2 students are killed.
Protest was spread to towns and villages near Dembi Dollo such as Mugi, Ashi, and Garjeda. Several students are reported to have been arrested indiscriminately.
In connection with the protests, several students of Adama University, East Shoa zone have been abducted by government forces and disappeared. One of the students arrested, Adunya Kiso, was the leader of Oromo cultural show known as GAASO.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
8, 2014
Ethiopian government unlished its forces in West shoa zone and made indiscriminate and massive arrests.
At least 400 people have been arrested in Mida Qanyi, West Shoa zone, students, teachers, farmers, government employees, including many local government officials and OPDO members in connection with the protest in the area.
The widespread and indiscriminate arrests occurred after the protests have slowed down in this area. In West Shoa zone alone mare than 600 Oromo students, including 15 year old girls, have been abducted and arrested.
Oromo students and residents of Ghmbi town staged a protest which is reported to have been turned into violence when an Oromo student was killed by an Amhara business man who lived in the city for many years. Some buildings are set on fire and many shops are reported to have been destroyed.
Oromo people of Bakko and Bakko Tibbe towns, West Shoa zone, protested and closed the road from Finfinne (Addis Ababa) to Finca’a town, Horo Gududru Wollegga zone.
3-Day Minnesota-State-Capitol OromoProtests Solidarity Hunger-Strike ended successfully at the Passing of Minnesota House Resolution condemning the Ethiopian govt’s violence on Oromo students.
Oromo student protest continued in Innango, West Wollega zone
Several Oromo students of Jimma University arrested.
Oromo protests solidarity hunger-strikers hold a mock funeral in front of the Minnesotan State capitol for slain Oromo students and civilians in Oromia.
Popular Oromo singer Hangatu Balcha released an inspirational revolutionary song on YouTube.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
14, 2014
Another round of Oromo student protest broke out in Wollega University. The government forces are reported firing live ammunition on the students. Several students are injured many others are abducted and taken away.
Government forces continued terrorizing Oromo students of Jimma University. Beating and arresting indiscriminately.
Qeerroo Bilisummaa Singers Group released a new revolutionary song named “Oromiyaa Keessaan Qeerroon sitti marse” (You are surrounded in Oromia by Qeerroo) on YouTube.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
15, 2014
Beating and firing live ammunition on Oromo students continued in Wollega University. More than 150 students hospitalized. Doctors and other health professionals of Nekemte Hospital are beaten for treating the injured Oromo students.
Oromo students of various colleges in Nekemte town staged peaceful protest and brutally beaten by government forces.
Oromo student protest broke out in Nedjo town, West Wollega zone. The Oromo students controlled Nedjo town for several hours until government Federal force arrived from Ghmbi town. The federal police started beating everyone indiscriminately upon arrival. Hundreds of students arrested. Others escaped to rural areas and remained there for several months. Many others are forced to permanently disappear from the area, some of them into exile.
A Young Oromo artist Jirenya Shiferaw released an inspirational and revolutionary song on YouTube.
At least 6 Oromo students are reported to have been arrested from their dormitories in Adama University in connection to the student protest held in the area.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
17, 2014
Continued
Two Oromo students, Milishu Mallasa and Bilisumma Lammi have been murdered in Adama town by government forces immediately after being released from prison.
Young Oromo artist Dadhi Galan released a new song named “dagachuu hin qabnu kan kalee” (we should not forget what happened [to us] yesterday). The singer is later arrested on the 2014 irreechaa festival (see October 22 report below).
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
May
24, 2014
Oromos and other Ethiopians staged peaceful protest in the capital Finfinne [Addis Ababa] against the government brutality on peacefully protesting Oromo students.
Oromo students of several schools in Ambo, Nekemte, and Nedjo demanded the release of their classmates who have been jailed, before they take the 10th grade national exam.
At least 10 students of Haromaya Uinversity have been abducted from their dormitories accused of refusing to celebrate the so called “Ginbot 20” (May 28).
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
June
4, 2014
Oromo student of Haromaya University, Aslan (Nuradin) Hasan, has been killed in prison as a result of extended and brutal torture.
A new protest of Oromo students broke out in Ambo, West Shoa zone, in Homacho Secondary School, demanding the release of Oromo students who have been jailed for participating in student protests. The director of the school was beaten badly by the protesting students when he tried to call government armed forces on the students.
An Oromo student named Dawit Wakjira was killed in Anfilo district, Qelem Wollega zone, by government forces. His death sparked a new wave of violence in the area.
A young Oromo high school teacher named Magarsa Abdissa is beaten and killed in Gulliso prison, West Wollega zone.
More than 200 Oromos have been adbucted and jailed from Begi town, West Wollegga zone. 9 of these ditainees have disappeared and their families could not find where they were taken.
15 Oromo students have been abducted from Madda Walabu University and their whereabout is unknown.
75 Oromo students (8 of them female students) are reported to have been under severe torture in prison in West Shoa zone. Their names can be found on the link given to the right of this row.
A new revolutionary song is released on YouTube by a young Oromo artist Kekiya Badhadha.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
June
10, 2014
Protest broke out in Anfilo, Qellem Wollega. At least 40 people arrested. The protesters closed the road between Mugi and Dembi Dollo for two days in a row.
Government military deployed in Gindeberet, West shoa zone, killed three 12th grade students: 1) Dame Balcha, 2) Chala Marga, 3) Bekele Terefe.
11 government employees (including three OPDO officials) are fired from their job accused of having ties with the OLF in Jardaga Jarte district, Alibo town, Horo Guduru Wollega zone.
A political Science Oromo student of Haromaya University, Husein Seid, is severely beaten by government armed forces and hospitalized.
A hidden massive grave, found at Hamareysa, East Oromia, infuriarated Oromo people of the area.
Oromo students of Qellem Preparatory Secondary Schhol, Dembi Dollo, Qellem Wollega zone, protested demanding the release of their class mates who are jailed. Their protest was met with brutal force of the government and many more students have been arrested.
A young Oromo man, Galana Nadha, who has suffered continuous torture in the Ethiopian prison, passed away and buried in Tokkee Kusaye district, West Shoa zone. The cause of death of Galana is widely belived to be directly related to his traumatic torture after which he developed a mental illness, eventually leading to his death. Some three thousand Oromo people attended his funeral.
New protest is ignited in Begi town, West Wollega zone, when several Oromo students who have been unjustly sentenced to long-prison for participating on protest were about to be transferred to Ghmbi Prison.
16 Oromo journalists of Oromoian TV, STVO, are fired from their job accused of not properly reporting the propaganda and lies of the regime and reporting the Oromo students’ protests and/or indirectly supporting the rightful demands of the Oromo people.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
June
27, 2014
Two students, among several Oromo students detained for participating in peaceful protests, escaped from prison in Begi town, West Wollega. In response, the government arrested several people and reportedly tortured them severely, including the mother of one of the students who escaped.
OLF- ShG and OLF-QC completed their unification process which was going on for two years. Their declaration is provided on Qeerroo website (see the link to the right).
Popular Oromo singer Hirpha Ganfure released a famous revolutionary song on YouTube praising the movement of Qeerroo. Hirpha Garfure is one of many Oromo artists who are forced to flee into exile, now lives in Norway. It is to be recalled that Hirpha also had released another inspirational “Ka’I Qeerroo” song following the formation of Qeerroo in 2011.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
July
7, 2014
Qeerroo Bilisummaa released a list of 61 Oromos killed and 903 others arrested and being tortured in different prisons accused of participating on the student protests of April and May 2014.
An Oromo student and an author of a book named “Qaroo Dhiga Boosse” (An Eye with Blood Tears) was abducted from Wollega University accused of having connection with the student protest
Oromo student Bikila Belay Tolera passed away, after staying in hospital following the gun shot wound he incurred when he participated in student protest in Ambo town, West Shoa zone.
Oromo students of Mattu University and Ambo University staged peaceful protest refusing the so called “political training” the regime started conducting in different universities in the region. The students chanted slogans in their campuses. Audio of the protest is recorded and presented by Qeerroo Bilisummaa (see the link to the right).
Oromo students of Jimma and Ambo Universities intensified their protest against the training of the regime. In Ambo, Oromo students burned the manual (book) distributed to them for training. Audio is presented in the link to the right.
Oromo students continued protesting against the training in Ambo, Jimma, Bule Hora and other universities. The audio of Jimma University is given below.
At least 53 Oromo students of Ambo University have been abducted and beaten on this day. Over 230 have been arrested from Ambo University in the last 3 days alone.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
August 27, 2014
The confrontation of Oromo students of Ambo Universityand Wollega University and the government forces is recorded and presented by Qeerroo Bilisummaa. Listen.
At leats 800 students of Wollega Uinversity arrested.
The university campus looked like war zone. One student killed in Wollega University. Amazing slogans of students. Listen the audio below.
Qeerroo released statement disclosing the names of 25 Oromo nationals who are on the verge of losing their lives by severe torture. Read the full statement here. The pictures of three of the Oromos at risk are below.
Sena Solomon, a young singer of Qeerroo Singers Group, released a new revolutionary song named “Gootni Baroode” (the Hero is Roaring [in the jungle]) on YouTube.
Oromo students of Jimma University protested in the University campus surrounded by the Federal Police and Agazi Force of the regime. The protest of the students erupted when the so called President of Oromia, Muktar Kadir, attempted to make an intimidating speech to the students through Plasma TV. In an unprecedented bravery, the Oromo students have been chanting slogans denouncing the regime, standing right in front of the brutal Agazi trrops.
A new protest erupted in Finfinne (Addis Ababa), Nefas Silk area, at a School called “Ginbot 20 School”. The protest is said to have attracted other nations and nationalities of the country.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
Sep.
16, 2014
Qeerroo Singers Group released a new revolutionary song “Jabaadhu WBO Abdii Saba Kiyyaa” (Be Strong WBO, Hope of My People) on YouTube. (“Waraana Bilisummaa Oromoo (WBO)” means “Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)”).
Irreechaa (Oromo Thanksgiving) is celebrated at Lake Arsadi, Bishoftu, Eastern Shoa zone. An estimated 4 million people participated on the occasion. Oromo youth participated in large numbers and expressing their grievances through various revolutionary songs.
One of the songs says: “Si eegee dadhabee ka’ee baduu laata?” (I waited too much for you [OLF], should I ran away?[to look for you]).
Three Oromo soldiers who are members of the regimes military, Eastern Command, have been arrested accused of having connection with the Oromo student protests in the area.
Qeerroo Activity and/or Ethiopian government response
Link for details of the news in Afan Oromo
November 5, 2014
21 Oromo students of Dire Dawa University, who have been languishing in jail for several months accused of participating in the Oromo student protest, have been unjustly sentenced to prison ranging from one year to five years. It has to be noted that Qeerroo has reported on August 30, 2014 (included in this report) that these students have been severely tortured and are at risk of losing their lives.
Darartu Abdata, sentenced to one year and 500 Birr payment
#OromoProtests (Qeerroo FDG) – Previously Unreleased Video of Oromo Students’ Protest at Finfinnee University Against the Addis Ababa Genocidal Master Plan
Barattootni Yuunivarsiitii Finfinnee Damee Science fi Technlogy Diddaa Kaasan.
Walgayiin barattootaa adeemsuma gaaffiwwan dhiyeessuutiin Yuuniversitii hunda irratti kan itti fufeedha. YuuniversitiiwwanAmboo,Wallagga,Jimmaa, Adaamaa fi kkf keessatti gaaffileen mirgaa dhiyaachaa jiran deebii argachu kan hin dandeenye ta’ullee ammas barataan kam iyyuu walgayii irratti hirmaachaa kan jiran gaaffiin deebii argachuu qabuuuf deebii dhabuun isaa sodaa mootummaa Wayyaanee barattootaa irraa qabu tahuun isaa waan beekameef dabalata Yuuniversitiilee hunda irratti barataan kamuu mooraadhaa ala bahu akka hin dandeenye hanga guyyaan walgayiin kun xumuramuutti mootummaan murtoo kan baase tahuu gabaasni Qeerroo addeessa. Keessattuu Yuuniversitii Wallaggaa irratti barataan mooraadhaa ala bahuu hin danda’u jedhamee murtoon guyyoota sadii asitti waan baheef barattootni diddaa jabeessaa jiru. Gaaffiin hin fuudhamu, dhimma guddina biyyaa fi qulqullina barumsaa irratti mareen barattootaa kan itti fufu malee gaaffii dhuunfaa fi dhimmi uummataa kana booda ka’uu hin qabu kan jedhus mootummaan Wayyaanee ibsa baasaa akka jiru gabaasni caasaa mootummaa irraanis ibsa. Walgayiin barattootaa guyyoota borus kan itti fufu waan ta’eef sochii fi fincilli barattootaa ammas haaluma wal fakkaatuun itti fufiinsa irra akka jirus qeerroon gabaasa. Gama biraan mootummaan Wayyaanee Yuunivarsitii Harammayyaa keessatti walitti qabamuun ololaa afaan faajjii irratti gaggeessa jirtu mormuun Iyyaannoo marasaa 2ffaa kan gaaffii mirga abbaa biyyummaa qabxii 10 of irraa qabu galfachuun walga’ii wayyaanee fudhachaa akka hin jirre ibsatan.http://qeerroo.org/2014/09/01/gaaffii-hin-fudhatnu-isa-isinitti-himnu-qofa-fudhaa-jedhchuun-hogganooti-wayyaanee-barattoota-oromoo-mirga-gaaffii-dhorkaa-jiru/
Oromia: Enhanced Master Plan to Continue Committing the Crimes of Genocide
The actions taken were aimed at destroying Oromo farmers or at rendering them extinct.
~Ermias Legesse, Ethiopia’s exiled EPRDF Minister
August 30, 2014 (Oromo Press) — The announcement of the implementation of the Addis Ababa Master Plan (AAMP) was just an extension of an attempt by EPRDF government at legalizing its plans of ridding the Oromo people from in and around Finfinne by grabbing Oromo land for its party leaders and real estate developers from the Tigrean community. The act of destroying Oromo farmers by taking away their only means of survival—the land—precedes the current master plan by decades. Ermias Legesse, exiled EPRDF Deputy Minister of Communication Affairs, acknowledged his own complicity in the destruction of 150,000[1] Oromo farmers in the Oromia region immediately adjacent to Finfinne. He testifies that high-level TPLF/EPRDF officials are responsible for planning and coordinating massive land-grab campaigns without any consideration of the people atop the land. Ermia’s testimony is important because it contains both the actus reus and dolus specials of the mass evictions[2]:
Once while in a meeting in 1998 (2006, Gregorian),the Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi , we (ERPDF wings) used to go to his office every week, said. Meles led the general party work in Addis Ababa. We went to his office to set the direction/goal for the year. When a question about how should we continue leading was asked, Meles said something that many people may not believe. ‘Whether we like it or not nationality agenda is dead in Addis Ababa.’ He spoke this word for word. ‘A nationality question in Addis Ababa is the a minority agenda.’ If anyone were to be held accountable for the crimes, everyone of us have a share in it according to our ranks, but mainly Abay Tsehaye is responsible. The actions taken were aimed at destroying Oromo farmers or at rendering them extinct. 29 rural counties were destroyed in this way. In each county there are more or less about 1000 families. About 5000 people live in each Kebele (ganda) and if you multiply 5000 by 30, then the whereabouts of 150,000 farmers is unknown.
Zenawi’s statement “the question of nationality is a dead agenda in Addis Ababa” implies that the Prime Minister planned the genocide of the Oromo in and around Finfinne and others EPRDF officials followed suit with the plan in a more aggressive and formal fashion.
Announcement of the Addis Ababa Master Plan and Massacres and Mass Detentions
AAMP was secretly in the making for at least three years before its official announcement in April 2014.[3] The government promoted on local semi-independent and state controlled media the sinister plan that already evicted 2 million Oromo farmers and aims at evicting 8-10 million and at dividing Oromia into east and west Oromia as a benevolent development plan meant to extend social and economic services to surrounding Oromia’s towns and rural districts. Notwithstanding the logical contradiction of claiming to connect Oromia towns and rural aanaalee (districts) to “economic and social” benefits by depopulating the area itself, the plan was met with strong peaceful opposition across universities, schools and high schools in Oromia. Starting with the Ambo massacre that claimed the lives of 47 people in one day[4], Ethiopia’s army and police killed over 200 Oromo students, jailed over 2000 students, maimed and disappeared countless others over a five-month period from April-August 2014. Read more @http://oromopress.blogspot.co.uk/
Barattootni Oromoo Godina Wallagga bahaa , Horroo Guduruu Wallaggaa fi Qeellam Wallagga irraa University Wallaggaatti walitti qabuun walgahiin wayyaanee gaggeeffamaa jiru hanga guyyaa har’atti milkii tokko malee mormii guddaan wayyaanee kan mudatee fi walgahichi barattoota Oromootiin fudhatama dhabee danqamee jiraachuun gabaafamera. Walgahii kana irrattis barattootni Oromoo gaaffii mirgaa fi iyyata galfachuun mirgi hiriira nagaa gochuu akka
hayyamamuuf gaafatan, walga’iin wayyaanee kunis fudhatamaa kan hin qabnee fi uummata Oromoo kan hin fayyadne ta’uu barattootni ifatti gaafachuun gabaafamera.
Walgahiin wayyaanee kun Oromiyaa bakkota hedduutti mormii barattootan fashaala’a jiraachuun hubatamera. Keessattuu Godina shawaa lixaa Amboo, Godina Jimmaa , Iluu A/Booraa, wallagga Lixaa fi wallagga bahaatti sochiin barattoota Oromoo wayyaanee haalan raasee boqonna dhorkuun gabaafamera.
Godina wallagga bahaatti barattoota manneen barnoota sadarkaa 2ffaa fi qophaa’ina barattoota bara kana qorumsa kutaa 12ffaa qoramanii University seenuuf jiraniif illee Onoota godinichaa irratti qopheessuun mormii guddaan barattoota kutaa 12ffaa irraas haala walfakkaatuun wayyaanee mudachuun wayyaanee fi ergamtoota lukkeelee wayyaanee OPDO abdii kutachiisa jiraachuun gabaafamera.
Walga’ii kanarratti barattootni mana barumsaa sadarkaa 2ffaa Biiftuu Naqemtee barattootni kutaa 12ffaa walitti qabamanii turanwayyaanee irraatti fincila guddaa kachiisuun gaaffii keenyaaf deebiin nuuf hin kennamne, walgahii keessan hin fudhannu gadi nu gadhiisa jechuun ergamtoota wayyaanee jeeqan.
Ergamtootni wayyaanees barattoota nu jeeqaa jiran kanneen University fi kutaa 12ffaas yoo ta’ee walgahii kana irraa isin ariina jechuun gaaffii barattootaaf deebii dhabnaan kana deebisan.
Barattootni Oromoo University garaa garaa irraa University Wallaggaa damee Gimbii, Shaambuu fi University Wallaggaa Naqemteetti walitti qabaman hanga guyyaa har’atti walgahii wayyaanee hin fudhannuu jechuun mormii guddaa waltajjii wayyaanee irratti kaachisuun garaaf bultoota wayyaanee boqonnaa
dhorkachuun abdii kutachiisa jiraachuun gabaafame.
Bakkota sadan irraa iyyuu FDG guddatu ka’a jedhamee waan eegamuuf humni waraanaa wayyaanee lakkofsi guddaan Shaambuu, Naqemtee fi Gimbii irra qubsiifamuun gabaafamera. Sochiin barattoota yeroo ammaa kanatti haalan kan ho’ee fi uummata FDG kan dammqsee jiru ta’uun immoo ittumaa wayyaanee fi lukkee wayyaanee OPDO yaaddeessee jira. Haaluma kanaan walgahiin wayyaanee kun FDG guddaan xummuramuuf jira.
Hagayya 21 yuuniversitii Mattuu irratti kan waamaman barattootni Oromoo 2000 ol ta’an walgayii wayyaanee diiganii ganama sa’a lama irraa kaasaanii dhaadannoo garagaraa dhageessisaa oolaniiru.
FDG Yuuniversitii Barattootni Walgayii Itti Waamamanitti Eegalee Jira
Mootummaan wayyaanee barattoota walgayii afeeruun isaa of dagachiisuuf ykns gaaffii mirgaa lamuu lammataa akka hin gaafatamneef haala isaan burjaajessuuf yaalee ka’ee dha, kun kan itti caale tahee argame,walgayiin yuuniversitiilee oromiyaa keessatti qophayanii waamaman irratti FDG har’a bakkooota muraasatti kan eegalee dha, sochii fi karoorri Qeerroon qabatee jiru ammas bakka hundaatti barattootan kan eegalee fi har’a ganama Hagayya 21 yuuniversitii Mattuu irratti kan waamaman barattootni Oromoo 2000 ol ta’an walgayii wayyaanee diiganii ganama sa’a lama irraa kaasaanii dhaadannoo garagaraa dhageessisaa oolaniiru.
Walagyii hin feenu,gaaffiin keenya hanga deebii argatutti nun gaggeessitan, gaaffiwwan yeroo darbe obboleewwan keenya itti wareegaman irra tarkaanfannee walgayii keessaniif kabajaa hin laannu jechuudhaan walgayiin wayyaanee yuuniversitii Mattuu irratti afeeramanii jiran har’a fesheletee jira.
Akkasuma yuuniversitii Amboo fi naannowwan godina Shawaa Lixaa Ona Tokke Kuttaayee, Calliyaa, Miidaqany, Amboo, Gindabarat fi kan hafan keessatti uummanni barattoota waliin gaaffii mirgaa isaa dhiyeessuun halkan edaa irraa kaasee weellisa qabsoo fi barruulee adda addaa bittimsuu irratti kan argamaa jiranii dha.Yuuniversitii mara irratti sochiin barattootaa FDG kaasuun kan wal qabateen eegalaa jiru itti fufa.
MADDA ODUU SBO/VOL Hagayya 22 Bara 2014 #OromoProtests
Godina Iluu Abbaa Booraa Aanaa Mattuu Gandoota Gabaa Guddaa , Siibaa fi Aadallee Gumara ( Mardaafa ) keessatti Finccilli ka’e jabaatee itti fufee ooleera. Hagayya 21 Bara 2014. #OromoProtests Illuu Abbaa Borora, Western Oromia.
Godina Iluu Abbaa Booraa Aanaa Mattuu Gandoota Gabaa Guddaa , Siibaa fi Aadallee Gumara ( Mardaafa ) keessatti Finccilli ka’e jabaatee itti fufee ooleera. Finccila kana daran kan hammeesse ergamtootin Diinaa Shamarree Lalisee Geetaahoo ganni ishee 16 ta’e ganda Aadallee Gumar ( Mardaafa) keessatti Osoo isheen kophaa adeemttuu arganii Billaan mormma ishee qaluuf kufisanii bakka jiranutti ummatin qaqabee irraa buusuun battaumati miidhamttuu gara hospitaala mattuuti kan geessan yeroo ta’u gochaan gara jabina daanggaa hin qabne Kun raawwatamuun isaa ummata gar malee aarsuun jeequmsi jabaan uumamee jiraachuu maddeen Keenya gabaasaniiru.
Barattoota Oromoo Sagalee Ummata Oromoo: The Oromo Students are the Voices of Oromo Nation
21 August 2014
Barattoonni keenya Sagalee uummata keenyaa ta’uu isaanii ammaas irra deebi’uu dhaan Mirkaneessaa jiru!!! bakkeewwan Mootummaan maree dhaaf Barattoota keenya walitti qabde mara keessatti osoo mareen hin jalqabin mormii guddaan uumamaa jira.mormii kanaaf sababa kan ta’an keessaa Durgoon barbaachisaa ta’e kaffalamuu dhabuun isa tokko yoo ta’u Dhimmi Maaster Pilaanii finfinnee waltajjii Marii kana keessaa dhibuun Barattoota keenya dheekkamsiiseera!! dhiigni Ilmaan Oromoo kan irratti dhangala’ee dhimmi Maaster Pilaanii Finfinnee osoo Xumura hin argatin biyya Dimokiraasiin keessatti dagaage Ijaaruuf mari’achuun bu’aa tokko illee hin qabu jechuu dhaan mormii kaasaa jiru.Barattoota kana mari’achiisuuf kan ergaman “Dhimmi Maaster Pilaanii Finfinnee yeroo dhaaf waan dhaabbatee jiruuf isa irratti mari’achuu hin barbaachisu” jedhanis, Barattoonni keenya “yeroo dhaaf osoo hin taane dhimmi maaster pilaanii Finfinnee yoom iyyuu taanaan akka Lafaa hin kaane Mootummaan waadaa nuuf seenuu qaba. akkasumas Lubbuu darbeef qaamni itti gaafatamummaa fudhate ifa ba’uu qaba!!” jechuu dhaan mormii isaanii dhageessisaa jiru!!
TPLF’s Oromo students indoctrination conference at the meeting at Haromaya University – Dire Dawa Campus has been discontinued after panelists refused to entertain questions regarding Addis Ababa master Plan and Per Diem payment. During the morning session students demanded the issue of the Mater Plan and Land Grab must be added to the agenda, and also per diem must be paid. The panelists, led by Faysal Aliyi ( formerly at Washington DC embassy and now head of diaspora affairs at foreign ministry), responded saying they have no authority over such matter. Failing to break deadlock, both side walked out practically ending the meeting for the day.
In Ambo, where students are attending the meeting under heavy federal police presence, none of the agenda items have been presented yet as student continue to protest towards inclusion of the Master Plan issue and payment of Per Diem payment.
Gimbitti walgahiin har’aa mootummaa dargii durii abaaruun eegalame, Guyyaa guutuu Dargii fi ABO abaaraa oolan. Sa’a booda marii akkaataa aanaa irraa dhufaniin taasifame irratti gaaffiin bartootaan ka’e, utuu dhimmi masterplani finfinnee hiika hin argatiin, kanneen hidhaman gad hin dhiisamiin, kan ajjeesan seeraan hin gaafatmiin, gaaffiin Oromoo marti deebii hin argatiinitti waa’ee badii dargii fi ABO akkasumas gaarummaa wayyaanee nutti hin haasa’inaa jedhan yoo kana hin taane ammoo gad nu yaasaa gara maatii keenyaa deemna jedhan. Kanneen akkataa aanaatti marii gaggeessaa turan gaaffii keessan kana nama walgahii kana gaggeessuf finfinnee irraa dhufetti isiniif dhiheessina nuti kana isiniif deebisuu hin dandeenyu jedhan. Kanumaan kana sa’a booda ture addaan citee jira.
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In Gimbi unlike other venues students were divided into their home district. The meeting started with condemnation of the previous Dergue regime and followed by accusation against OLF. Students protested saying its pointless to talk about Dergue and OLF while refusing to engage us on the Master Plan, releasing jailed students and bringing to justice those who perpetuated killing. Panelists resorted to similar excuse saying they have no authority to answer question that are not on the manual provided to them by the government. The meeting discontinued on this point.
#OromoProtests, 21st August 2014
Breaking News: Hagayyaa (August) 20, 2014 FDG Marsaa 2ffaan Godina Lixa Shawaa Yuunibarsiitii Amboo Keessatti Goototata Dargaggoota Oromoon Qabsiifame. #OromoProtests in Central Oromia, Ambo University.
The planned indoctrination conference of Oromo Students at Walaga University- Naqamte Campus dispersed before it began due to disagreement between regime cadres and students. Its reported that students demand for per diem payment since they are forced to gather at the expense of their vacation time when they could earn money by helping their parents or through summer jobs. The cadres told student they have no power to make such arrangement, at which time students walked out promising to return when an entity with such power comes to meet their demand.
Similar question was raised at the Gimbi meeting, however the cadres were able to buy time promising they will make the necessary arrangement for payment. The cadres then introduced three themes of the conference 1) Building democracy in Ethiopia 2) Security and foreign policy of Ethiopia 3) Religion as cause of Oromo Student Protest. Students immediately raised procedural demand insisting the issue of Finfinne and land grab should be discussed before moving into the theoretical and policy focused issues . The cadres responded saying they were given syllabus with strict order and hence cannot discuss any other issue. Meeting adjourned while still in deadlock.
These indoctrination meeting is planned to take place in Gimbi, Naqamte, Adama, Madda Walabu and Haromaya. The regime has threatened that students who fail to attend one of these meetings will not be allowed to enroll back to college in Fall. http://www.siitube.com/article_read.php?a=587
In order to raise global awareness about the protests and the imminent threat facing students who have been expelled from school and those imprisoned, the International Oromo Youth Association (IOYA) is launching a social media campaign. IOYA has prepared a short informative documentary that provides a summary of the protests to date. IOYA is also calling for the immediate release of thousands of Oromo students currently being held in detention and are likely to face torture for peacefully protesting against the Integrated Development Master Plan. The Ethiopian government’s continuous use of brutal force, arbitrary detentions, and torture to severely restrict freedom of expression and rights of citizens should be condemned. The campaign will call on various international human/governmental organizations to urge the Ethiopian government to release the students arrested and to refrain from expelling and abducting innocent students. To follow everything related to the social media campaign use #FreeOromoStudents
THE ADDIS ABABA MASTER PLAN IS A PLAN TO MASSACRE AND DISAPPEAR THE OROMO PEOPLE
By Yunus Abdellah Ali | July 14, 2014
Why the Oromo students decided to sacrifice their life against AAMP of the brutal dictator government of Ethiopia? The AAMP is the core issue of the complete oromo struggle.So it is the question of life and death for the whole oromo population. Millions of oromo s have been massacred by the emperor Minilik, emperor Haileselase, Derg, and TPLF for more than 120 years. But our oromo elders paid their life, their bones, their blood to bring a lot of achievements in the oromo struggle,and they did it. We have achieved some of the fruit of our elders struggle. We have regained the name Oromia for our land, oromo for our people, Afaan Oromoo for our language, our culture, in general we have gained our identity by the blood of oromo freedom fighters with an unforgettable dream of regaining our unique system of governance the Gadaa system.
But recently we the qube generation is facing one of the biggest challenge ever in the middle road of journey to freedom,that is the Addis Ababa Master Plan (AAMP). This plan is the plan that will take all of our achieved rights by our past struggles. So the qube generation is decided to protest against this AAMP in many parts of the world especially in the Ethiopian universities and high schools .This protest is not simply a protest, it the question of life and death,we qube generation are not only protest against this illegal plan, but also we will defend our land from being sold even if we continue being killed by the brutal Ethiopian government.
The Oromia students protest is the life costing struggle for the question of life and death. The dictator Ethiopian government is expanding Finfine , This means, the Weyanes want to expand from the center of Oromia and taking the the oromo land in to their federal territory. The AAMP going to take away our rights we gained through our years struggle with the blood of oromo elders. So that this master plan obviously is not about investment but it is about disappearing of the oromo people.this master plan is targeted directly towards the struggle of the oromo people ,which affects the oromo people directly in a lot of ways.
The current federal language amharic will expand again,in other words the working language of Oromia is going to be amharic based on long term expansion.Once the late prime minister Meles said that he will eliminate the dominance of oromo population in terms of number and the land. That is why the TPLF government have massacred the oromo people in different parts of Oromia and now displacing thousands of oromo farmers from their land. As he already said, in long term, the oromo people will be weak financially, small in number with out unity, and will be eliminated . But we oromo youngsters know that we can’t let our land to to be sold to the investors or government based NGO s even if it costs us our lives.
The Ethiopian government has been displaced many oromo farmers in eastern shewa, western side of Finfine in the name investment. For example in Oromia region in the areas of Zuway , Holeta, and other places there are flower farming. That farm is toxic naturally. And release a lot of toxic chemicals in to the soil kills the soil nutrient for 100 years,so the oromo farmers around that area have died by drinking toxic water that flows from those toxic soil to the lakes and rivers around, the release of chemical dusts from the local industries to the river. Many industries in Oromia release such toxic fluids in to the river of oromo farmers using for drinking water.
In conclusion the Addis Ababa Master Plan is not planned for investment but for elimination of the oromo nation one of the nation in Africa. This master plan is a plan with a mission of hidden eradication of the oromo people identity and population with the progressive erosion of oromo resources, culture, politics, language, land ,people and others from every angle.
So that we Oromo people will struggle by protesting both inside and outside until the end, to cancel the Addis Ababa Master Plan(AAMP) at any costs.
#OromoProtests– 19th June 2014, joined with their families, primary and secondary school students in Najjo, western Oromia, have boycotted classes and staged demonstration today.
#OromoProtests- FDG Magaalaa Dambi Dolloo Irratti Itti Fufee Jira
Gabaasa Qeerroo Qellem Dambi Dolloo Waxabajjii 18
Waxabajjii 17 Bara 2014 barattootni mana barumsaa sadarkaa olaanaa fi qophaayinaa Qellem gaffii mirgaa dhimma hidhamtoota oromoo mana hidhaa keessatti dararamaa jiraniin wal qabsiisanii hiriira bahaniin tikni wayyaanee dura dhaabbachuudhaan barattoota hedduu gara mana hidhaatti guuraa oole.
Hidhamuu barattoota kan guyyaa kaleessaa waraana wayyaaneetiin jilmaadhaan mana hidhaatti guuramaniin har’a waxabajjii 18 uummannii fi barattootni mana barumsaa sadarkaa garagaraa magaalaa Dambi Dolloo keessatti argamu itti fufuudhaan gaaffii mirgaa gaafachuudhaan barattootnni hidhaman nuf haa bahan jedhanii ganama kana irraa kaasanii iyya isaanii dhageessisaa jiru.
Humni waraana wayyaanee diddaa kana dhaamsuuf magaalaa kanatti guuramaa jira, uummanni fi barataan magaalichaa keessaa hidhamtootni gaaffii abbaa biyyummaa gaafatanii hidhaman akka bahaniif diddaa isaanii ciminaan gaggeessaa akka jiran Qeerroon gabaasaa jira.
Radio Afuura Biyyaa Waxibajjii (June) 16, 2014. Interview with Dr. Gizachew Teferra Tesso. The topic of discussion at RAB studio this time is the environmental impact assessment.
Why Resist the Master Plan?: A Constitutional Legal Exploration
Tsegaye R. Ararssa
When the Ethiopian government announced its readiness to implement its “Integrated Regional Development Plan” (the “Master Plan” for short) in the middle of April 2014, it provoked an immediate reaction from university students across the National Regional State of Oromia. Through the instrumentality of its security forces (such as the Federal and State Police, the Army, and the Special Forces), the Ethiopian government responded with brutal repression of the protests. In a series of campus-based and street protests that barely lasted for two weeks, over a hundred innocent Oromos are killed and thousands are jailed. To date, sporadic and spontaneous protest demonstrations continue to erupt in various parts of Oromia. Fuelled by anger triggered by the reckless words and utter disdain expressed in the course of a televised discussion between the Addis Ababa City Administration and the mayors and other executive heads of the surrounding towns over the Master Plan, and informed by history of killing, mutilation, dispossession, and political marginalization (all of which continue unabated), the protests were more a spontaneous reaction than a planned resistance.
Ignored by the state and local government, lied on by the national propaganda machine, neglected by international media and NGOs (with few exceptions), the students continue to resist. Diaspora Oromo communities, in a gesture of solidarity, voiced the plights of the students at home, and they took the occasion to ‘witness’ the violence once more. The non-Oromo Ethio-political elite, which always finds it difficult to speak out on atrocities perpetrated on Oromos, rather characteristically, is still struggling with itself on how to express anger at the mass killings without siding with the cause of the Oromo. (Basking on the nation-wide challenge to the regime as a fertile political moment, they sought to make gestures of solidarity in the hope that they won’t be left out in the event that the tide gets traction thereby leading to the eventual crumbling of the regime.) But very few groups came out in public and condemn this state-orchestrated terror. To be fair, they did well in voicing the plight of the six bloggers and three journalists arrested in the weeks following the start of the unrest. And that is to be appreciated. But the contrast was nothing less than disheartening to those who expected more than gestures of solidarity and had hoped that Oromo lives and rights would be valued as any other lives and rights in Ethiopia.
In this piece, I seek to make a close reading of the constitutional-legal frame within which to situate the master Plan. Accordingly, first, I seek to explore the constitutional-legal context within which the Master Plan should be considered and analysed. Next, I will present a summary of four major constitutional-legal arguments against the Master Plan.- Read the full text @ http://www.gulelepost.com/2014/06/04/why-resist-the-master-plan-a-constitutional-legal-exploration/
#Oromo Protests- Jen & Josh (Ijoollee Amboo) witnessed the cruelties of TPLF/ Agazi forces against peaceful Oromo students and civilians in Ambo, Oromia
The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and Mederk have Successfully & Peacefully Demonstrated in Hawssa! @ Sidama capital, Hawassa, June 14, 2014
The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and Mederk (Coalition of Opposition Parties in which SLM is a part of) have successfully conducted their anti-TPLF’s government demonstration in Sidama capital Hawassa amid tremendous fear of civilians resulted from a systematic over weeks’ intimidations and terror deliberately created by the regime’s army, Security forces and police personnel of federal and regional as well as Sidama Zone’s TPLF’s messengers, all of whom remained patrolling the entire Hawassa and its outskirt for the past five days leading to the June 14, 2014 demonstration. The ultimate aim of the regime’s agents who were busying themselves with missions of intimidation, harassment, repression and suppression- literally terrorising peoples individually and at family levels going from house by house- was hindering the participants from taking part in the said demonstration although they have only partially succeeded in doing so as the expected number of over 100,000 was cut by over 80%.
From another angle however, symbolically the numbers of participants who have taken part in today’s Hawassa demonstration exceeded the expectations of the organisers as it has happened against odds despite the fact that TPLF’s authoritarian regime has left no stone unturned to obstruct the participants from taking part deploying various means including sending the entire Sidama civil servants (majority of whom could have added several thousand if not tens of 1000s) out of Hawassa city under the pretexts of trainings to various southern regional towns for 3-4 days since June 12, 2014.
Besides, the leadership of both SLM/Medrek have expressed their fair satisfaction with the numbers of participants, which has been estimated to be between 11, 000 and 12,500. Given regime’s heinously planned hard work put into this involving deploying its army to harass and terrorise the civilians for the last few days, the numbers were significant victory to both SLM and Medrek. Additionally, since the 13thof June 2014, the regime has also paid the owners of public transportation vehicles in the entire Sidama districts further ordering them to remain out of work until the demonstration is over to hinder the Sidama civilians from taking part. Regardless these all hurdles, the people of Sidama nation have defiantly travelled hundreds of miles on foot to take part on today’s demonstration. The leadership of SLM and Mederk have expressed their gratitude to the people of gallant Sidama and Oromo nation and others who have taken part in today’s demonstration, inviting all to do similar in the future.
ETV (the only and State owned Ethiopian television) has fully satisfied the expectations of genuine minded peoples of SLM/Medrek supporters by putting the numbers of today’s Hawassa demonstrators at about 200!! No wonder if TPLF’s Media (ETV) has significantly cut the number to under 2% as it always does when it comes to success of the opposition parties such as SLM and Medrek. Thus, expecting the regime that deliberately undermines its constitution to speak the truth will by itself be utter naivety.
The slogans of the demonstrators involved:-
Unconditionally Respect the Rights of Nations and Nationalities!!
Unconditionally Release all political prisoners!!
The rights of peoples individually and collectively must respected as they are constitutionally guaranteed!!
Unconditionally Stop the uprooting of the Oromo peasants from the outskirts of Finfinnee and bring those who have massacred Oromo civilians to an independent justice!
Stop Finfinneee Master Plan! Stop uprooting Sidama from the outskirt of Hawassa!
Bring those security forces and authorities who’ve massacred Sidama civilians on May 24, 2002 in Looqqe village to justice and unconditionally respond to the Sidama national quest to regional self-administration for which the Sidama civilians have sacrificed their lives!
Stop harassing, intimidating and terrorising civilians of the country who have demanded their constitutional rights to be respected!!
Stop displacing peasants under false promises of fake Development!!
Stop selling the lands of nations and nationalities to transnational companies!!
We need Freedom!! We need justice not bullet!! Any numerous others.
The demonstration was peacefully concluded despite the fact that the regime planned to slaughters Sidama civilians soon after the 12th Anniversary of Looqqe massacre.
#OromoProtests- Finfinnee (Addis ababa) organised by Oromo Federalist Congress, 24th May 2014
Guyyaa har’a kana Kongereessiin Biyyoolessa Oromiyaa hiriira nagaa magaala Finfinneetti waame haala ho’a ta’een bahe ummani Oromoo. Sa’a sadii hanga sa’a torbaatti kan geggeeffamee yoo ta’u dhadhannoo arman gadii dhageessisuuni
1. Hidhaan fi ajjeechan barattoota Oromoo irratti rawwatamaa jiru yaa dhaabbatu
2. Master plan yaa dhaabbatu
3. Godinaa addaa naannoo Finfinnee kan Oromiyaati dabarsinee hin kenninu
4. Rasaasnii furmaata hin ta’u
5. Namoonni ajjeecha raawwatan seeratti yaa dhiyaatan
6. Mootummaan amma jiru uummata bakka hin bu’u
6. Ol aantummaa seera,haqa,bilisummaa ,walabummaa ,birmadummaa ni barbaanna fi kkf irratti sagalee dhageessisa turan.
(May 24, 2014) – Hundreds of thousands of protesters in the Ethiopia’s capital Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) today demanded the TPLF Ethiopian regime to stop killing Oromo students, and to stop evicting Oromo farmers and grabbing their land in the name of “development.” The protest rally was called by Medrek, a coalition of political organizations, including the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC).
The protesters have demanded justice for the Oromo students and civilians slaughtered by the TPLF Ethiopian regime during the Oromia-wide #OromoProtests in April and May 2014 against the Addis Ababa Master Plan, which outlines the Addis Ababa City’s plans to annex land from the Federally and Constitutionally instituted Oromia in the name of “development,” thereby evicting millions of Oromo farmers and subjecting them to both genocide and ethnocide in their own land.
Among the slogans chanted by the protesters at today’s rally in Finfinne include: “Stop eviction of farmers in the name of development,” “Stop the massacre,” “Bring culprits to justice,” “Free all political prisoners,” “Stop the land grab,” and “We need freedom of expression.”
Waltajjiin falmii araddaa finfinnee fi naannoo gochaa yakkamaa shira diinaa kana jabeessee kan balaaleffatu ta’uu ibsaa dhala OROMOO fi qaama dhimmi kun laallatu hundaaf kan gadditti tuqame kana qaabachiisuun barbaachisaa dha jedhee amana.
Akka sabaatti haalli keessa jirruu fi itti nudhiibaa jiran saalfachiisaa fi jibbisiisaa jireenyaa gadiiti. Haala kana falmii qindaaheen, kutannoo fi wareegama amma lubbuu gaafatu malee kan keeessaa nubaasuu danda’u hin jiruu hubannee wareegama gara hundaa bilisummaan gaafattu keessaa qooddachuun dirqama namaa fi qaama oromummaan laallatu hundaa ta’uu qaba. Wareegama nama biraatin bilisummaa hawwuun yakka yakkaa olii ta’uunis hubatamuun akka.
Diinni keenya garaagarummaa ilaalcha siyaasaa, amantii, gandaa fi dantaa xixxiqqoo qabnutti dhimma bahee bittaa gabrummaa issaa nurraatti dheereffachuun salphina jaarraa 21ffaa keessa harkaa nuqabu. Falli salphina kana ittiin obbaafannu waan hunda dura oromummaa dursuun qofa akka ta’e hubachiifna.
Buqqa’iinsa Lafaa Uummata keenya naannoo finfinnee irratti raawwatee fi raawwachaa jiru keessaa Oromoonni beekaa ykn otoo hin hubatin bu’aa yarootin hawatamtanii lafa abbaa keessanii oromoon dhiigni keessan irraa buqqaafame diina yakkamaa kana harkaa safartanii fudhachuun yakka dhala OROMOO irratti raawwatamaa jiru keessaa qooddachuu ta’uu hubatanii akka irraa ofqusattan isiniif dhaamna.
Barattoonni dargaggoo fi shamarran dhaloota qubee akkasumas qoteebultoonni fi jiraattonni magaalaa, ojjattoonnii fi waliigalli uummata oromoo daba Oromoo fi Oromiyaa irratti aggaammate hubattanii dura dhaabbachuun wareegama hulfaataa amma lubbuu gahu kanflatanii fi kanfalaa jirtan wareegamni keessan itti fufa wareegama gootummaa falmii mirgaa, Tufaa Munaa irraa amma Laggasaa Wagii fi sana boodalleen kanfalamee waan ta’eef seenaa keessatti kabajaan yaadatamaa jiraattu.
Sochii mormii gootonni barattoonnii fi dargaggoonni akkuma obboleewwan isaanii kan kaleessaa ciminaan akka Oromoo lafarraa buqqisuun dhaabbatuuf itti jiran hin deeggarra. Madaan issaanii madaa keenya. Duuti issaanii du’a keenya. Kanaaf akka dhiigni issaanii bilisummaa uummata keenyaa marguuf waan barbaachisee fi danda’amu hundaan bira dhaabbanna.
Hogganootaa fi ojjattoota mootummaa naannoo Oromiyaa, miseensota OPDO, Humna poolisii fi waraanaa dhalootaan oromoo ykn saba fe’erraa taatanii tarkaanfii garajabinaa wayyaaneen barattootaa fi uummata oromoo irratti fudhatee fi fudhachaa jiru ifatti ykn karaa isiniif aanja’e hundaan dura dhaabbattan kabajaan isiniif qabnu guddaa dha. Kanneen ammalleen garaa fi garaacha issaaniif yaaduu bira kutuu hanqatanii faallaa mirga Oromoo dhaabbatan maraatummaa fi raatummaa itti jiranirraa yaroon gara qalbii fayyaatti deebi’uuf akka yaalan gaafanna.
Badiin har’a uummata Oromoo irratti aggaammate kun akkuma kana dura waan hedduu waliin dhamdhamne boru isinis xuquun kan hin oolle ta’uu hubachuun sabnii fi sablammoonni biyyattii keessa jirtan akka falmii mirgaa barattoonnii fi uummanni Oromoo itti jiru bira dhaabbattan isin gaafanna
Saba Tigraay tiif
Gochaalee olitti xuqame kan dhaaba sikeessaa dhaltee siinis utubame kanaan Oromoo irratti raawwachaa turee fi itti jiru balaaleffattee harka kee xurii dhiigaa irraa qulqulleeffachuuf yaroon ati qabdu ammaa fi amma qofa. Kun ta’uu baatee akkuma kaleessaa qarqara dhaabbattee ililtaan harka dhooftaaf taanaan gatii guddaa har’a si mataa kee ykn dhalaa fi dhaloota kee boruu kanfalchiisuun waan hin oolle ta’uu siif himuu feena
Saba Amaaraa tiif
– Mootummoota kalee saba Amaaraa keessaa bahaniin biyyaattiin sun gidiraa
– Waggaa dhibbaa baattee jiraachuuf dirqamuun dhugaa dha. Haa ta’u malee
– Qotee bulaa fi cinqurfamaan saba amaaraa akka sabaatti bu’aan addaa
– Mootummaa maqaa keetin dhaadachaa turerraa hargatte ammamuu
– Mul’ataa Miti. Akkuma saboota biraa rakkinaa fi gadadoo keessa turuun kees
– Beekkamaa dha. Uummanni Oromoo fira malee diina kee miti. Atis oromoo
– Dhaaf fira malee diinaa miti. Mirgi oromoo kabajamuun akkuma waan mirgi kee kabajameetti lakkaa’ama. Kana hubattee kanneen maqaa keetiin dhaaba
– Faallaa mirga Oromoo ijaarrataniin gowwoomtee akka faallaa qabsoo mirgaaf
– Godhamaa jiruu hin dhaabbanne sigaafanna.
Irra deebinee waliigala Uummata Oromootif
– Mirga uumamaan qabdu garuu diinaan sirraa mulqame deebifattee
– Bilisummaa dheebotte gonfachuuf fallii fi malli issaa harka kee malee
– Harka eenyuutuu miti. Kana gachuun wareegama gaafatu qaba. Wareegama
– Malee mirgi addunyaa kanarratti kabajamee, mul’atees hin beeku. Waan ofii
– Gootuun malee kan namrraa eegduun milkii hawwaa jiraachuun ga’uu qaba
– Warra ebeluu fi ebelutu kana gochuu didee komii himachaa bara guutuu
– Aadaa jiraachuun gahee kara siif mijate hundaan qabsoo bilisummaa fi mirga
– Abbaa biyyummaaf godhamu keessaa qooda fudhadhu.
Dhaabboleen siyaasaa biyya keessaa fi alatti maqaa OROMOO tin sochootan
– Yaroon ofii harka walqabatanii akka uummanni harka walqabatee human ta’u
– Itti ojjattan amma ta’uu qabaan waamicha keenya.
Humni milkii qabsoo bilisummaa fi mirga abbaa biyyuummaa furgaasu tokkummaa OROMUMMAA irratti hundaa’e qofa!
#OromoProtests– Wealth gained by corruption, land grabs and mass killings :TPLF’s general Alemeshet’s new building in Finfinnee. The building, which is located at CMC Mikael in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), is partially rented for 500,000 birr per month to several Chinese companies, one bank and one restaurant on the first floor. The building is registered under his wife Ansha Seid.http://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=79369
Gabaasi Qeerroo magaalaa Dambi Dolloo irraa
Caamsaa 21,2014 addeessuun har’a barattootni mana barumsaa Qellem barumsa dhaabuudhaan gara gaaffii keenya bu’uuraa kan deebi’uu dideetti deebina jedhuun mooraa mana barumsaa keessatti wal gayuudhaan diddaa eegaluuf gana sa’a 2:30 irratti waltti qabaman, Lukkeen waraanni wayyaanee eessaa dhufeen isaa fi eenyumaan isaa kan hin beekamne barattoota kana akka amala isaanii reebuuf gara mooraa mana barnootatti ol gamuu yoo eegalan barattootni tokkommudhaan barsiisota dabalatee dhagaadhaan of irraa qolachaa akka turan Qeerroon gabaasee jira, barataan guyyaa guutuu mooraa keessa waraanni wayyaanee mooraa manicha barumsaatti marsanii hamma ammaatti akka jiran gabaasni Qeerroo addeessa. Barattootni hamma dhugaanii ifa bahutti hamma gaaffiin uummata keenyaa deebi’utti barumsa akka hin baranne murtoo dhumaa fi beeksisa baasanii maxxansanii akka jiran gabaasni addeessa.#OromoProtests– Dambi Dolloo, Western Oromia, 21st May 2014.
Oroomoon martuu dubbiisu qabduu eerga kana !
Obboo Ermiyas Legesse ittii aana Ministeera Data fi information kan turan Wagga 12 fis motuumma wayyaanne waliin kan hojjeeta turaan yeroo amma biyyaa gadhiisudhan biyya ambaati argaamu isaanis Gaffiifi deebii Televizioonaa ESAT waliin tasiisan kessa yaadoota tokko tokkoo gabaabse isiin fi ka’ati na caqaasa .
1Gafiin Dura Magaala Finfinne Eenyuu tu bulcha ka jedhu ture
Obbo Ermiyas : akka seraa fi heeraa biyyaattitti magaalan finfinnees tae kan nannoo ofiin of bulchu ka jedhu barreeffame jira.
Gabaabumatti deebiisufi ofiin of bulchuun kan eegalu yoo namnii ati filaatte sii bulche fi akkasuuma yoo seeraan siin tajaajille yeroo barbaaddettis nan ta’u jette kastee qofadha.kun immoo akka finfinneettis akka gutuumma biyyaattitis hin jiruu.Sabaabnisa filaanno walaabatti wayyaannen wan hin amanneefi
2.Wa’e Master planii finfinnee yeroo amma ilaalchisee
Obboo Ermiyas: Gara master planii finfinne isa amma osoo hin tane waema guddiina fi lafa qabaanna nannoo finfinnee irraattin waa siif himuu barbaada.
Gazeexessanis :Tole
Obboo Ermiyas : Nannoo finfiinneeti wantoota qote bulaa fi jiraata Oroomo nannoo finfinnee irra jiraatani yoo kasnee mardhuummantu sii gubaata.
Maqaa Investmentiitin Hayat Real State kan jedhaamu kan qabeenyuumman isa namoot
Tigiraayi ta’e lafa duwwaa argaate mara irraatti mana xiqqoo (service) ijaarudhan maqaa manaattiidhan lafa duwwaa hektaara kumaataman lakaa’amu gurguuratani fixan
Akkaasumas dhaboolen adda maqaa ijaarsa mana irraatti bobb’an edduun kan qabeenyuumman isa warra Tigiraayi ta’e Oroomo kumaatama lafa isaarra buqqiisudhan abba warra gara kuma dhibbaatokkoo fi shantama qe’e isaarra buqqaasani bakka kanaatti aboottin warra kun ijoolle meqaa qabu matii maqaa qabaachu danda’u kan jedhuun bayiisati Oroomon meqaa akka buqqa’e tilmaamun isiin hin rakkiisu.
Fakkeenya nama anii beekuu tokkoo siif kenna Abbaan shanqoo lafa baldha qabu turaani qotee bulaadha shanqoon ijoolle gulbee ykn gatiitti fi surraa qaban nannoo anii jiraadhu kessa tokkoodha
Abbaan shanqoo lafa nannoo Hospiitala Bethel akka jiruutti kan sanii ture nannoon kun g
kara Ayar xenaa bakka jedhaamu fi zennaaba werqi bakka radio fm 97 .1 ttii bakka dhihatuudha namoota hin bekneefi
Shanqoon dur midhaan abbaan isa omiishe hardheetti fe’e gabaatti gurguure gala ture eerga laftii abba isa gurguurame warrii abba qabeenya itti ijaarraatani bioda garuu shanqoon dur midhaan abba isa hardheetti fe’e fidee gurguurun afee
Mana magaazinadha namoota fi hardheetti fe’e gara mana isaanitti gessuu eegale dur namnii midhan ofii isa gurguuru jechuudha.
Kun fakkeenya nama tokkooti garu seenna Oroomo nannoo sani 10 yks yks 40 yks 100 ykn 1000 lakka’amaniiti
Fakkeenya kan bira Dubartii Oroomo dhabbaata miti motuumma tokkoo kessa sha’e gurguurte jiraattu tokkoo mee siif ha kasuu
Hiriyaan ko tokko NGO tokko dhabuudhan namoota HIV dhan qabaamanifi gargaarsa tasiisa ture
Gafa tokko gara dhabbatichatti na affeere wae dubartii HIV qaban kana kan achii sha’e danfiisudhan jiraatani kana naf kasee
Dubartiin kun dur utuu laftii isaani jala hin fuudhatamiin dura hadha warra qotee bulaa cima turaani yeroo mara hardhee fi gangeetti midhan fe’udhan gara gabaatti midhaan gessuu turaani
Garuu laftii isaani gafs gurguuramu abban warra isaani jireenyi isaani qonnaa irraatti wan xiyyeeffatefi qonnaas wan jaallatanifi lafti isasni gafa gurguuramu yeroo jalqaab fi isa xumuuradha fi qonna waliin naga waliitti dhamaani
Kana boods gara magaalatti galuun qarshii isaani kanan harii irraan kan ka’e akka malee dhuguus eegalani yeroo kanas gara shamarran mana buna biira deemuu eegaalani HIV dhafis saxiilamani
ati warra isaanis HIV dhan qabaamani mucaan gidduu kanaatti dhalaattes HIV waliin dhalaatte
Ilmii isaani dargagfessis HIV dhafi saxiilame
Jartiin kun jalqaaba muca ishee isa xiqqaa awwaalte ittii ansuudhan abba warra ishee itti ansuun ilma ishee isa dargaggeessa
Amma xumuurri ishe dhabbata miti motuumma NGO tti galuudhan hojii sha’e danfiisu kana hojjeette jiraatti
Garuu isheen matii ishee hunduuma awwaalte fixxee boor garuu isheen awwaalcha hin qabduu .
Kun seenaa Oroomo tokko lama miti 50 yks 100 hanga kumaatamati
Gabaaba dhumastti kun anaaf Genocide dha yks Duguugga sanyii Oroomo irraatti xiyyeeffatedha.
Oroomon kumni dhibbaa tokko fi kuma shantaama ol ta’u bakka handhuurri isa awwaalamte irraa buqqiisun fayyaatti du’a ittii murteessu jechuudha kun .
Wan dubbiistaniifi galaatoma!
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Short summary:
English Translation by: Henok Oromia Kan Oromotti
Every Oromo must read this summarized translation!!
Mr. Ermiyas Legesse Former Vice Minister of Data and Infromation who had been in office for 12 years working within the TPLF government. Mr. Ermiyas is currently a refugee outside Ethiopia. He had an interview with the ESAT television and I would like to give you a summarized version of the interview. I hope you read my summarized version!!
.
1. (Interviewee) The first question: Who governs the city of Addis Ababa(Finfinnee)?
Mr Ermiyas: According to the governments law and regulation written in the constitution the city of Finfinnee should be able to govern it self. In short, self govern means(starts) if the person/party you have selected is the full representative of you, and you as a citizen can decide whether to like or not to like the law being proposed. Unfortunately the government of the city of Finfinnee let alone the government of the country don’t live on its own constitution. The reason is the government does not believe in free and fair rule(election).
2. Speaking of the current situation on the Finfinnee Master Plan:
Mr: Ermiyas: Before we jump in to the Finfinnee master plan issue there is one thing I would like to clarify(tell you) first.
Interviewee: Sure go ahead!
Mr. Erimyas: If we start talking about the livelihood of the Oromo Farmers and the Oromo people within the outskirts of Finfinnee you will burn in side. In the name of investment, there was Hayat Real Estate which was constructed on “Free Open” land which is solely owned by Tigray investors. These investors build small “service” constructions and sell each lands of thousands of hectares.
In addition, many of contractors and investors are of Tigray ethnic background, who evacuate thousands of Oromo people from their ancestral land. If we put this in numbers the Oromo people being evacuated can be around 150,000 who were displaced from their own land. To find out the scale of how many Oromo people were displaced in this area is not hard to find out.
For instance let me tell you of a Family I knew. Shanqoo’s Dad (Abba Shanqoo) who is a farmer, used to have a huge farm land. Abba Shanqoo had a land that was up to the Bethal hospital. That whole area used to belong to him.
In the neighborhood of Ayer-xenaa and Zenaba Werqi near the radio 97.1 studio there is no one who doesn’t know Shanqoo. He used to carry the vegetables his father cultivated on a donkey and took it there to sell. However, ever since there land was taken and sold away, the vegetables that Shanqoo used to take to the market was no more.
Currently he delivers magazines on his donkey to those area. This is just an example of one person but there are many Oromos like him in that area maybe 10 maybe 40 maybe 100 maybe even over 1000 in numbers!
Another instance, there is an Oromo girl who sell tea for living, let me tell you about her. One of my friends was NGO for assisting HIV affected individuals.
One day he invited me to his organization and mentioned to me about a girl who was living with HIV and was selling tea. This girl long ago before their land was not sold to investors, her mother was a strong farmer. Every now and then they used to take the cultivated vegetables to the market on their donkey and mule. But ever since there land was sold their dad payed his last tribute to his land and migrated to the city and started to drink(intoxication). The intoxication is due to depression and anger. At this time he was visiting the coffee shops and having contacts with women, and unfortunately had contacted HIV. His wife contacted HIV and a child was born between them this child(tea girl) had HIV.
This woman’s(tea girl) first child was lost, then her husband then her teenager son. Now she is part of the NGO where she currently works as a tea lady to support her self.
She burried her whole family but tomorrow she has now one to burry her. This is not a story of one Oromo this is a story of many more like her maybe 50 or 100 more.
To me just to summarize, this is genocide that is specifically focused on the Oromo People.
Oromoo of over 150,000 who are buried in their own capital is just like a complete execution.
SAD NEWS!! #OromoProtests
In west wallagaa in the town of Gimbi in the neighborhood of Waloo-yesuus. There was a 16 year old grade 9 student named Gammachiis Dabalaa. In his life time he used to burn firewood to make charcoal so he can support his family as well as paying for his education. Like his day to day duty, while he went to fetch woods and burn for charcoal on his way to Gimbi town in the morning on 02/09/2006(E.C). He was shot on his foot by a woyanee(TPLF) soldier. Since that day this young boy was spending his time in the Adventist Hosptal in the Gimbi town. Due to lack of quick recovery he passed away on 12/09/2006. May his soul rest in peace!!!!!!!
This photo shows the colonial mansion of Abadi Zemo – one of TPLF’s men. The house is in Yerer Ber. Just a decade or so ago, Yerer was an Oromo district.This 19th-century-U.S.-plantation like colonial mansion was not built by evicting one Oromo farmer and family. It was built by uprooting an entire community of Oromos in Yerer. No one knows what has happened to that Oromo community uprooted from Yerer to make way for Abadi Zemo’s colonial mansion. Who must stand for those Oromo communities being uprooted across Oromia in TPLF’s land-grabbing campaign? – Gadaa.com
This is just tip of the iceberg of TPLF’s empire of corruption.
Aduna Workneh, father of five, lives across bunches of flower farms near Addis Ababa. Officials from the government and flower farms came and talked to him in person. They told me I will benefit better if I take the offer from the government and leave my land. Initially, I refused the offer – because they money would feed my family for a few years, but my land will feed till the ages of my grandchildren and even beyond.” However, Aduna was forced to take the offer and he is now a landless man. He is not sure about his future.
These flower farms benefit us nothing; at least they were expected to provides employment opportunity, says Aduna. Only a few members of our community got employed; as for the majority are not from this area. Showing across the valley, Aduna says – this whole valley was covered by indigenous trees – now is cut down and green houses have been constructed on them. We were able to collect firewood from leftovers and foliage in the forest – the flower farms have taken away everything from us.
#OromoProtests: Dambi Dollo, Western Oromia, Wallaggaa, 14th May 2014
#OromoProtests- Oromo students peaceful protest and Agazi’s brutality at Jimma university, 14th May 2014
#OromoProtests FDG: Renewed Anti-Land-Grabbing Students Protests at Wallaggaa University. Four Oromo Students Reported Dead; Several Hundred Oromo Students Injured
May 14, 2014 (gadaa) — #OromoProtests FDG continued at Wallaggaa University in the Nekemte Campus on May 14, 2014 to demand that the Addis Ababa Master Plan be annulled, and to demand for the institutionalization of the Special Interests of Oromiyaa over Finfinnee per the Constitution. The Addis Ababa Master Plan is termed as the Master “Genocide” Plan by Oromo activists as it aims to evict millions of Oromo farmers around Addis Ababa (whose Oromo name is Finfinnee), and hand out the land to local and foreign land-grabbers – with the Chinese being main actors of the ongoing land-grabbing campaigns in Oromia/Ethiopia.
According to sources, three Oromo students were reported dead at the Wallaggaa University May 14, 2014 #OromoProtests FDG, and one fell/was thrown from a high-rising building. And, medical staff at the nearby hospital have reported up to 200 injured Oromo students being brought to the emergency room. The Agazi TPLF Ethiopian Security Forces continue to lead the violent crackdown of the nonviolent Oromo Students Movement known as #OromoProtests FDG. When students barricaded themselves in dorm rooms, the Agazi forces have demolished walls to enter the rooms, and carry out their harassment, killings and arrests of the students.
Meanwhile, several hundred Oromo students are being arrested en masse at Jimmaa University; this latest campaign of mass arrests by the TPLF Ethiopian regime is in addition to the already arrested hundreds of Jimmaa University Oromo students and Oromo university professors/instructors.
Here are some photos from today’s Wallaggaa University incident: photos show the atrocities being committed by the Agazi TPLF Ethiopian Security Forces on unarmed Oromo students. Warning: some of the photos are gruesome; viewer discretion advised. –For more images click Gadaa.com
#OromoProtests at Walaga University when students barricaded themselves in dormitory, Agazi’s broke down the walls and doors. 14th May 2014
#OromoProtests- Agazi’s brutality at Nekemte (Naqamtee) Wallaggaa University, 14th May 2014
Agazi & the brutal regime(TPLF) in Ethiopia is killing peacefully demonstrating oromo students. The TPLF/ Agazi is also showing its brutal actions on victims’ families and health workers who have showed their empathy to the victims. They are showing their cruelness in each and every action they take on the voiceless peaceful civilians. What does the international legislation, the WHO’s patients’ rights says to this ignorant regime? They are disrespecting international laws in multiple ways.
#OromoProtests FDG Renewed Anti-Land-Grabbing Students Protests at Wallaggaa University.
Four Oromo Students Reported Dead; Several Hundred Oromo Students Injured Posted: Caamsaa/May 14, 2014 · Finfinne Tribune | Gadaa.com
#OromoProtests FDG continued at Wallaggaa University in the Nekemte Campus on May 14, 2014 to demand that the Addis Ababa Master Plan be annulled, and to demand for the institutionalization of the Special Interests of Oromiyaa over Finfinnee per the Constitution. The Addis Ababa Master Plan is termed as the Master “Genocide” Plan by Oromo activists as it aims to evict millions of Oromo farmers around Addis Ababa (whose Oromo name is Finfinnee), and hand out the land to local and foreign land-grabbers – with the Chinese being main actors of the ongoing land-grabbing campaigns in Oromia/Ethiopia.
According to sources, three Oromo students were reported dead at the Wallaggaa University May 14, 2014 #OromoProtests FDG, and one fell/was thrown from a high-rising building. And, medical staff at the nearby hospital have reported up to 200 injured Oromo students being brought to the emergency room. The Agazi TPLF Ethiopian Security Forces continue to lead the violent crackdown of the nonviolent Oromo Students Movement known as #OromoProtests FDG. When students barricaded themselves in dorm rooms, the Agazi forces have demolished walls to enter the rooms, and carry out their harassment, killings and arrests of the students. Meanwhile, several hundred Oromo students are being arrested en masse at Jimmaa University; this latest campaign of mass arrests by the TPLF Ethiopian regime is in addition to the already arrested hundreds of Jimmaa University Oromo students and Oromo university professors/instructors. Here are some photos from today’s Wallaggaa University incident: photos show the atrocities being committed by the Agazi TPLF Ethiopian Security Forces on unarmed Oromo students. Warning: some of the photos are gruesome; viewer discretion advised. Agazi breaking into dorimtories. #OromoProtests reports that medical staff at Nekemte Hospital being harassed and assaulted by federal police. Altercation began when police tried to remove a wounded individual from the critical unit.
#OromoProtests, Gimbi, Wallaggaa, Western Oromia, May 1oth 2013
Gimbi continued their protest again the dictatorial regime for the Oromo land grab and Finfinne. Accordingly, the TPLF/ Ethiopian government security forces (Agazi) are burning buildings and other stores in the Gimbi town. Qabsoon qeerroo gara dhihaa onnee guuttun itti cimee fufeera. Magaala Gimbii keessatti Mormiin uummataa itti fufee jira.
The brutal crime and atrocity of T.P.L.F thugs committed on unarmed peaceful Oromo student’s and civilians is continued. While the Oromo Community in diaspora demanding for justice still the killing is continued in Oromia. This picture is from Gimbi, Wallagga, Western Oromia.
#OromoProtests Dembi Dolloo, Qellem Wallagaa, Western Oromia, 6th May 214
#OromoProtests Arjoo (JImma Arjo and Nunnuu Qumbaa), East Wallaggaa, Western Oromia, 6th May 2014.
2nd May 2014#OromoProtests pictures from the rally at Galila (E.Walaga)
#OromoProtests Photo: Addis Ababa University Oromo students urge Mr. John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, who’s on a visit in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), to condemn the government violence on unarmed Oromo students protesting against the Addis Ababa Master Plan to expand the city limits, and thereby evict in millions those Oromos living around the Capital, and also dispossess them of their land (May 1, 2014)
#OromoProtests 2nd May 2014 in Dongoro town (27 KM from Gimbi) – low resolution picture
#OromoProtests #Oromo, 2nd May 2014, Arsi (Dodola) Ethiopia Godina Arsii Lixaa magaala Dodoolatti barattoonni mana baruumsa sadaarka lammaaffa dodoola Fdg eegaluf moona mana baruumsa afootti osoo marii’ata jiran,humnoota mootummaan addaan bittiinayan.barattoonni kun osoo sagaale hin dhageesisin addan bittiinaayanis bakka mirgi Abbaa biyyumma ummaata oromoo hin kabajaminitti hin barannu jeechun yeroo amma kana mormi dhageessisa jiran.
#OromoProtests, 4th May 2014: Guduruu (Kombolcha), Horroo Guduruu Wallagaa, Western Oromia
kaleessa godina horro gudduru wallagaa magaala kombolcha aanaa guduruutti ummanni oromoo fi baratoonni oromoo hirira nagaa bahan ta’us haala nagayan itti fufu hin dandeenye sababni isaa saroonni fi jaleen wayyaanee ummata fi baratoota mirga isaaf dhaabate kana reebanii adda adda fachaasani haa ta’u malee gaafa kibxataa(28:8:06) haala nama ajaa’ibun hiriira nagaa bahuuf qopha‘ani jiru kanaaf uummanni oromoo hundi qabsoo isaa itti fufuu qaba jenna nutti oromoonni hundi keenya mirga keenyaaf dhaabachu qabna hamma yoomiitti cunqursama hafnaa??
Oromo diaspora (Norway) joined the Oromia (at home) peaceful movement, 1st may 2014 in protest of the Tyranny of Ethiopia and its genocidal master plan.
#OromoProtests– SIREE town, 50km from Adama, Siree high school and preparatory student are going to protest “The Master Plan” that is planned by #TPLF to annex 20 oromia towns. The people are also preparing to abandon him/herself from any activity, teachers are going to stop teaching, student are going to stop learning, there is no marketing, gov’t employer are going close the office until the questions of oromo student get response. When and where the Siree high school and preparatory student will going to hold demonstration is not publicized for security purpose. 5th May 2014
Horrifying Scene from the Ambo Massacre of April 29, 2014 – #OromoProtests – Peaceful Oromo protesters – opposing the Addis Ababa Master Plan – chased by the TPLF security forces as they (the TPLF security forces) indiscriminately batter rally-goers
Photos/Videos: the Global Oromo Community and Friends of the Oromo Express Solidarity with #OromoProtests and Demand Justice for Slain Oromos
Posted: Caamsaa/May 4, 2014 · Gadaa.com
(Gochaa Abba irre Motummaa Wayyaanee ummata Oromoo irratti raawachaa jiru, mormudhaan tarkaanfii waloo fi hatattama fudhachuuf Marii waamame ture milkaawe jira. Qophiin kuni, akka aadaa Oromootti Ebbaa Jaarsoole Oromoon dungoo qabsiisuudhaafi yaadannoo Gotoota Oromoo nuf waregamnin jalqabame. Marii kana irratti namoota dhibban lakkawaaman kan argaman yemmu ta’u, bakka bu’oota Hawaasa Oromoo Berliin-HOB. ev fi Hawaasa Oromoo Munchen fi Nannoo-HOMN e.V, Murtii isaani ummataaf ibsani gaaffii ka’eefis deebi kennaniiru. Waluma galatti Hirira nagaa gaafa Caamsa 9, 2014tti geggeffamu ilaalchisanis haalli qindaawee akka jiru ibsame, hawaasonni biro fi Jaarmooli siyaasas misensoota isaani kan hirmaachisan ta’u isa akkasumas, Warri yakka kana ummata kenya irratti rawwatan haga Seeraan Gaafatamani murtii isaani argatanitti fi gaaffin Saba Oromoo deebii hamma argattutti utu giddutti hinkutiin qabsoo kana kessa hirmaachuuf waada galaniiru. Jarmooleen Siyaasaa Oromoos gargarummaa ilaalchaa siyaasaa qabaan dhiphiifataa diina irratti xiyeeffachuun akkataa dantaa ummataa Oromoo kabajchisuu fi tiksuu irratti garaa fuulduraa maarii bal’aa kan hawaasni keenyaa ifatti qoodaa irraa fudhaatuu akkaa yabboo(Forum)n tolfamuu hirmatoonii walgahii kanaa dhammatnii jiru. Tokkummaan Humna! – 03.05.2014 – Muenchen)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Oromo Community in Munich, Germany; May 3, 2014)(Photo: Oromo Diaspora in Minnesota – the largest community outside Oromia – met on Sunday, May 4, 2014, to discuss on how to best help Oromo Students’ #OromoProtests)(Photo: Oromo Diaspora in Minnesota – the largest community outside Oromia – met on Sunday, May 4, 2014, to discuss on how to best help Oromo Students’ #OromoProtests)(Photo: Oromo Diaspora in Minnesota – the largest community outside Oromia – met on Sunday, May 4, 2014, to discuss on how to best help Oromo Students’ #OromoProtests)
The so-called Addis Ababa Master-Plan is meant to physically/ethnically/nationally cleanse Oromo from Tulama-land. Let us see this case, Lafto was an Afan-Oromo speaking Oromia district a mere 15 years ago. Over the last decade or so, the Afan-Oromo Lafto has been transformed into an Amharic-speaking region inside Addis Ababa – with no significant Oromo nationals there; thus, by expanding to the Lafto area, the Habesha government of Addis Ababa has committed ethnocide on the Oromo in Lafto (it changed the ethnic/national makeup of the Lafto area). This is a point in addition to physically murdering the Oromo farmers who used to live in Lafto area – where are they now? With no land, home and livelihood to depend upon, they have been left to die slowly – which is the genocide committed on the Oromo as a result of the expansion of Addis Ababa into Lafto. The same can be said about other Oromo regions now forcefully incorporated into Addis Ababa, especially over the last few decades: CMC, Kolfe, Kotebe, etc. In other words, the expansion of Addis Ababa has nothing to do with “urbanization” or “development” – but only for committing the physical liquidation (genocide) of the Oromo farmers, and extermination of their language and culture (ethnocide). To summarize, the expansion of Addis Ababa results in the death of Oromo farmers and their families, and also in the death of their culture and language. This is to say, the Master Plan of Addis Ababa is the Habesha’s Mein Kampf on the Oromo. (Note: Mein Kampf is Hitler’s hateful plan for extermination of the Jews). By all means necessary, all Oromos and friends of the Oromo – and peace-loving citizens of the world – must destroy the Habesha’s Mein Kampf on the Oromo – aka the Master Plan of the Addis Ababa City. Those behind this document must be brought forward to face justice for attempting/vouching to perpetrate ethnic cleansing and ethnocide on the Oromo. – Gadaacom Oromo
The Secrets of the New Master plan of Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) Expansion
THE NEW MASTER PLAN (MASTER CLAN KILLER) OF FINFINNE (ADDIS ABABA): Critique and Protest Against Utopian (Nowhere) Comprehensiveness and Physical (Tabula Rasa) Determinist Master Plan.
It is a politically motivated move based on driving the surrounding Oromo community into deeper poverty offering only empty promise to others simply echoing what they think people may want to hear such as, international standard, accelerated development, modernizing the city, experts from prominent European master planners, etc. They have wrongly judged the Oromo thinking and aspirations when they try to trick the Oromos by naming few Oromo individuals like Kumaa Dammaksaa, Berhane Deressa, Driba Kuma, etc. These individuals have always been on the other side of the Oromo issue that the dictators were ingenuous to think that such names would soften the position of the Oromos to thwart the grand political question that they have been asking. No cover ups and use of Oromo names can answer this questions, only the rule of law implemented without political infringement can. The current Ethiopian constitution touted 20 years ago then is politically void in that many of its provisions including articles 40, 43, and 49 remained hollow promises. Particularly, Article 49 of the fake constitution gives only lip service concerning the special interest of Oromia on Addis Ababa. So far, the acclaimed special interest had not met any interest of the Oromo people and the State of Oromia except the contamination of rivers, unmanaged urban runoff, untreated grey water, and pollutions from different land uses of Finfinnee continue to wreak lives and destroy livelihoods of the surrounding Oromos. No considerations of inclusionary practice for Oromo people who use water from the contaminated rivers is made in the recent master plan; it rather plans to do worse, uproot the remaining communities and clear up the swaths of land for the alien settlers. The plan is not inclusive and has no room for managing conflicting interests. So, it is morally, ethically, and professionally wrong and void. Politically flawed; federally owned or territorial boundary of the city has no geographically limited space and no sustainable growth management practices are evinced within the master plan document. The territories of States are divisible and can be manipulated all the time for hidden and clear goals where the state of Oromia has no clear boundaries. The master plan has a clear expansionist goal that will divide the state of Oromia in to two separate regions while it gives access (connection) to the Amhara region and Gurage zone in the near feature. So, the acclaimed master plan is an open venue for the urban sprawl and the development it claims can create political instability for that country. Legally unconstitutional and has no legal means is provided to acquire 1.1 million hectares of land. It is aimed to transfer a political power, state property, and private property to the other private owner (the riches). This is illegal because government cannot take a property from one citizen and transfer it to other private citizen or cannot treat its citizens prejudicially and undermine the rights of indigenous population. The so called master plan has unbearable outcomes; it is aimed to disintegrate the shared values of Oromo people, kills the sense of belongingness, the clans, sub-clans, hamlets, and traditional norms. That master plan has ignored the right of the Oromo people and the state of Oromia to administer a large city and has the intent of building a single municipal government on the big chunk of land. The so called prominent European experts on the advisory payroll seemed to have no clue of multijurisdictional planning or ignored the underlying effects of planning that can destroy existing unique identity. If growth is desirable the undesirable effects of planning could be averted. For instance, cities can have contiguous shape or spotted (leapfrog) settlements while having different local governments that leave sensitive places open as it is in between the cities such as farm lands, environmentally sensitive places, historical places, and indigenous population. Why is the state of Oromia cannot administer satellite (suburban) cities? No reason except there is a hidden goal.That master plan is naive about the sociological formation of indigenous people and assumed as if no diversity exists. Its planning contents disrespected existing values that are given for diversity of culture, values, and different interests of the Oromian state position. No principles and normative theory is evidenced. That master plan is naive about the sociological formation of indigenous people and assumed as if no diversity exists. Its planning contents disrespected existing values that are given for diversity of culture, values, and different interests of the Oromian state position. No principles and normative theory is evidenced. No answer is provided for questions such as, who is going to be evicted? Why they are evicted? Where is their destination? And where is the end point of expansion of the city of Finfinnee? No equal opportunity and equitable conditions provided for the affected.
By Gamsiis (Ph.D.)
Introduction
The aim of this short essay is to protest and critique the newly declared Master Plan of Finfinne (Addis Ababa), the central city of Oromia. Moreover, it is also aimed to advocate for and bolster the voice of the underrepresented Oromo communities living in around Fifinne who are affected by this master plan. The so called new master plan of the city of Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) is a top-down, utopian, physical determinist, a blue print production oriented plan, and filled with politically void terms, laden with hidden agenda that has a grand aim of disintegrating the territorial integrity of the state of Oromia and expand federal government and the minority settlers it has been sponsoring for the last 23 years at the heart of Oromo land, Finfinne.
Prior to discussing the details of the so called master plan this article will define and analyze three major planning and plan related issues. Here we will discuss the theoretical and practical considerations in defining a city planning, and the legal frameworks surrounding city planning practices.
City planning (Town planning) in general term is an activity that regulates the urban development to efficiently manage the urban land use in order to improve the lives of its community by creating safe, healthy, equitable, well situated, and attractive social and economic opportunities for the present residents without compromising the need and possible aspirations of future generations.
Therefore, Master plans (comprehensive plan, general plan) should be aimed to create more development opportunity, better living conditions, healthy and livable place. There are multiple outcomes that are expected from the genuine planning activity. Planning should focus on providing and creating better job opportunity for the community, build improved tax base for the city government, and facilitate the provision of better public services such as transportation, supply, utility services, schools, safety services (policing, fire protection, etc.), recreations, and park services. Secondly, planning is aimed to facilitate economic development outcomes that encourage existing economic institutions and attract new development opportunities. Thirdly, planning activity must create equitable benefits (conditions) for the business community, the public, and the local government (city government). Fourth, city planning activity should empower environment friendly development activities while regulating activities that can have negative environmental impacts and severe environmental hazards such as industrial pollutions, management of urban runoffs, and control other land use externalities.
Contrarily, planning can have negative impacts on property values, can affect peoples’ life negatively, may have hidden values or vague goals, and can have negative political impacts against citizen. Planning activity without legal and judiciary means of protecting civil right can serve as covert exercise of power over the private property, and natural amenities can have a devastating outcome. Authorities, business community, and interested stakeholders may use planning as a land grabbing tool or can impose unfair land use management practices.
Moreover, planning itself can be viewed as a political exercise that manifests itself as taking power (eminent domain) or policing power over public/community properties as well as private property. In its perfect sense, planning should be purely apolitical and it is a governmental duty exercised by city government. But planning can unequally benefit/harm citizens, and even displace and evict communities, destroy shared common values, culture, identity, history and heritage of people, and can kill the sense of belongingness and ownership. Particularly, in places like Finfinne where the unique merger of history and power accorded aliens the privilege of carving a settlement for themselves among the indigenous people, planning to expand, modify the settlement (city) will have always adverse effect on the surrounding indigenous communities. In addition to the scramble for the physical land resources there exist invaluable cultural and historical heritage heritages that may be destroyed by planning practices. There are diverse multi layered socio-cultural orders, common shared values, systems, clans, sub clans, villages, traditional settlements, historical places, and related religious amenities of indigenous nature on which planning can have a devastating effect. It can kill all of these values if not practiced carefully and if legal measures and institutions are not in place to protect all of these including environmentally sensitive areas.
Additionally, planning is value laden practice and with multi-faceted interest where affected parties need to consulted, counseled and legally represented at all planning levels and their needs and rights given proper consideration. Planning graphics, maps, colors, and planning jargons can be very complex, can be hard to be understood by layperson, and are full of professional terms. In some cases planning can have hidden goals where the outcomes are not clear to everyone including the stakeholders they were meant to serve.
The Master Clan Killer
As the case study conducted about the current and newly proposed master plan shows
The analysis of the newly proposed master plan of Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) indicated that its content and quality has imposed issues (values) that are dictatorial and top-down planning activity. The so called master plan is aimed at physical development such as land acquisition for the expansion of the city without full social, cultural, and environmental planning concepts. The industrial zonation of the south east Finfinne was an example of bad planning practice that did not take in to account the impact it can have on the environment. Industrial wastes from this zone have affected thousands of individuals along Akaki (Aqaaqii) river banks and the effects have been felt as far south as Koka (Qooqaa). Therefore, this and earlier master plans were aimed to achieve physical design goals i.e., a plan to expand the perimeter of federal constituency at the expense of social, cultural, environmental, historical and economic injustices to the nearby indigenous communities. The so called master plan failed the affected communities, destroyed their values and can be called the CLAN KILLER. The following is a justification why it has to be called the MASTER CLAN KILLER.
The acclaimed master plan is socially blind and has never mentioned to have a social oriented goal. So, it is socially reckless physical design oriented towards achieving a narrow goal of undermining the state of Oromia and the Oromo people and expanding breathing ground for aliens settled in the city.
It is blind towards the cultural and historical heritage of Oromo people that existed for thousands of years before the inception of Finfinnee. No evidence of any attempt was presented to protect the cultural and historical heritages of the local communities and the major Oromo clans of the area such as Abbichuu. Gullallee, Galaan, etc, are on the verge of extinction.
It is a politically motivated move based on driving the surrounding Oromo community into deeper poverty offering only empty promise to others simply echoing what they think people may want to hear such as, international standard, accelerated development, modernizing the city, experts from prominent European master planners, etc. They have wrongly judged the Oromo thinking and aspirations when they try to trick the Oromos by naming few Oromo individuals like Kumaa Dammaksaa, Berhane Deressa, Driba Kuma, etc. These individuals have always been on the other side of the Oromo issue that the dictators were ingenuous to think that such names would soften the position of the Oromos to thwart the grand political question that they have been asking. No cover ups and use of Oromo names can answer this questions, only the rule of law implemented without political infringement can. The current Ethiopian constitution touted 20 years ago then is politically void in that many of its provisions including articles 40, 43, and 49 remained hollow promises. Particularly, Article 49 of the fake constitution gives only lip service concerning the special interest of Oromia on Addis Ababa. So far, the acclaimed special interest had not met any interest of the Oromo people and the State of Oromia except the contamination of rivers, unmanaged urban runoff, untreated grey water, and pollutions from different land uses of Finfinnee continue to wreak lives and destroy livelihoods of the surrounding Oromos. No considerations of inclusionary practice for Oromo people who use water from the contaminated rivers is made in the recent master plan; it rather plans to do worse, uproot the remaining communities and clear up the swaths of land for the alien settlers. The plan is not inclusive and has no room for managing conflicting interests. So, it is morally, ethically, and professionally wrong and void.
Politically flawed; federally owned or territorial boundary of the city has no geographically limited space and no sustainable growth management practices are evinced within the master plan document. The territories of States are divisible and can be manipulated all the time for hidden and clear goals where the state of Oromia has no clear boundaries. The master plan has a clear expansionist goal that will divide the state of Oromia in to two separate regions while it gives access (connection) to the Amhara region and Gurage zone in the near feature. So, the acclaimed master plan is an open venue for the urban sprawl and the development it claims can create political instability for that country.
Legally unconstitutional and has no legal means is provided to acquire 1.1 million hectares of land. It is aimed to transfer a political power, state property, and private property to the other private owner (the riches). This is illegal because government cannot take a property from one citizen and transfer it to other private citizen or cannot treat its citizens prejudicially and undermine the rights of indigenous population.
The so called master plan has unbearable outcomes; it is aimed to disintegrate the shared values of Oromo people, kills the sense of belongingness, the clans, sub-clans, hamlets, and traditional norms.
That master plan has ignored the right of the Oromo people and the state of Oromia to administer a large city and has the intent of building a single municipal government on the big chunk of land. The so called prominent European experts on the advisory payroll seemed to have no clue of multijurisdictional planning or ignored the underlying effects of planning that can destroy existing unique identity. If growth is desirable the undesirable effects of planning could be averted. For instance, cities can have contiguous shape or spotted (leapfrog) settlements while having different local governments that leave sensitive places open as it is in between the cities such as farm lands, environmentally sensitive places, historical places, and indigenous population. Why is the state of Oromia cannot administer satellite (suburban) cities? No reason except there is a hidden goal.
That master plan is naive about the sociological formation of indigenous people and assumed as if no diversity exists. Its planning contents disrespected existing values that are given for diversity of culture, values, and different interests of the Oromian state position.
No principles and normative theory is evidenced.
No answer is provided for questions such as, who is going to be evicted? Why they are evicted? Where is their destination? And where is the end point of expansion of the city of Finfinnee?
No equal opportunity and equitable conditions provided for the affected
No evidence of public participation and the affected side has no say in it. All planning jargons, engineering graphics, color codes, and the full intent of the plan supposed to be explained to the unskilled public. Legal representation and professional advocacy supposed to be rendered for the affected community. The so called master plan has no principles or notion of inclusive community development plan. Its participants are outsiders and foreigners to the Oromo public and have nothing to do with Oromo to discuss their future destiny on behalf of our community. No authority is vested to any foreign nationals or foreign government or any non-Oromo group to decide on them or ratify any type of master plan on behalf the State of Oromia. This will create distrust between the representatives of Oromian state and the Oromian nationals at large while undermining the fake constitution of Ethiopia. The leaders of OPDO should rise and remove the curtain that has blinded them for too long. If they need any sort of credibility among the Oromo people, this is their chance. They have to stand firm and oppose this TPLF sponsored master plan of destroying Oromia and the Oromo people. The destruction of the Oromo people as we know is the end of OPDO as well.
It is a perpetrated document for federal government to practice an overtly eminent domain and expand the federal government holdings.
It is a document aimed to kill (weaken) the tax base of the state of Oromia and economically marginalize Oromian citizens while holding them in a perpetual poverty trap.
It is a planning document without zoning ordinance and legal support.
It is a top-down faceted planning activity and it is the same as the past failed master plans. It is a dictatorial planning system that has no public interest envisioned.
It is an old style, rigid, and inflexible blueprint without common value.
From Ambo in West, to Melka Jebdu/Dire Dawa in East, to Jimma in South, to Kombolcha/Walloo in North, Oromia is Up for Grabs Under the Cover of “Industrial Zones”
Posted: Ebla/April 15, 2014 · Gadaa.com
According to documents acquired by Gadaa.com, the scale of land grabbing (land thefts) underway in Oromia by the TPLF junta, its Habesha “INVESTORS” (aka Neo-Neftegna’s) and its foreign financiers is larger than previously known to the public. According to information aggregated by Gadaa.com, prime farmlands in Oromia, including the Walloo territory in the North, will be divided into at least 8 “industrial zones” and ownership of Oromo farmlands will be transferred to Habesha “INVESTORS” (aka Neo-Neftegna’s) and their foreign financiers under the pretext of the “Growth and Transformation Plan – GTP – Development” scheme. Ambo, in West Oromia, is slated to be ultimately incorporated under the authority of Addis AbabaAdministration, together with Bole-Lemmi, Sandafa, Dukem, Kilinto and other small Oromian towns Surrounding Addis Ababa. Under this scheme, Oromo farmers in Kilinto have been completely evicted off their farmlands over the last year in 2013/2014, as it was reported last week on Gadaa.com. Farmlands around Jimma in South Oromia and those in Melka Jebdu around Dire Dawa in East Oromia will all be incorporated into the adjacent cities, and the ownership of the land be transferred to Habesha“INVESTORS” (aka Neo-Neftegna’s) under the pretext of “development,” “Growth and Transformation Plan – GTP,” and so on. In Northern Oromia, the TPLF regime has already doled out land to “INVESTORS” under its GTP scheme around Kombolcha, near Bati, Walloo. The full TPLF plan, if implemented, will uproot millions of Oromos from their farmlands, and condemn them to further poverty with no land and livelihood. Here are some documents: – The 8 so far known “industrial zones” designed by TPLF for land theft and grabbing in Oromia (includes Jimma, Dire Dawa and Kombolcha/Walloo): – Ambo and Other Towns Around Finfinnee: the expansive Addis Ababa will ultimately bring these Oromian towns under its authority per the TPLF plan: http://gadaa.com/oduu/25363/2014/04/15/from-ambo-in-the-west-to-melka-jebdudire-dawa-in-the-east-to-jimma-in-the-south-to-kombolchawalloo-in-the-north-oromia-is-up-for-grabs-under-the-disguise-of-industrial-zones/#.U0y_ONMGNwM.facebook
The Oromo Federalist Congress(OFC) has sounded its sternest alarm about the ongoing land-grab activities in Oromia, especially the plan regarding the Oromian towns surrounding Finfinnee, in a statement released on April 14, 2014. OFC issued the statement at the conclusion of its meeting in Finfinnee on April 13, 2014.
In the statement, OFC also condemned the Ethiopian government’s Land Policy, which is being enforced in Oromia without Oromo’s participation, as a plan that will ignite violence between Oromo farmers and investors. Furthermore, OFC reminded the Ethiopian government about the Special Interests of Oromia in Addis Ababa (Finfinnee), which has not been implemented so far, per the Constitution.
Ibsa ABO | The OLF Condemns the Acts of Ethnic Cleansing in Finfinnee
The OLF Condemns the Acts of Ethnic Cleansing Perpetrated Against the Oromo People by the TPLF-led Regime in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa)
PRESS RELEASE 16th April 2014
We are gravely concerned that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front-led (TPLF) regime has, once again, intensified its policy of cleansing the Oromo people from Finfinnee, the capital city of Oromia, and the surrounding districts.
The regime first created the so-called Oromia Special Zone in 2008 and since pursued a relentless systematic removal of the indigenous Oromo people from their ancestral land in the name of “land for investors”, with the sole purpose of forcefully usurping and controlling Oromo land and resource.
The Oromo towns including Akaki, Bonsa, Burayu, Chaffe, Chancho, Dukam, Galan, Holata, Mojo, Mulo, Sabata, Sandafa, Sululta, and Walamara, which the regime has brought under the administration of the “Special Zone”, are scattered along the four main gates to and from the capital in the range of 25Km to 50Km from the capital city.
The regime has launched its most recent atrocity under the guise of “Addis Ababa and the Surrounding OromiaIntegrated Development Plan Project” and annexed the aforementioned towns from Oromia. The regimes’ long-term sinister strategic plan is to surgically remove Finfinnee and the surrounding from Oromia and annex it to the neighboring Amhara state and deprive Oromia of its vital economic and political capital when Oromia eventually becomes an independent country.
Having compulsorily and illegally evicted the Oromo people from areas surrounding their capital city, and now removing a huge landmass and vital strategic towns away from Oromia, the regime has — as it did in 2004 when it imprisoned, killed and exiled over 350 Oromo students for opposing the eviction of Oromo institutions from their capital city — provoked the Oromo youth to rise up and protest. Now it will use this as pretext to dismiss Oromo students from universities, imprison them, and send them into exile en masse.
The TPLF regime and its collaborators need to understand that the land taken from the Oromo people will be returned to its lawful owners sooner or later.
The regime has been waging state terrorism against the Oromo people to suppress their protest against eviction from their homeland and confiscation of their farmlands. It has imprisoned tens of thousands of them for their objection to its apartheid-like educational policy and for their demands of political rights and the right of self-determination for the past two decades. Numerous reports from credible regional and international human rights organizations confirm that the TPLF considers all socially and politically conscious Oromo nationals as enemies, and that it targets them as such.
There has been no regime that has pushed the Oromo people harder than the TPLF in their history. They are being pushed to the limit by the brutalities of the regime and have no alternative but to rise up in unison. Hence, the current TPLF-led regime needs to be reminded that its premeditated human rights abuses and dehumanization of the Oromo people constitute a recipe for a disastrous civil war.
The OLF believes the TPLF must be stopped. The OLF will do all in its power to strengthen its struggle against the regime. We will also renew our call to our people to stand shoulder to shoulder and strengthen our unity to defeat the enemy and guarantee the survival of our nation.
Oromia shall be free!
Oromo Liberation Front
Addi Bilisummaa Oromoo Mootummaan Wayyaanee Oromoo Finfinnee fi Naannoo Keessaa Haxaayee Baasuuf Itti Jiru Ni Balaaleffata
An office called “Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia Integrated Development Plan” prepared an International and National Conference on June 2013 at Adama Town, Galma Abba Gadaa.
The Objective of organizing the conference of the top ranking government cadres (mostly OPDO’s) was to work on the manifesting of the proposed Integrated Regional Development Plan (IRDP) and prepare the cadre’s to work on the people.
On the Conference, it was stated that, the Purposes of the “IRDP” are: Instrumental to unleashing Regional Development Potentials Enables localities addressing their mutual development challenges Enables localities addressing their mutual development challenges Strengthens complementarities and interconnection of localities These purposes can be the explicit or clear objectives of the plan. However, the plan have hidden or implicit agenda. Systematically bringing the land under their custody so that, it will sooner or later scramble among their impoverished people in their region. For example, the Finfinnee City Administration and Finfinnee Special Zone can address their mutual development challenges without being incorporated into one master plan. However, the Master plan is not prepared on mutual benefit as the plan is solely prepared by Finfinnee City Administration, despite the name of the office. Hence, though development is boldly emphasized, the main purpose seems to clear the Oromo farmers from their lands in the name of unfair Economic Development. It was also stated that the Pillars of the Integrated Regional Development Plan are: Regional Infrastructure Networks Natural Resource and Environment Stewardship Cross – Boundary Investments/ e.g FDI) Joint Regional Projects However, there seem hidden agenda behind these pillars. For example, in the name of cross-Boundary Investments, local Oromo farmers are going to lose their land for the so-called “investors” and under the pretext of promoting national economy through FDI initiatives In addition, if the plan is going to be realized natural and environmental degradation is inevitable. In addition, the Basic Principles of the Integrated Regional Development Plan are: Ensuring Mutual Benefits A joint development Framework – not a substitute for local plans An Integrated Regional Plan voluntarily accepted by participating partners Differences resolved through negotiation and under in-win scenario Nevertheless, the plan will not ensure a mutual benefit at it is largely intended to displace Oromo farmers from their land. In additions, the populations of the two areas are not homogenous. Hence, they have no common interest. Even though it is said the “IRDP’ will be voluntarily accepted by participating partners, the top cadres in Oromia themselves have strongly opposed the plan on the conference. Beside, the implicit objective of the plan is to remove/avoid the differences in language and culture there by to plant “Ethiopianism or Tigreans” on Oromo land. The plan is intended to say good bye to Oromo Culture and language. The other thing is that the differences between Oromo and others cannot be resolved as it is intended to eradicate Oromo identity, culture and language. As we know from history, Oromo’s never compromised on these issues. Hence, if the plan is to be implemented, peaceful co-existence may not be there.
Oromos are demanding Article-49.4 of the Constitution Be Respected.
Article 49 – The Capital City
4. The special interest of the State of Oromia with respect to supply of services or the utilization of resources or administrative matters arising from the presence of the city of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia shall be protected. Particulars shall be determined by law.
19 years since the 1995 ratification of the Constitution; why is the TPLF government violating its own Constitution by delaying and ignoring ARTICLE-49.4?Deliberate and systematic extermination of identities of indigenous peoples of Ethiopia through land grabbing (1870 – 2014) Land grabbing is classically known as the seizing of land by a nation, state, or organization, especially illegally or unfairly. It is recently defined as large scale acquisition of land through purchase or lease for commercial investment by foreign organizations (4). Abyssinian governments of Ethiopia are systematically used land grabbing as a tool either to eradicate completely or to reduce indigenous peoples of Ethiopia particularly Oromo and generally Southern peoples in favor of Abyssinian identities. Both micro and macro scales of land grabbing have effectively resulted in disappearance of indigenous identities over time, because in agrarian society land is not only a fixed asset essential to produce sufficient amount of crops and animals to secure supply of food, but it is the foundation of identities (language, culture, and history) of a community or a nation. Changes to land use without consultation with traditional owners of the land, mainly by forceful displacement of indigenous peoples, can, in a long term, result in the disappearance of languages, cultures, and histories of the peoples traditionally identified by ancestral land. Both the expansion of amorphous towns and cities without integration of identities of indigenous peoples and large scale transfer of rural land to investors are the major political strategies of current Abyssinian government to successfully achieve the target of eradicating identities of indigenous peoples of Ethiopia in order to replace it with Abyssinian identities. Thus, problems associated with land grabbing become very complex in Oromia and Southern Ethiopia where the peoples are unrepresented by the Abyssinian government of Ethiopia.http://gadaa.com/oduu/25483/2014/04/22/deliberate-and-systematic-extermination-of-identities-of-indigenous-peoples-of-ethiopia-through-land-grabbing-1870-2014/#.U1Wk8iPYF14.facebook Read the Full Article (OromoPress.Blogspot.com):http://oromopress.blogspot.com/#!/2014/04/eprdfs-addis-oromia-special-zone-master.html
In 1907, Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) had Birbirsaa and Finfinne Hot Springs as its outskirts (border) on the western and southwestern direction. This is when Menelik II was still alive, and merely 21 years after the fall of the Oromo Finfinnee region under the Shoan Amhara kingdom led by Menelik II. On the eastern side, only few embassies were venturing out to the Eekka area (where today’s British Embassy is situated today was the city limit). Today, Addis Ababa has expanded close to ~1800% to what it used to be in 1907 – and in the process, millions of Oromo farmers who used to till and live around the outskirts have been murdered genocidally or ethnocidally (i.e. either directly killed or relocated to other peripheries of the Empire to die helplessly, or their Oromo heritages (culture/language) have been destroyed.) In other words, as the Addis Ababa city expands beyond limits, it has done so at the expense of the Oromo people living around it. The Habesha governments have been using the “expansion of Addis Ababa” as a means (a tool) to perpetrate genocide on the Oromo. Stopping the expansion of Addis Ababa means stopping the genocide on the Oromo living around it.
CNN report: There has been widespread protest by Oromo students in universities in Ethiopia against unpopular ‘Addis Ababa-Finfinnee surrounding integrated master plan’. Oromo students in Haromaya, Jimma, Ambo and Wollega universities held protests. Although officials in Oromia state and Addis Ababa city administration insist the plan only intends to develop Addis Ababa and its surrounding, Oromo students and the wider Oromo elites believe the plan is to displace farmers in the outskirts and suburban areas of the city, meet the growing demand for land, and weaken the Oromo identity. The Ethiopian constitution grants a special interest to the Oromia state regarding administrative, resource and other socio-economic matters in Addis Ababa, in its article 49 which never have been implemented. This has largely resulted in significant resistance within the ruling party, OPDO, in Oromia and a continues pressure to materialize the implementation. The protest against the doomed to fail master plan is held in four universities sofar. Yesterday (26/04/2014) at Wollega University, the infamous and notorious Federal police opened fire at innocent Oromo students. Reports and eye witness indicate unknown number of students were hurt and some have fled to the bushes. The people of Nekemete town were prevented from joining the resistance. Even then some of the residents broke through line of federal police force and joined the protest. At similar protest in Jimma university, the security forces picked more than 10 students and jailed them. Further 15 students in Ambo university were jailed. The uproar against the plan is resonating across different segments of Oromo society. A singer by name Jafar Yusuf was jailed last week that is believed to be because he released a single condemning the plan. The diaspora is is voicing its concerns through the newly launched diaspora based Oromia Media Network The security forces in Ethiopia are dominated by the Tigrayan minority who have been in power since the downfall of Derg communist regime in 1991. The Oromos are the most prosecuted in Ethiopia. More than 40000 Oromos are in jail, although the correct figure is hard to know.http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1125264
April 26, 2014 (Oromo Free Speech) – Oromo students’ nonviolent protests are underway at Wallaggaa University against the plan (called the Addis Ababa Master Plan) to evict millions of Oromo farmers and dispossess them of their land in Oromian districts surrounding Finfinnee under the pretext of the “urban development of Addis Ababa.” According to published data, under the current TPLF regime, Addis Ababa has expanded by ~400% since 1991 (from ~13,763.3-ha in 1991 to ~52,706.2-ha in 2014 – see d
Gallant Oromo Students are Heroically Demanding their rights!
‘Gallant Oromo Students are heroically moving forward opposing Government’s unlawful and Unconstitutional plan to uproot Oromo Peasants from the outskirts of Finfine to create Room for settlers and trade Oromo land for its benefit. All peoples of nations and nationalities of Ethiopia must support Oromo Students and demand the regime to unconditionally stop its unlawful plans with immediate effect.’ http://sidamanationalregionalstate.blogspot.co.uk/
Dispossession and annexation of land from the Oromo people and other people of Ethiopia is part of TPLF’s original play book or master plan. Once they changed their strategy from seceding from Ethiopia to ruling Ethiopia, they were determined to dispossess the Oromos of their ancestral land.As everybody knows, the land policy in Ethiopia is that it does not belong to anybody but to the Ethiopian state. Who rules the Ethiopian state? -the TPLF regime rules it. In effect, they have made sure that all the land belongs to them and they have ascertained this legally. They have created this legal pretext to evict anybody they want.Their focus has mainly been the Oromo farmers. Under the guise of development, they have displaced thousands of Oromo farmers without any compensation forcing them to become beggars or laborers on their own ancestral land.The Tigryan led minority regime disguised behind multi ethnic puppet representatives will continue this trend until they change the whole demographic situation of Ethiopia, mainly of the Oromos.The current Oromo generation and all who stand for peace, justice and democracy in Ethiopia should fight this trend and put a stop to it. An injustice to one is injustice to all. This call includes the peace loving people of Tigray who have been duped by this regime.If this continues, it will reach a stage where it would be irreversible and would remain a shame and a wound on the history of the Oromo people-and this is a strategic goal of the TPLF from the very beginning.What everybody has to understand is that this is part of the regime’s grand strategic scheme to change the demography of Ethiopia when it comes to the Oromo people. In fact, they have also annexed huge chunk of the Amhara land in Gondar and other places in their pursuit to form a greater Tigray.How long will this shame continue? How long will this trick continue? How long will making the Oromos beggars on their ancestral land continue? What is life full of shame, slavery and dispossession in the 21st century?The TPLF regime disguised behind a prime minster from the South and an Oromo symbolic president would like the world to believe that they are purely doing well by pursuing development goals and who by any means speaks against what they do is against Ethiopia’s bright future.Any kind of development that is not in the best interest of the indigenous people, any kind of development that goes ahead without respecting the people’s interest, any kind of development that is based on dispossessing the people of their land and their properties by force is bound to have a negative and destructive consequence in the end.Unbalanced development dictated by the few with a far reaching strategic consequence to destroy a nation is bound to fail.It is time to rise up and stop the shame, denigration and destruction of a great nation. Life without freedom is meaningless!! http://ayyaantuu.com/horn-of-africa-news/dispossession-annexation-tplfs-strategic-goal/http://ayyaantuu.com/horn-of-africa-news/dispossession-annexation-tplfs-strategic-goal/VOA Afaan Oromo reporting on Oromo students peaceful demonstrations:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeFLCX3ZDQ4http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzO3tr0rfZwhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=tx8LqDvWSPEProtests Grow Over Addis Ababa’s Expansion
Oromo students in Ethiopia are ratcheting up opposition to the territorial expansion of the Horn of Africa nation’s capital, Addis Ababa. Thousands of students at all eight regional universities in Oromia, the largest of Ethiopia’s federal states, turned in recent days to demand an immediate halt to the city’s so-called “Integrated DevelopmentMaster Plan,” unveiled earlier this month.
Today, Tuesday 29 April, an estimated 25,000 people, including residents of Ambo town in central Oromia, participated in a city wide demonstration, in the largest show of opposition to the government’s plans to date. A handful of students have been injured and others arrested in protests at the campuses of Jimma, Haromaya, Ambo, Wollega, Metu, Bolu Hora, Adama and Maddawalabu universities, according to local reports.
Once dubbed a “sleeping beauty,” by Emperor Haile Selassie, Addis Ababa is an awakening city on the move. Vertically, buoyed by a growing economy and rural to urban migration, there is construction almost on every block — so much so that locals refer to it as “a city underconstruction.” The country’s first light rail transit which will connect several inner city neighbourhoods, being constructed with the help of the China Railway Group Ltd, is reported to be60% complete. Horizontally, over the last decade, not least due to an uptick in investment from returning Ethiopian expats from the U.S. and Western Europe, the city has expanded at a breakneck pace to swallow many surrounding towns.
Addis Ababa’s rapid urban sprawl is also getting noticed abroad. In 2013, it’s the only African city to make the Lonely Planet’s annual list of “top 10 cities to visit.” In April 2014, in its annual Global Cities Index, New York-based consultancy A.T. Kearney named Addis Ababa, “the third most likely city to advance its global positioning” in sub-Saharan Africa, only after Johannesburg and Nairobi. If it maintains the pace of development seen over the last five years, Kearney added, “the Ethiopian capital is also among the cities closing in fastest on the world leaders.”
Overlapping jurisdictions
Founded in 1886 by emperor Menelik II and his wife Empress Taytu Betul, Addis Ababa sits at the heart of the Oromia Regional State. According to the country’s constitution, while semi-autonomous, Addis Ababa is treated as a federal district with special privileges granted to the Oromia region, for which it also serves as the capital.
The Addis Ababa City Administration, the official governing body, has its own police, city council, budget and other public functions overseen by a mayor. The overlapping, vague territorial jurisdictions have always been the subject of controversy. Now contentions threaten to plunge the country into further unrest.
Home to an estimated 4 million people, Addis Ababa offers Ethiopia one of the few gateways to the outside world. The state-run Ethiopian airlines, one of the most profitable in Africa, serves 80 international cities with daily flights from Addis to Europe, different parts of Africa, the United States, Canada, Asia and the Middle East.
In addition to being the seat of the continental African Union, the city hosts a number of United Nations regional offices, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. There are also more than 100 international missions and foreign embassies based in Addis, earning it the nickname of ‘Africa’s diplomatic capital.’ All these attributes require the city to continually grow to meet the needs and expectations of a global city.
City officials insist the new “master plan”, the 10th iteration since Addis Ababa began using modern city master plans in 1936, will mitigate the city’s disorganised growth and guide efforts to modernize it over the next 25 years.
According to leaked documents, the proposed plan will expand Addis Ababa’s boundaries to 1.1 million hectares, covering an area more than 20 times its current size. Under this plan, 36 surrounding Oromia towns and cities will come under Addis Ababa’s jurisdiction. Oromo students, opposition and activists say the plan will undermine Oromia’s constitutionally granted special interest.
A history of problematic growth
Addis Ababa’s spatial growth has always been contentious. The Oromo, original inhabitants of the land, have social, economic and historical ties to the city. Addis Ababa, which they call Finfinne, was conquered through invasion in 19th century. Since its founding, the city grew by leaps and bounds. But the expansion came at the expense of local farmers whose livelihoods and culture was uprooted in the process. At the time of its founding, the city grew “haphazardly” around the imperial palace, residences of other government officials and churches. Later, population and economic growth invited uncontrolled development of high-income, residential areas — still almost without any formal planning.
While the encroaching forces of urbanisation pushed out many Oromo farmers to surrounding towns and villages, those who remained behind were forced to learn a new language and embrace a city that did not value their existence. The city’s rulers then sought to erase the historical and cultural values of its indigenous people, including through the changing of original Oromo names.
Ultimately, this one-time bountiful farm and pasture land from which it draws the name Addis Ababa – meaning ‘new flower’ – where Oromos made laws under the shades of giant sycamore trees, grew foreign to them by the day. It is this traumatic sense of displacement that elicits deep passions, resentment and resistance from the Oromo community. The Oromo are Ethiopia’s single largest ethnic group, numbering over 25 million – around 35% of the total population – according to the 2007 census.
Ethiopia’s constitution makes a pivot to Addis Ababa’s unique place among the Oromo. Article 49 (5) of the constitution stipulates, “the special interest of the state of Oromia with respect to supply of services, the utilisation of resources and joint administrative matters.”
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia, which drafted the constitution, was fully cognisant of the potential conflicts of interest arising from Addis Ababa’s unbridled expansion, when it decided “to limit its expansion to the place where it was before 1991 and to give due attention to its vertical growth,” according to Feyera Abdissa, an urban researcher at Addis Ababa University.
But in the city’s 1997-2001 master plan, which has been in effect over the last decade, the city planners determined vertical growth posed key urbanisation challenges. In addition, most of Addis Ababa’s poor cannot afford to construct high-rise dwellings as per the new building standards. Officials also noted that the city’s relatively developed infrastructure and access to market attract the private investment necessary to bolster its coffers; the opening up to privatisation contributed to an upswing in investment.According to Abdissa, during this period, “54% of the total private investment applications submitted in the country requested to invest in and around Addis Ababa.” In order to meet the demand, city administration converted large tracts of forest and farmland in surrounding sub-cities into swelling urban dwellings, displacing local Oromo residents.
Local self-rule
In 2001, in what many saw as a conspiracy from federal authorities, the Oromia regional government decided to relocate its seat 100kms away, arguing that Addis Ababa was too “inconvenient” to develop the language, culture and history. The decision led to Oromia-wide protests and a brutal government crackdown, which left at least a dozen people, including high school students, dead. Hundreds of people were also arrested. In 2005, regional authorities reversed the decision amid internal pressures and protracted protests in the intervening years.
But the current opposition to the city’s expansion goes far beyond questions of self-rule. Each time Addis Ababa grew horizontally, it did so by absorbing surrounding Oromo sub-cities and villages. Many of the cities at the outskirts of the capital today, including Dukem, Gelan, Legetafo, Sendafa, Sululta, Burayu, Holeta and Sebeta, were one-time industrious Oromo farmlands. While these cities enjoy a level of cooperation with Addis Ababa on security and other issues of mutual interest, they have all but lost their Oromo identity. If the proposed master plan is implemented, these cities will come directly under Addis Ababa City Administration — thereby the federal government, further complicating the jurisdictional issue.
Among many other compromises made possible by Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, each state has adopted the use of its native tongue as the official language of education, business and public service. In theory, the country’s constitution also grants autonomous self-rule to regional states. Under this arrangement, each state makes its own laws and levy and collect taxes.
In contrast, municipalities that fall under federal jurisdiction, including Addis, are governed by their own city administrations and use Amharic, Ethiopia’s federal working language. For the Oromo, as in the past, the seceding of surrounding towns to Addis means a loss of their language and culture once more, even if today’s driving forces of urbanisation differ from the 19th century imperialist expansion.
As seen from its recent residential expansions into sub-cities on the peripheries such as Kotebe, Bole Bulbula, Bole Medhanialem, Makanisa and Keranyo, the semi-agrarian community, including small, informal business owners, were given few options. The city’s new code requires building high-rises that are beyond their subsistence means. Unable to comply with the new city development code, the locals were pressured into selling their land at very low prices and eke out a living in a city that faces chronic unemployment. As a result, the horizontal expansion and displacement of livelihoods turned a one time self-sufficient community into street beggars and day labourers.
Activists fear that the latest expansion is part of a grand plan to contain a resurgent Oromo nationalism. As witnessed during the 2001 protests, any attempt to alter Addis Ababa’s administrative limits, unites Oromos across religious, regional and political divides. Unless halted, with a steam of opposition already gathering in and outside of the country, the ongoing of protests show ominous signs.
In a glimpse of the fervent opposition that could quickly turn deadly, within weeks after the plan was unveiled, two young and upcoming Oromo artists have released new music singles lamenting the city’s historic social and cultural heritage. One of the singers, Jafar Yusef, 23, was arrestedthree days after releasing his musical rendition — and has reportedly been tortured. Despite the growing opposition, however, the Addis Ababa municipal authority is vowing to forge ahead with the plan, which they say was developed in consultation with a team of international and local urban planners. Federal Special Forces, known as Liyyu police, who have previously been implicated in serious human rights violations, have been dispatched to college towns to disperse the protests. Soldiers in military fatigues have laid siege to several campuses, preventing students from leaving, according to eyewitness reports.
Trouble at the top while those at the bottom lack the basic necessities
The city administration is also riddled by a crippling legacy of corruption, massive inefficiency and poor service delivery. Its homeless loiters in the crowded streets that are shared by cars, pedestrians and animals alike. There are few subsidised housing projects for poor and low-income families. Many of the residents lack clean drinking water, healthcare and basic education. While some progress had been made to upgrade the city’s squatter settlements, the city is full of dilapidated shacks. Despite poor drainage system and other infrastructural deficiencies, studies show that there is a general disregard for health and environmental hazards in Ethiopia’s urban redevelopment scheme.
A lot of these social and economic problems are caused by the city’s poorly conceived but dramatic urban expansion. In the last two-decades, in an effort to transform the city into a competitive metropolis, there have been an uptick in the construction of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels and condominiums, which displaced poorer inhabitants, including Oromo farmers. “No one is ensuring the displaced people find new homes, and there are no studies about what his happening to them,” Mara Gittleman of Tufts University observed.
Regardless, the outcome of the current controversy will likely test Ethiopia’s commitment to ethnic federalism. The advance of the proposed master plan would mean further estrangement between the Oromo masses and Oromia regional government. Long seen as a puppet of the federal regime, with substantial investment in cultural and infrastructural development, regional leaders are only beginning to sway public opinion. Allowing the master plan to proceed would engender that progress and prove suicidal for the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Oromo element in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition. In the short run, the mounting public outcry may not hold much sway. The country’s one-time vibrant opposition is disarray and the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has almost complete control of the political system.
The opposition to the expansion plans does not pose an immediate electoral threat to the EPRDF who, controlling the system as they do, are likely to claim an easy victory in next year’s elections. However, opposition, and the government’s possible aggressive response to it, could make Oromo-government relations more difficult. The government now has a choice, violently crackdown on protestors, labelling them “anti-development”, or engage with them as stakeholders representing historically marginalised communities. Ethiopia’s federal constitution suggests the latter course of action; sadly, recent history may suggest the former.
Correction 29/4/14: The article originally stated that Jafar Yusef was 29, rather than 23. This has been changed.
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Following the peaceful demonstrations held by Oromo students in nine Universities across Oromia [Haromaya, Jimma, Ambo, Adama, Bule Hora, Wallaga, Madda Walabu, Kotebe and Dire Dawa Universities], more than a dozen people are so far reported to have been killed by the TPLF mercenaries in Ambo (10) and Bale Robe (3). Today, the public outrage in Ambo that subsequently claimed 9 more lives and property losses came after the TPLF forces opened live rounds on demonstrators and killed a 9th grader, by the name Endale Desalegn (picture attached herewith). It is so revolting and heartbreaking to hear that these security forces gunned-down peaceful demonstrators for no other reason; but for they were simply asking their constitutionally protected rights be respected. As the entire Oromo nation is in deep agony following these tragic events happening across Oromia, 2nd May 2014 #OromoProtests ALERT: Muhaba Hussien, the lead actor in the Afaan Oromo drama ‘Sakaallaa’ has been in jail in Adama for last few days. Family and friends have been denied access. Unconfirmed report indicate that he might have been transferred, overnight, to Maekelawi along about 100 students and residents arrested from Adama and neighboring towns.Victim of Police shooting in Bale Robe, #Oromia,#Ethiopia during a protest against the new Addis Ababa Master Plan | April 30, 2014 Below is Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) University as invaded by Agazi/TPLF Army 1st May 2014
Disturbing Images of Oromo Students Injured By TPLF’s Military Police at a Peaceful/Nonviolent Rally in Wallaggaa, Oromia
Barsisaa isporti Tiquando kan ta’e suraa isaa kan armaan olitti argamu maqaan isaa Abdi Akmal kan jedhamu waraana TPLF n ajefameraa. Kumalaa Gudisa jirata magala amboo yerota’u kalesa galgala mana yalaa xiqur anbasa ti samuisa gubaa huna motuummaa wayaneen rasaasaan rukute subii guyyaa 1/05/2014 boqotee refi isa gara magala diree inciniti gefamaa jira. #OromoProtests Barataa Taddasaa Gaashuu Barataa kutaa 9ffaa amboo Keessa gaafa 30/4/2014 rasaasa agaaziitiin wareegame jira.#OromoProtests Barataa Taddasaa Gaashuu Barataa kutaa 9ffaa amboo Keessa gaafa 30/4/2014 rasaasa agaaziitiin wareegame jira. RIP kichuu Ayiii#OromoProtests photo of Alemayoo Urgesaa who was killed in Gudar during last week’s massacre. He was laid rest 5th May 2014. May he join our martyrs in heaven. #OromoProtests Barataa Taddasaa Gaashuu Barataa kutaa 9ffaa amboo Keessa gaafa 30/4/2014 rasaasa agaaziitiin wareegame jira.OROMO STUDENTS AND RESIDENTS INCLUDING KIDS OF AMBO FIRED BY ARMED TPLF& INJURED NOW IN AMBO HOSPITAL , 1ST MAY 2014 Humna hidhattota Wayyaane tiin Fanjii dhoyeen Barattota Universitii Haromayaa’rra miidhaan hamaa ga’ee jira. Kan wareegaman ni jiru, dhibbatti lakkawwamani’mmoo madayaaniiru” jedhama.2/04/”014. #OromoProtests #OromoProtests update 2nd May 2014; the number of students who were killed the bomb attack on Haromaya University campus has reached four. One died on the same day three passed away yesterday and today at Hiwot Fana hospital where this picture was taken. 10 students are still listed as critical in ICU. WARNING Gruesome and disturbing picture. 2nd May 2014, victims of TPLF’s voilence @Najjoo, Westwrn Oromia. Shamaran sadii fi dhira tokko Dhukassa federal midhamanii dhigni isaan gar malee kan dhangala’ee kunoo kana fakkata! @Nadjo Hospital!! 2nd May 2014, Oromia Innocent Oromo mother while she coming from market, attacked by Agazi, wayooooo wayooooooo!!! Uuuuuuuuuuuuuu 2nd May 2014,Oromo student Mohammed Abdulhamid shot dead by Agazi while at peaceful demonstrations at Balee Robee, Oromiyaa. GUYYA KALEESA HIRIRAA BALEE ROBEE KESSATI BARATOONI OROMOO KAN RASASSAN NU BIRAA AJJEEFAME BARATAA MOHAMMED ABDULHAMID JEDHAMAA UMRII DHAN IJOOLA WAGGA 21. #OromoProtests 2nd May 2014, Daarimuu, Abbaa booraa, Oromia Caamsaa 2/2014 Godina Iluu Abbaa booraa aanaa Daarimuu irratti fincila diddaa garbummaa geggeefameen qotee bulaan oromoo rasaasa poolisii federaalaan rukutame Hospitaala Karl Mattuu du’aaf jireenya gidduu jiruu dha. “Hiriyyottan koo lubbuu koo olchitaniif galanni koo guddadha. Kan na biraa lubbuun keessan darbeef waqayyoon lubbuu keessan haa yaadatu. Qabsa’aan ni kufa qabsoon itti fufa.” http://www.spreaker.com/user/ragabaa/roorroo-dachaa?sp_redirected=true #OromoProtests RIP Hachalu Jagama who was killed in Jibat while peacefully protesting. He was a university graduate, who was working as day laborer. Data from Oromia regional government show that less than a third of those who graduated in the last 2 years were able to land job. #OromoProtests Kumala Gudisa Bali who was shot by Agazi in Ambo on April 30 and passed away at Tikur Ambassa Hospital. May he join the rest of our martyrs in heaven.#OromoProtests body of Mekonnen Hirpa who was killed at Madda Walabu by University by Agazi. May he join the rest of our martyrs in heaven. Your sacrifice will not be in vain.#OromoProtests Student Abbabaa Xilahun, statistics 3rd year shot wounded by Agazi and denied medical treatments requires. Kun Abbabaa Xilaahun, barataa istaatistiksii waggaa lammafati. Bombii magaalaa Haroomaayatti dhoo’een madaaye. Doktoroonni Hospitaala Hiwoot Faanaa doorsisni poolisootaan nurra gahaa jiru tajaajila fayyaa bifa tasgabbayeen kennuu nu hanqise jedhuun komatu. Mothers of Oromo students crying for their lost sons and daughters killed by TPLF snipers http://dhaamsaogeetti13.wordpress.com/2014/05/03/in-review-photos-from-the-oromoprotests-against-the-addis-ababa-master-plan-and-for-the-rights-of-oromiyaa-over-finfinne-03-05-14/https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ndJ1NE0qV_Mhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkQyKa4JP2chttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z3_AWytE16g
BREAKING NEWS: MASS ARREST AND KILLING OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS!!!
The recent plan to partition Finfine (Addis Ababa) by the current regime has received a single, united and resounding NO from Oromo’s all across the globe. Ethiopia’s plan to partition large portions of land that belongs to Oromo’s in a pseudo-quasi excuse of expanding the capital city is not only unlawful, but an unprecedented move. The Ethiopian constitution, although vague and widely disapproved by citizens grants special interest to the state of Oromia in regards to administrative and resource management in the capital city. However, the government has chosen to ignore the interests of Oromo’s, the state of Oromia, and its own constitution with its unprecedented move to dislocate thousands of Oromo’s in the interest of expanding the capital city. Not only does this violate Ethiopia’s own constitution, but that of many globally accepted governing bodies. According to Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the in¬terest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” Furthermore, article 21 (2) states, “In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.” The current regime has broken its own law as well as that of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Ironically, Finfine is home to the African Union, however, the unelected and dictatorial regime continues to unjustifiably remove Oromo’s mostly peasants who depend on the land for livelihood from surrounding areas in Finfine. The African Union must stand in unison with Oromo’s, lawful owners of the land and hold the Ethiopian regime to account for breaking the Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Otherwise, what is the purpose of such organization if it cannot legally protect disenfranchised citizens from aggression of unelected and illegitimate government? In addition to AU’s Charter, globally accepted governing norms dictate the Ethiopian regime has broken international laws far too many times. The latest one should be the last if the world legitimately expects the Oromo people and other ethnic groups throughout Ethiopia to live in peace without fear of losing life, liberty, and property. According to one of the most recognized governing bodies in the world, the United Nations in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “1. everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her] property.” Given this UN declaration as well as that of the African Union’s Charter, the Oromo’s are not only legitimate owners of the land, but should legally be entitled to protection from these governing bodies. These governing bodies are obligated to STOP the mass discrimination, injustice, and growing inequality toward Oromo’s and should immediately put in place mechanism to protect over 40 million Oromo’s. After all, the language Oromiffa is the fourth widely spoken language in Africa, which suggests the depth of Oromo population. Oromo’s have been victimized for far too long and can no longer remain silent, so it is in the international community’s interest and obligation to step in and mitigate this matter before further escalation. In addition to violating the rights of land owners, Ethiopia continues to further disregard human rights. In a widely condemned move, the regime has sent armed federal troops to Universities across the country to suppress the voices of countless students who are peacefully protesting the partition plan. Countless students have been beaten, arrested, and 8 have been confirmed dead, a number that is expected to sharply increase as crackdown on peaceful protesters intensifies. Government officials who ordered armed federal troops to open fire on innocent protesters should be brought to justice. This is a heinous crime against humanity. The mere fact the Ethiopian regime has no regard for its young citizenry is a concern that should cause individuals and governments all over the world to openly condemn and unequivocally voice their grave concern! Oromo’s have been victims at the hands of various Ethiopian regimes for nearly a century. However, in this day and age where social media has proven it can topple dictatorships like the recent Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, we the people can bring about change with a united and resounding voice of disapproval for the current unelected regime. Oromo’s have suffered enough under brutal regimes and more than 23 years of power for a single party is beyond ample time, in fact it is quite absurd by western standards, therefore, immediate change of government is not only necessary, but a must to end all atrocities! Therefore, those in the west who enjoy unparalleled freedom must speak up for over 45,000 voiceless Oromo’s languishing in Ethiopia’s inhumane prisons, current students suffering for voicing their concern, and the mass number of Oromo’s who are forced to vacate their ancestral land. Whether one voices their opinion through social media, by word of mouth, letters to elected officials, or simply contacting international media’s like CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera etc… we must exercise our right to voice our opinion. Innocent students were brutally beat and killed for simply exercising their inherent right guaranteed by UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a right those in the west so often take for granted. Thus, silence is no longer an option, let us all unite to support Oromo students, prisoners, and landowners throughout Ethiopia! http://www.oromotv.com/breaking-news-mass-arrest-and-killing-of-university-students-3/https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=h4STfZRg_28
Massacre of Peaceful Demonstrators- Perpetual Habit of TPLF Regime
OLF Press Release The level of repression and exploitation exacted by the successive regimes of Ethiopia on the subject peoples under their rule in general and the Oromo people in particular has been so unbearable that the people are in constant revolt. It has also been the case that, instead of providing peaceful resolution to a demand peacefully raised, the successive regimes have opted to violently suppress by daylight massacre, detention and torture, looting, evicting and forcing them to leave the country. Hundreds of students have been dismissed from their learning institutions. This revolt, spearheaded by the Oromo youth in general and the students in particular, has currently transformed into an Oromia wide total popular uprising. The response of the regime has, however, remained the same except this time adding the fashionable camouflage pretext of terrorism and heightened intensity of the repression. This has been the case in Ambo, Madda Walabou, Dambi Doolloo, Naqamte, Geedoo, Horroo Guduruu, Baalee and Ciroo in Oromia; and Maqalee in Tigray as well Gojjam in Amhara region, by the direct order from the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders in the last 22 years. Tens of peaceful demonstrators, including children under the age of 10, have been massacred in Ambo, Madda Walabou yesterday April 30, 2014. Hand grenades have been deliberately thrown on student demonstrators in Ambo and Haramaya Universities causing several death and serious wounds. More have been detained. Indiscriminate severe beating, including elderly, women and children by Federal Police and militia, is widespread. The OLF condemns the perpetration of these atrocities and holds, the Prime Minister of the regime, the army, federal police and security chiefs, directly responsible for these crimes selectively targeting the Oromo, who peacefully presented their legitimate demands. The OLF renews its call on the Oromo nationals who are serving in the armed forces of this regime not only to refrain from partaking in this crime against their parents, siblings and children; but also to resist and stand in defense of their kin and kith and other civilians. We call upon the Oromo people both inside and outside the country, to realize that we have been pushed to the limit. The only way out of this and to redeem the agony visited upon us for the past is to fight back in unison. We specially call upon you in the Diaspora to act on behalf of your brethren, who are under siege, and urge the nations who host you to discharge their responsibility as government and a community of human beings towards the long suffering Oromo and other peoples under the criminal TPLF regime. We urge again and again that the international community, human rights and organizations and governments for democracy to use their influence and do all they can to stop the ongoing atrocity against the Oromo people. Failure to act immediately will be tantamount to condoning. Victory to the Oromo People! Oromo Liberation Front May 01, 2014
Latest News: Godina Wallaggaa lixaa aan aa Ganjii Mana barum saa sadarkaa lammaff aa Ganjii Ganjii kee ssatti Barattootni H iriira gaggeessun dh aadannoo dhageessisu u irratti argamu
Witnesses say Ethiopian police have killed at least 17 protesters during demonstrations in Ethiopia’s Oromia region against plans to annex territory to expand the capital, Addis Ababa. Authorities put the protest-related death toll at 11 and have not said how the demonstrators were killed. The main opposition party says 17 people were killed while witnesses and residents say the death toll is much higher. Residents say that an elite government security force opened fire on protesters at three university campuses. The demonstrations erupted last week against plans by the Ethiopian government to incorporate part of Oromia into the capital. Oromia is Ethiopia’s largest region and Oromos are the country’s largest ethnic group. Oromos say the government wants to weaken their political power. They say expanding the capital threatens the local language, which is not taught in Addis Ababa schools. – VOA Newshttp://gadaa.com/oduu/25780/2014/05/02/voa-deadly-protests-in-ethiopia-over-plans-to-expand-capital/#.U2PO0unJ7BY.facebookhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=nQ3x0L9wfpUhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=821Ijw2GoXM Partial lists of Oromo students of Adama University kidnapped by Agazi and the whereabouts are not know: as of 3rd May 2014 Barattoota University Adaamaa Kaleessa Guyyaa 5/1/2014 Mana Hidhaatti Guuran Keessaa Kan Ammaaf Maqaa Isaanii Arganne Armaan Gaditti Laalaa…
The AU Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Anthony Maruping, told journalists in Malabo on Monday that the Fund would work to correct balances of payment positions across Africa.
He said such positions were mainly caused by low export of commodities and high import volumes which exerted negative burden on currency stability.
The AMF would be established to basically help to tackle macro-economic matters in Africa, he added.
The commissioner said, “It is not true that there has been an economic leadership gap in Africa. We are creating an African institution because the UN Economic Commission for Africa is a global body.”
Mr. Maruping said the Fund was expected to create proper lending system in Africa to correct imbalance in payments within the continent and ensure exchange rate stability.
“It will also work toward African currency convertibility, ensuring that currencies across Africa can be exchangeable. The Fund will promote monetary cooperation on the continent and speed up economic development. To achieve these objectives, the Fund will design formulas to lower the debt burden and other debt management policies in Africa and facilitate development of the African financial markets,” he said.
The AU official said the Fund would have an authorised share capital denomination of $100 (N16,285) per share with a callable share capital of 50 per cent of the authorised share capital, which is $11.32 (N1,845).
The paid up share capital would be at least 50 per cent of the callable share capital $5.66 billion (N922 billion) denominated in $100, he added.
He said South Africa was expected to get the highest allocation of the 500,000 shares, with an 8.05 per share, translating into nearly $1billion (N163 billion), followed by Nigeria at 7.94 per cent, translating into $899 million (N16 billion) in capital contributions.
Egypt, Africa’s third largest economy, was expected to subscribe for 6.12 per cent of the shares, contributing $693 million (N112 billion), followed by Algeria, to be allocated 4.59 per cent of the shares at $520 million (N84 billion).
Each country was expected to pay for its subscription at once or in four instalments of 25 per cent of the amount and payment period would last between the initial four years and eight years.
The first payment is expected 60 days after the AMF treaty enters force.
The countries are also allowed to issue bonds in U.S. dollars which are non-interest earning.
The Fund would invest in international financial markets and expected to maintain a sound credit rating.
The AMF will be based in Yaounde, Cameroon.
(PANA/NAN)
See also The Creation of the African Monetary Fund @ http://openanthropology.org/libya/AUamf.pdf
‘Poverty is not merely going hungry; it means lack of resources like land or education to make out a living; means lack of employment; means lack of access to some basic needs of life like health services, education, food etc., means lack of voice to be heard and ability to influence the formulation of policies or implementation of programs by the government.
Poverty may also be understood as an aspect of unequal social status and inequitable social relationships, experienced as social exclusion, dependency, and diminished capacity to participate, or to develop meaningful connections with other people in society. This is of considerable relevance to the Indian situation. …Dominant sections of ethnicity in the society controls the political conditions and assets, depriving the marginalized from having access to these economic assets. ‘
Definition : Poverty is a situation where the individual or community lack the resources, ability to meet the basic needs of life.
Relative Poverty: Refers to lacking a usual or socially acceptable level of resources or income as compared with others within a society or country.
Penury : Extreme poverty.
Absolute Poverty: is destitution wherein one lacks basic human needs including clean water, food, clothing, shelter, health cover and education.
The World Bank defines poverty in absolute terms. According to them, the poverty is classified into:
Extreme Poverty : Living on less than US $1.25 per day
Moderate Poverty : Living on less than US $2 a day
Self-determination “denotes the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order,” the Legal Information Institute.
This right was enshrined in international law with its inclusion in the UN Charter in 1945. Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is: “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, this was made even more explicit: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
For people deprived of equal rights and political participation, self-determination could take many forms: independence, assimilation, sovereign association, or another form they choose for themselves. But no one has a right to self-determination at the expense of someone else.
“It is well known that any attempt to deny a human group its self-determination only intensifies its demand for sovereignty and enhances its collective identity,” writes Shlomo Sand in The Invention of the Jewish People. “This does not, of course, give a particular group that sees itself as a people the right to dispossess another group of its land in order to achieve its self-determination.
Self-determination is not just a utopian ideal. It is a legal right. The contents of the UN Charter and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
There is an name for ruling over people while preventing them from being part of the political process that governs their lives. It’s called colonialism, In international law, it is a crime against humanity.
see more @ https://alethonews.wordpress.com/…/the-persistent-u-s-oppo…/
Self determination (international law)
Self-determination denotes the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order. Self-determination is a core principle of international law, arising from customary international law, but also recognized as a general principle of law, and enshrined in a number of international treaties. For instance, self-determination is protected in the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a right of “all peoples.”
The scope and purpose of the principle of self-determination has evolved significantly in the 20th century. In the early 1900’s, international support grew for the right of all people to self-determination. This led to successful secessionist movements during and after WWI, WWII and laid the groundwork for decolonization in the 1960s.
Contemporary notions of self-determination usually distinguish between “internal” and “external” self-determination, suggesting that “self-determination” exists on a spectrum. Internal self-determination may refer to various political and social rights; by contrast, external self-determination refers to full legal independence/secession for the given ‘people’ from the larger politico-legal state.
See, e.g.:
Independence of Kosovo (from Serbia), advisory proceedings currently pending before the ICJ.
Independence of Abhkazia (from Georgia).
See also:
uti possidetis juris, requiring the maintenance of the territorial status quo to preserve stability, order and traditional legal boundaries (and hence possibly conflicting with principle of self-determination) (Burkina Faso/Mali, ¶¶25-26, pp.16-17 (“At first sight this principle [UPJ] conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples to self-determination.”)
Sir Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web and founder of the Web Foundation, has called for the Internet to be recognised as a basic human right. Sir Tim noted that in our increasingly unequal world, the Web has the potential to be a great equalizer, but only “if we hardwire the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, affordable access and net neutrality into the rules of the game.”
In order to reverse this slide and leverage the power of technology to fight inequality, the Web Foundation is calling on policymakers to:
Accelerate progress towards universal access by increasing access to affordable Internet and ensuring that everyone can use the Web all of the time, safely, freely and privately.
Level the playing field by preventing price discrimination in Internet traffic, and treating the Internet like any other public utility.
Invest in high-quality public education for all to ensure that technological progress doesn’t leave some groups behind.
Promote participation in democracy and protect freedom of opinion by reversing the erosion of press freedom and civil liberties, using the Web to increase government transparency, and protecting the freedoms of speech, association, and privacy.
Create opportunities for women and poor and marginalised groups by investing more in ICTs to overcome key barriers in health, education, agriculture and gender equity.
ETHIOPIA, The Gambia and Sudan are some of the most repressive places in Africa for online freedom, a new report by watchdog organisation Freedom House indicates, while South Africa and Kenya are the among the most free for internet users in the continent.
But the 12 African countries surveyed show a worrying trend – the majority are becoming more repressive compared to last year. Just South Africa – the best ranked – Kenya, Uganda and Malawi have maintained the same score as last year; Nigeria, Angola, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Ethiopia have deteriorated. Zambia and The Gambia are new entrants on the list this year.
The negative trajectory in internet freedom is mirrored around the world – the report states that in 36 of the 65 countries surveyed, internet freedom scores have become worse, as governments become increasingly nervous about their national security, and more sophisticated in surveillance and control.
“Very few countries registered any gains in internet freedom, and the improvements that were recorded largely reflected less vigorous application of existing internet controls compared with the previous year, rather than genuinely new and positive steps taken [by governments],” the report states.
Although most African countries do not explicitly censor content much, there has been an increasingly harsh manner in which users are targeted for the things they say online – in some countries, Freedom House reports, “the penalties for online expression are worse than those for similar actions offline”.
A higher score means a more repressive environment. Source: Freedom House
In July 2013, for example, the Gambian government passed amendments to the Information and Communication Act that specifically criminalised the use of the internet to criticise, impersonate, or spread false news about public officials. Anyone found guilty could face up to 15 years in prison, fines of roughly $100,000, or both—significantly harsher punishments than what the criminal code prescribes for the equivalent offenses offline.
The report reveals that breaches in cybersecurity are also eroding freedom, as government critics and human rights organisations are subject to increasingly sophisticated and personalised malware attacks, documented in 32 of the 65 countries examined.
Low internet penetration, state monopoly
Ethiopia comes out as the worst place in Africa for internet freedom. In the first place, lack of telecoms infrastructure, government monopoly and oppressive regulation means that internet penetration is just 2%, one of the lowest in Africa.
A law enacted in November 2013 gives the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) carte blanche to inspect private online activities without oversight. Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, and CNN were inaccessible for 12 hours in July 2013, while the number of permanently blocked webpages also increased.
In the Gambia, as well as setting out punitive new laws, internet cafe registration regulations were tightened in September 2013, requiring operators to provide thorough details for a license, as well as mandating the physical layout of cafes and the signs that must be displayed.
In Nigeria too, cybercafés have to keep a log of their customers – although the mobile revolution means that these attempts at controlling internet use will become increasingly irrelevant.
But if you can’t control access, then persecution and punishment becomes the next measure – and African governments show remarkable sophistication here.
In Ethiopia, the government launched high-tech surveillance malware against several online journalists in the Ethiopian diaspora and dissidents in exile; six bloggers of the prominent Zone9 blogging collective were arrested in April 2014 on charges of terrorism.
This year shows a more repressive environment than last year in many countries. Source: Freedom House
The same was observed in Angola, where “insider sources” affirmed that a German company had assisted the Angolan military intelligence in installing a sophisticated communications monitoring system on a military base, the report states. Further evidence, as of November 2013, found that at least one major ISP hosts a spyware system directly on its server.
In Rwanda, a growing number of independent online news outlets and opposition blogs were intermittently inaccessible in Rwanda in the past year. The Law Relating to the Interception of Communications enacted in October authorised high-ranking security officials to monitor email and telephone conversations of individuals considered potential threats to “public security”.
In Sudan, a localised internet service disruption in June and a nationwide blackout in September corresponded with large anti-government protests; the blackouts were reportedly directed by the government.
Even in the countries ranked as relatively free, harassment and intimidation of journalists and bloggers – and even ordinary citizens – is a widespread form of internet control. In Malawi online journalists are “periodically detained and prosecuted for articles posted on news websites”.
Most recently, Justice Mponda, a correspondent for the online publication Malawi Voice, was arrested in November 2013 for allegedly “intimidating the royal family” in an investigative story about former President Banda’s connection to the theft of millions of Malawian kwacha from government coffers in a scandal known as “Cashgate.” He was later acquitted.
Mugabe’s digital ‘death’
But it’s Zimbabwe that has had some of the most bizarre persecutions. An editor at the Sunday Mail state newspaper, Edmund Kudakwashe Kudzayi, was arrested in June on accusations of running the Baba Jukwa Facebook account, an activist page of over half a million followers harshly critical of the government. In July, the government took down the facebook page, and Kudzayi’s case remains unresolved.
It gets crazier – in January 2014, teenage Facebook user Gumisai Manduwa was arrested for allegedly insulting the president after he posted on his Facebook page that President Mugabe “had died and was being preserved in a freezer.” Manduwa was released on bail two days after his arrest. His case remains on the court’s docket as of mid-2014.
And another court case, this one against 21-year old Shantel Rusike is still being dragged through the magistrate courts in Bulawayo as of mid-2014.
Rusike was arrested on December 24, 2012 and held for four days after she was reported to the police for sending an image depicting President Mugabe “in a nude state” via WhatsApp on her mobile phone. Rusike faces charges of “causing hatred, contempt or ridicule of the president”.
Ethiopia
2013 2014
Internet Freedom Status Not Free Not Free
Obstacles to Access (0-25) 22 23
Limits on Content (0-35) 28 28
Violations of User Rights (0-40) 29 29
TOTAL* (0-100) 79 80
* 0=most free, 100=least free
Population: 89.2 million
Internet Penetration 2013: 2 percent
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes
Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes
Press Freedom 2014 Status: Not Free Key Developments: May 2013 – May 2014
• Telecom services worsened, characterized by frequently dropped phone calls, prolonged internet service interruptions, and slow response times to service failures (see Obstacles to Access).
• Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, and CNN were inaccessible for 12 hours in July 2013, while the
number of permanently blocked webpages also increased (see Limits on Content).
• A law enacted in November 2013 gives the Information Network Security Agency (INSA)
carte blanche to inspect private online activities without oversight (see Violations of User
Rights).
• The government launched sophisticated surveillance malware against several online journalists
in the Ethiopian diaspora and dissidents in exile (see Violations of User Rights).
• Six bloggers of the prominent Zone9 blogging collective were arrested in April 2014 on
charges of terrorism (see Violations of User Rights).
Introduction
Ethiopia continues to have one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile phone connectivity in the world, as meager infrastructure, government monopoly over the telecommunications sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the country. Coupled with highly repressive laws and tactics aimed at restricting freedom of expression and access to information, internet freedom in Ethiopia is consistently rated the worst in sub-Saharan Africa and among the worst in the world.
Despite the country’s extremely poor telecommunications services and a largely disconnected population, Ethiopia is also known as one of the first African countries to censor the internet, beginning in 2006 with opposition blogs.1. Since then, internet censorship has become pervasive and systematic through the use of highly sophisticated tools that block and filter internet content and monitor user activity. The majority of blocked websites feature critical news and opposition viewpoints run by individuals and organizations based mostly in the diaspora. Surveillance of mobile phone and internet networks is systematic and widespread, enabled by Chinese-made technology that allows for the interception of SMS text messages, recording of phone calls, and centralized monitoring of online activities. The government also employs commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape.
During the report’s coverage period, internet freedom in Ethiopia worsened due to increasing restrictions on access to social media and communications tools, such as Storify, and the temporary blocking of Facebook and Twitter in July 2013. A new law passed in November 2013 gave the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) carte blanche to track private online communications and investigate electronic devices without oversight. In addition, a number of diaspora journalists and exiled dissidents were targeted with surveillance malware, demonstrating a growing level of sophistication in the government’s effort to silence critical voices that extends beyond the country’s borders.
In 2014, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown against bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and quash dissent. Most alarmingly, six bloggers from the critical Zone9 blogging collective and three journalists associated with Zone9 were arrested in late April 2014 on charges of terrorism, which, under the Telecom Fraud Offenses Law and anti-terrorism proclamation, can entail a sentence of up to 20 years in prison if the bloggers are found guilty. The Zone9 case was repeatedly stalled by the courts throughout 2014, leaving the bloggers in pre-trial detention for over six months as of late-2014. Meanwhile, two online radio journalists were arrested and detained for a week without charges in August 2013, and the prominent dissident blogger, Eskinder Nega, and award-winning journalist, Reeyot Alemu, continue to serve lengthy prison sentences, despite international pressure for their release. The overall crackdown has had a major chilling effect on internet freedom and freedom of expression in the country, leading to increasing levels of self-censorship among online journalists, bloggers, and ordinary users alike.
Obstacles to Access
In 2013 and 2014, access to ICTs in Ethiopia remained extremely limited, hampered by slow speeds and the state’s tight grip on the telecom sector. According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), internet penetration stood at a mere 1.9 percent in 2013, up from 1.5 percent in 2012. Only 0.25 percent of the population had access to fixed-broadband internet, increasing from 0.01 percent in 2012.Ethiopians had more access to mobile phone services, with mobile phone penetration rates increasing from 22 percent in 2012 to 27 percent in 2013 though such access rates still lag behind a regional average of 80 percent. Meanwhile, less than 5 percent of the population has a mobile-broadband subscription. Radio remains the principal mass medium through which most Ethiopians stay informed. While access to the internet via mobile phones increased slightly in the last year, prohibitively expensive mobile data packages still posed a significant financial obstacle for the majority of the population in Ethiopia, where per capita income in 2013 stood at US$470.8 Ethiopia’s telecom market is very unsaturated due to monopolistic control, providing customers with few options at arbitrary prices. Prices are set by the state-controlled Ethio Telecom and kept artificially high. As of mid-2014, monthly packages cost between ETB 200 and 3,000 (US$10 to $150) for 1 to 30 GB of 3G mobile services.
The computer remains the most practical option for going online, though in 2014, personal computers are still prohibitively expensive. The combined cost of purchasing a computer, initiating an internet connection, and paying usage charges makes internet access beyond the reach of most Ethiopians. Consequently, only 2 percent of Ethiopian households had internet access in their homes in 2013. The majority of internet users rely on cybercafes to log online, leading to a growth of
cybercafes in recent years, particularly in large cities. A typical internet user in Addis Ababa pays between ETB 5 and 7 (US$0.25 to $0.35) for an hour of access. Because of the scarcity of internet cafes outside urban areas, however, rates in rural cybercafes are more expensive.
For the few Ethiopians who can access the internet, connection speeds are known to be painstakingly slow. For years, logging into an email account and opening a single message could take as long as six minutes at a standard cybercafe with broadband in the capital city.12 According to May 2014 data from Akamai’s “State of the Internet” report, Ethiopia has an average connection speed of 1.2 Mbps (compared to a global average of 3.9 Mbps). Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s broadband adoption (characterized by connection speeds greater than 4 Mbps) is less than 3 percent,14 while the country’s narrowband adoption (connection speed below 256 Kbps) is about 20 percent among those with access. Numerous users reported that internet and text messaging speeds were extremely slow during the coverage period, with services completely unavailable at times. Frequent electricity outages are also a contributing factor to poor telecom services. Despite reports of massive investments from Chinese telecom companies in recent years,17 Ethiopia’s telecommunications infrastructure is among the least developed in Africa and is almost entirely absent from rural areas, where about 85 percent of the population resides. The country is connected to the international internet via satellite, a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to its international gateway, and the SEACOM cable that connects through Djibouti to an international undersea cable. In an effort to expand connectivity, the government has reportedly installed several
thousand kilometers of fiber-optic cable throughout the country over the past few years. Construction of the East African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) was completed and launched in July 2010, but its effects on Ethiopia have yet to be seen as of mid-2014. The space for independent initiatives in the ICT sector, entrepreneurial or otherwise, is extremely
limited, with state-owned Ethio Telecom holding a firm monopoly over internet and mobile phone services in the country. Consequently, all connections to the international internet are completely centralized via Ethio Telecom, enabling the government to cut off the internet at will. As a result, the internet research company Renesys classified Ethiopia “as being at severe risk of Internet disconnection,” alongside Syria, Uzbekistan, and Yemen in a February 2014 assessment. During the coverage period, one Renesys report found that 40 percent of Ethiopia’s networks were down for a few hours on July 18, 2013 as a result of a disruption on the SEACOM network, though the exact reason for the disruption was unknown. In September 2013, a number of cybercafe owners in Ethiopia reported an increasing trend of unpredictable internet connections and speeds beginning in June that resulted in a significant decline in business, with internet connections reported as unavailable for up to 15 days in a month. Mobile phone networks—also completely centralized under Ethio Telecom—are similarly vulnerable to service disruptions and shutdowns by the government, which often occur during politically sensitive times. During the coverage period, there were frequent reports of dropped cell phone and landline calls, complete network blackouts in many parts of the country, and overlapping voices in calls. The latter phenomenon led people to suspect government engagement in a widespread eavesdropping scheme (see “Violations of User Rights” for details on surveillance). Meanwhile, cybercafes are subject to onerous requirements under the 2002 Telecommunications
(Amendment) Proclamation, which requires cybercafe owners to obtain an operating license with Ethio Telecom via a murky process that can take months. During the coverage period, Ethio Telecom began enforcing its licensing requirements more strictly in response to the increasing spread of cybercafes, reportedly penalizing Muslim cafe owners more harshly. Violations of the stringent requirements, such as a prohibition on providing Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services, entail criminal liability. Despite repeated international pressure to liberalize telecommunications in Ethiopia, the government
has not eased its grip on the sector. In June 2013, the prime minister publicly affirmed that the government would maintain a monopoly over the country’s telecoms. In the meantime, China has emerged as a key investor and contractor in Ethiopia’s telecommunications industry, and in July 2013, the government signed a US$1.6 billion agreement with the Chinese telecom companies,
Zhongxing Telecommunication Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei, to upgrade its broadband network to 4G in Addis Ababa and expand 3G across the country. The networks built by the Chinese firms have been criticized for their high costs and poor service, though the partnership has enabled Ethiopia’s authoritarian leaders to maintain their hold over the telecom sector. Furthermore, the contracts have led to increasing fears that the Chinese may also be assisting the authorities in developing more robust internet and mobile phone censorship and surveillance capacities.
The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA) and the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA) are the primary regulatory bodies overseeing the telecommunications sector. These two organizations were established as autonomous federal agencies, but both are highly controlled government bodies. Limits on Content
During the coverage period, over a hundred websites remained inaccessible in Ethiopia, with a greater number of online tools and services targeted for blocking. A June 2014 report affirmed the government’s efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online.
The Ethiopian government imposes nationwide, politically motivated internet blocking and filtering that tends to tighten ahead of sensitive political events. The majority of blocked websites are those that feature opposition or critical content run by individuals or organizations based in the country or the diaspora. The government’s approach to internet filtering generally entails hindering access to a list of specific internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the Ethio Telecom-controlled international gateway. A more sophisticated strategy of blocking websites based on a keyword in the URL path, known as deep-packet inspection (DPI), was detected in May 2012 when the Tor network—an online tool that enables users to browse anonymously—was blocked. In January 2014, an independent test conducted by a researcher based in the country found 120 unique URLs that were inaccessible in the country, 62 of which were Ethiopian news websites, 14 of which were political party websites, of which were blogs, and 7 of which were television and online
radio websites. During the test, some websites opened at the first attempt but were inaccessible when refreshed. The test also found that select tools and services on Google’s Android operating system on smart phones were inaccessible at irregular intervals but for unclear reasons. A separate test on over 1,400 URLs between July and August 2013 by the OpenNet Initiative in partnership withHuman Rights Watch similarly found 62 websites blocked altogether and numerous others intermittently inaccessible. International news outlets were increasingly targeted for censorship. Al Arabiya, a Saudi Arabia-based media outlet, and both of Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English websites were intermittently blocked during the coverage period. In July 2013, websites belonging to Yahoo and CNN were reportedly inaccessible for about 12 hours. Facebook and Twitter were also targets of the short-term July 2013 blocking. There was no evident impetus or reason for the short-term blocking, and other major services such as Gmail and new outlets such as the New York Times remained accessible. Nevertheless, the incident further increased worries over reports of government plans to block popular social media tools completely. Facebook and Twitter platforms were otherwise generally accessible, although some individual Facebook groups belonging to opposition individuals remained blocked altogether, particularly when accessed via the unencrypted (http://) URL pathway. Meanwhile, the social media curation tool Storify—first blocked in July 201241—remained blocked during the coverage period, while the URL shortening tool Bit.ly was inexplicably blocked in late 2013.
In the past few years, the authorities have become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, electing to block select webpages as opposed to entire websites. Critical online news articles are usually targeted, such as an August 2012 Forbes article titled, “Requiem for a Reprobate Ethiopian Tyrant Should Not Be Lionized,” which was blocked for criticizing the local and global praise of the former prime minister’s debatable economic growth achievements; the article remained blocked as of June 2014.44 A July 2013 YouTube video of the anti government Muslim protests that occurred from 2012-13 was also blocked as of late 2013.
International blog-hosting platforms such as Blogspot have been frequently blocked since the disputed parliamentary elections of 2005, during which the opposition used online communication tools to organize and disseminate information that was critical of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. In 2007, the government instituted a blanket block on the domainnames of two popular blog-hosting websites, Blogspot and Nazret, though the authorities have
since become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, now blocking select pages such as the Zone9 independent blog hosted on Blogspot, as opposed to the entire blogging platform. Nazret, however, remained completely blocked as of June 2014. Circumvention strategies have also been targeted, with the term “proxy” yielding no search results on Google, according to an independent source. Meanwhile, the terms “sex” or “porn” are still searchable.
In addition to increasing blocks of online content, politically objectionable content is often targeted for removal, often by way of threats from security officials who personally seek out users and bloggers to instruct them to take down certain content, particularly critical content on Facebook. The growing practice suggests that at least some voices within Ethiopia’s small online community are being closely monitored. Some restrictions are also placed on mobile phones, such as the requirement for a text message to obtain prior approval from Ethio Telecom if it is to be sent to more than ten recipients. A bulk text message sent without prior approval is automatically blocked. There are no procedures for determining which websites are blocked or why, which precludes any avenues for appeal. There are no published lists of blocked websites or publicly available criteria for how such decisions are made, and users are met with an error message when trying to access
blocked content. This lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s continued denial of its censorship efforts. Meanwhile, the decision-making process does not appear to be controlled by a single entity, as various government bodies—including the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), Ethio Telecom, and the ministry of ICT—seem to be implementing their own lists, contributing to a phenomenon of inconsistent blocking. Lack of adequate funding is a significant challenge for independent online media in Ethiopia, as fear of government pressure dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites. Local newspapers and web outlets receive their news and information from regime critics and opposition organizations in the diaspora. While the domestic Ethiopian blogosphere has been expanding, most blogging activity on Ethiopian issues still originates in the diaspora. Few Ethiopian journalists work for both the domestic print media and overseas online outlets due to the threat of repercussions. Increasing repression against journalists and bloggers has had a major chilling effect on expression online, particularly following the arrest of the Zone9 bloggers in April 2014 (see “Violations of User Rights”). Fear of pervasive surveillance has led to widespread self-censorship, and many bloggers publish anonymously to avoid reprisals. Notably, users on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter seem to practice a lower degree of self-censorship, which may be due to poor awareness of privacy settings, or the perception that posts on social media are anonymous or more secure. Despite extremely low levels of internet access, the authorities employ progovernment commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape. Acrimonious exchanges between commentators on apologist websites and an array of diaspora critics and opposition figures have become common in online political debates. There was a noticeable increase in the number of progovernment commentators during the coverage period, as confirmed in a June 2014 report by the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT) that detailed the government’s efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online. According to the ESAT report, hundreds of bloggers who report directly to government officials had been trained on how to post progovernment comments and criticize antigovernment articles on social media platforms. As the country prepares for the upcoming 2015 National Election, the state media has stepped up its campaign against the press in general and the use of social media in particular, claiming that foreign agents and terrorists are using social media to destabilize the country. Consequently, many civil society groups based in the country are wary of mobilizing against the government, and calls for protest come mostly from the Ethiopian diaspora rather than from local activists who fear the government’s violent crackdowns against protest movements. Nevertheless, over the past few years, Facebook has become one of the most popular mediums through which Ethiopians share and consume information. Social media services have also become significant platforms for political deliberation and social justice campaigns. For example, in September 2013, a group of young Ethiopian bloggers and activists based in Addis Ababa launched a Facebook and Twitter campaign on the occasion of Ethiopia’s New Year celebration to share their vision of a better Ethiopia, using the hashtag #EthiopianDream.52 In November 2013, Ethiopians responded to the Saudi government’s crackdown on undocumented Ethiopian immigrants in Saudi Arabia by organizing the online campaign, #SomeoneTellSaudiArabia, to protest the abusive treatment of Ethiopian immigrants. Netizen activism was particularly pronounced and widespread following the arrest of six Zone9 bloggers and three journalists for their alleged affiliation with the Zone9 collective (see “Violations of User Rights”). Ethiopian bloggers and social media users flocked online to spread the #FreeZone-9Bloggers hashtag in a campaign that quickly swept across the social media sphere and garnered
widespread support from around the world. Within five days, the #FreeZone9Bloggers hashtag had been tweeted more than 8,000 times. Unfortunately, the international campaign elicited no response from the government, and the imprisoned bloggers and journalists are still awaiting trial on charges of terrorism as of late-2014.
Violations of User Rights
During the coverage period, the Ethiopian government’s already limited space for online expression continued to deteriorate alongside its poor treatment of journalists. A new proclamation passed in November 2013 empowered INSA with sweeping surveillance capabilities without judicial oversight. Sophisticated malware was launched against online radio journalists and dissidents in exile, while repression against bloggers and ICT users in the country increased notably. Six bloggers of the critical Zone9 blogging collective were arrested for their alleged terrorist activities. The 1995 Ethiopian constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and access to information, while also prohibiting censorship. These constitutional guarantees are affirmed in the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, known as the press law, which also provides certain protections for media workers, such as prohibiting the pre-trial detention of journalists. Nevertheless, the press law also includes problematic provisions that contradict constitutional protections and restrict free expression. For example, media outlets are required to obtain licenses to operate through an onerous registration process that applies to all outlets, regardless of size, though it is uncertain whether the press law’s broad language encompasses online media. Penalties for violating the registration requirement and other restrictions on content, such as defamation, involve high fines and up to two and three years in prison, respectively.
In September 2012, the government codified specific restrictions on various telecommunications activities through the passage of the Telecom Fraud Offences law, which revised a 1996 law that had placed bans on certain communication applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)60— including Skype and Google Voice—call back services, and internet-based fax services. Under the new law, the penalties under the preexisting ban were toughened, increasing the fine and maximum prison sentence from five to eight years for offending service providers, and penalizing users with
three months to two years in prison. The law also added the requirement for all individuals to register their telecommunications equipment—including smart phones—with the government, which security officials typically enforce by confiscating ICT equipment when a registration permit cannot be furnished at security checkpoints, according to sources in the country.
Most alarmingly, the Telecom Fraud Offences law extended the violations and penalties defined in the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and 2004 Criminal Code to electronic communications, which are broadly defined yet explicitly include both mobile phone and internet services. The anti-terrorism legislation prescribes prison sentences of up to 20 years for the publication of statements that can be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism, vaguely defined.64 Meanwhile, the criminal code holds any “author, originator or publisher” criminally liable for content allegedly linked to offenses such as treason, espionage, or incitement, which carries with it the penalty of up to life imprisonment or death. The criminal code also penalizes the publication of a “false rumor” with up to three years in prison. In 2014, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown against bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and silence dissent. Most alarmingly, six bloggers from the critical Zone9 blogging collective and three journalists associated with Zone9 were arrested in late April 2014 on charges of terrorism. They were accused of “working with foreign organizations that claim to be human rights activists… and receiving finance to
incite public violence through social media,” though the arrests had occurred just days following Zone9’s Facebook post announcing plans to resume its activism. The blogging collective had been inactive for seven months as a result of “a considerable amount of surveillance and harassment” the bloggers had suffered at the hands of security agents for their writings and social media activism. Despite widespread international condemnation of the Zone9 arrests, the detainees were denied bail in August and remained in jail as of fall 2014, awaiting trial. Meanwhile, the well-known dissident journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega is still carrying out an 18-year prison sentence handed down in July 2012 under the anti-terrorism law. Numerous other journalists and media outlets—both online and print—were targeted for arrest and prosecutions during the coverage period, including Darsema Sori and Khalid Mohammed who were arrested in August 2013 for their work with the online radio station, Radio Bilal, which is known for its extensive coverage of the 2012-13 anti government protests organized by Ethiopian Muslims.
They were released after being held for a week without charges,71 but the arrests were in keeping with the government’s concerted efforts to silence the protests. Given the high degree of online repression in Ethiopia, some political commentators use proxy servers and anonymizing tools to hide their identities when publishing online and to circumvent filtering, though the ability to communicate anonymously has become more difficult. The Tor Network anonymizing tool was blocked in May 2012, confirming that the government has deployed deep-packet inspection technology, and Google searches of the term “proxy” mysteriously yield no results. Anonymity is further compromised by strict SIM card registration requirements. Upon purchase of a SIM card through Ethio Telecom or an authorized reseller, individuals must provide their full name, address, government-issued identification number, and a passport-sized photograph. Ethio Telecom’s database of SIM registrants enables the government to cut-off the SIM cards belonging to targeted individuals and to restrict those individuals from registering for new SIM cards. Internet subscribers are also required to register their personal details, including their home address, with the government. In 2013, an inside informant leaked worrying details of potential draft legislation that seeks to mandate real-name registration for all internet users in Ethiopia, though there are no further
details of this development as of mid-2014. Government surveillance of online and mobile phone communications is pervasive in Ethiopia, and evidence has emerged in recent years that reveal the scale of such practices. According to 2014
Human Rights Watch research, there are strong indications that the government has deployed a centralized monitoring system from the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE, known as ZXMT, to monitor phone lines and various types of communications, including mobile phone networks and the internet.73 Known for its use by repressive regimes in Libya and Iran, ZXMT enables deep-packet inspection (DPI) of internet traffic across the Ethio Telecom network and has the ability to intercept emails and web chats. Another ZTE technology, known as ZSmart, is a customer management database installed at Ethio Telecom that provides the government with full access to user information and the ability to intercept SMS text messages and record phone conversations. ZSmart also allows security officials to locate targeted individuals through real-time geolocation tracking of mobile phones. While the extent to which the government has made use of the full range of ZTE’s sophisticated surveillance systems is unclear, the authorities frequently present intercepted emails and phone calls as evidence during trials against journalists and bloggers or during interrogations as a scare tactic. In November 2013, a new Cyber Security Law expanded the surveillance powers of the Information Network Security Agency (INSA)—the government body established in 2011 to preside overcurity of the country’s critical communications infrastructure. According to reports, the law states that “social media outlets, blogs and other internet related media have great capabilities to instigate war, to damage the country’s image and create havoc in the economic atmosphere of the country”—
setting the logic for expanding INSA’s duties to include developing offensive cyber capabilities and ICT tools. The proclamation also empowers INSA to investigate computers, networks, internet, radio, television, and social media platforms “for any possible damage to the country’s social, economic, political and psychological well being.” INSA reportedly uses sophisticated spyware, such as the commercial toolkit FinFisher—a device that can secretly monitor computers by turning on webcams, record everything a user types with a key logger, and intercept Skype calls—to target dissidents and supposed threats. A leaked document confirmed that the UK-based company, Gamma International, had provided Ethio Telecom with the FinFisher surveillance toolkit at some point between April and July 2012.80 In addition, research conducted by Citizen Lab in March 2013 worryingly found evidence of an Ethio Telecom-initiated inSpy campaign launched against users that employed pictures of the exiled prodemocracy group, Ginbot 7, as bait. There has been an increasing trend of exiled dissidents targeted with surveillance malware in the past few years. In April 2013, Tadesse Kersmo, a senior member of Ginbot-7 living in exile in the United Kingdom since 2009, came across the above-mentioned Citizen Lab FinSpy report and noticed that one of the spyware campaign’s bait was a picture of himself. He contacted Citizen Lab to have his computer examined and found that FinSpy had been active on his computer over two days in June 2012. The spyware may have transmitted any or all of Kersmo’s emails, chats, Skype calls, files, and web searches to a server based in Ethiopia, which could have provided the authorities with names of contacts, colleagues, and family members still living in the country. In February 2014, Privacy International filed a criminal complaint to the UK’s National Cyber Crime Unit on Kersmo’s behalf, urging them to investigate the potential unlawful interception of communications.
In the same month, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a similar suit in the United States on behalf of another Ethiopian dissident (and American citizen) identified publicly under the pseudonym Mr. Kidane. Kidane’s computer had also been found infected with the FinSpy malware sometime between late October 2012 and March 2013, which had secretly recorded dozens of his Skype calls, copied emails he had sent, and logged a web search conducted by his son on the history of sports medicine for a school research project.86 The FinSpy IP address was linked to a server belonging to
Ethio Telecom. Recent Citizen Lab research published in February 2014 uncovered the use of Remote Control System
(RCS) spyware against two employees of the diaspora-run independent satellite television, radio, and online news media outlet, Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT), based in Alexandria, VA.87 Made by the Italian company Hacking Team, RCS spyware is advertised as “offensive technology” sold exclusively to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world, and has the ability to steal files and passwords, and intercept Skype calls/chats. 88 While Hacking Team claims that they do not deal with “repressive regimes,” the RCS virus sent via sophisticated bait to the two ESAT employees made it clear that the attack was targeted, and researchers have strong suspicions of the Ethiopian government’s involvement.
While the government’s stronghold over the Ethiopian ICT sector enables it to proactively monitor users, its access to user activity and information is less direct at cybercafes. For a period following the 2005 elections, cybercafe owners were required to keep a register of their clients, but the requirement has not been enforced since mid-2010.91 Nevertheless, some cybercafe operators revealed that they are required to report any “unusual behavior” to security officials, and officials often visit cybercafes (sometimes in plainclothes) to ask questions about specific users or monitor user activity themselves.
Government security agents frequently harass and intimidate bloggers, online journalists, and ordinary users for their online activities. Independent bloggers are often summoned by the authorities to be warned against discussing certain topics online, while activists claim that they are consistently threatened by state security agents for their online activism. Bloggers from Zone9, for example, reported suffering a considerable amount of harassment for their work, leading them to go silent for several months. Shortly after the blog announced on Facebook that it was resuming activities in April 2014, six Zone9 bloggers were arrested and sent to a federal detention center in Addis Ababa where the torture of detainees is reportedly common. The active Gmail accounts belonging to several of the Zone9 bloggers94 while in detention suggests that they may have been forced give their passwords to security officials against their will.
Read more @ https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf
ETHIOPIA: ‘BECAUSE I AM OROMO’: SWEEPING REPRESSION IN THE OROMIA REGION OF ETHIOPIA
In today’s busy world, we’ve become a people obsessed with productivity and “work hacks.”
Getting more done in less time allows us to get ahead, and even gives us more availability to do the things we love outside of work.
The problem we run into is that it is easy to get motivated, but hard to stay disciplined.
Most of us look at productivity in the wrong way: task management tools are shiny at first and then go unused. Being chained to your desk is as unhealthy as it is unproductive.
Achievement isn’t about doing everything, it’s about doing the right things–productivity means saying no.
Focus and consistency are the bread-and-butter of being truly productive. Right now, we’ll take a look at the science behind how the brain works in the synthesis state, and what changes you can make for the better.
The first thing to acknowledge in the pursuit of getting more done is the mountain of evidence that suggests willpower alone will not be enough to stay productive.
According to research by Janet Polivy, our brain fears big projects and often fails to commit to long-term goals because we’re susceptible to “abandoning ship” at the first sign of distress.
Think of the last time you went on a failed diet.
You stocked your fridge with the healthiest foods and planned to exercise every day… until the first day you slipped up. After that, it was back to your old ways.
To make matters worse, research by Kenneth McGraw was able to show that the biggest “wall” to success was often just getting started. Additional research in this area suggests that we’re prone to procrastinating on large projects because we visualize the worst parts; the perfect way to delay getting started.
According to researcher John Bargh, your brain will attempt to “simulate” real productive work by avoiding big projects and focusing on small, mindless tasks to fill your time.
“Big project due tomorrow? Better reorganize my movie collection!”
Perhaps worst of all, numerous studies on the concept of “ego-depletion” have provided some evidence that suggests our willpower is a limited resource that can be used up in it’s entirety. The more you fight it, the more gas you burn. An empty tank leads to empty motivation.
With all of that stacked against us, what can we possibly do to be more productive?
In order to figure this out, one of our best bets is to observe the habits of consistently productive people.
The habits of productive people
If I were to ask to describe the practice regiments of world-class musicians, you’d probably envision a shut-in artist who plays all day long and then tucks in their instrument at night.
Amazingly though, research by Anders Ericsson that examined the practice sessions of elite violinists clearly showed that the best performers were not spending more time on the violin, but rather were being more productive during their practice sessions.
Better yet, the most elite players were getting more sleep on average than everyone else.
How is that possible?
Subsequent research by Anders reveals the answer: the best players were engaging in more “deliberate practice.” You’ve heard the term, but beyond the hype, what is it all about?
It’s nothing more than spending time on the hardest tasks, and being better at managing your energy levels.
Think of it this way: If you were trying to get better at basketball, you’d be much better off practicing specific drills for two hours rather than “shooting hoops” all day long.
Since deliberate practice requires you to spend more brainpower than busy work, how can you implement it without draining your willpower?
The first answer isn’t very sexy, but it’s necessary: the best way to overcome your fear of spending a lot of energy on a big project is to simply get started.
The Zeigarnik Effect (mentioned above) is a construct that psychologists have observed in numerous studies on “suspense.” One such study gave participants brain-buster puzzles to complete, but not enough time to complete them. The surprising thing was, even when participants were asked to stop, over 90% of them went on to complete the puzzles anyway.
According to the lead researcher:
“It seems to be human nature to finish what we start and, if it is not finished, we experience dissonance.”
It’s the same thing that happens when we become engaged in a story in a book, movie or TV show: we want to see how it ends.
You can use this knowledge to your advantage by just getting started on that next big project; in the most basic sense, don’t focus your motivation on doing Activity X. Instead, focus on making Activity X easier to do.
Start the night before. Is your to-do list already written up? Is your place of work ready for you to get started? Break down barriers of friction before relying on willpower.
On working like an expert
A multitude of research has shown us that discipline is best maintained through habits, not through willpower.
According to Tony Schwartz, CEO of The Energy Project, most people hold their productivity back by not rigidly scheduling work and rest breaks throughout the day.
Since most of us are worried about willpower, we don’t push ourselves to maximum output: instead of “giving our all” for brief sessions, we distribute our effort throughout the day, leading us back to busywork to fill our time.
What should we do instead?
Schwartz often cites a research study conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration that revealed how short breaks between longer working sessions resulted in a 16% improvement in awareness and focus.
Research from Peretz Lavie on ultradian rhythms matches up with these findings: longer productive sessions (of 90 minutes) followed by short breaks (of no more than 15-20 minutes) sync more closely with our natural energy cycles and allow us to maintain a better focus and higher energy level throughout the day.
Both of these studies on energy management match up with the practice schedules of the violinists: the most common regimen for the cream of the crop players was a 90-minute block of intense practice followed by a 15-minute break.
The moral of the story is that it’s hard to be productive while trying to maintain high energy levels through your entire day.
It’s much easier to work intensely when you know that a break is just around the corner, not at the end of the day. Instead of trying to conserve energy for hours, break big projects down into smaller chunks and plan a recovery period right after.
For projects done on your own time, try scheduling blocks of 90-minute work sessions with a planned cool down time of 15 minutes directly afterwards. When you know a break is on the horizon, you won’t try to “pace yourself” with your work, and will be more inclined to dive into the difficult stuff.
While great for tackling the toughest parts of large projects, this technique doesn’t really address many problems related to discipline, an important part of staying productive for more than just a day or two.
The art of staying disciplined
One segment of the population known for struggling with discipline are those who are addicted to hard drugs.
Given their disposition for being unable to commit to many things, you might be surprised to find that during an experiment testing the ability of drug addicts to write & submit a 5 paragraph essay on time, those who wrote down when and where they would complete the essay were far more likely to turn it in.
These findings have some interesting correlation with those related to discipline in other people: in a study examining the ability of average people to stick with a strict dieting plan, researchers found that those participants who rigorously monitored what they were eating were able to maintain far higher levels of self-control when it came to maintaining their diet.
Last but not least, Dan Ariely and colleagues conducted a study involving college students and found that students who imposed strict deadlines on themselves for assignments performed far better (and more consistently) than those who didn’t.
These findings were especially interesting because Ariely noted that students who gave themselves too generous of a deadline often suffered from the same problems as students who set zero deadlines: when you allot yourself too much time to complete a task, you can end up creating a “mountain out of a molehill.”
Since we now know that tracking our progress is a key component of productivity, how can we implement this practice into our daily routine?
One method is to use an accountability chart to track what work you’ve completed during your 90-minute productive sessions, similar to how the dieters tracked their food consumption.
To easily implement one, simply create two-columns on a piece of paper, Google Docs spreadsheet, or even a whiteboard.
Column 1 will list the time-span of one of your productivity sessions.
Column 2 will list what tasks you’ve accomplished in that limited time-span.
Don’t include any columns for your 15-minute breaks, as those times are for your own sake and means to replenish your willpower.
This works well for 2 specific reasons:
Dr. Kentaro Fujita argues that tracking your progress in this way is helpful because you’ll be exposed to the work you’ve actually accomplished, and not the (inaccurate) assumption of work you might construe in your head.
Forcing yourself to write down the fact that you spent 2 hours on YouTube isn’t about shaming, it’s about awareness; you’ll be less likely to do it again.
Progress tracking is also a known strategy for stopping yourself from engaging in robotic behavior (also known as busywork), a habit that researcher John Bargh describes as the #1 enemy of goal striving.
Productivity and multitasking
With a work schedule, an energy management strategy, and a task-tracking system in place, the last challenge we have to face is that of multitasking.
According to a 1999 study, we have a tendency to view multitasking as effective, even when it isn’t.
However, researcher Zhen Wang was able to show that on average, multitaskers are actually less likely to be productive, yet they feel more “emotionally satisfied” with their work—creating an illusion of productivity.
“We were absolutely shocked. We all lost our bets. It turns out multitaskers are terrible at every aspect of multitasking.”
When working on the computer, the best thing you can do is turn on Airplane Mode; no need for temptation when you can’t even access the web. If you’re unable, help yourself with tools like StayFocusd to block distracting sites.
The next best strategy is to create an evening planning ritual where you select a few priority tasks to accomplish the next day.
The reason this method works far better than planning your daily tasks in the morning? Research from the Kellogg Schoolhas shown that we miscalculate the amount of focus we’ll be able to maintain in the future. We strongly believe that we’ll be able to quickly plan our day the next morning, but when tomorrow rolls we stumble off track.
You can create an evening planning ritual with a simple pen & paper or use an online tool like TeuxDeux each night. List only priority tasks (the “big 5”) for the day.
Instead of listing “Work on research project” as a daily goal, try something like “Finish introduction” or “Find additional sources” as a task you can actually complete.
The instant replay
Let’s play that all back real quick:
Willpower alone is not enough: Your productivity shouldn’t be reliant on your sheer force of will alone. Mental toughness will go a long way, but in order to stay disciplined you’re better off relying on systems.
Give yourself the ability to go “all-in”: Working harder on the stuff that matters is going to drain you mentally & physically. Don’t be afraid of giving yourself multiple breaks throughout the day. It’s better to “chunk” productivity sessions into 90 minute periods (in order to keep yourself sharp and to alleviate the stress of pacing your energy throughout the entire day.
If it’s not worth measuring, it’s not worth doing: Tracking has been proven to be the best way to stay diligent about your progress. Create an accountability chart to list what productive things you’ve gotten done throughout the day. You’ll see how much you’re really accomplishing.
Multitasking is your enemy: Treat it as such. Block out unwanted distractions and as Ron Swanson would say, “Never half-ass two things, whole-ass one thing.” Plan your day the night before so you won’t get consumed with the wonderful distractions of the internet when you start your day.
Read from its source @ http://qz.com/315903/how-to-get-more-done-and-in-less-time/
(NEW YORK) – In recent years, a growing number of African governments have issued Eurobonds, diversifying away from traditional sources of finance such as concessional debt and foreign direct investment. Taking the lead in October 2007, when it issued a $750 million Eurobond with an 8.5% coupon rate, Ghana earned the distinction of being the first Sub-Saharan country – other than South Africa – to issue bonds in 30 years.
This debut Sub-Saharan issue, which was four times oversubscribed, sparked a sovereign borrowing spree in the region. Nine other countries – Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania – followed suit. By February 2013, these ten African economies had collectively raised $8.1 billion from their maiden sovereign-bond issues, with an average maturity of 11.2 years and an average coupon rate of 6.2%. These countries’ existing foreign debt, by contrast, carried an average interest rate of 1.6% with an average maturity of 28.7 years.
It is no secret that sovereign bonds carry significantly higher borrowing costs than concessional debt does. So why are an increasing number of developing countries resorting to sovereign-bond issues? And why have lenders suddenly found these countries desirable?
With quantitative easing having driven interest rates to record lows, one explanation is that this is just another, more obscure manifestation of investors’ search for yield. Moreover, recent analyses, carried out in conjunction with the establishment of the new BRICS bank, have demonstrated the woeful inadequacy of official assistance and concessional lending for meeting Africa’s infrastructure needs, let alone for achieving the levels of sustained growth needed to reduce poverty significantly.
Moreover, the conditionality and close monitoring typically associated with the multilateral institutions make them less attractive sources of financing. What politician wouldn’t prefer money that gives him more freedom to do what he likes? It will be years before any problems become manifest – and, then, some future politician will have to resolve them.
To the extent that this new lending is based on Africa’s strengthening economic fundamentals, the recent spate of sovereign-bond issues is a welcome sign. But here, as elsewhere, the record of private-sector credit assessments should leave one wary. So, are shortsighted financial markets, working with shortsighted governments, laying the groundwork for the world’s next debt crisis?
The risks will undoubtedly grow if sub-national authorities and private-sector entities gain similar access to the international capital markets, which could result in excessive borrowing. Nigerian commercial banks have already issued international bonds; in Zambia, the power utility, railway operator, and road builder are planning to issue as much as $4.5 billion in international bonds.
Evidence of either irrational exuberance or market expectations of a bailout is already mounting. How else can one explain Zambia’s ability to lock in a rate that was lower than the yield on a Spanish bond issue, even though Spain’s credit rating is four grades higher? Indeed, except for Namibia, all of these Sub-Saharan sovereign-bond issuers have “speculative” credit ratings, putting their issues in the “junk bond” category and signaling significant default risk.
Signs of default stress are already showing. In March 2009 – less than two years after the issue – Congolese bonds were trading for 20 cents on the dollar, pushing the yield to a record high. In January 2011, Côte d’Ivoire became the first country to default on its sovereign debt since Jamaica in January 2010.
In June 2012, Gabon delayed the coupon payment on its $1 billion bond, pending the outcome of a legal dispute, and was on the verge of a default. Should oil and copper prices collapse, Angola, Gabon, Congo, and Zambia may encounter difficulties in servicing their sovereign bonds.
To ensure that their sovereign-bond issues do not turn into a financial disaster, these countries should put in place a sound, forward-looking, and comprehensive debt-management structure. They need not only to invest the proceeds in the right type of high-return projects, but also to ensure that they do not have to borrow further to service their debt.
These countries can perhaps learn from the bitter experience of Detroit, which issued $1.4 billion worth of municipal bonds in 2005 to ward off an impending financial crisis. Since then, the city has continued to borrow, mostly to service its outstanding bonds. In the process, four Wall Street banks that enabled Detroit to issue a total of $3.7 billion in bonds since 2005 have reaped $474 million in underwriting fees, insurance premiums, and swaps.
Understanding the risks of excessive private-sector borrowing, the inadequacy of private lenders’ credit assessments, and the conflicts of interest that are endemic in banks, Sub-Saharan countries should impose constraints on such borrowing, especially when there are significant exchange-rate and maturity mismatches.
Countries contemplating joining the bandwagon of sovereign-bond issuers would do well to learn the lessons of the all-too-frequent debt crises of the past three decades. Matters may become even worse in the future, because so-called “vulture” funds have learned how to take full advantage of countries in distress. Recent court rulings in the United States have given the vultures the upper hand, and may make debt restructuring even more difficult, while enthusiasm for bailouts is clearly waning. The international community may rightly believe that both borrowers and lenders have been forewarned.
There are no easy, risk-free paths to development and prosperity. But borrowing money from international financial markets is a strategy with enormous downside risks, and only limited upside potential – except for the banks, which take their fees up front. Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies, one hopes, will not have to repeat the costly lessons that other developing countries have learned over the past three decades.
The following is the case study on Ethiopia from Opride Contributors http://www.opride.com/oromsis/articles/opride-contributors/3781-sovereign-bond-may-prove-to-be-a-nightmare-for-ethiopia
SOVEREIGN BOND MAY PROVE TO BE A NIGHTMARE FOR ETHIOPIA
By J. Bonsa
Ethiopian has recently joined the sovereign bond market, where governments sell debt to investors with a guarantee that they would pay periodic interest rates and the initial investment value at maturity.The bulk of sovereign bonds are bought by institutions and governments, individual investors constitute a relatively small proportion of total bond buyers. Sovereign bonds are often denominated in local currencies.
Ethiopia’s foray into the sovereign bond market has raised eyebrows in the world of financial market for at least three reasons. First, Ethiopia is the poorest country ever to venture into this market. Second, the real value of Ethiopia’s currency has been deteriorating at alarming rates, devalued by close to 40 percent in the last three years alone. Third, the108-page long prospectus that the Ethiopian government prepared and submitted to formally enter the market contained astonishing revelations. In a bizarre twist, the government made unfamiliar and strange declarations about risks associated with purchasing the bond it is about to issue.
Among other things, authorities warned about: famine, Ethio-Eritrean war, social unrest and upheaval in the aftermath of the May 2015 election. These are extra-ordinary admissions of risks to a scale not heard in this market before. But what is the motive of the Ethiopian government in exhibiting such an extraordinary behavior? What are the triggers for the move to enter the sovereign bond market? In this piece, I will attempt to seek answers to these questions.
Carrot and stick
The local English weekly Addis Fortune reported rumors in Addis Ababa that the unusual admission of the risks was due to naivety of junior staff. However, central government in Ethiopia is known for ordering lower level units to do things a certain way only to deny involvement to avoid blame at a later stage. For example, federal government officials often deny and attribute human rights abuses to local authorities. The latest screw up seems to be an extension of that logic to international diplomacy. The fact that this rumor was leaked through a pro-government newspaper provides further clue about some sinister motives beyond a simple act of incompetence by those who prepared the prospectus.
It is likely that the government used the document as a carrot and stick tactic aimed at Western governments. An evidence of this comes from the revelations about Ethiopia’s “credit lines from China and Chinese entities accounted for 42 per cent of all external loan disbursements in 2013-14, and for 69 percent in 2012-13.” This fact underscores Ethio-Chinese partnerships have been considerably strengthened. Western countries, particularly the U.S., recognize Ethiopia’s support in the global fight against terrorism. But they also know that that support has often been offered to them so officiously with hidden motives, which at times jeopardized Western interests in the Horn of Africa.
The issuance of the sovereign bond and rare admission about the scale of Ethio-China relations appear like a warning to the U.S.: Buy the bond generously if you want to stop us from lurching toward China. The categories of hazards the government chose are even more telling. For instance, the possibility of another war with Eritrea is inserted to gain sympathy and also imply that terrorism is still rampant in Horn of Africa. The likelihood of social unrest after the next election is meant to warn the West that they should not seriously consider pressing the government on human rights and democratization.
Other motivations are rooted in domestic politics. The government knows that the risks are real and investors will find out sooner or later. In that case, by declaring the risks upfront, the regime tries to present itself as a brutally honest and transparent government. In doing so, they might be trying to pre-empt opposition claims about lack of transparency in areas of governance and economic management.
Liquidity crisis
The Ethiopian government has a strange habit of biting more than it could chew. For example, it plans to invest about $5.1 billion per year over the next decade on mega infrastructural projects: power, roads, and telecommunications. Another $6 billion is required to build a 2.4 thousands km railway network. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River is expected to cost about $4.8 billion. The World Bank has warned that this level of investment (more than 40 percent of GDP and three times the $1.3 billion in infrastructure spending that the country managed during the mid-2000s) is well beyond the country’s modest means.
This created a self-inflicted wound in the form of a very messy liquidity crisis: an acute shortage or drying up of funds in the economy. This crisis is the main trigger for the foray to the sovereign bond market. The shortage of funds is specially manifested in difficulty to borrow funds from the banking system. The crisis has been around in the Ethiopian economy for a good part of the last decade. The government left no stone unturned in the sphere of the domestic economy to overcome the severe liquidity crisis.
But the regime squandered huge sums of free grants and concessionary or low interest loans from donors, annual net-inflows in the upwards of $2 billion, excluding other humanitarian aid.
The debacle from the 2005 election and the 2009 Charities Law, which restricted operations of foreign NGOs, saw a noticeable reduction in foreign aid. The government had to seek non-concessionary loans, particularly from China, to finance its mega projects. Meanwhile, the ill-designed project locations in less productive sectors or regions means sharp declines in export earnings.
For much of the last decade, the government simply printed more and more birr and engaged in a spending spree. However, a limit was reached when inflation hit the roof, approaching 60 percent in 2008. Fearing political backlash through social unrest and also due to pressures from international financial institutions, the government backed down from its inflationary financing strategy.
Involuntary savings
Absent foreign funds, the government maintained a dogged determination and vowed to proceed with the mega projects by entirely relying on domestic savings. This began with sales of government savings bonds to domestic institutions, to raise about $892.2 million in five years. Obviously, this was not realistic. About 70 percent of Ethiopians still live in extreme poverty, and one cannot expect households to voluntarily save even a small proportion of the target amount of saving. Consequently, the government resorted to force savings, using unorthodox methods.
The involuntary savings was accompanied by an intensive propaganda campaign to rally the public around the mega infrastructural projects by creating wartime like atmosphere. It is not only “unpatriotic” to question the suitability or merit of the large projects, it borders with criminality to express any reservations specifically about the GERD. Every civil servant has been forced to buy a saving bond paying her one-month salary in 12 installments. They have also made a relentless but unsuccessful campaign to entice the Ethiopian diaspora. The perverse method applied to sell bonds to households was followed by an even more crude procedures meant to force bonds on the business community. Private Banks have been compelled to purchase bonds equivalent to 27 percent of their annual loans. However, this does not apply to government owned banks. Banking is effectivelygovernment monopoly, the three major state-owned banks hold 73 percent of the total bank assets in the country, 63 percent for the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia alone.
The extent of ignorance among Ethiopia’s policy makers is baffling. The involuntary saving is meant to boost publicinvestment expenditure, which is part of aggregate demand that fuels economic growth. But the authorities grossly overlooked the very act of involuntary saving is bound to reduce the other components of expenditure — household consumption expenditure on goods and services as well asbusiness investment expenditure. Sure enough, the government has belatedly realized there was a limit to achieving their goals through involuntary savings, and with all options in the domestic economy already exhausted.
Sovereign bond
The sovereign bond saga is a yet another maneuver to raise funds the government so desperately needed to finance the ill-conceived mega projects. This time the movement is on a less comfortable and unfamiliar terrain beyond Ethiopia’s borders, in the international market arena where the regime cannot apply brute methods to enforce bond purchases. Perhaps for the first time in its rein, Ethiopia’s ruling party will have to play by the rules.
Accordingly, it set out with a calculated move to secure a “sound” credit rating from known global agencies. In a quick succession during the first half of May 2013, credit rating agencies offered the government exactly what it needed. Fitch Ratings and Moody’s assigned ‘B’ and ‘B1’ ratings to Ethiopia, respectively. These endorsements opened the door for a debut on international capital markets.
However, the government rhetoric notwithstanding, most economic analysts know that the fundamentals of the Ethiopian economy have not reached the level that warranty the kinds of credit ratings offered to Ethiopia. For instance, in May 2012, three months before Meles Zenawi died, theEconomist observed:
JUST how sustainable is Ethiopia’s advance out of poverty? This is a vexed topic among bankers and others in Ethiopia who hold large wads of birr, the oft devalued currency. Despite hard work by the World Bank, oversight from the International Monetary Fund, and studies by economists from donor countries, it is not clear how factual Ethiopia’s economic data are. Life is intolerably expensive for Ethiopians in Addis Ababa, the capital, and its outlying towns. Some think Ethiopia’s inflation figures are fiddled with even more than those in Argentina. Even if the data are deemed usable, the double-digit growth rates predicted by the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi look fanciful.
Similarly, soon after Ethiopia received the favorable credit ratings, the International Monetary Fund“warned that the pace of accumulation of public sector debt to finance major investments in dams, factories and housing construction “deserves close attention.”’ Given these reservations about the credibility of Ethiopian authorities, it is perplexing as to why the ratings agencies endorsed Ethiopia to enter the global capital market.
This could have happened only if Ethiopian authorities have utilized their familiar strategy: buying the services of powerful and highly connected lobbying firms. This has become a familiar last resort forauthoritarian regimes in Africa. Ethiopia reportedly allocates a sizeable budget to pay for prohibitively expensive lobbyist service fees.
Public sector debt has been growing at alarming rate. As Horn Affairs reported recently, “Ethiopia’s public sector debt grew threefold in the past five years. The total outstanding external debt surged from $5.6 Billion in 2009/10 to $14 Billion in 2013/14.”These are increasingly becoming commercial or non-concessionary loans such as those from China. Ethiopia’s premature entry into the sovereign bond market amounts to adding fuel to a flame.
IMF predicts Ethiopia’s “total debt to GDP increases from 24 percent to 48 percent of GDP in 5 years, posing risks to debt sustainability. External commercial borrowing entails risks even under the assumption of a highly efficient big-push public investment program.” This means unlike in the past when funds have been flowing in through free grants or soft loans, debt servicing will soon become a huge burden on the Ethiopian economy, given the government’s wasteful investment and a shift from soft to commercial loans. However, it is anybody’s guess whether or not the regime will stay long enough to face the consequences of its decisions.
*The writer, J. Bonsa, is a regular OPride contributor and researcher-based in Asia.
Maaram is believed to be the divinity of women. Maaram was created by Waaqa and addressed as haadha boor (the mother of ocean). I think this is to indicate that Maaram came to the Oromo from outside. The Oromo believe that Mooram is the mother of a child. The Oromo women perform traditional ceremonies in respect of Maaram. It is believed that Maaram will help barren women to beget a child, and help pregnant women to give birth to a child. When a woman gives birth to a child Oromo women will gather and ululate (say ilili ilili). They also prepare porridge, and splash butter. It is normal for the Oromo to sacrifice an animal during this ceremony. Moreover, Maaram is worshipped for the health of the environment, animals, human beings and crops. The Oromo Qoolluu leaders pray to Maaram every two weeks for the continuation of offspring of humans. Maaram has her own ritual house. Ritual goods include Jaaloo (earthen caldron), and Qoloo (traditional shirt). It has also madabii (raised platform of Earth). The dancing ceremony is performed on Tuesdays, Thursdays,. and Saturdays.
Some writers have explained the nature of Ateetee and Maaram. Knutsson states that the names Ateetee and Maaram are used interchangeably for the same kind of being (Kmitsson 1967,55). Daniel states that the various songs of Ateetee imply that “[a]teete is a ceremony prepared for Ayyolee, Maaram and Waaqa as thanksgiving by those who have children and a lamentation by the barren women” (Daniel 1984, 111). Bartels, however, questioned this assertion. To the Oromo of Western Matcha, Ateetee is the name of the ritual in which Maaram is invoked (Bartels 1983). Baxter (1979) had similar observation concerning the belief of the Arsi Oromo. For Cerulli, Ateetee is conceived as the goddess of fecundity (Cerulli 1922,127; Harris 1968,50).
In the traditional Oromo society, women played distinct roles through an institution called the Siiqqee (a symbolic decorated stick given to all women by their mothers upon marriage). This is an exclusively women’s solidarity institution sanctioned by tradition and respected by society. It is a sort of sorority that provides women with channels to participate in village councils, and a cultural vehicle to mobilize en masse against violence and abuse. Infringement of certain rights that women enjoy is regarded as an attack on human rights. In the event of violation of their rights, women take out the Siiqqee and mobilize to fight for the respect of rights, and for any perpetrator of abuse to be tried by society. The use of Siiqqee draws an enormous religious, ritual and moral authority and in the pursuit of peace and social tranquility. According to tradition peace is not merely the absence of war, but a constant state of unity and cooperation among the people as well as harmony with God and nature, with the power to bless or curse. Historically, women as a sector of society were designated as strangers and excluded from the Gadaa structures and rituals, but, they stuck together through the Siiqqee counting on one another within this common sorority. –http://oromowomensinternationalconferenceonline.com/general-information.html
In Oromo mythology, the divinity for motherhood and fecundity is Ateetee or Maaram. Maaram or Ateetee is invoked and praised on birth-rituals. In addition, women prepare a feast and invoke Her, praise Her kindness so that they could be fertile, healthy, prosperous, and happy (Bartles, 1990,124; Cerulli 1917, 127, Tilahun Gamta, 2004,101)
Get-together, for today is Maaram
Let us rejoice, throw away the boredom!
O Maaram, O dear Maaram,
Reconcile, with us who lack wisdom.
Maaram with beautiful eyes, O Maaram,
Have a sit, in front of me, please come!
When in pain, the mattress one clutches
When in labour, the wall one clutches
After delivery, a baby one snatches!
In return for your labour pain
Here, the little one is your gain.
O prolific woman, your clothes smell bad,
But Maaram has adorned your backyard,
The husband laughs from the front yard.
O sterile woman, with beautiful dress
Your husband furiously grumbles,
For your backyard, Maaram avoids.
If I were Balas,
That Balas of Boongaa,
To a bad-shooter his trophies I give;
So he could boast about it with relief.
If I were Maaram,
Our great lady Maaram,
A son I would give to the sterile woman,
So she could intimidate her man.
O Maaram, my dear Maaram
Be merciful to the childless.
O Maaram, with beauty and grace
You have revered blood in your face
O Maaram, you are my commuter [between me and God]
My parturifacient mother.
Two kinds of mothers are there
One is far across the river [The biological one]
The other one is the one here. [Maaram]
I know a rider’s thought and will
He gallops down the hill
I know a husband’s thought
He loves the prolific wife the most;
He equates me to a mule, dry and bare
and makes me carry his ploughshare.
O Maaram every women’s’ queen
Resolve this problem for me
Either grant me a baby boy
I call him “he the wise”
Either grant me a baby girl
I call her “she the wise”
Or either give me death
So I could get done with my worries.
Yaa dhabduu masoo dhirsa
Dhirsatu dhaanu hawwee.
Yaa saree eegee dabbasaa
Kan quufee Waaqiin darbata
Kan Maaram namaa gootu
Haati ofii namaa hingootu.
Sibiila mutaa gootee
Kan djiiga mucaa gootee.
Baddaan qullubbii hinqabu
Muree laga dhaabbata
Kan kee dhukkubbii hinqabu
Turtee nama yaadattaa.
Araarfanne yaa maaram
Sirraa deenyee.
Gadi jedheen xaafii haamaa
Ol jedheen Waaqiin waama
An old horse’s rise from the stable,
I wonder if dogs have seen it and been able?
To have eaten it, and then did settle?
Cry of a baby-longing childles
Lament of a health-longing patient
A trophy-longing hunter’s plight
I wonder if Maaree have seen?
If She has seen and granted!
Ululation for Waaqa is a must
I ululate and beseech Waaqa;
Market of the taxing tanner
I am Waaqa’s earnest prayer!
The Loomee firewood of the street
When do you think we could meet?
Tomorrow, around mid-day
We will meet slipping away.
A handful of barley
That a widow parched and eat
the sterile prospered with it
the prolific counted it. [To equally divide.]
You know what the prolific said?
“Do not see my baby.” she said
“Do not enter my inner-room” she said.
What if I enter her inner-room?
What if I see her baby?
To her baby, I give a gift
To my stomach, porridge I eat.
No calf is kept in her inner-room,
She thinks I pine her child, I presume.
What a pity for the sterile lady
She could not get pregnant and eat a hunk of meat
She could not deliver and have showers of gift.
Abundance of rock and escarpment
Is hanging and piling up
The sterile did not hate giving birth
It is Maaram that un equalizes.
The prolific with smelly skirt
Her backyard is full of spirit.
But, the childless in a pretty skirt
Her backyard is devoid of spirit.
The sterile, the husband’s name-sake
The husband wishes to punish her.
O dog with a hairy tail
The over-fed hurls at Waaqa
The favour Maaram does for one
One’s own mother would not do.
She turned iron to needles
She turned blood to a baby that toddles.
The high land does not have onion
They cut and plant in the valley;
Your delay is not offensive
for you compensate gradually.
Reconciliation with you, O Maaram
You gave us deliverance.
I bow down and harvest xaafi [food plant]
I rise up and invoke Waaqi
This article is for those who did not have the opportunity to know how democracy evolved in human society. Democracy is only one type of government supposedly based on the will of the masses. There had been other types of government like monarchy or aristocracy, dictatorship or autocracy and totalitarian. One can find overlapping characters in all these. So what ever form we may talk about we have to expect element of one in the other. For much, democracy is an ideal type of government but not all proclaimed democracies are fully pro-people. Here the writer is trying to introduce the essence of both Western and Oromo democracy in an easy way. For those who are well versed in theory and practice of democracy this is an opportunity to enrich this work for the benefit of the youth. In particular the young generation that is showing pride in its historic past from oral tradition if armed with the facts may show more interest and start to inquire about it. To prepare the following information in addition to oral tradition and experience this writer was exposed to, the books: Gadaa and Oromo Demokrasii by Asmirom Laggasaa, The Oromo by De Salviac as translated by Qannoon, Folk Litrature by Ceruuli, Aadaa Booranaa by Ton Leus, Ethiopia through Russian Eyes by Bulatovich and Wikiipedia from internet were refered to.
Short note on Western Democracy
Democracy is a term frequently heard from lips of everyone to express equality, justice and liberty in one word. There are no governments that do not claim to follow democratic principles in their governance. Even totalitarian states call themselves “democratic republics” (probably with exception of fascism) in spite of flagrant violation of their subjects’ rights. Just like true democrats they talk about the inviolability of people’s and human rights and respect for the rule of law and fair and free election. They claim that it is to protect these rights on behalf of the masses when they take what are inhuman actions for others. Their founding documents are full of borrowed phrases from ideal democracies. Democratic governmental structures are adopted minus their functions from different countries.
Democratic models many emulate are American governmental structure with its system of separation of powers. The functions of legislature, executive and judiciary are separated into three branches in such a way that one can check on excesses of the other to maintain the balance of power. The executive or President and the legislative or members of Congress are elected directly by the people. Members of the Supreme Court are nominated by the president and endorsed by the legislature for life. The other models are Parliamentary Democracy where the executive is elected by the legislature. Those can be its members or non elected persons that are answerable to it. Britain and European governments fall under this. They have mainly different styles of organization. Still others are traditional rulers blended with modern jargons.
All these claim their objective to be safeguarding peoples’ democratic interests. The term democracy is a legacy of ancient Greek city state, Athens. It is derived from Greek demokratia which means government of the people (“demos”, people, and “kratos”, power). In this aspect “people” for Athens includes only male citizens above 20 years of age. That does not include women, children under 20, those not born in the city state and slaves.
In the city state all those qualified had the right to be present at meetings and participate in deliberations directly. That is why it is now referred to as direct democracy. After many modifications it has reached the present level of modern Western democracy. Here people elect representatives that participate in deliberations on its behalf. The two methods of electing representatives are plurality and proportional voting systems. In the first one with the highest vote is elected even if one represents minority of voters. The second shares votes in proportion of the votes parties got in overall election. Those are the features of modern indirect democracy. In both not all electorates are represented.
Now in most cases men and women above certain age have the right to vote depending on the law of each democratic country. The right to vote for women was achieved, for example, for Switzerland in 1971 on federal level and 1990 at Canton levels. It took a long time and a relentless struggle to attain universal suffrage. Though all accept these basics of democracy the structure and function of elected offices are not yet standardized and methods of elections fall short of including every voter’s voices. For example if hundred people vote for three persons and two of them got thirty votes each and the third one gets forty he/she wins the whole thing. That leaves 60 persons unrepresented. Proportional representation may improve this but cannot totally correct it. Here seats are divided in proportion to votes parties got overall.
For African countries democracy was imposed on them by departing colonial masters that keep on insisting to this day not to abandon it even if it was a fake one. Africans did not participate to construct a government relevant to their culture and tradition. Even those who later wanted to introduce amendments tried to mix the various world systems instead of looking into their own history and tradition and make it reflect national personality or psyche. As copy and eclectic as it is, it is understood only by elites who themselves are copies of colonial culture.
They rule the way they wanted, constitutions are only window dressings. On the other hand the West had modified the concept of democracy in such a way that it fits their particular national needs not as it was practiced by Athenians or any other pioneer democracies. Therefore there is no one common blueprint for it.
Had it not excluded a segment of the population Athenian democracy could have been an ideal one where the concern of every member is taken care of. Much has been tried to approximate that but the world did not yet achieve flawless democracy. Abraham Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg Address “Government of the people, by the people for the people shall not perish from the earth.” reflects that aspiration. The question to be answered is who are the people that influence decisions, are they really the people or oligarchs? Though the ideal is not yet achieved there are those that had come nearer and worth emulating. Had Oromo democracy been able to answer that question?
Be as it may there are certain basics that underlie every governance of those that claim to be democratic. Principles like equality, freedom, fair and free election; rule of law and respect for people’s and individual rights run through all of them. Even dictators and totalitarian government claim to apply these principles in their own way. Thus these are universally accepted principles of governance though malpractice is rampant in so many countries. Ethiopian rulers had tried to adopt constitutionalism under pressure against their established tradition. The emperor had instituted a semblance of Westminster parliament without political parties. His successor (Darg) had one party state. The next (Wayyaanee) is a pseudo multiparty system but only its party is destined to win.
Be him the last emperor or the two dictators after him used democratic phraseology to cover up their core authoritarian values. Their inherited autocratic practices could not go away. The Habashaa in most part of their own history were ruled by forces that come through coup d’états violently or outlaws overthrowing the preceding government. That was so before they formed the empire and remained so even after it. All the three came to power overthrowing their predecessors. The first two staged coup d’états the third was an outlaw.
It was not consensus but brut force that kept that highland kingdom together under one crown. Democracy assumes one man one vote in a fair and free election that should be carried out periodically. Democracy is the rule of majority. Who ever gets most of the votes comes to power. In numbers they are the minority in the empire and are scared of others outnumbering them at the ballot box. They have no confidence of winning an election by strength of their platform and performance. Therefore they believe that many opportunities would be at stake if they really change from the old ways bowing down for democratic principles. The situation makes the rulers greedy, self centered, chauvinistic and paranoid that they believe only in their own ways and wisdom and are not permeable to new possibilities. They do not believe that even their own people would elect them in a democratic election. That is why human right abuse became their trade mark.
Brief note on Gadaa Democracy
When one discusses Gadaa it would be preposterous to claim understanding its depth and breadth. It was a highly complicated and sophisticated societal system to be attributed only to few generations. That it has a background of ancient civilizations can be deduced from organization of society, its legal system and patterns of knowledge it emanates. For this reason what this article presents is only a simplistic superficial aspect of it, which yet could give a clue to its democratic legacy. Leaving aside procedures, rituals and the regalia what interests us here is the legal and democratic principles enshrined in it. To discover the truth of it much effort is needed from nationals that so far considered it to be just one among the age grade initiation systems found in so many societies. They have to erase all they learned about the Oromo in colonial schools and start unraveling the truth about this so far neglected great African nation.
Gadaa was an all encompassing national system where by every male of all ages had roles to play in groups based on peerage. Accordinglly all institutions in society were managed by elected bodies that decide in counsel. Though all activities in general fall under the Gadaa system, it was more visible in its political aspect. Major divisions to be considered are the temporal and the spiritual institutions and within the temporal one the social and the political functions. Gadaa is temporal while Qaalluu is spiritual. It is said that the Qaalluu office used to assist in Gadaa operations like elections. But sovereignty is vested in Gadaa Assembly. Therefore Qaalluu as an institution does not interfere in running political affairs of the country. That means Gadaa was secular. Here we are more interested in Gadaa secular democracy. The social and political aspect of the spiritual institution may worth following for its historical and academic significance. There are several Oromoo that follow traditional religion to this day.
Gadaa was practiced by the Oromo people from time immemorial. In social aspect male members of society are grouped into age grade “hiriyaa” (peer) system. To simplify, these were Dabbalee from 1-8 years, Foollee or Gaammee 9-24 and Qondaala or Kuusaa 25-33, Raaba didiqqaa 30-38, Raaba Doorii, 38-46 Luba 46-54 and Yuba 55-78 and gadamoojjii or jaarsa above 78 (taken from different regions practice for convenience). Each member of a society had rites to pass through. At each grade there were roles to be played and training to go through.
Activity of a hiriyaa group starts from cradle to calf herding, to different hurdles of fitness that include military training to ruling and counseling the country. It is from these hiriyaa groups that members of national leadership evolve and gradually become Luba, members of the Gadaa ruling group. These leaders in most cases had been leaders of hiriyaa group from the beginning. Women, non naturalized aliens (kan luba hin bahin) and artisans were not included in Gadaa power sharing process.
One Gadaa period is eight years. At the end of that period there used to be great feast. That ceremonial feast was called “Buttaa”. Buttaa also served as measurement of time. To know someone’s age one asks “how many Buttaa did you eat?” All those who were born during the eight years tell the same age, one, two, three etc. Buttaa. From that a wise man could tell to which hiriyaa group or Gadaa party one belonged. Five buttaa are slain in one Gadaa cycle of forty years. Those born into each Gadaa are hiriyaa (peers) irrespective of up to eight years possible differences. A boy born at the beginning of the eight years and one born on Buttaa day after eight years are considered to have eaten one Buttaa.
On the political side society is divided into Gadaa of five parties. Members in each Gadaa party were recruited from their own generational age grades. Each Gadaa has a role to play in the political life of the nation depending on the time and level in the Gadaa tier. The oldest group is the Yuba. It is composed of person whose members were in power in previous times. Next is Luba, the ruling party. Below that is the Itmakoo or Raba Doorii (these may have other names with different tribes) juniors that lead in defense and nation building. The next group follows the foot steps of their seniors and engages in different aspects of society appropriate for their ages. Each hiriyaa group maintains close relationship and prepare themselves for the next stage of partisan responsibility. They all elect their leaders. Those at the bottom of the ladder are the dabbalee to whose raising society gives much attention. It is there that the basis of Oromummaa is laid down and hunting for generational leaders start.
At any one period there are three Gadaa levels that engage is serious party work and has conventions or yaa’a. The bottom one is Raabaa Doorii a group that is preparing to take power after eight years (from), the middle one is the Gadaa in power Luba and the last one is the one that leaves office, Yuba. Each Gadaa comes to power after a cycle of forty years. Since there is a party in waiting to replace the other no party can stay in power for more than eight years. No crisis can be obstacle to transfer Baallii for there is a ready made leadership. To transfer Baallii means to transfer authority. As symbol of authority the old Abbaa Gada hands over to the incoming ostrich feather that was in his custody. Each Gadaa proclaims its own constitution and laws. Therefore there is no stagnation in waiting for cumbersome methods of amendments. Even if there is no article to be changed the past law is formally made null and void and proclaimed again as new. The five Gadaa had set names or are called after their leaders.
The highest Assembly of the nation is Caffee or Gumii. The Caffee sits under shade of an Odaa tree. The General Assembly includes all members of the ruling party and any such persons that want to attend it. In this way it is a representative indirect democracy with some elements of direct democracy. Living Abbaa Gadaas and the Yuba can also participate in the assembly. Abbaa Gadaa or Abbaa Bokkuu is the head of the Caffee and the chief executive as well. There is a case where their were two heads of Caffee, one ritual head called Abbaa Bokkuu and another elected head, Abbaa Gadaa. The Luba usually consults “raagaa” wise man or philosopher on the future or consequences of certain decisions. But the raagaa has no power to avert a decision.
In addition to mentioned institutions there are several others that should not escape our attention. For example the institution of clan elders which are hereditary have no place in the Gadaa structure but has important role in organizing and guiding the tribe. Members of Gadaa were recruited (nominated) from tribes they lead. They have ritual symbols and roles to play in cursing and blessing. When Gadaa is the national leadership these ones are tribal ones. It was from among these ones that the colonizers embraced and recruited as agents for all their grassroots activities. In tribal protocol the eldest of the clans is called or seated first. Since tribal structures have already been rendered obsolete it has no nationwide political relevance in modern setting. There is also the Siiqqee institution that gives women social and political authority to some degree. In principle this can be integrated into any modern adaptations.
For the Oromo rights like equality, freedom, fair and free election; rule of law and respect for people’s and individual rights, respect and protection for environment and wild life are inbuilt qualities of Gadaa democracy. All human beings are equal; no one is above the law; discrimination because of origin, color or economic status etc is unjust. Respect for human rights, freedom of expression that are not safuu or morally repulsive, freedom of movement and association are protected by law. Elected officials are loved and respected as long as they serve the people whole heartedly and with the highest morale standard. An incompetent and corrupt official can be removed from office by the assembly before the expiry of his term of office. In meetings it was preferred if decisions were reached by consensus. Each member of a meeting or assembly has the right of veto to halt a discussion. Once decisions were reached all are required to acclaim and the law becomes sacred.
Gadaa Assembly combines executive, legislative and judiciary powers. Gadaa here is to mean the ruling class as well as the eight years of their rule. Leaders of current Gadaa are called Luba. The outgoing Gadaa which participates as advisors and judges are called Yuba. The Yuba group includes two previous Yuba. Though all powers and responsibility lie with the Luba, Yuba and all living Abbaa Gadaas had also roles to play in matters of law and checking on excesses of Luba and had great influence on all political matters. Full retirement comes three Gadaa after they leave office. From thence they are called gadamoojjii or jarsaa. Another hiriyaa group that is active during a Gadaa period is the Itmakoo or Raaba Doorii with defense as their major activity with their eye on the bokkuu when the time comes.
In Oromo society there was a tendency of the weak to form alliance against the strong. For example grandparents and grandchildren ally against parents. In the same way it is logical for Raabaa Doorii to ally against the strongest institution of the land, Luba. In that way power of Luba can be checked before it gets corrupted and become abusive.
The chief Luba is the Abbaa Bokkuu or Abbaa Gadaa (Hayyuu Fiixee). In places he has two deputies one having greater power than the other. The executive power is held by Salgee, the top nine Luba or six in some places. Those were elites elected by the people for eight years with Abbaa Gadaa as their leader. Committees were usually formed at different levels for different functions. Prerogatives of decision making at each level is known. There will always be consultation before decisions are taken. They were it is believed, those frequent meetings to make seera (law, legislation) that gave rise to Amaara legal term “seeraa” to mean conspiracy.
Abbaa Bokkuu implements what is decided by Salgee. Abbaa Bokkuu’s role as a chief is defined by law. Thus he has internal constraint imposed on him by peers and external ones by Yuba and Raaba Doorii and Caffee periodic assembly that is chaired by Abbaa Seera who is a well respected past Abbaa Gadaa. The limitation of office term of only eight years for a party is by it self a reason not to get corrupted lest face humiliation with no chance of reelection. Thus Gadaa democratic system was a well balanced system with inbuilt checks and balance mechanism. The Abbaa Gadaa and Luba had assistances called makala (Makkala). Makala kan be compulsory service to Gadaa offices.
Military functions are assigned to Raaba Doorii by law and tradition. But Abbaa Gadaa was commander in chief and only Caffee can declare war. Commanders are appointed by Abbaa Gadaa for each engagement. After a campaign is over the person went back to his normal duties.
But lack of efficient communication and contingent law enforcement mechanism had given rise for Abbaa Duulaas to defy tradition starting in the course of the 16th century.
Some cardinal points of Gadaa system
Gadaa is equal: There should be no one to be denied passing through Gadaa process, elect and be elected when ones turn comes. There should not be partiality or discrimination in services and protections Gadaa provides. Every member has the right to directly or through elected representative be heard in all affairs that affect people’s life; to be equally treated in matters of administration of justice. No one is above the law. No one may be prohibited to attend Gadaa deliberations.
Odaa is equal: Odaa is a national symbol for people’s government, demokratia. It represents freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly, equality of all participants that meet there, freedom of worship, peace and araaraa (reconciliation) and liberty to rest for persons and animals under its shade without worry of being disturbed.
Malkaa is equal: Ford or river crossing (confluence) is open to all for crossing; perform rituals; using water for drinking, washing etc for humans and animals. No one for any one reason can bar any one from using it. Malkaa is a symbol of transiting from status quo to something new.
Market is equal: every one has equal rights to take ones produce to the market and exchange with goods and services that it provides. Every one is free to participate in such exchanges and any trade of ones liking that the market provides
Road is equal: every one is entitled to the right of way; no one can be denied an access from his home to outer world or restricted from using of existing roads like all others; there will not be restriction to the right of travel; no one has the right to close an existing road for own use.
Is there any point that modern society discard from these? So far we have tried simplistic approach to uncover old Gadaa practice. Gadaa was more inclusive in its membership than Greek City state democracy. It involves every member of society to equally participate in all activity of the nation according to generations. All male nationals are grouped into generational hiriyaa and play roles society assigned for them. For this reason the Gadaa system involves all in the process of managing a society. Each division stays in the age grade for eight years before it is initiated into the next level. Probably except kids under nine all elect their leaders through electoral process. Gadaa was a representative democracy with some elements of direct democracy. Anyone that can travel to Caffee Assembly can participate in its deliberations and express ones opinion. That gives it semblance of direct democracy. Gadaa was practiced when Qaalluu institution had significant role in Oromo society and the nation was at a different level of economic and technological development than the present. Taking these variations into account let us see if there are principles that we could salvage for new democratic Oromiyaa.
Societal development takes place on two lines. One is the social age grade system and the other is the party system. One follows the gradual mental and physical development of a child, while the other handles its political development. At stage of adult hood both overlap. In the political aspect society is grouped into five hiriyaa category and a party name is attached to them. Each party takes turn in governing every eight years. A party has to wait for forty years to reign again. All five parties exist at the same time with different roles to play.
In Gadaa executive and legislative functions are combined. Bokkuu and Caffee (Gumii) are the highest authority of the land. Sovereignty lies with the people but expressed through Caffee and Bokkuu.
Decisions are reached by consensus how ever long it may take. That means minority opinion is never neglected.
Abbaa Bokkuu is the commander in chief of the fighting force. Caffee is the only power that can declare war. People love and respect the leaders because of their valor and uprightness not out of fear and threat.
Yuba is the highest advisory body and also heads the supreme court of the land. Its head is the most respected among the living retired Abbaa Gadaas and usually taken as the Supreme Judge (Chief Justice).
Itmakoo/Raaba Doorii is a power in waiting to replace the incumbent Luba. It is responsible for recruiting, training military personnel and conducting war.
Qaalluu is the spiritual leader with some functions concerning elections but never interferes in secular affairs of the Gadaa. Gadaa was a temporal institution.
Women were recognized as subjects of rights through Siiqqee institution. There were also rituals that cannot be performed without them. But full equality was not guaranteed.
The top Gadaa counselors were nine ( Salgee) or Six
The Luba are assisted by unelected official called makala (Aide de camp)
Each Gadaa general assembly convenes at the beginning of its term to declare laws. Then it will assemble in its mid term to make progress report. Then members can be criticized, condemned or uprooted for wrong doings if any. That means electors had the right to recall their representatives for corruptions and abuses. Caffee meetings are open for citizens that can attend.
Raagaa is a wise usually old man or philosopher that can advise on the future
Hayyuu were notables (elites) that can give decisions and counseling on several issues. They were knowledgeable members of the society without any flaw in character.
To summarize, the people are sovereign; representative system mixed with direct democracy were practiced; rulers were elected for a limited term of only eight years; citizens had the right to elect and be elected according to their ages; no one was above the law; people can recall their representative; humans, animals and nature are protected by law; the welfare of children was concern of all members of society; their was majority rule but by making decision by consensus minority views were protected; all human being were equal, ill treatment was abhorred; right to assemble and freedom of expression were protected; right to engage in any trade was protected; right to travel were granted; right to worship was recognized and discrimination based on race, age, gender and economic status are forbidden. There was inbuilt check and balance system in the political process but not so spelled out.
Now, that we have seen a brief introduction to western and ancient Oromo Gadaa democracy, let us try if we can come out with a fitting system for reorganizing modern Oromiya. The system of dividing and managing society into generations is not different from modern world school systems. Children learn what is assigned them according to peerage, “preschool, kindergarten, primary, secondary, college”. This is not far from what they call “dabbalee, Foollee, Gaammee, Raaba etc.” Existing political parties recruit members from this school system. But the Oromo as different as they are, had something to add and their own outlook. Oromo see the system in interrelation with all other societal activities. To pass from one stage to the other are rights of all citizens not of particular classes.
Probably it would be essential to revise certain things and see how they may serve modern society better. Instead of collectively saying Oromo youth association if one says association of Foollee, Gaammee, Raaba etc it will help to mobilize in unison generation that under stand each other better. It may also give better opportunity to develop future leadership for society. In the past stages in the Gadaa were seen from fathers’ point. For this reason the age at which one has to produce a child was determined. If one is born before that it was bad omen. Now all children should be treated equally and age has to be considered from childrens point. So, age should not be calculated by butta and father’s Gadaa grade, but the exact date of a child’s birth. All those excluded to participate in gadaa activities and elections must now be included to make true that all humanbeing are eqal. This is only the skeleton otherwise social functions require deeper research. During the period of Abbaa Gadaa there was only one Qaalluu, now they are numerous (in addition to those of other religions). In the past we go for pilgrimage only to Abbaa Muudaa now we crossed the sea and added Mecca and Jerusalem etc. After all, what do you think? This is a big challenge for Oromoo intellectuals. It may require liberating ones mind from the shackles of foreign influences to appreciate what we had. Gadaa is never obsolete but may need refurbishing. Go and make research before responding.
Let us get prepared to be ourselves and show the world that Gadaa still dwells in our minds and body. This will not be difficult for one who has pride in Oromummaa.
Honor and glory for the fallen heroines and heroes; liberty equality and freedom for the living and nagaa and araaraa for the Ayyaanaa of our fore parents!
Ibsaa Guutama
July 2011
…The presence of the aged, both men and women who attired in traditional costumes, and carrying ritual sticks—bokkuu and siiqqee—the symbols of power and justice of the gadaa system decorated the march which reflected the authentic Oromo tradition. This authenticity is articulated not only in the words spoken by the elders and sung by the artists but also expressed in the peacefulness of the gathering of millions of people. Oromo nationalism is reviving and thriving in the fertile soil of rich symbolic cultural resources that have come to the open since the 1990s. The array of national symbols such as the odaa tree which decorate the costumes worn by men, women and children, the siiqqee, the bokkuu and other pre-colonial pan-Oromo symbols carried by men and women at the festival represent and reinforce the pride of the nation and unite the multitude gathered for the festival through a common imagery of shared memories, myths and values—in other words the shared structures of feeling.
is the principle of deep moral honor and accountability that was fostered by Waaqayyo fearing people of Oromia. “Yoon maqe, Waaqni na arga” is the principle rooted in each Oromo proven to be worthy of wholesomeness, to have virtue, and love other. These type of people have a desire to understand and live by traditional values.
Young Oromo children often spoke about the fundamental principle that telling the truth, respecting nature, being trustworthy, and standing for the right thing is natural to human beings. As an Oromo, we were taught these values and it made us women and men of such noble character.
Not only our characters were shaped by Safuu Oromo, even the process of Seera tumu (law making) was inspired by this principle and the Gadaa system was framed on the basis of Safuu. Basically then, Safuu is the principle of restoration of human dignity in a significant way. Because of Safuu, Birmadummaa and honesty is expected from each Oromo so that we all can live virtuous life of divine purposes.
When the Oromo people lived according to the Gadaa system, they dominated the horn of Africa and established their republic, and the Oromoo Foollee turned into statesmen and defended the norm of Gadaa governance. Because they believed in being honest, true, benevolent and virtuous in doing good to humanity, they demanded no money for their work and time. They worked on their farms but served their country as abbaa Seeraa, abbaa Alangaa, abbaa Caffee, abbaa Bokku and as Hadha sinqee etc..
Because of Safuu, the Oromos are inspired to respect nature and committed to deal justly with humankind! That’s why we are indebted to freedom-loving individuals everywhere who had the integrity necessary to build the foundations of human societies upon safuu’s fundamental moral values. Only in an atmosphere of freedom and trust could values like honesty and integrity truly flourish.
Safuu Oromo therefore is an expectation that people must rise above self-interest and act in the public interest with wisdom and courage both on the national and the local political scene.
One reason for the decline of Safuu in Oromia to day is that people invented new standards that constantly changes and undependable moral conduct. As a result, individuals define good and evil as being adjustable according to each situation but doing so is in direct contrast to the Safuu standard.
The vast majority of so called educated Oromos speak or think based on this mindset where right and wrong are calculated to either remain neutral or to be liked by others at the expenses of own value, the Safuu. In the process, our people lost their ancestral knowledge of what is right and what is wrong and went astray by longings for luxury and leisure that they think will be found in the western world style of living and thinking.
The devastation that comes from such fraudulent life style and self misrepresentation is immeasurable. It leads to a false belief that they can worship anything they want following the rules they set for themselves.
However, the continued survival of a free and open society is dependent upon a high degree of divinely inspired values and moral conduct (safuu), as stated by the Oromo Ayaantus. People must have trust in their institutions and in their leaders. Hence, a great need today is for leadership that exemplifies truth, honesty, and decency in both public and private life.
Honesty is not only the best policy, it is the only policy according to Safuu Oromo.
There are several things we can do to develop SAFUU.
Desire It (Fedhii Safuu horadhu)
Live honest life (hin Maqin)
Be Humble (Fayaalessa ta’i)
Study (Qu’adhu)
Search and ponder on ideas (Yaada xiinxali)
Love nature ( Umaa jaaladhu)
the International Tale communication Union (ITU) rates Ethio Telecom as the Least Service Provider. The report in Information and Communication Technology Development Index (IDI) on October 24, 2014 shows that Ethiopia stands 162nd out of 166 surveyed countries, based on mobile phone and internet use. Among the major criteria that the ITU uses to rank countries are ICT intensity and usage level, and ICT capability or skills. see http://www.itu.int/en/newsroom/Pages/wtis14-mis-images.aspx
Denmark ranked Number One in ITU’s ICT Development Index (IDI)*, a composite measurement that ranks 166 countries according to their level of ICT access, use and skills. It is followed by the Republic of Korea. The IDI top 30-ranking include countries from Europe and high-income nations from other regions including Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Japan, Macao (China), New Zealand, Singapore and the United States. In terms of regional comparisons, Europe’s average IDI value of 7.14 remains well ahead of the next best-performing region, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS – 5.33), followed by the Americas (4.86), Asia & the Pacific (4.57), the Arab States (4.55), and Africa at 2.31. The CIS and the Arab States showed the highest improvement in regional IDI averages over the past 12 months.
Rather than providing market based quality services to the public, the Ethiopian government is using control of its telecom system as a tool to silence dissenting voices.The TPLF run governmen tis using Chinese and European technology to survey phone calls and Internet activity in Ethiopia and among the diaspora living overseas . http://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/ethiopia-is-spying-on-its-citizens-with-foreign-tech
The Obama administration seems finally to have found its voice again in speaking about ongoing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. More than a decade after rebellion and conflict began, some three million people are internally displaced or refugees in neighboring Chad. More than 800,000 have been displaced in the past two years; some 2 million human beings have been newly displaced since the disastrously conceived and badly failing UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) took up its civilian protection mandate in January 2008. The death toll from the direct and indirect consequences of violence now exceeds 500,000—and mortality looks to be poised to rise steeply given reduced humanitarian capacity.
After seven years of distinguishing itself only by being…
His Excellency Mr Ban Ki-Moon
United Nations Secretary-General
Office of the Secretary General of United Nations
885 Second Avenue
United Nations Headquarters
Room DHL-1B-154
New York, NY 10017
Fax +1 212-963-4879
Your Excellency
I write on behalf of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to bring to your kind attention the plight of the Oromo people and to ask you to request the Security Council of the United Nations to treat the matter as a priority, to condemn the lawless atrocities by the Ethiopian regime, adopt appropriate actions to bring perpetrators to account, and safeguard the wellbeing of the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia.
In the land of their birth, the Oromo, who constitute the single largest national group in Ethiopia, are denied the most basic democratic right to organize freely and legally and express their political opinion. We do not know any country in the world, expect Ethiopia, where 35 million Oromo people are denied the right to have their own newspapers, to elect their own leaders and support an organization of their choice. Today, it is a serious crime, even punishable by death, to support independent Oromo organizations, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), internationally recognized organization, which jointly ruled Ethiopia with the TPLF in 1991/92. Supporters of the OLF and other independent organizations are harassed, detained for years without charge and their property confiscated without due process. Your Excellency, there is no doubt that the OLF enjoys support from the majority of the Oromo population. The current Ethiopian regime is dominated and controlled by the ruling Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF represents less than seven percent of the population of Ethiopia. The TPLF, which fears the Oromo numerical voting power in any free and fair election, has directed multi-faceted attack on the Oromo political organizations, cultural institutions, educational establishments, the press and the killings of Oromo men and women, young and old, truly reaching a very dangerous proportion. This has to stop before it is too late. Today in Ethiopia all independent Oromo organizations are crippled and our people’s legal newspapers and magazines closed down. Even the Matcha and Tulama Association, a civic association, which was established in 1963 was closed down, its leaders detained and its property confiscated. We believe the TPLF dominated Ethiopian government deliberately targets the Oromo for persecution. This has been well documented by several human rights organizations, including the Ethiopian Human Rights League, European Parliament, Human Rights Watch/Africa, and Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa, Oromia Support Group and the State Department Annual Human Rights Report. The very recent 156 page Amnesty International October 2014 report clearly demonstrates that the TPLF dominated Ethiopian regime deliberately targets the Oromo population for persecution. This attack on the Oromo must be stopped before it is too late.
The Amnesty International, AI, report contains graphic accounts of arassment, intimidation, arbitrary and indefinite detention in formal and secret detention centres, extra-judicial killings and disappearances of innocent civilians on mere suspicion of individuals for sympathies with the Oromo Liberation Front. Collective punishment sometimes punishing entire neighbourhoods and penalising a close relative in place of a suspect, and mutilation and rape in detention are also common place in Oromia.
Peaceful demonstrators are wantonly beaten, tortured and mutilated, and many suspects indefinitely disappeared. The AI report is thoroughly detailed and it is based on information gathered in real time from real victims past and present, and from close family and friends of victims and from observers on the ground. The report provides specific cases that constitute crimes against humanity and violation of international law against arbitrary and cruel punishment. Whilst the report brings forth the regime’s
arbitrary and lawless behaviour, it must be said that it only scratches the surface, as the reality is even much worse.
There is no question that details unearthed by AI constitute extra-judicial killings and violations of international law. If disputed, the facts can be verified but the regime has to agree and guarantee another neutral investigation. The fact remains that the Oromo people and indeed all the different population groups in Ethiopia are undergoing a harrowing experience under abject misrule with no respite. What is happening in Ethiopia that AI report brought forth is a denial of basic freedoms including freedom to organise, freedom of expression, freedom to life and personal security, the freedom to be judged and the freedom to take part in decisions over ones affairs. As experience somewhere showed such lawlessness by governing elites lead to complete breakdowns and increased violence leading to even worse mass suffering and deaths and engulfing ever wider areas within the country and beyond. On experience of similar tragedies elsewhere including Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the behaviour of the current Ethiopian regime constitute a clear and present threat to international peace and security, which should not be ignored.
Your Excellency, my people were brought under Ethiopian domination through violent conquest during the Scramble for Africa and made part of the expanded Empire of Ethiopia. My organisation was forced to resort to armed resistance to regain Oromo people’s national rights only after the previous imperial regime adopted violent repression to Oromo attempts at peaceful processes to regain their basic human and democratic rights. The military dictatorship that replaced the imperial regime in 1974 initially raised hopes for a democratic alternative but soon snuffed the life out of any such hopes by instituting an intolerant one party dictatorship that respected no law, trampled elementary democratic practices and denied our people’s right to determine its destiny. The violation of basic human rights by that regime was also well documented by AI and many other human rights organisations.
My organization the OLF and the core of the present regime the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front, TPLF, were during the Marxist military regime on the same side opposing and exposing the lawlessness and excesses of that regime, and they solemnly committed themselves to institute a democratic future for all the oppressed peoples in Ethiopia. They also agreed to recognise their respective peoples’ rights to decide their own affairs and to freely determine their future destiny. They were partners also in organising a transitional programme enshrined in a charter which guaranteed basic liberties for the individual and self-determination of peoples including the Oromo.
According to the transitional programme, all peoples in Ethiopia would govern their affairs and participate in central government on equal basis. The process meant to guarantee equality and a level playing field for all parties with stake in the process. Unfortunately, within less than two years of the transitional exercise, the TPLF and its stalking-horse the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF, systematically drove all autonomous organisations out of the transitional process and ever since running a one party dictatorship. While opposition parties are registered in name, in an echo of practices in eastern European countries during the Cold War, their members face constant intimidation, harassment and repression and their political activities severely curbed. Similarly, the regime in Ethiopia does not tolerate any criticism of its arbitrary actions, not even a peaceful demonstration by the affected people. The peaceful protests in Oromia at the beginning of the current year 2014 was triggered by the regime’s arbitrary plans to extend the city limits of Addis Ababa against the wishes of the Oromo people, when, as witnessed, the regime unleashing severe repression firing live ammunition on peaceful demonstrators killing many, and detention, torture and disappearance of many more.
Your Excellency, there are undeniable changes from the era of the imperial rule and the Marxist military regime when the very name Oromo and Oromia were outlawed. However, mere facade of federal framework on paper that the current regime boasts does not amount to a real change. The trampling of basic human and democratic rights and the denial of our people’s right to decide their own affairs is fraught with further resentment and resistance. As the saying goes, a stitch in time saves nine. That is why we call on Your Excellency to bring the ever deteriorating situation in Ethiopia to the attention of the Security Council asking them to adopt measures that impress on the TPLF/EPRDF regime to uphold basic freedoms including freedom of expression, organisation, peaceful demonstration, and respect for the national rights of the Oromo people.
It will be recalled that the regime in Ethiopia has on several occasions during the past two decades organised sham elections to justify its misrule. However, far from giving it legitimacy, the charade has only deepened the mistrust and scorn of the Oromo and all other peoples and political players in Ethiopia. Regardless, the regime is again busy to run a similar election in 2015. The result is of course simple to predict. In view of the total obliteration of any meaningful competitors, the TPLF/EPRDF will retain power and the status quo will be maintained. This is an opportunity for the Security Council to
act to prevent maintenance of the status quo, which would speed a slide down the treacherous trail trekked in the past by similar tyrannical regimes in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia and Syria with ruinous consequences. Your kind and swift action is much appreciated.
More @ https://oromianeconomist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/appeal-letteer-to-un-general-secretary-mr-ban-ki-moon-12-11-2014.pdf
A panel discussion organised by the Oxford Water Network and the Oxford Martin Programme on Resource Stewardship
Africa faces formidable development challenges in the 21st Century, with expanding populations and accelerating urbanisation; rising demand for water, energy and food; greater hydrological variability predicted with climate change; and persistent poverty and inequalities. Dams seem to promise an appealing package of benefits to meet Africa’s development needs – they can reduce floods, store water for irrigation, provide energy for burgeoning populations and facilitate regional integration. Yet, the benefits and costs of dams are not distributed evenly and new large dams are planned that could alter the political, social and water landscape of the region. What is the role for dams in Africa’s development? Can they give African countries the boost they need for growth and poverty alleviation, or will they only serve to exacerbate environmental problems, conflict and existing inequalities?
See more @ http://www.water.ox.ac.uk/africa-dams-and-development/
Oakland, CA – Today, the Oakland Institute (OI), in collaboration with the Anywaa Survival Organisation (ASO), released Engineering Ethnic Conflict: The Toll of Ethiopia’s Plantation Development on the Suri People, the latest in its series of comprehensive investigative reports about land grabs and forced evictions in Ethiopia. The report uncovers the truth behind a reported massacre of 30 to 50 Suri people in May 2012 near the 30,000-hectare Malaysian-owned Koka plantation. Based on extensive fieldwork, Engineering Ethnic Conflict reveals the destabilizing effects of foreign investment in Southwestern Ethiopia and examines the role of international aid programs in supporting forced evictions in the country.
“The tragic experiences of the Suri people outlined in this report are just one of many examples of the human rights abuses experienced by pastoralist communities in regions across Ethiopia,” said OI’s Executive Director, Anuradha Mittal. “These incidents are intimately tied to the Ethiopian government’s priorities of leasing land to foreign entities,” she continued.
“Some donor countries and development institutions have heralded Ethiopia for its unprecedented economic growth in recent years, which has in turn led to large-scale land acquisitions by foreign interests,” said Nyikaw Ochalla, Executive Director of the Anywaa Survival Organisation. “What has gone underreported is the tragic on-the-ground impact of this growth on indigenous populations. Engineering Ethnic Conflict exposes this harsh reality,” Ochalla continued.
“Unfortunately the Suri and other marginalized groups have no ability to voice their concerns over these developments on their land. There is little in the way of an independent media in Ethiopia that is permitted to cover this story, civil society that could advocate on these issues have been decimated by repressive laws, any criticism of government is met with harassment and detention. So what options are left for the Suri?” said Felix Horne of the Human Rights Watch.
The Suri pastoralist communities have lived in Southwestern Ethiopia for up to 200 to 300 years. The introduction of the large-scale plantations, including the Koka plantation in 2010, has not only made important grazing lands unavailable to the Suri and devastated their livelihoods–but also disturbed political order between the Suri and other local ethnic groups, escalating violent conflicts.
From coerced displacement of the Suri people to the exacerbation of pre-existing ethnic tensions between local groups in the region, Engineering Ethnic Conflict highlights the unreported nightmare experienced by Ethiopia’s traditionally pastoralist communities.
The report comes at a significant time in US politics. The US Senate included provisions in the 2014 Appropriations Bill that effectively diverts development aid funds for Ethiopia away from projects associated with forced evictions. Engineering Ethnic Conflict raises important questions about whether and how this language is being implemented, and the problematic connections between aid from the World Bank Group and other international donors, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development, for programs that support forced displacement and perpetrate violence against pastoralist communities.
“The stance taken by the US government in 2014 was encouraging, but it remains unclear whether action has been taken to implement the provisions of the bill and monitor the situation on the ground in Ethiopia,” said Mittal. “In light of this opacity and the continued violence and human rights abuses, it is time for the US government, other donors, and international institutions to stop turning a blind eye and take a strong stand to ensure aid in the name of development is not contributing to the ongoing atrocities nor supporting the forced displacement of people,” she continued.
The Oakland Institute is an independent policy think tank whose mission is to increase public participation and promote fair debate on critical social, economic and environmental issues (www.oaklandinstitute.org).
About the Anywaa Survival Organisation
Anywaa Survival Organisation is a not-for-profit organisation that believes in social justice and environmentally sensitive development that recognises and respects the rights of indigenous peoples’ active participation and enjoyment of the benefits of development in their own territories without prejudice (www.anywaasurvival.org).
Federal government plans to take over the entire corridor of 25km between Hawasa and Shashamene. Both Sidama Zone or SNNPR and Oromia have not been consulted yet.
Major cities in Oromia are administered in what is termed as “special zone.” Jimma and its surrounding is special zone; Addis Ababa and its surrounding is special zone; Adama and its surrounding is special zone. Now the federal government of Ethiopia is considering to create one for Shashamane because, sources disclose, the city is becoming home for ”nations and nationalities” and economically very significant to be left for the regional government. In fact, the federal government wants to take over the entire corridor of 25km between Hawasa and Shashamene. And both Sidama Zone or SNNPR and Oromia have not been consulted yet. The plan will land on table presumably after 2015 election and EPRDF secures majority in the house that is already decided at the council of ministers in their last successive meetings.
As a tradition, top-down orders from the Government of Ethiopia (GoE), which is mostly controlled and manipulated by the Tigrayan minority group TPLF, would not be questioned by the regional states and the ruling regional “allies.” Any form of divergence from what the GoE says would not be tolerated and often officials are intimidated. The Addis Ababa master plan for example faced stiff resistance and after about months of “mediation,” the GoE via Addis Ababa city administration is bracing for what is thought to be a potential escalation of dispute with Oromia when the plan is once again put for test in January 2015. The exact terms reached between Addis Ababa and Oromia with more arbrating than mediating role of Federal officials will never be known until documents are available for media and public. As to Diriba Kuma himself, he is nervous because he wants to return back to Oromia with his little left reputation. Aafter all Oromia is much formidable place for officials than the federal government, and this master plan is not making things easy for him. Again, he also wants to stay and turn things around, and that would risk him for intimidation by GoE.
The word ‘’federalize’’ is only used in this context to describe the intention of the Federal government. As it is dictated by the constitution and other bylaws, federal government can’t own land. However, the GoE acts as if it owns everything in the empire amplifying the stark reality and difference between what is on paper and what is being practiced. In fact, the creation of special zones can be taken as a strategy of weakening the regional governments by snatching economically viable and productive areas, at the same time, strengthen the much talked about TPLF’s economic empire.
Creating a special zone is not new thing in developing countries. The noble motive of creating such geographic and administrative demarcation is to facilitate development and ensure smooth and dynamic rural-urban divide, and reduce the negative impacts of emerging industries on the the environment and the society. However, the case of Oromia is quite different, or perhaps as the source indicates, disastrous.
In Addis Ababa, rampant mismanagement and corruption of land is source of fortune for few and destitution for most. Although rarely, this has been acknowledged by the city government itself. The last wave of urban land grab was right after the 2005 election. The so called Land Bank was fabricated to ration land to Tigrayans; following that campaign, Ex-Minister Ermisa Legese tells, over 150000 Oromo farmers and their families were displaced in what is now understood as systematic genocide. The second wave of land grab, this time deep into Oromia, is an ongoing project since 2012 right before Mele’s death. And many believe this Adds Ababa master plan legitimizes what has been done under the radar for the last 10 years. We should be afraid that It might take another 15 year but a complete social and economic Abyssinianization of Jimma, Adama and Shashamane is quite possible within this regime unless change is pending.
As smooth as it looks from outside falsely to handle investment and industries, the creation of special zone is an administrative hurdle because it is a redundant procedure. Creating a zone within Zone, society within society, economy within economy, is not sustainable and fair. There are experiences from other federal countries how to develop both social and economic sectors of the population without adversely impacting the livelihood of the people and the ecology. And the best way to do that is not to disconnect the rural surrounding from its urban epicenter.
Special zone model is attentively and particularly geared to be applied in Oromia as neither in Amhara nor in Tigray regions that they have special zones in a way they are in the former. In the later two regions, there are Mekele zone and Bahirdar zone but it is only purely for economic reasons since they have a smooth and consistent social transition from urban to rural settings. Without bold social and economic policy changes, my source thinks, these cities such as Jimma or Adama are administratively would soon be out of Oromia. because of their economic and administrative model and their social mix, which are not according to the interest of the Oromo people, just like Addis Ababa.
Apart from serving as a new hotbed for corruption and mismanagement, the new special zone around Shashamane and its link with Hawasa is intended to create an ‘’atmosphere of cooperation’’ between the two regional states. The increasing hostility between regional states were an intense topic during several federal security meetings. Most of these disputes are over land and border. Tigrayan controlled GoE, heavily influenced by Amhara individuals (not ANDM persei), wants to check and demise the little autonomy of regional state in pretext of ‘’creating one socioeconomic community’’ rhetoric of the constitution thereby pleasing the assimilative and border-phobic motives of some influential Amhara elites to restore their nostalgic interest of the empire and at the same time ensuring the continuous economic hegemony of Tigrayan minority.
Federal government plans to take over the entire corridor of 25km between Hawasa and Shashamene. Both Sidama Zone or SNNPR and Oromia have not been consulted yet
“Dargaggoonni kun Imaanaa guddaatu isin irra jira.Hacuucamuu sodaattanii biyya irraa hin godaaninaa.Jaalala uummataa qabaadhaa. Walii galtee qabaadhaa. Ani amma milli koo tokko gara boollaati. Isin garuu uummata keessan haqaan tajaajiluuf humnaa fi kutannoo cimaa qabaachuu qabdu!!!” Obbo Bulchaa Dammaqsaa
The only pro-democracy Opposition Coalition Party in Ethiopia, Medrek, held a rare rally in Finfinne (Addis Ababa) on Dec. 14, 2014. According to the reports, thousands of rally goers chanted slogans in Afan Oromo, English and Amharic languages demanding the TPLF-led Ethiopian regime free Oromo political prisoners, journalists and other political prisoners. Some of the slogans included: “Free Bekele Gerba!” – “Free Oromo Students!” – “Stop Land-Grabbing” – and “Free Journalists!”
At the rally, senior leaders of Medrek gave rousing speeches; speakers included: Dr. Beyene Petros (the Coalition’s President), Mr. Bulcha Demeksa (Chairman Emeritus of the Oromo Federalist Congress/OFC – one of the political organizations in the pro-democracy Medrek), Mr. Tilahun Endeshaw of the Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party/ESDFP, and Mr. Desta Dinka (Leader of the Medrek Youth).
Building on colonial rule’s multilayered identities of first-, second-, and third-class citizens, newly independent African countries regarded ethnolinguistic diversities entrenched in divergent political opinion as detrimental to unity and contrary to the nation-building project. They sought to dilute them in various systems of common-identity, single-nation projects and one-party systems. The failure to accommodate multiple community identities constitutes a critical challenge that poses severe threats to lasting peace, stability, and development, with particular importance in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
The combination of local mistrust in the current government and the opportunity for material gain present a recipe for violent conflict. Just as colonial powers developed systems focused on extracting resources from the continent to fund their own empires, local elites often use the profits from natural resources on the continent for their own ends. At the heart of the resource curse are issues of democratic governance. Without accountable institutions, the wealth from natural resources corrupts elites and thwarts democratic governance. – http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_effective_governance_in_challenging_environments.pdf
The “Africa rising” narrative has gained traction in recent years. But who, exactly, is rising? While statistics point to a continent whose fortunes have improved, many African citizens remain at the margins of socioeconomic development. Citizens’ uprisings in North Africa and in Burkina Faso provide a fresh reminder of the danger in touting impressive economic growth statistics while the majority of a
country’s population remains excluded from democratic governance processes and development.
It is also widely believed that development failures and governance deficits lie “at the heart of
Africa’s violent conflicts.”
According to the report Africa will only live up to the “rising” narrative if it can strengthen its systems of governance, promote inclusive development, and embed a culture of democracy and peace. It examines the obstacles to effective governance in challenging environments—from identity crises to poor natural resource management. A growing youth bulge and the widespread marginalization of young people, enduring underdevelopment, and persistent inequalities are among the social and economic challenges that are negatively impacting efforts to improve governance.
The report argues that Recent reverses in peace and security across Africa illustrate the persistent gaps that exist between the aspirational norms of democratic governance and their implementation. Yet, in the face of these setbacks, policy responses tend to focus on the violent symptoms of insecurity rather
than addressing one of the primary root causes of these conflicts: poor governance. To overcome this ambivalent record, Africa needs a unified strategy to address the continent’s governance challenges and advance long-term peace and stability. Effective, inclusive, and accountable governance; visionary leadership; and solid democratic institutions are critical to ensuring Africa reaches its potential in ever challenging environments. Thus, restoring and strengthening governance in fragile and conflictaffected
contexts calls for a new social contract built on accountability and inclusiveness—of institutions, politics, economic growth, natural resource management, and the delivery of public services. This new social contract, which is an essential prerequisite to Africa’s transformation, has the potential to facilitate the kind of socioeconomic development and responsive, inclusive politics that leads to an enabling environment for sustainable peace and stability.
Exploring African responses to these challenges, the authors outline progress and setbacks in developing frameworks for effective governance and strengthening institutions at regional, national, and local levels. They offer a number of recommendations for the African Union, its member states, and others to enhance democracy, bridge the divide between governance standards and performance, and promote effective governance from the ground up. Read @ http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_effective_governance_in_challenging_environments.pdf
It is not often you hear a Vice President of the World Bank calling for revolution, but Oby Ezekweseli did just that at the Royal African Society’s Annual Lecture last week.
There is an unwritten rule among politicians globally that they do not rubbish their rulers when they are abroad, but Oby – who would not describe herself as a politician – did not hold back.
We should have guessed how fired up she was when the former minister in President Obasanjo’s government in Nigeria and World Bank Vice President set the title: “Africa Rising? What will happen when her citizens arise?” You can watch her presentation here
She traced the lack of participation by the vast majority of Africans in their own development over the past 50 years which has left 70 – 80% of them absolutely poor. She blamed the “parasitic” African elites, not just for looting their countries, but for preventing any of the benefits of economic growth reaching their people. Her own country, Nigeria, is very rich but has some of the worst human development figures in the world.
She also pointed out that external actors, the aid donors, the World Bank and the IMF who drove the structural adjustment economic reforms of the 1990s and 2000s and left African citizens with no part to play in making the national choices for development. These reforms were necessary, she said, but “externals cannot give development to any country or any people… The ownership of the process by African citizens has been the missing link.”
Dismissing the current crop of African rulers, she expressed her pride in the people of Burkina Faso for the uprising that ejected President Blaise Compaoré
, who ruled there for 27 years. The leaders “absolutely don’t care” about their own citizens, she said, but spend their time among the global elite “all of whom have each other’s’ phone numbers”.
The next stage of development, said Oby, can only be done with the participation of the people, “no external force can do that…The change you have been waiting for will not come from the elite class waking up and having an epiphany. The change has to be made by the people. They are the only ones who can.”
And she urged the African diaspora to return to Africa and lead the struggle, a remark that created a moment of awkwardness in the room I noticed.
But I am sure you will agree this was an inspiring, energising message: People of Africa, you are citizens, not slaves. Rise up and demand what is yours and remove the people who have stolen it from you. Could the removal of Compaoré
by mass demonstrations followed by the refusal to accept an interim military ruler be the beginning of an Africa-wide trend as a 21st Century generation comes of age? It is not the usual message that you hear from African ministers or the World Bank.
But there is an anomaly here. If Oby is right then the most democratic countries with the most widespread political participation would be the most prosperous. And the most equal in terms of sharing the national cake. But this is not so.
Put aside the oil and mineral-rich countries in Africa, and, as Oby pointed out, you find that the fastest growers are those with stability and strong institutions such as effective ministries that deliver health and education to their people. In turn these attract aid and investment. These countries are Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania.
But what else do they have in common? Ethiopia and Rwanda are top-down dictatorships ruled by parties that fought their way to power and have ruled since 1991 and 1994 respectively. They deliver health and education to their people but they do not allow freedom of speech or association. Their media are tightly controlled. Uganda is a less powerful dictatorship but President Yoweri Museveni also came to power through the barrel of a gun in 1986 and his army has controlled the country ever since. The ‘Walk to Work’ mass movement in 2011, which complained about lack of services and high prices, was brutally suppressed.
Museveni was forced by aid donors to open up politics and he now has to put up with a rumbustious parliament and a moderately free press. A grumpy population, especially in the capital, might vote for someone else if they were sure that someone was allowed to run in a fair election. That is unlikely. At election times the state, including the police and the army, is an extension of the ruling party.
Mozambique and Tanzania are still run by the parties that led those countries at independence. Both will soon become exceedingly rich because of oil and gas; God-given resources that are profoundly anti-democratic. Oil-rich countries do not need to raise taxes from their people, they mainline millions from oil companies straight into the treasury. So whoever is in power when those revenues begin to flow may stay there for decades. There is still some democratic space in these countries and there are real national debates with opposition parties in both of them, although it is unlikely that an opposition party could win without provoking violent reactions from the ruling parties.
So is benign dictatorship the best Africans can hope for? There are certain advantages – stability and consistency. The downside is that it is dangerous to think or speak out so there is no national debate. Meanwhile new generations emerge – especially in Africa where birth rates are high – and dictators become out of touch. If the new generation follow Oby Ezekwesili’s call, Africa will remain exceedingly interesting and exciting and should also become prosperous and powerful.
See more @ http://africanarguments.org/2014/12/11/citizens-of-africa-arise-you-have-nothing-to-lose-but-your-chains-says-oby-ezekwesili-by-richard-dowden/
International Human Rights Day marks the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. Crafted in the shadow of the horrors of the Holocaust and World War II, the Declaration gave the world the vision it needed to stand up to fear and the blueprint it craved to build a safer and more just world. Its single premise is: “Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”
Human Rights Day Message:United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein’s message for Human Rights Day 10 December 2014.
In observing Human Rights Day, its important to highlight the horrific going on in 2014 in our world. The following document is the summary of horrific repression going on against Oromo people by tyrannic Ethiopian regime:
From Colonization to Globalization: Different or Repetition?
Martial Frindethie
. . . since the collapse of the USSR, the dynamics of empire has changed. The World is now more multipolar and mercantile, with China and Europe emerging to compete against the US. Empire is more driven by multinational corporations, whose interests transcend those of any particular nation-state.
STEVEN HIATT—”Global Empire: The Web of Control,” A Game As Old as Empire
Crisis as Possibility or Globalization à la française
General Charles de Gaulle, this most beloved French president and iconic figure of French resistance and morality, once formulated an aphorism whose hideous veracity is only equaled by the unscrupulous zeal with which France put it into practice throughout history. “France,” he said, “has no friends, but only interests.” This Gaullist maxim, which foreboded an unchanged paradigm of philosophical disinformation, economic strangulation, military persecution, and political destabilization, if it has proven factual over time and has helped France accumulate a colossal fortune to the detriment of its former colonies, is today being challenged by most French-speaking African countries. Perhaps, the most powerful counter-hegemonic social movement of the twenty first century witnessed in French Africa is the resistance movement that has been taking place in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002. Sidiki Bakaba, an Ivorian filmmaker, has documented it in his Bare-handed Victory.1 It is a mobilization and struggle against French neocolonial agenda disguised under the coat of globalization. The objective of this polymorphous resistance movement is to unveil and defeat France’s imperial economic and political scheme wherever it will manifest itself in Côte d’Ivoire and under whichever form it will hide. Côte d’Ivoire, the Ivorian patriotes often chant, will be the graveyard of
France’s deceitful policy in its former colonies. What they mean is that, at least in Côte d’Ivoire, they are determined to put an end to the French arsonist policy by which France has historically schemed to set multiple fires in Africa in order to hire itself as emergency management agency via the United Nations and the world financial institutions.
THE LOGIC OF FRENCH INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA
No matter under which form they come into view, the various French interventions in Africa have never had a philanthropic thrust. French intrusions in Africa have always been driven by logic of maximum wealth through minimum or no effort. Historically, the French Republic has seldom won a war. In fact, the French have systematically lost most wars, even the ones that they confidently declared on their neighbors; and each time France was defeated, it turned to Africa or to the Caribbean with the most destructive designs to assuage its bruised ego and to rebuild its broken finances. An understanding of the French policy in Africa—and the Caribbean—whereby in moments of political and financial distress at home crises are implemented abroad as possibility for Hexagonal improvement could inform a discussion of the contemporary stance against France’s brand of globalization in Africa in general, and in Côte d’Ivoire in particular.
In 1871, in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, a war that France declared and seemed so confident to win on its Prussian neighbor, France emerged a broken and demoralized nation with a diminished territory, a poor economy, and an injured reputation. The German Alliance had just defeated France, annexed its territories of Alsace and Lorraine, and handed the French government a reparation invoice the equivalent of one billion dollars to be paid within three-year. Despite its drained reserves, France managed to acquit itself of the enormous bill long before the scheduled deadline. France’s alacrity to make good on the German humiliating tab would have seemed a casual occurrence if almost fifty years before this event, a less powerful country, Algeria, asking that France reimbursed a loan it had owed for too long, had not paid a heavy cost for its impertinence. In fact, the immediate economic outcome of the 1789 French Revolution was catastrophic. Agricultural methods in France had remained archaic. Unlike British farmers, for instance, French farmers had not been able to develop large agricultural exploitations to sustain the local markets and bring in much-needed revenues. The small farms could hardly feed the French populations, and the price of grain and firewood had skyrocketed; bread, the quintessential French food,
was being rationed. France was on the verge of famine, and an even more dangerous prospect was developing: Napoleon’s hungry armies in Italy and Spain were getting irritable, and a mutiny could break any time. Subsequently, France turned to two Algerian commercial houses, Bacri and Busnach, for a loan in money and grains in order to remedy the country’s hardship. However, Bacri and Busnach, too, owed some money to the Algerian sovereign, Dey Kodja Hussein, and they were waiting for France to honor its
tab, so they could settle their debt with the Dey. In 1815, by the end of the Napoleonic failed war, France’s debt to Algeria was about 18 million francs. Perhaps the merchants had asked Dey Hussein to recover the money from French authorities on their behalf, so that they could also settle their debts with him. Whatever
the case, Dey Hussein grew impatient with France’s tergiversations. In 1827, during a heated argument with Pierre Deval, the French consul in Algeria about France’s long-due balance, the Dey’s flywhisk flew in the face of the French consul. King Charles X, who was not very eager to pay off his delinquent debt to Algeria, seized this occasion to protest what he perceived in the Dey’s gesture as lack of respect for the French Crown. Despite Dey Hussein’s explanation that his gesture was in response to Pierre Deval’s
personal insult to him, and not a condescension directed at the king of France, 600 French ships landed 37,000 troops in Algeria on June 14, 1830. The French soldiers engaged in the most despicable acts of religious vandalism and human right abuses. They raided mosques and transformed them in cathedrals.
They destroyed private properties; they raped women, and executed hundreds of Algerians. Less than a month later, on July 5, the French deposed Dey Hussein. By February 1831, Algeria became effectively a French settlement colony, and French authorities invited 4500 French colonists to farm the fertile coastal
lands of Algeria.2 The French occupation of Algeria was not easy, nonetheless. Until 1962, the Algerians resisted the French. Finally, in 1962, the Algerians handed the French one of their most humiliating defeats in history. Germany of 1870 was not 1830’s Algeria. France understood that it was not in its interest to
delay its obligation toward the Germans. So, France paid its debt promptly and spent the ensuing years ruminating its defeat and thinking of ways to brighten its tarnished image in Europe. Many social engineers suggested that France should concentrate its efforts overseas and build itself an empire that would both replenish its depleted coffers and extend to “inferior” races its ideals of civilization.
France, it should be noted, had been present in Africa as early as 1642 and had actively participated in the slave trade that sold more than 28 millions Africans in Europe and in the Americas between 1650 and 1900. At that time, the purpose was clearly economic, and no one spoke of extending French “superior” civilization to the “inferior” races of Africa. In the later years of the 1800, however, the climate was no longer the same. By 1804 Denmark initiated an abolitionist wave that started to sweep Europe and America. In 1848, France reluctantly abolished the official practice of slave trade. Among the people who had expressed disapproval of the slave trade, was Olaudah Equiano, a former slave. Equiano was also a former slave owner who had understood that slavery could only be stopped if there could be an incentive for not practicing it. So, he tried to convince slave owners that slave trade was depleting Africa of potential consumers of European goods, and he urged Europeans to turn instead to disseminating European civilization to Africa, as they exploited the many African raw materials from which slave trade had distracted them.3 The functioning semantic pair was thus launched, commerce and civilization, which would henceforth be seized on as determining the scope of France’s—and European—new globalizing efforts in Africa. Taking Equiano’s suggestions to globalize otherwise at heart, European countries raced for the riches of Africa. Ivory, gold, timber, cocoa, coffee, rubber, palm oil, nuts, and tropical fruits, and not slaves—even though some “lawbreakers” were still trading in slaves, for seventy years went by between the Danes’ abolition of slavery in 1792 and the effective stop of slave importation to Europe became the new commodities that brought huge profits to European markets.
By the late 1800, Africa became so crowded with European fortune seekers that conflicts became inevitable. To better regulate trade in Africa and to avoid conflicts among the international actors in the region, the European powers held a conference in Berlin between November 15, 1884 and February 26, 1885, under the chairmanship of German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck. Although the organizers publicized the conference as a meeting for discussing issues of humanity, peace, and the “civilizing” and “welfare” of the native populations of Africa, it was definition of the rules to govern the Europeans’ claims of territories in Africa that actually dominated the talks. The Conference resolved the question of territorial conflicts among European countries by deciding that any European nation that formally gave other nations notice of its occupation of
a territory would be recognized as the rightful owner of that territory. So, having defined the rules of the game, European powers rushed to slash as larger morsels as they could of the African pie.
However, still haunted by the specters of defeat, the French had yet to be convinced. Their 1870 beating by the Germans had dampened all their enthusiasm for globalizing enterprises. Furthermore, their Algerian colonies had not turned out to be what India had been to Great Britain. Algerians continued to oppose long drawn-out resistances to the French occupation, and the North African colony had cost more headaches to France than it had brought in profits. In light of so few encouraging events, French financiers were hesitant
to spend money in African adventures; they preferred less uncertain governments bonds, and French politicians preferred for their constituencies a good pot-au-feu to the bad bread that they ate during the 1870 German siege of Paris. On the other hand, the wounds of humiliation inflicted by the Germans were slow to heal, and many government officials believed that France could shine again if only it could secure for itself a large African empire. Five months after the Berlin Conference, a debate between proponents and opponents of colonial expansion was raging in the hall of the French Assemblée Nationale. The two most memorable protagonists of this debate were Jules Ferry (Ferry was twice prime minister of France, once from September 1880 to November 1881, and another time from February 1883 to April 1885) and Georges Clémenceau. On July 28, 1885, five months after being driven out of office for overseeing the failed the 1885 Chinese-French war, Jules Ferry was making a case for colonialism in the chamber of the
National Assembly.
Ferry invoked three arguments in favor of France’s colonial expansion. Economically, within the logic of its industrial aspirations, France needed to find new markets outside Europe and the United States for its export commodities, as Germany and America had become increasingly protectionist at the same time as
they had been flooding France with new agricultural and industrials products. Economists like Leroy-Beaulieu, who tried to establish a nexus between Britain’s wealth and its possession of an overseas empire, and who argued that the acquisition of a colonial empire would indubitably bring economic wealth to France, supported this argument.5 From a humanitarian perspective, Ferry argued that, as a member of the “higher race,” France had a divine right and a duty to civilize the “inferior races,” perfect them, and improve their backward morals. From a political and patriotic perspective, Ferry insisted that France needed to ensure its place in the world by performing acts of grandeur. For Ferry, amidst the European rush
for territorial expansion, any politics of abstention on the part of France would amount to abdication. To ascertain its position on the international exchequer, France would have to start importing its language, its customs, its flag, and its genius.6 Replying to Ferry, Clémenceau charged that Ferry’s dichotomy of superior race/inferior race was suspect and reminiscent of the German social engineers’ discourse in the days preceding the Franco-Prussian war. The Germans, like Ferry was doing then, had argued for racial superiority. German scientists had asserted that because the French were an inferior race, France was doomed to lose the war. So, Clémenceau urged his fellowmen not to repeat this German axiom against African nations by trying to disguise violence under the cunning designation of civilization. For him, the
excuse of right or duty to civilize was nothing but a right to brutality that scientifically advanced societies tend to arrogate to themselves in order to take possession of less advanced nations and torture their citizens and exploit them for the benefit of so-called superior races. Clémenceau concluded that to make civilization a justification for colonization was to adjoin hypocrisy to violence. In any case, the early 1890s witnessed the rise of a multitude of strong pro-colonialist pressure groups, such as, the Comité de l’Afrique française, the Comité de l’Égypte, the Comité de l’Asie française, or the Comité de Madagascar, all unified under the banner of the Parti colonial, which made the case for a revival of France’s place in the world. Their argument was less to sell an African business venture to French investors than to sell an African empire to the state. By 1890, a colonial consensus was in place in France, which advocated a new globalizing venture based less on treaties with local chiefs, and more on forceful military approach.7 Against all apprehensions,
the French militarized globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa turned out to be more lucrative than even pro-colonists had previously thought. When the dust of the European global dash to Africa settled, the continent was parceled into fifty territories, and most European countries had their African colonies. France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal were the countries that obtained the lion part. France snatched a large territory in West Africa from Mauritania to Chad (French West Africa), and Gabon and Congo (French equatorial Africa), as well as the Island of Madagascar. France became an empire-building nation. Its overseas empire comprised the territories of present day Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Togo, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the Islands of Mauritius, Reunion, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, and Mayotte.
The French territories did not all have the same status. They were slave colonies, exploitation colonies, settlers’ colonies, or protectorates, and they were ruled accordingly. Most French colonies in the Caribbean were slave colonies, whereas in sub-Saharan Africa they were principally exploitation colonies. In exploitation colonies, France’s goal was to run away with most of the resources the colonies could yield (coffee, cocoa, lumber, palm oil, rubber, tropical fruits and nuts, and various minerals) for the benefit of the metropolitan state. Also, Africans from exploitation colonies were not on the same footing as those living
in settlers’ colonies or protectorates. Settlers’ colonies and protectorates had local rulers collaborating with a French appointed consul. The protectorate of Tunisia had a local sovereign, the Bey. In the Settlers’ colony of Algeria, it was the Dey. These first attempts at globalization were, like the ones that preceded them, devoid of any real reciprocity. The native peoples of the colonies resisted them ferociously; and whatever justification the imperialist countries gave for their retreat from the colonies, they did not leave on their own good will. The cost in human and financial capital was too high for France to sustain, the determination of the colonized too strong to break. The imperialist countries left because they were simply and purely beaten and forced to recognize the autonomy of their colonies.
However, the hexagonal impulse for profit was so imperative that France devised a number of “cooperation” schemes to remain the privileged speculator in the newly independent countries of Africa.
French-speaking Africa’s independences in the 1960s did not preclude France from seeking to exploit its former colonies. France’s politics in Africa has consistently been governed by a protectionist itch; an itch that long after the African independences, continues to make France think that it is the Promised Land, its language the quintessential language, and its culture the exemplary culture, and that by indoctrinating Africans to think so to, France can keep on transferring economic resources from Africa to France as natural and expected. Already, during the colonial system, France’s protectionist impulse had mandated free entry of French goods in the French African colonies and imposed tariffs on colonial goods entering France.8 This decision had the obvious consequence of impoverishing the colonies while enriching the metropolis. However, the 1930s recession made it crucial, for France’s economic survival, that French authorities transform the African colonies into consumer markets. France thus eased tariffs on its colonies in order to allow them to sell more easily on French markets, earn money, buy French manufactured goods, and also pay interests on their debts. At the same time, in order to avoid competition from other powers, France imposed quotas on some foreign imports to France and to French colonies. France also forbade its colonies to export certain products to foreign markets, thus forcing those foreign countries to purchase only from France products that would otherwise be available in the colonies. In addition, France placed duties on some foreign imports competing with colonial goods entering France. These duties ranged from 11% on non-colonial bananas to 110% on cocoa, passing through 34% on peanuts and palm kernels and 91% on non-colonial coffee. Although many analysts have wanted to see this pre-independence “preferential system” accorded to the colonies as having greatly contributed to keeping French Africa afloat during the 1930s economic slump and responsible for what came to be known in the 1980s as the economic miracle of Côte d’Ivoire, evidence disproves it.9 In fact, the market-driven economy that this colonial system fostered provided the colonies with some money, only to be returned tenfold to France. Furthermore, this market economy, which France managed to keep alive long after the African independences, was the source of many economic shocks, as it put French-speaking African nations at the mercy of international speculators. The preferential economic systems established by France on its own—and later with the cooperation of the E.C., which became the E.E.C in 1975—actually sought to maximize France’s profits by curbing France’s diminishing returns in the colonies. Already in 1959, the French commercial system made it possible for France’s African colonies to consume 28.2% of French exports while contributing to 20% of French imports. These numbers dropped to 7.8% of French exports used by Francophone Africa against 5.9% of French imports coming from Africa. The various conventions (Lomé, Yaounde, Lomé 2), which reinforced
France’s economic “cooperation” with its former colonies and later with Anglophone Africa and the ACP states, did little to create real conditions of development for non-European countries. In fact, France maneuvered to exclude “Asian ex-colonies from the ACP states on the ground that they would prove dangerous competitors in a range of industrial products,” and the tiny country of Mauritius, a potential competitor in textiles was asked by the E.C. to voluntarily restrain from the ACP.10 The E.C. states, and particularly France, its most aggressive member, did nothing to foster manufactures in Africa. As far as the E.C. was concerned, Africa was to remain an eternal supplier of raw materials; and late 1980s Washington Consensus, with its menu of one-sided depoliticization of the state that opposes social public sector investment in welfare, job creation, environmental protection, healthcare, education, and poverty reduction,11 offered France the blessing of the Bretton Woods institutions to carry on a game that it had been perfecting for so long: that of draining off wealth from Africa under the semblance of reciprocal improvement.
As it turned out, economic globalization as conceived by the Washington Consensus presupposed an international violence. Economic globalization assumes, often on the ground of mere bureaucratic sixth sense and no scientifically dependable instance, that, in order to improve the welfare of human populations, the prescription is to oblige developing countries to fine-tune their economies according to the requirements of Euro-American multinational corporations by way of liberalizations of local markets. The result of this philosophical-economic exercise is that, as was the case in the days of the colonization of Africa, it effectively relocates crises of economic deterioration from North to South. The World Bank and the IMF’s persistence that developing countries open their economies to Foreign Direct Investments has
enabled the re-occupation of the countries that have resolved, half a century ago, to determine the course of their particular developments away from the imperial ambitions of Europe. In most cases, globalization has succeeded in reinstating European—and American—imperialism by allowing First World capitalists quasiownership of Third World countries through purchases of strategic government-owned enterprises, such as, power, water, and communication companies. The scheme works when “the imperial state bails out banks, investors and speculators and provides political pressure to open markets, sends military expeditions to eliminate alternatives.”12 In this grand design of recolonization disguised as globalization, resistance is ruthlessly squashed by a variety of coercive methods. For the Third World leaders who, against the First World’s schema, try to pursue a populist agenda that advocates national control of their country’s resources and benefits, and who, true to their people, refuse to fall prey to the trap of corruption and the promise of First World lifestyle, “the EHM [Economic Hit Men] game plan includes a full menu of oppositions to ensure compliance, whether willing or not.
The menu includes subversion of the political process, contact with and corruption of administration and business leaders, corruption of the military, of the media, of trade unions, and of academics, and the stirring of ethnic and religious divergences; a menu that seems to come directly from the handbook of the colonial era, and which begs to be verified against the inventory of treatments that countries like Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Haiti, to cite only these few, have endured for daring to stand against the tripartite collusion of the northern countries, the United Nations and the financial institutions, and their corrupt local political puppets. In Côte d’Ivoire, this threefold conspiracy functioned along the axis of a high-level African IMF executive, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who doubled as a shady native informant, during his years as prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire, his direct association with French multinationals, Bouygues and Bolloré, and his ties with the Chirac government in France. This web of international relationships is essential for understanding Côte d’Ivoire’s resistance to globalization à la française.
CÔTE D’IVOIRE: FROM ECONOMIC PROSPERITY TO SCARCITY
The 1970s were an age of prosperity in Côte d’Ivoire. The skyrocketing prices on international markets of cocoa and coffee, the country’s main export commodities, had created an astonishing economic boom and established Côte d’Ivoire as the preeminent economic power in the West Africa. Signs of development were visible in all sectors; and economic observers were not shy to compare the Ivorian economic sensation to the Japanese miracle. They were partly right: The Ivorian growth rate was only second to Japan’s.
However, this economic boom was heavily dependent on foreign capitals, as it was tied to international speculators’ willingness to pay high prices for coffee and cocoa. Attempts to diversify the economy and launch development programs led the country to borrow external capitals, which were not always well managed. Furthermore, the falling prices of coffee and cocoa in the late 1970s and early 1980s amplified the country’s external debt and led Houphouët to turn to the World Bank and the IMF for loans to stabilize his country’s economy. The period spanning from the mid-1980s to early 1990s was a time of mixed blessings for Côte d’Ivoire’s economy. The exploitation of newly discovered offshore oil reserves had helped alleviate some of the country’s hardships; however, the economic storm was not totally weathered.
Amidst rumors of government layouts, people took massively to the streets to protest what they interpreted as the results of the grab for power of the PDCI (party in power). To save his presidency, Houphouët bent to the conditions of the Bretton Woods institutions and invited the IMF economist Alassane Ouattara in April 1990 to chair the Comité Interministériel de Coordination du Programme de Stabilisation et de Relance Economique (Interministerial Committee for Coordination of the Stabilization and Economic Recovery Program), a committee in charge of reflecting on ways to tackle the economic crisis and find adequate solutions. Five months later, an ailing Houphouët appointed Alassane Ouattara prime minister. What happens from April 1990 onward is a series of events that read like a novel.
DOMINIQUE NOUVIAN FOLLEROUX: FEMME FATALE
Ouattara’s proximity to Houphouët allowed him greater closeness to Ms. Nouvian Folleroux, the woman that would become his wife and most trusted associate in the most rocambolesque financial intrigues to define the political future of Côte d’Ivoire. The circumstances in which Dominique Nouvian was introduced to the epicenter of power in Abidjan are still not very clear today. What is clear is that she became Houphouët’s official mistress and the exclusive administrator of Houphouët’s huge estate and part of the country’s estate. Her new title gave her tremendous name recognition and financial power, even as her benefactor’s popularity at home was declining. Indeed, in the early 1990s a fierce political opposition assailed the ailing Ivorian president, Houphouët. For the first time, the “Old Man,” as he was affectionately called in Africa, released his grip on power. Under the pressure of the Bretton Woods institutions and France, he named Ouattara prime minister, legalized opposition parties and promised multiparty presidential and legislative elections in Côte d’Ivoire. The October 28 multi-candidate presidential election confirmed the strength of the opposition, and especially of Houphouët’s old political rival, Laurent Gbgagbo, leader of the socialist Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). According to international observers Gbagbo garnered more than 30% of the votes—though the official ballot count conceded him only 18.3% against 81.7% for the seating president. On November 26, 1990, eighteen opposition parties competed against Houphouët’s PDCI during the parliamentary elections. Houphouët’s PDCI retained 163 of the 175 parliamentary seats. If anything, the contestation of the Old Man’s hitherto absolute power was the confirmation of a new era. Houphouët was a diminished man.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Dominique Nouvian Folleroux’s business seemed to suffer no setback at all from Houphouët’s trouble at home; au contraire. Among other things, she sold some of Houphouët’s real estates in France for the amount of 19 million Euros, a transaction that, though suspicious by Ivorian authorities,
put her at the center of French big business. She acquired Jacques Desange’s hair saloons in the United States. AICI (Agence Iternationale de la Commercialisation Immobilière), the real estate office that she opened in Abidjan was attracting big clients, as she was making important friends. Her regulars were Martin Bouygues, the French king of concrete, owner at 42.9% of TF1 (the first French TV station drawing more than 31.6% of French TV audiences), owner of LCI, another French TV channel, special guest to Nicolas and Cécilia Sarkozy’s wedding, and godfather of their son Louis Sarkozy; Vincent Bolloré (business partner of Bouygues) king of cigarette paper and media—it was Bolloré who paid the new French president a vacation trip to Malta on his luxurious boat as a congratulation present after the 2006 French presidential election; it was he again who lent his private Falcon 900 to Sarkozy and his then new girlfriend Carla Bruni for their December 25, 2007 vacation trip to Egypt; Dominique Strauss-Khan, former minister of finance of President Mittérand and IMF president since 2007, Bongo, president of Gabon who, like
Houphouët before him, has been so close to Dominique Nouvian Folleroux as to also entrust the administration of his real estate and part of his country’s property to the Gabon branch of Mrs. Folleroux’s company AICI, run by her brother Philippe Nouvian. Other patrons of Mrs. Dominique Nouvian Folleroux are Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, and Kadhafi of Libya. Hers was a network of powerful financial friends; the same network that Ségolène Royal, the Socialist candidate to the French presidential election accused on May 4, 2007, of trying to influence French elections by manipulating the news.14 The very network that Ms. Royal was denouncing during the French presidential elections is the association of powerful financial interests that Mrs. Dominique Nouvian Folleroux has been able to weave since she first entered Houphouët’s bedroom in Abidjan. Dominique Nouvian Folleroux was the powerful woman that Alassane Ouattara said to have fallen in love with, as he responded to President Houphouët’s IMF-coerced call for help.
“OUATTARA! OUATTARA! HE’S OUR MAN. HE CAN’T DO IT, NOBODY CAN!”
Such seemed to be the mindset of the Bretton Woods institutions and big international corporations with financial stakes in Côte d’Ivoire since about the death of Félix Houphouët Boigny, in December 1993. An excellent student of the IMF, where he first worked from 1968 to 1973 before assuming various positions at the BCEAO (Central Ban of West African States), Ouattara was very receptive to the International Monetary Fund’s prescription of Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa despite the burden that these programs put on local populations. As prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire, his solutions for redressing the country’s economy did more harm than good. Ouattara cut subsidies to farmers, as recommended by the WTO, at the same time as the European Union and the United States were heavily backing their own farmers with huge subsidies; he dismissed more than 10,000 employees from the state payroll. Those who were lucky to keep their jobs saw their salaries reduced by 40% or were forced to accept an early retirement package. He reduced access to early education by freezing the recruitment of new teachers. He closed students’ subsidized restaurants. He eliminated transportation and basic healthcare services for students. He imposed fees on the masses for basic healthcare services. He initiated the devaluation of the CFA at the rate of 100 CFA francs for 1 French franc. He instituted the highly controversial resident cards for foreigners, which was the source of much harassment toward foreign nationals coming from neighboring African countries, and he aggressively pursued Mauritanian and Lebanese merchants for so-called back taxes in the upward of millions of CFA francs. In a word, Ouattara
executed the World Bank/IMF’s recommendations to the letter. These measures, as it was to be expected, frustrated the masses even further. Workers and students’ demonstrations intensified; which, under his orders, were repressed in blood. Scores of students were killed and student, union, and opposition leaders, among whom the current president, Laurent Gbagbo and the leader of higher education teachers’ union, Marcel Etté, were jailed and tortured amidst international outcries and unsuccessful calls for an independent investigation. Undeniably, Ouattara was a good student of the IMF. In Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara was the praiseworthy son of a powerful institution that had reared him to serve the father unreservedly. The question was whether he was really a son of Côte d’Ivoire, concerned with the interests of his fellow citizens.
As far as the World Bank and the IMF were concerned, this question had no bearing so long as the Washington Consensus had a powerful spokesperson in the country that would guarantee the interests of its shareholders. So, under further pressure, the ailing president Houphouët had Ouattara cumulate the portfolios of prime minister, minister of finance, and interim president. During Houphouët’s long sickness and his medical treatment in Europe in 1993, Ouattara ordered that all public receipts (collection of taxes, debts, and returns from the customs, the ports, and even the treasury) be directly deposited in a special account at the office of the prime minister rather than at the treasury, as it was customarily the case. This a typical management style, to say the least, quickly mixed individual assets with state property, and millions of dollars from the public treasury remained unaccounted for, while Ouattara, taking as much as two flights a week to Europe, officially to visit his sick boss—but unofficially on capital flight missions was tucking enormous sums of money away in personal foreign bank accounts, making him one of the richest men on earth. Ouattara’s mysterious fortune raised some eyebrows, even among his supporters.
However, Ouattara’s questionable wealth did not cause the slightest shudder among the high priests of morality who, in their immense chairs, in the temples of virtue of 1818 H Street as well as 700 19th Street, in Washington, D.C., were sermonizing the world about good governance and saintliness. Why should they care? Was it not fair that Ouattara be rewarded for being such a great agent to his masters? For Côte d’Ivoire, however, Ouattara’s activities were economically disastrous. During his term as prime minister, Ouattara became one of the biggest actors of capital flight from Côte d’Ivoire toward European banks. As he raided the country’s coffers, he also depleted Africa of much needed resources.
Indeed, capital flight, the bulk of the private assets and as we have just seen with Ouattara, private and public assets can be easily mixed—that are legally or illegally held in foreign countries outside Africa, is one of the continent’s biggest impoverishers. Capital flight, reported to amount to about US$ 22 billions, is as much as half of the aid that Africa needs for its development programs. Were this money brought back to Africa, it would constitute 64% of Africa’s private capital stock.16 As one of Africa’s biggest capital
jetsetters, Alassane Ouattara is, without doubt, and in proportion to the short time he spent as prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire (three years and 1 month), among the leaders who have economically siphoned the continent the most.
As the prime minister was busy outsourcing his public function to the businessman in him, thus mixing state capitals with private capitals, Dominique Folleroux—whom Ouattara had by then married during a 1991 ceremony officiated by the former mayor of Neuilly, currently president of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy—was now, against all ethical propriety, lobbying for Bouygues and Bolloré to acquire state-owned EECI (Energie Electrique de Côte d’Ivoire) and SODECI (Société de Distribution d’Eau de Côte d’Ivoire), respectively power and water companies. It did not take long for her clients to obtain satisfaction. These strategic Ivorian companies and others were sold off to Mrs. Dominique Nouvian Folleroux Ouattara’s clients and friends, usually under their market values, sometimes for just one symbolic
franc, all against the objection of opposition leaders and even leaders of Ouattara’s previous party (the PDCI). Henri Konan Bédié, at the time president of the National Assembly, fiercely opposed Ouattara’s unethical liberalization in the parliamentary chamber. As a result of Ouattara’s collusion with French businessmen, 27% of the assets of Ivorian enterprises were French-owned; 240 subsidiaries and more than 600 companies belonged to French businessmen; which represented 68% of direct foreign investments in Côte d’Ivoire. The shady investments enabled by Alassane and Dominique Ouattara’s, and which have
mortgaged the economic and political future of Côte d’Ivoire, have been widely reported, rightly so, as quid pro quo investments.
Mr. Michel Camdessus, a Frenchman who was the president of the IMF during the last term, when Alassane Ouattara was vice-president of the IMF, is currently serving as adviser to the French president Jacques Chirac. Of the members of the political parties and groups in Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, an unabashed advocate of IMF policies and an ideologue of the theology of neoliberalism, and his current wife, a French businesswoman solidly connected with business lobbies, offer the best guarantee to satisfy the conditions for security and profit for the French government, corporations, settlers, and small-enterprise owners who can have a lifestyle of comfort they cannot afford or even imagine to have in France.
For consenting to the corrupt terms of French business in Côte d’Ivoire at the detriment of the masses, Ouattara is allowed by France to realize his First Worldist jouissance by plundering his country’s coffers undisturbed. This lack of probity on the part of Africa’s most influential economists and leaders ought to be examined in relation to the dire future that their selfish proclivities set up for the continent. Between 1985 and 1998, the net outflows from Africa to developed countries have risen from of US$ 3.6 billion to the alarming amount of US$ 12.5 billion.18 Capital flight by native pillagers has contributed enormously to these outflows. This, of course, has profound depressing incidences on progress. As a result, Africa continues to service huge debts and remains unable to invest in public and private sectors; which in turn erodes, not just poverty reduction projects, but also, the confidence that honorable foreign investors have in the continent; and the cycle of poverty linked to debt servicing and fiscal deficit goes on until the corrupt agents’ facility to ransack is short-circuited. In Côte d’Ivoire, it was Henri Konan Bédié, the institutional heir to the presidency, who put an end to Ouattara’s capital flight activities, but not for long. Ouattara’s Parisian cronies were too determined to maintain their monopoly in the country to see the latter out of the political arena.
HENRI KONAN BÉDIÉ: NOT EXACTLY THE MAN PARIS HAD DREAMED OF
On December 7, 1993, Houphouët, who for three years had been sidelined by his illness from participating actively in Ivorian politics, passed away in his native village of Yamoussoukro. The Ivorian constitution had a provision for replacing a deceased head of state. Article 11 of the constitution stipulated that in such a vacancy of power, the president of the National Assembly was to assume the duties of head of state until the outcome of new elections. Bédié was therefore the constitutional heir to Houphouët. However, bypassing the legal process, Ouattara proclaimed himself legitimate successor to the presidency. This obvious constitutional hold up provoked uproar at the National Assembly, and during an unscheduled appearance on national TV, Bédié announced his intent to carry out his constitutional duty by finishing Houphouët’s term.
In the past, during his years as president of the National Assembly, Bédié had been openly critical of Ouattara’s complacent economic liberalism that widely opened the doors to foreign buyouts of strategic companies with very little regard for the country’s security. At the time when French politicians, led by Minister of finance Nicolas Sarkozy, were hammering at employees gatherings and at the French national Assembly that EDF (French state-owned power company) and GDF (French state-owned gas company) were never going to be privatized because of their strategic importance to French economy, Ouattara, the prime minister of Côte d’Ivoire, was selling his country’s power and water companies to the closest friends of the French government.19 What made Sarkozy’s position so tenable in France and so untenable in Côte d’Ivoire? Could it be for the simple reason that one was dealing in one case with a country located in Europe, and in another case with a country located in Africa? It is this lack of moral reciprocity, this kind of utter injustice that the movement of patriotes in Côte d’Ivoire has taken to task. In so doing, their demonstration was also aimed at denouncing the collaborators from within who have betrayed their people for the promise of economic lactification. For, the waves of coup d’état and political instabilities that have succeeded one another in Côte d’Ivoire since 1999 are strangely laden with odors of organic betrayals. Each time Côte d’Ivoire was affected by shockwaves of military blows, Ouattara was the insider that, for the
promise of a First Worldist enjoyment, betrayed the loyalty of a country he claimed to love.
Bédié, like Ouattara, believed in economic liberalism. Only insofar as one can speak in relative terms, Bédie’s liberalism, however, was one that was committed to ensuring that his country would not lose total sovereignty to wealthy investors from Europe, or from anywhere else for that matter; and he was working at it by making a number of reforms. Some of the measures that Bédié took in that direction had to do with the thorough identification of the populations living on the Ivorian soil through a systematic census program, the cleaning up the prevalent anarchical land exploitation, and the regulating of landownership. In fact, from the mid- to the late 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire was the second immigration destination in Sub-Saharan Africa, right behind South Africa, with an unusually high immigrant population rate of 27% for 13 million
Ivorians. The largest foreign communities were from Mali (2 millions), Burkina Faso (2 millions), Ghana (1.5 millions), Nigeria (500,000), and in smaller numbers from Benin and Togo. Though an agreement among the countries of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) allowed a free circulation and settlement of populations from any member state, the migration to Côte d’Ivoire was almost unidirectional. The important immigrant populations from neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, whose main purpose for coming to Côte d’Ivoire was to work the fertile land of the country or to cut and burn trees for the very lucrative charcoal business toward drier countries (Mali or Burkina Faso) had clashed several times with local populations over issues of landownership, forest fires, and severe national reserve deforestation. In 1999, a land dispute between settlers from Burkina Faso and locals from the region of Tabou (West of Côte d’Ivoire) had caused about 12,000 Burkinabé to flee their lands. This event, which took place a year after the National Assembly adopted a law that would prevent the sale of land to foreigner, invited even harsher criticisms towards Bédie’s reform. Bédie’s land reform did not sit well with his Malians and Burkinabé counterparts. The governments of Mali and Burkina Faso relied heavily for their national income on the money that their expatriates sent from Côte d’Ivoire. They perceived in Bédie’s reform a pretext to dispossess their compatriots of lands they had been exploiting for years, and they also found objectionable the reform’s obvious consequence of depleting their countries of much needed revenues. In their resentment of Bédie’s method, the Malians and Burkinabé could find stronger allies in the
French.
The old class of French landlords who acquired large portions of land in the southern part of the country often in obscure contexts, with no proper or convincing legal papers stipulating, for instance, the duration of the lease . . . oppose any form of land reform, as it could jeopardize transfer of these lands to their descendants.
These French landlords and businessmen had seen their privileges increased and consolidated with Ouattara. Under the administration of Houphouët’s prime minister, the status of the state had shifted from that of a governmental institution to the status of a non-governmental organization (NGO)—to use this term by James Ferguson. In other words, the prime minister had lost interest in state affairs and had, instead, become a businessman, increasingly drawn to establishing private business deals and building personal wealth to the disadvantage of public welfare. In the context of Bédie’s reform, the question then was whether, after having had a taste of the state of Côte d’Ivoire as a non-governmental institution, with all the advantages that this conversion entailed, France and the neighboring countries of Côte d’Ivoire, notably, Burkina Faso and Mali, were still inclined to see the administration of Côte d’Ivoire return to its rightful condition of a governmental institution committed to the welfare of the masses. This was the challenge that confronted the Bédié government in the mid to late 1990s.
Against this sociological background, it becomes clear that Bédie’s demise—for he was to fall soon—was not the result of mismanagement or hostility to openness. In fact, Bédié was as open to FDIs as Ouattara had been; he was just a little more mindful of the governmental role of the state. The fact that, for the most part, Africa’s openness to international trade and finance has left it at the mercy of insatiable First World capitalists and corrupt Third World collaborators should be less imputable to globalization itself than to the probity of the protagonists in the globalizing enterprise. Globalization has succeeded in places where the actors involved have shown a minimum of moral decency. Available data for Africa in the 1990s shows that countries in North Africa, and South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire had managed a low level of poverty with high level of openness. Côte d’Ivoire’s numbers are 20% of poverty incidence for 40% of openness.
Incidentally the data is not distributed on specific years of the 1990s, but it is easy to surmise that the incidence of lower poverty occurred during the Bédié years. Even Bédie’s detractors acknowledged that between 1995 and 1999, Côte d’Ivoire had known economic growth and increase in individual wealth.
Furthermore, a Trade Policy Review of Côte d’Ivoire’s trade policies conducted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on July 4 and 5, 1995, concluded with high praise for Bédie’s government open trade policies and expressed optimism for Côte d’Ivoire’s future.22 Bédie’s demise is just one more evidence that Foreign Direct Investments or private capital flows are not that private after all; Foreign Direct Investments often unleash state intervention, with all its military shock and awe. Whenever a powerful state intervenes to invade a weak state, one can be sure that some private investors from the powerful state, unhappy about
their returns in the weak state, have directly or indirectly triggered the military intervention. History is littered with examples where private investors have sent their countries to war to protect or simply to increase their dividends. Bédie’s lukewarm support for French interests was not what France had hoped for. Bédié was a man of France’s, but not their number one man. His zeal for reforms could hurt French interests in Côte d’Ivoire. Ouattara had been more bighearted to French business with his unchecked liberalization and his gré à gré surrender of public corporations to French investors and to his French partners. With Ouattara in power, France was sure to regain its slippery grip on Côte d’Ivoire by continuing to buy under their market values state-owned enterprises and by continuing to get government contracts by bypassing any calls for bids that would put them in competition with investors from the United States, Canada, Japan, South African, China, among others. For the sake of French interests, Bédié had to be deposed.
Meanwhile, Ouattara, who had returned to the IMF in 1993 upon the Supreme Court’s confirmation of Bédié as legitimate head of state, had been appointed by Michel Camdessus to serve as his deputy chairman of the institution one year later. Though at the IMF, Ouattara had not given up his presidential ambitions; neither was he willing to wait for regular elections to have his chance. The massive foreign electorate constituted by undocumented immigrants from Mali and Burkina Faso, many who had voted before in the one-party system farcical elections that had confirmed and reconfirmed Houphouët by acclamation, and on which Ouattara, too, was relying to win the 1995 presidential race, had been compromised by Bédie’s identification program. Bédie’s identification program required that only established Ivorians should vote in presidential elections, though established foreign residents were still allowed to vote in legislative and municipal elections. Bédie’s land reform as well as his census and civic formation projects fell under the umbrella of what he had termed ivoirité. This notion, whose origin had misleadingly been attributed to Bédié, and which had even more deceitfully been translated as Ivorianness, rather than simply Ivority as one had spoken of Africanity, Americanity, and Francity elsewhere was said to have first appeared in 1945 in Dakar at a black students’ conference. Later, in 1974, an Ivorian writer and poet, Niangoran Porquet, used it in an article entitled “Ivoirité et authenticité.” Ivorian scholar, Kanvaly Fadiga, defined it as the national consciousness, the common will of brotherly people who have chosen to live together on the Ivorian soil, and share together the same sufferings, the same joys, and the same hopes.
WHY FRANCITÉ BUT NOT IVOIRITÉ?
Ivoirité, as Bédié had recuperated it, was first intended to be, for the more than sixty ethnic communities of Côte d’Ivoire, a signifier of identification, a social glue that would instill in them a more patriotic stance, and consequently a stronger attachment to the state and its institutions as embodying the sum total of all individual nationalistic expressions. This was an essential societal project given the lack of fervor that the Ivorian populations had up till then expressed for the state and state institutions. Côte d’Ivoire was in most Ivorians’ eyes a state-ECOWAS, a sort of Deadwood, but a rich one nonetheless, where any opportunistic member of the 15 ECOWAS nations, and even beyond, would come to seek fortune by all means necessary, with no sincere attachment to the land, but a lucrative one. The people of Côte d’Ivoire had lost faith in their successive governments as really preoccupied with safeguarding their welfare, rather than bending over to live up to an image of sanctuary country by satisfying the caprices of ECOWAS. This situation was exacerbated by Houphouët’s choice, throughout his presidency, of foreign nationals as cabinet members. For instance, Raphaël Saller (France) had been minister of finance and development; Mohamed Diawara (Mali) had been minister of development; Abdoulaye Sawadogo (Burkina Faso) had been minister of agriculture; Hamadou Thiam (Senegal) had been minister of information. To better understand this level of governmental openness and the resulting mass frustration that ensued, Americans would only have to imagine Canadian, Brazilian, Columbian, Senegalese, or Antiguan nationals (who have never been naturalized or who do not even intend to naturalize) occupy posts in the United Sates government, as treasury secretary, HUD secretary, or secretary of health. In the 1980s-1990s a phrase that illustrated the Ivorian distrust in their government and their detachment from public property was the infamous “on s’en fout, ça appartient à l’Etat” (who gives a damn? It belongs to the state), a phrase that would justify any act of vandalism or spoliation of state property.
Bédie’s Ivoirité intended to rectify this mass cynicism. It intended to create the conditions for an allegiance that would no longer be based on ethnic background—as it had until then been the case in the context of the aloof and impersonal state but rather an allegiance that would be grounded in identification with the nation-state that was created on Independence Day, August 7, 1960. This was nothing novel. In the sphere of cultural contestations, coinages in -ité suggesting allegiance to geographical, national, racial or linguistic origins have abounded. Senghor, the only Black consecrated by France—this France so reactive to ivoirité—in its so elitist French Academy for being so French, thus so right, said in his December 11, 1974 course at the Sorbonne that it was important to struggle, to suffer, and to die, “plus volontiers pour une –ité ou une –itude que pour un –isme” (more readily for an –ity or an –itude than for an -ism)? Curiously, however, it seems that African heads of state have been more willing to struggle, suffer, and die for France’s specificity than their own. An illustrative example is their unashamed gathering around the theme of Francophonie, which, as we learn again from Senghor, is no more no less than a synonym of Francité. In May 1968, during a conference at the University of Beirut, while defending the so-called peaceful and nonimperialistic nature of Francophonie or Francité, Senghor insisted that Francophonie was not a war machine constructed by European imperialism, but a mode of thinking a certain way, a mode of approaching issues and seeking solutions, a spirit of French civilization or Francité. Francophonie, Senghor declared, is Francité; and Francité, he swore had not the slightest imperialistic bent in it, but was merely the expression of French civilization and culture devoid of any political agenda; and while most African leaders accepted the word of this griot of things French that Francité would not harm a fly, yet, the same leaders were quick to condemn ivoirité as a war machine. Today, as in 1968, the most passionate defender of Francité is an African, an ex-Senegalese president, Abdou Diouf. He is the current secretary general of Francophonie. He goes around world capitals selling French culture and civilization and promoting the expansion of French business and policy; and wherever he convenes his annual gathering, a plethora of African leaders follow him—among whom Bongo of Gabon, Wade of Senegal, Toumani of Mali, and Compaoré of Burkina Faso have the privileged seats on the baseline. Lately, however, the proselytizer-in chief of French culture, Diouf, got a blunt reminder that, despite his professed worship of things French, he was specifically an African, and African he would remain. On May 13, 2006, as he was responding to the Canadian government’s invitation to speak in Winnipeg on matters relating to the pseudo-apolitical Francophonie, Abdou Diouf, this easily recognizable towering political figure who travels with a diplomatic passport and a strong following, was stopped and body searched at Toronto Airport. The diplomatic reactions that followed this humiliation of an African politician proved beyond all doubts that Francité, or Francophonie as it is often referred to, was more political than its supporters knew or would admit to know.
President Diouf’s humiliation at Toronto Airport was only symptomatic of the duplicitous nature of the North/South encounter, a reality to which Africans have never been able to respond in a synchronized way because of the North’s successful politics of Divide and Rule, and most importantly, because of African leaders big complex of inferiority. While Senegalese, the most fervent believers of Francité in Africa, were protesting their ex-president’s treatment at Toronto Airport, many Ivorians were chuckling at what they perceived as a fair shock therapy to all the French-African puppets who, like the Senegalese sharpshooters of World War II, were busy fighting France’s war while the French populations were hiding in their basements or the modern native Africans Economic Hit Men who were starving their peoples by selling off their countries’ resources to international multinational corporation in order to enjoy a little bit of white dreams. Ivorians had trouble understanding why, at the same time as Paris, with the support of some African leaders, was prosecuting Abidjan’s successive governments in the media for a so-called maintenance of Ivoirité; the same African leaders were touring the world to promote Francité. As if Francité was the natural expression of their own salvation, Francophone African leaders like Bongo of Gabon, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and Toumani of Mali, had been more vociferous about French nationalistic interests than they had been supportive of their own national interests.
At least, President Bédié had been aware of cultural-ideological nature of the concept. Having sensed France’s undeclared support for Ouattara just before the 1995 presidential election, Bédié activated against the latter the ideological political dimension of Ivoirité. A modification of the electoral code of Côte d’Ivoire, adopted on November 23, 1994, stipulated that only Ivorians whose parents were both Ivorianborn could run for the presidency. Bédié took this new measure not out of the blue, but precisely because he knew Ouattara. They were from the same generation. They knew where each other came from. They had followed each other’s formation and ascent. They had served for the same international financial institutions, and they knew how and why each one of them was appointed at the various posts they held. Bédié knew Ouattara as much as Ouattara knew him. Bédié knew—and Ouattara had admitted this in a sign correspondence to the Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire—that after his high school studies in Bobo
Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Ouattara had benefited from an American scholarship to study in the US as a student from Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). Bédié knew that after his studies in the US, Ouattara first entered the IMF in 1968 under Upper Volta quotas. Bédié knew that Ouattara had obtained his first job at the BECEAO as an Upper Volta representative, and later served as vice-governor of the same institution between 1982 and 1984 as a functionary of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). Apparently, Bédié was not the only one in the secret; for on August 8, 1984, on page 21 of an article entitled “Monsieur FMI,” Béchir Ben Yamhed, the editorial manager of Jeune Afrique, reported that, starting November 1, 1984, the Africa Department of the IMF was going to have a new director; and that
Dr. Ouattara, from Upper Volta, would be serving in replacement of Zambian Justin B. Zulu. The Jeune Afrique article even specified that Ouattara was born in Côte d’Ivoire of immigrant parents from neighboring Upper Volta.24 Alassane Ouattara’s Voltaic nationality was no secret to anyone, especially as he exhibited it whenever it served his purpose.
Having evolved in the same professional space as Ouattara, the sphere of international financial institutions, Bédié was well positioned to know, as Jeune Afrique had reported, the nationality of Ouattara. He was an Upper Volta citizen, who took advantage of an American scholarship as an Upper Volta student. He was first recruited at the IMF under the quota reserved for Upper Volta citizens, and later, he served as vice-governor of the BCEAO as a representative of Upper Volta, with an Upper Volta diplomatic passport. In 1985, After his military coup in Upper Volta, Thomas Sankara, the new strongman of Burkina Faso a country that, unlike Houphouët’s Côte d’Ivoire, was not in the business of appointing foreign citizens as cabinet ministers offered Ouattara to enter his government as minister of economy and finances, a post that Ouattara, utterly resentful of Sankara’s revolution, disdainfully rejected, preferring to remain at his more prominent and lucrative international position at the BCEAO. Sankara then asked him to resign as the Upper Volta representative. It is at that time that Houphouët, who had a profound aversion for military regimes, especially the ones operating too close to his borders, intervened, and in a taunting gesture toward Sankara’s junta, offered Ouattara an Ivorian diplomatic passport that would keep him at his post.25 In 1988, upon the death of Abdoulaye Fadiga, then BCEAO director, Houphouët twisted the arms of the member heads of state, and imposed Ouattara as the new governor of the institution. Bédié knew, as another journalist of Jeune Afrique had also reported, that from the time he finished his studies thanks to an American scholarship awarded to him as a Voltaic student, and for the many years to come, Ouattara served in many capacities, in several places (Washington, Paris, Dakar), at several financial institutions (BCEAO, WAMU [West African Monetary Union], ADB [African Development Bank], UNCTAD [United nations Conference on Trade and Development]) and took part in many general assemblies as a Voltaic citizen, equipped with a Voltaic diplomatic passport.26 Bédié knew that by modifying the electoral code to request that both parents of any presidential candidates be Ivorian-born he was arresting Ouattara’s presidential ambition; which he did.
Bédié was a cunningly shrewd politician for changing the electoral rules in the middle of the political process. Ouattara was right to have protested Bédie’s unfair electoral practices. However, he challenged them on the wrong ground. It would have been more honorable of Ouattara to admit that, indeed, he had claimed Voltaic nationality to get a scholarship from the US and later to take advantage of an IMF quota system that favored Voltaic nationals; but that he had changed his nationality since then; and he could have provided documentation to that effect. He could also have maintained that, though his parents were Voltaic, he was born on Ivorian soil; and he could have challenged the Ivorian electoral rule on the ground of his birthplace. Instead, he told two momentous untruths that were totally undeserving of any prospective president. First, he denied, in the face of accumulating evidence that he had ever been a Voltaic national; he maintained that as far as he could remember, he had always had the Ivorian nationality. Secondly he denied that his parents were Voltaic, while his father had been a well-known village chief in Upper Volta. These two fabrications alone were good enough to disqualify any presidential candidate. As Bédie’s operatives started to produce proofs of Ouattara’s deceptions, he left the country for Paris under the pretext that his life was in danger. Bédie’s Justice Department launched against him an international warrant for forgery. Just immediately, there started a vast media campaign that sought to legitimate any unconstitutional blow against the Bédié regime; a media campaign that resuscitated some of Bédie’s formerly ignored shortcomings or simply invented him new ones.
HOW DOES ONE RATIONALIZE A COUP D’ÉTAT?
BY CONDUCTING IT THE NAME OF GLOBALIZATION
In Côte d’Ivoire, the first coup d’état started with demonizing the Bédié regime on two levels. Socially and politically Bédié was to be presented as an insufficient leader who could not be the unifier and leader open to human and capital flows that his predecessor, Houphouët, was. Economically, he was to be proven a reckless manager and an embezzler of public funds whose misconduct was hurting the masses. So, Bédie’s notion of ivoirité served to demonize him as a divider and a xenophobic. Ivoirité, as Bédié had explained,
was a formulae meant to synthesize the aspirations of the multiple ethnic groups living within the borders of Côte d’Ivoire. As such, the concept was to encompass not only the autochthonous people of Côte d’Ivoire, but also, the people from all over the world who lived and worked in the country, insofar as they, too, shared and respected the values of the nationals. For Bédié, ivoirité “. . . la synthèse culturelle entre les ethnies habitant la Côte d’Ivoire . . . concerne en premier les peuples enracinés en Côte d’Ivoire mais aussi ceux qui y vivent et y travaillent en partageant nos valeurs.” 27 ( . . . the cultural synthesis of the ethnic groups living in Côte d’Ivoire . . . is primarily about the peoples rooted in Côte d’Ivoire but also those who live in the country and share our values.) Nothing in these words could hint to some official anti-immigrant or xenophobic stance, despite the fact that—and it has historically tended to be the case more in France than in Côte d’Ivoire—some frustrated fringes of the populations usually displace the inadequacies of their societies on the presence of foreigners.
Nevertheless, a powerful media campaign led by Ouattara’s operatives successfully disseminated the idea that Bédie’s ivoirité was a recipe to repatriate immigrants from neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso; and an apparently credible French press went so far as to link minor occasional conflicts opposing locals to immigrants as direct consequences of ivoirité, thus further exacerbating limited clashes by politicizing them. It did not take long for a country with nearly a 30% immigrant population to be indexed as xenophobic. However, the French Press’ real motive for demonizing Bédie’s regime was elsewhere: Alassane Ouattara, France’s preferred candidate, could not run for the Ivorian presidency on account of his doubtful nationality. Bédié is no saint, one must admit. He is only a politician, and every act he posited was politically calculated. Ivoirité in its political reach could also serve, not only to eliminate Ouattara’s chances at the presidency, but also, to contain the massive electorate from Burkina Faso and Mali on which Ouattara was counting to this effect, and which, fitted with Ivorian national ID cards since the 1970s, had hitherto voted in every election. This electorate was geographically from countries north of Côte d’Ivoire, and religiously more than 90% Muslim. Ouattara wasted no time to coalesce topography and faith to his advantage, launching this designed sentence from his self-imposed Parisian exile, “On ne veut pas que je sois président parce que je suis musulman et nordiste” [They do not want me to be president because I am a Muslim and a Northerner], thus instigating an interethnic and interreligious pandemonium.
There was no reason to link Ouattara’s disqualification to the fate of the five million immigrants that lived in Côte d’Ivoire. Yet, this is what a corrupt and irresponsible national and international media did. For the purpose of the denigration campaign that Bédié was to undergo under the hostile media, Ouattara suddenly condensed all that was foreign and Muslim; and any wrong done to him either proven or unproven became automatically a wrong done to any of the five million immigrants or the northern Muslims living in Côte d’Ivoire. Equally, any justice rendered him could be interpreted as justice rendered to the immigrants or northern Muslim populations of the country. Curiously, however, the self-professed certified media that supported Ouattara’s messianic campaign and was eager to impose him to Ivorians as legitimate president glossed over his own admission that he studied with an American scholarship reserved to Voltaic students and carried a Voltaic passport until the age of 42 with a disconcerting carelessness and an unforeseen lack of journalistic rigor. As one could read in L’Express,
A Paris, dans ce bureau de l’agence immobilière que dirige son épouse française, Alassane Ouattara, qui admet avoir été boursier du gouvernement de Haute-Volta et détenteur d’un passeport voltaïque, étale sur une tablette les copies des documents censés confondre ses détracteurs: cartes d’identité parentales, acte de naissance, certificat de nationalité. [In Paris, in the office of the real estate agency that his French wife manages, Alassane Ouattara, who admits to have held a scholarship from the government of Upper Volta and a Voltaic passport, displays on a little table copies of documents that are meant to prove his critics wrong: parents identity cards, birth certificate, certificate of nationality.] Only journalists with premeditated purposes could be so blind as to pass over facts that begged so deafeningly for a minimum of objectivity.
Objectivity, however, was far from being the primary concern in the design to topple Bédié. Whoever has closely followed African politics, on the other hand, will know that African leaders are, in their great majority, corrupt officials, strongly encouraged by greedy northern political and business operatives to steal from their peoples or to embezzle foreign aids with impunity, insofar as these northern officials can be secured enormous benefits. One will recall how former French president Valérie Giscard d’Estaing and his cronies allowed former Central African Republic’s Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa to remain in power for many years so long as he permitted them to plunder the uranium and diamond mines of his country. One will also recall how successive French presidents, from Giscard d’Estaing to Jacques Chirac closed their eyes on the financial follies of dictators like Mobutu from Congo/Zaire, Bongo from Gabon, Eyadema from Togo, Papa and Baby Doc from Haiti, as long as these corrupt leaders made their countries the economic playgrounds of French multinational corporations. The rulers of Côte d’Ivoire, from Houphouët to Bédié, passing through Ouattara and Gueï, have all treaded in the muddy waters of France’s organized crime, whereby they would cede their countries’ resources to France under their market values in return for huge commissions that often came in the form of freedom to embezzle with assurance of no audits; this is, until the crooked leaders start acting like renegades. Bédié offers an interesting case study to this paradigm. Of all the misappropriations of funds in which Bédié and his close associates were involved, there is one that he would always remember the most as the scandal that helped kill his presidency.
Between 1992 and 1997, the European Union approved several grants to Côte d’Ivoire; which were earmarked to improving the healthcare system and supporting the country’s decentralization program. Most of the aid vanished in government members’ bank accounts. Between 1992 and 1997, two different governments had been in control in Côte d’Ivoire, the all-powerful government of Prime Minister Ouattara (1990-1993)—which, under an ailing Houphouët, saw the prime minister cumulate the portfolios of interim president and finance minister with that of prime minister and the Kablan Duncan’s government under Bédie’s presidency (1993-1999). Though the member states of the European Union acknowledged that the misappropriation of the European Union’s grants spanned over a five-year period, which should include at least one year of Ouattara’s administration, curiously, no mismanagement was imputed to the Ouattara government. The reason for this was quite simple. Ouattara had been good to French business in particular and to European interests in general, though at home much had been said and written on the illicit source of his huge personal fortune, on his elitist style, and on his arrogance toward the middle class that his blind support for the IMF and the World Bank’s forced structural adjustment was exponentially pauperizing.
Bédié, on the other hand, was becoming an annoyance to France and to the European Union in general. His much-heralded reforms were not to the liking of France. Land reform threatened big French landowners, especially many who acquired their lands through deceitful means. Bédie’s project of identification, by regulating the flow of immigration along the borders of Côte d’Ivoire, threatened France’s own politics of immigration, which sought to keep West Africans away from French borders in particular, and from European coasts in general. For a long time, Côte d’Ivoire had been the basin of African immigration. Many West Africans with dreams of better lives away from home who could have tried their luck in Europe had settled in Côte d’Ivoire, and had found in the Ivorian social and economic haven, not only more than the economic prospects they could envisage in France, but also, better social political and religious integration than could be imagined in Europe. So long as these African immigrants could remain in Côte d’Ivoire, they were millions less souls for the European Union’s immigration systems to worry about.
Furthermore, Bédie’s identification policy termed as Ivoirité was susceptible of disqualifying France’s greatest ally, Ouattara, and thus killing France’s hope of returning the state of Côte d’Ivoire to the status of non-governmental organization (NGO), a status which though disadvantageous to the Ivorian masses, had made so many French businesses wealthy and France’s balance of payments affirmative. So, five years after passively watching successive Ivorian governments indulge, among others, in the spoliation of the
European Union’s grants, France was suddenly struck by some pang of conscience and decided to act on behalf of the oppressed masses that were being shortchanged by their leaders.
So, France, leading the European Union, ordered an audit of the management of the grants during 1995 and 1997, which was coincidentally the period concerning only the Bédié government, despite the widely reported fact that the scandal traced as far back as 1992, that is, as far back as the Ouattara administration.
The audit of very limited scope undertaken by the European Union, though it appeared somehow commendable, was in fact one more artifice in a series of carefully choreographed ruses meant to sully Bédie’s government and justify any military blow to come. The audit, conducted in November and December 1998 by the audit firm 2AC, uncovered that more than $30 millions, of an $88 million package, have gone missing. This revelation coincided with the Cologne (Germany) announcement of debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and caused the European Union to freeze its budgetary help to Côte d’Ivoire. The story of embezzlement of international aid by the Bédié government made a big splash in Europe and was disseminated by all the conceivable French major TV networks and newspapers.
Nevertheless, some voices in Europe expressed suspicion about the timing of this revelation.30 The experts of the European Union could not have been blind to the embezzlement going on for five years. They were well aware of the misuse of fund. They just chose to ignore it because the time was not right yet to blow the whistle. Bédie’s misappropriation of international development aid from the European Union became public only when came time to justify a coup against him. The revelation of the scandal coincided with the time when the question of Ouattara’s nationality became a burning issue in Ivorian politics, culminating with Ouattara’s self-imposed exile in France. Now, Bédié had on his hands, not only multiple not-so-peaceful demonstrations organized by Ouattara’s followers, the ire of the World Bank, the IMF, and the European Union, but also, the incensed populations of Côte d’Ivoire prompted each day by a hostile national media and a French gregarious media that has always mechanically aligned itself with the international policy of French politicians. A few weeks after Ouattara turned up on the doorsteps of his Parisian friends and partners, on December 24, 1999, Bédié was deposed by the military. On January 3, 2000, Bédié went in exile in Paris via Lomé and went to live in his private apartments on rue Beethoven, in the luxurious 16th arrondissement. Ouattara, as for him, returned to Abidjan triumphantly, persuaded that Robert Gueï, the new strong man of Abidjan, who had been his army chief of staff during his days as prime minister, was warming up the presidential seat for him. Ouattara was wrong. General Gueï decided to hold on to power. He promised to maintain excellent relationships with France, honor Côte d’Ivoire financial obligations
toward the Bretton Woods institutions, and return power to civilians as soon as he had swept the house and put things in order.
Gueï must have been very reassuring and unthreatening, for not a single time were there talks of French citizens being in danger in Côte d’Ivoire. None of the 20,000 French nationals living in the country was asked to leave by the French authorities. How could they be in danger? After all, was not Gueï close very close, to Ouattara? Was not Ouattara himself the man of the IMF and the World Bank, thus the man of France and of the West in general? In fact, “respectable” French newspapers, like Le Monde and French radio stations, like RFI, were literally dispatching Gueï’s version of the coup, presenting the despot as a hero who was forced by moral imperatives to take power in order to rectify injustices caused by Bédié; and while powerful African leaders like Obasandjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa saw no reason to justify Gueï’s military coup, and while they were strongly condemning the military overthrow in Côte d’Ivoire as illegitimate and were calling for the restoration of Bédie’s power, France wasted no time, through its minister of cooperation, Mr. Charles Josselin, to recognize the new praetorian regime and to announce its willingness to work with Gueï.
However, Gueï misinterpreted France’s support as a support for him instead of temporary regency of Ouattara’s throne. Mysteriously, the question of Alassane Ouattara’s nationality, which had been a sticking point during the Bédié administration, resulting in Ouattara being disqualified from the 1995 presidential race, and which according to Gueï was at the foundation of the December 1999 coup against Bédié, resurfaced on the occasion of Gueï’s presidential ambition. Like his predecessor, General Gueï pressed Ouattara to settle the issue of his doubtful Ivorian citizenship. On September 12, 2000, Gueï’s lawyers produced some papers intended to disprove Ouattara’s assertion that he had never availed himself of another nationality. Among the papers exhibited were Ouattara’s marriage certificate to an American woman named Barbara Davis, in which he declared himself a citizen of Upper Volta and stated at the time of marriage, in 1966, that his mother was no longer living; a fact that contradicted his earlier declaration that his mother was a living eighty-year-old Ivorian woman by the name of Hadja Nabintou Cissé. There were also a 1978 bank account document and of a 1980 property sale certificate in which Ouattara declared himself to be a citizen of Upper Volta. For Gueï, all these discrepancies spoke more of Ouattara’s immorality and criminal mind than they could shed light on his honesty. Gueï threatened to charge Ouattara with falsification, and once again, the Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire rejected Ouattara’s candidacy to the presidential election on the ground of suspicious nationality.
Members of foreign press did not remain silent to this nth injustice perpetrated against the misunderstood savior of the Ivorian flock and took it upon them to lecture the Ivorian people about what great opportunity they were missing by persecuting the great messiah come from the IMF. Nevertheless, unencumbered by the criticisms of international media that have lost all credibility even in the rare cases where they happen to get the news right, General Gueï barred Ouattara from the October 22, 2000 presidential election. As a result, five contenders vied for the presidential seat, General Robert Gueï for the military junta, Laurent Gbagbo for the socialist party FPI, Francis Wodié for the PIT, Mel Théodore for the UDCI, and the independent Nicolas Dioulo. Halfway through the ballot counting, Gueï attempted to load the dice to his advantage by stopping the count and declaring himself the winner while, the early returns had Gbagbo leading the race. Gbagbo’s supporters took to the street to protest Gueï’s coup de force, and with the support of the Defense and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, they drove Gueï to hiding. A few days later, the Supreme Court declared Gbagbo the winner of the presidential race with 59.36% of the votes, against 32.7% for Gueï, 5.7% for Wodié, 1.5% for Mel, and .8% for Dioulo. Ouattara’s RDR contested the results, demanding that the election, which saw only a 37% participation and did not include Ouattara, be redone, this time with Ouattara’s participation. This protest by the RDR remains the Damocles Sword hovering over Gbagbo’s presidency that would be used to rationalize all the conceivable coups bas. Laurent Gbagbo, the saying goes, was elected in calamitous conditions–59% of the votes with a participation rate of only 37%, and above all without Ouattara, the darling candidate of France and of the Bretton Woods institutions, he who, more than anyone else before, made French multinationals in Côte d’Ivoire so wealthy by selling them the country’s strategic companies under the excuse of satisfying a World Bank/IMF program called the Washington Consensus. Therefore, against Gbagbo, all blows are permitted, even the most contemptible ones.
Hardly had Gbagbo been sworn into office than accusations of ethnocentrism and xenophobia started flying his way, and the “crimes” once imputed to Bédié and Gueï became his daily lot. Gbagbo had announced a program that disturbed French interests: Refondation (Reconstruction). It is true that the greatest distinguishing feature between imperial rule and independent government is the externality of the former. In colonial societies, the power to rule was taken away from local populations and entrusted to another state with which these populations had absolutely nothing in common. All happened as if “the ability to decide a country’s destiny, its collective mind, had been cut out surgically and transplanted into another mind in London, Paris, Brussels, The Haye or Washington;”31 a fact which in the France-Africa relationship, and for what concerns here, in the France-Côte d’Ivoire relationship, had persisted throughout all the governments that had preceded the Gbagbo administration. Gbagbo had decided that the transfer of power, thought, and responsibility from Côte d’Ivoire to the metropolis that had hitherto defined the France-Africa relation and made French African governments non-governmental organizations at the sole service of France’s interests with no regard to the interests of the Ivorian people had to come to an end through political, economic, and social purgative Refondation. Refondation was meant to dig into the foundation of the Ivorian society in order to correct the structural flaws that were slowing or impeding progress and, thus, undermining the social growth of the Ivorian people.32 Economically, among other resolutions, Refondation wanted to review the terms of renewal of a number of conventions ceded to France multinationals under their market values by the Ouattara government, conventions the clauses of which French firms had hardly abided by, and which were to fortunately come to expiration around 2004. Among these were the
exploitation of Côte d’Ivoire Telecom conceded to France Telecom, the exploitation of Côte d’Ivoire’s power (EECI) and water (SODECI) companies conceded to Bouygues, the exploitation of the railway system conceded to Bolloré, and which was in dire need of modernization. Refondation also meant reassessing some construction contracts by which French firms were fleecing the Ivorian economy by overpricing their services. For instance, the contract of a third bridge to be built in Abidjan was ceded to the French Bouygues, although a Chinese company (COVEC) would build the same bridge for 1/3 of the price and would accept part of payment as exchange in coffee and cocoa. In a word, Economically speaking, Refondation was to liberate the Ivorian economy by doing away with France exploitative and manipulative
“friendship,” which had not changed since the days of the colonial exclusif—this French policy whereby French colonies could only buy from France and sell to France at prices fixed by France—in order to stretch a hand to all who were willing to be partners of good faith rather than abusing speculators, as has usually been the case with France. It was obvious that if such reassessing was to happen, the pressure exerted by France on Côte d’Ivoire cede all its development deals to French multinationals without any bid for contracts would be fruitless; and French firms would henceforth have to openly compete with other multinationals (American, British, Canadian, Chinese, Japanese, South African, etc.) for a chance to obtain contracts in Côte d’Ivoire. This could be economically hazardous for France, especially as 2005 was announcing new privatizations, such as the privatization of the Ivorian oil refining company (SIR) and number two Ivorian cellular phone company TELECEL. In an open competition, French multinationals, which have proven in the past to be driven by no other concerns but exponential returns at all cost, would have very little chance of securing further contracts in Côte d’Ivoire. Actually, in an open competition, French multinationals risked losing everything to Americans, British, Canadians, or South African, Japanese or Chinese.
Perhaps, after all, Refondation’s pretensions were only a tale, the bluff of a nostalgic socialist out of touch with the realities of the moment. Perhaps, France had nothing to fear from Refondation, as Gbagbo had practically inherited a country on its knees, a country that, because of the disastrous politics of the PDCI in the previous forty years, was more dependent than ever on international aid, and especially on France. Without France, its colonial and post-colonial guarantor, where could Refondation get the money it needed for its program of development? After all, the devaluation of the CFA, the depreciation of coffee and cocoa, the country’s two major exports, the European Union’s and the World Bank/IMF’s refusal to lend any
more money to Côte d’Ivoire after the Bédié administration’s much-publicized financial scandal had left Côte d’Ivoire no other alternative than to be on the good side of France, which could then intercede with international financial institutions to garner some much-needed loans and grants on behalf of Abidjan. Gbagbo could not be serious. He could not run the risk of losing France’s support at such a crucial moment by threatening French multinationals’ monopoly in Côte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo had anticipated the dilemma of not receiving any external financial help. To remedy it, he initiated a measure of austerity that consisted in working at eradicating poverty with a secured budget (a budget that could not rely on any external help); he named it le budget sécurisé. Also, he undertook to fight corruption in taxes and at the customs. Gbagbo’s determination, earnestness, and visible success caused the World Bank to unconditionally return to doing business with Côte d’Ivoire. In 2002, the IMF, the European Union, and the African Development Bank followed suite. This made it possible for Abidjan to have the necessary financial resources to implement its program of Refondation. France’s fear started to materialize, especially as to signal France’s loss of esteem in Côte d’Ivoire and Refondation’s resolve to rectify its cooperation with France, and with all partners for that matter, a South African Company had just beaten French Bolloré at a bid for the construction of a new airport in San Pédro, south-west of Côte d’Ivoire. French multinationals had no intention of competing fairly with other countries. In the past, it had been easy for France to buy influences in French Africa by financing the campaigns of politicians sympathetic to French interests or by bribing local officials. Refondation was undercutting this practice and leaving French multinationals, which hitherto garnered enormous dividends for France’s economy, at the mercy of other international competitors. France had no intention of loosening its grip on Côte d’Ivoire, the wealthiest former French colony in sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, Côte d’Ivoire’s stance, if left unchallenged, could be infectious. Other French financial havens could start questioning the validity of their “cooperation” with France; and should they, like Côte d’Ivoire, have the audacity to voice the anomalous makeup of that cooperation, France-Africa relations could be in great danger of vanishing forever. This was not about to happen, for, as Koureyssi Bâ observed so fittingly, the French policy in Africa, characterized by deceit, lawlessness and violence, remains unchanged no matter which party is in power in Paris. Furthermore, France can always rely on the servile devotion of its puppets and its docile locals informants who do not care about their legacy in history, and who are ready to draw a dagger into the back of any brother who dares to say no to the master.33 Ouattara, who had dreamed of being president of Côte d’Ivoire at all cost, had no problem driving the dagger in the back of Laurent Gbagbo, France most annoying killjoy in Africa. Convinced that France would back any subversive coup against Gbagbo, this is what Ouattara had to say in 2001 to a freshly elected group of mayors from his party:
Nous n’attendrons pas 5 ans pour aller aux élections. Après tout, dans certains pays, il y a des coups d’Etat et les gens s’accomodent bien de ces personnes pendant une certaine période. Nous avons des monarchies dans le monde et les gens acceptent bien qu’une personne non élue représente le peuple dans sa totalité. Pourquoi devrions-nous attendre 5 ans pour que vous ayez ce à quoi vous avez droit et surtout ce que les populations réclament ? Nous avons certaines relations extérieures. Nous avons commencé à les actionner. J’aimerais vous dire aussi que nous avions convenu avec le maire Adama que nous aurons des réunions périodiques pour qu’ensemble, nous puissions développer assez rapidement une stratégie pour la conquête du pouvoir.
[We will not wait 5 years to go to the elections. After all, in some countries, there are coups d’État, and people get used to the situation after a while. We have monarchies in the world, and people accept that a person who has not been elected represent the country in its totality. Why should we wait 5 years before you get what you deserve, especially when the populations are asking for it? We have external contacts. We have started to activate them. I would also like to tell you that with Mayor Adama we have agreed to have periodic meetings so that, very quickly, we can all develop a strategy for the conquest of power.]
So, in the night of September 19, 2002, France triggered one of its bloodiest punitive campaigns against Côte d’Ivoire. A group of deserters from the Ivorian army, who had been training in neighboring Burkina Faso, simultaneously hit the cities of Bouaké and Abidjan with a brutality never experienced in the country. More than 100 unsuspecting members of the Ivorian defense forces in Bouaké were executed in their beds along with their families. Scores of wandering civilians were shot. Emile Boga Doudou, the Ivorian minister of interior who had just returned from a visit to his French homologue Sarkozy a day earlier, a visit during which he had raised the question of Ivorian deserters being trained in neighboring Burkina Faso, was executed in his bed, along with members of his family and his domestics. General Gueï, the former president and his wife were assassinated. It was a night of carnage. Gary K. Busch has detailed the operational organization of that atrocious nightly attack on Côte d’Ivoire.
In September 2002 about 650 rebels loyal to General Robert Gueï, attacked both Bouaké and Abidjan from neighboring Burkina Faso while Gbagbo was in Rome to meet the Pope. Their operation was supposed to last five days maximum. They were hoping to seize power and force Gbagbo to exile; but they were ill armed and disorganized, and soon the defense force of Côte d’Ivoire cornered them and reduced them to half. It was then that the commander of the French army in Côte d’Ivoire requested a cease-fire so that he could evacuate the French citizens and a few American nationals living in Bouaké. During the 48 hours allotted the French army, three Antonov-12 flew from Franceville (Gabon) to supply the rebels in armament. Other planes and truck brought in armament and mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the rebel force, which was previously estimated at 320 troops, grew to 2500 mercenaries armed with kalachnikovs and other weapons that had never been part of the Ivorian armory. The French army also supplied the mercenaries with sophisticated communication equipments that kept them always aware of the movements of the Ivorian defense troops. The French then retreated gradually leaving the rebels in charge with Eastern Europeans mercenaries as technical advisers. Once the rebels were well positioned, Chirac then activated the international pressure machinery through the United Nations to obtain a resolution entrusting France with a peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire.35 While tergiversations were taking more time than needed at the United Nations, the rebels were multiplying their fronts not just in the Northern part of the country, but also in the Western parts, recruiting more mercenaries from Samuel Doe’s civil war troops as well as mercenaries from the RUF in Sierra Leone. The rebels’ indiscriminate killing and raping of thousands of children, elderly, and women led to mass exodus toward Yamoussoukro and Abidjan. Gbagbo had dared to defy France, and France had launched against his regime the biggest firepower ever delivered on Côte d’Ivoire. Now the United Nations, through the Security Council, could play its partition by blessing France’s direct intrusion in the country.
Yet, Gbagbo’s Refondation was not merely a rumination posture against France. Evidently it intended to rectify Côte d’Ivoire’s anomalous relationship with France. The rosy economic definition of liberalization that treats Foreign Direct Investment as “. . . a decentralized process wherein each foreign company takes the investment decisions of the others as beyond its control . . .” is exploded in French Africa. There, nothing is meant to remain beyond the control of French multinationals whose barons have vouched to filter all non-French multinational investments’ access to the continent to the point of reducing them to nothing. “Exploding” is not just a figure of speech, as the daily conflagrations caused by heavy French artillery and the frequent turning out of black corpses scare Anglo-Saxon and Asian investments out of French Africa, while France remains curiously present before, during, and after the cannon roars. From the perspective of most French investors in Africa, Foreign Direct Investment should have nothing to do with each firm forming “. . . an expectation about the host country’s eventual trade policy and [evaluating] the profitability of its own potential foreign investment accordingly.” Instead, the host country should be bomb-pressured to accepting the level of protection and the terms of profitability dictated by France. It is unfortunate that, in economic circles, the kinds of quid pro quo foreign investments that have made French multinationals and a few corrupt nationals wealthy while impoverishing most Africans by a relocation of their economic resources are still treated as epiphenomenal or isolated episodes involving a small number of disreputable industrialists. French multinationals’ brutal practices in Africa are systemic, and they ought to be examined as such. The much-publicized Elf-Aquitaine affair has now shown that French multinationals’ dirty economic practices run deep into the French government no matter which party is in power. Gbagbo’s Refondation was principally a program of poverty reduction through a distribution to the masses of healthcare and education services and the creation of jobs; a program that fell well within the United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for Africa. The French-supported rebellion put Gbagbo’s poverty reduction program at a standstill, and the passion with which Koffi Anan’s United Nations defended the French actions and supported France’s subsequent direct intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was mind-boggling. The victim was presented as the victimizer, and the victimizer was made both judge
and Jury of the victim. This collaboration of African leaders such as Ouattara and Kofi Anan with a brutal European force against their people, though revolting, nevertheless has an explanation. In all times, Africa has had local collaborators who enabled the exploitation and impoverishment of the continent by Western powers, so long as these local informants could be left to collect a few morsels alongside their plundering Western masters. At the time of the question of Côte d’Ivoire, Kofi Anan had his own scandals at the United Nations hovering over his head, and the oil for food humiliation in which his son, using the father’s influence, was deeply involved, and for which Anan needed France more than ever to testify on his behalf.
This could only happen if he took care of France’s interests in Africa, no matter what the consequence could be for the African people. Anan and Ouattara were only repeating an ancient gesture called North/South collaboration. Unfortunately, It would be utterly hypocritical for anyone who unreservedly condemns the resistance organized by the Ivorian Patriotes to pretend to speak in favor of poverty reduction and growth in the Third World, and especially in Côte d’Ivoire. It is obvious that France’s gangster-like intervention in Côte d’Ivoire has undermined progress by any theory of economics. I shall point to some of the consequences of France’s disquieting intrusion in Côte d’Ivoire as they relate to the armoring of the most pessimistic economics theories for the Third World and the undercutting of all development theories ever to cast any promising outlooks on poor countries.
To proponents of dependency theory—the theory that winners and losers are two inevitable sides of the same coin of development the Chiraquian martial incursion in Côte d’Ivoire to protect lamenting French multinationals terrified of international competitions makes factual the hypothesis that as economic trade grows between rich and poor nations, global income inequality grows, too. In the kind of liberal commerce that, in the wake of the Washington Consensus, has characterized the “exchanges” between Côte d’Ivoire and France, and in which the French government and the French army, following an age-old tradition, have figured more like bullying middlemen than state institutions, profits have been unashamedly unidirectional.
So, this explaining that, the convergence theory—the theory claiming that someday, in a happy future, the last shall meet the first, and that rich countries will experience dwindling returns and be caught up by poor countries is belied. If the economic trends, as we observe them today, keep up, convergence theory becomes, for the proponents of global equality, wishful thinking, an unrealizable fancy. The impossible possibilization of convergence theory is pushed even further back into the dominion of bleakness by the doing of rich countries that have specialized in altering, in poor countries, all the control variables in which advocates of endogenous growth have invested so much optimism. How so?Against convergence theorists’ pessimistic outlooks for rich countries and optimistic perspectives for poor countries, proponents of endogenous theory would argue that humanity is only at the beginning of useful discoveries, and therefore, rich countries will always be able to subvert the menace of diminishing resources and remain dominant just by the significance of the scientific, technological innovations that they make at home. This is possible because rich countries have traditionally been able to control certain variables, such as, fertility rate, level of human capital (education), and government spending. These controlled variables are referred to as conditional factors. Traditionally, the control for these variables has been absent in poor countries. So then, the factors that come to be known in rich countries as conditional convergence factors (insofar as the conditions for their control are present) become unconditional convergence factors in the Third World (insofar as the condition for their control are absent). No one, however, would dispute the fact that conditional and unconditional convergence factors are not natural occurrences. They do not respectively appear in rich and poor countries by Devine design. They are not the making of an omnipotent Big-Other who assigns them, in that order, to civilized capitalist societies on the one hand, and to primitive territorial populations on the other hand. Conditional and unconditional convergence factors are not inherently attributed to one group of people who are in control of all their intellectual faculties as opposed to another group subjected to lobotomy. Conditional and unconditional convergence factors are created and manipulated by greed, ruthlessness, and brutality, which are not necessarily signs of intelligence. Therefore, before proponents of endogenous theory rest assured that any responsibility for failure and economic decline is entirely organic, perhaps, it would be wise to situate responsibility. On the levels of human capital and government spending, the multiple muscled interventions of France in West Africa have always, intentionally, turned conditional and unconditional factors on their heads in a theatrical diagram that made perfect sense for France while disturbing any prospect of planned development for the African nations. This viciously masterful manipulation made conditional factors unconditional for national social engineers while at the same time keeping them conditional for French business. Bare Hands Victory becomes enlightening in disclosing France’s responsibility in that regard; but Bakaba’s documentary can only expose the symptoms of a bigger infection in Africa. In Bare Hands Victory, Côte d’Ivoire is but a case study of a more pervasive hexagonal will to power determined to make profits by all means necessary.
Is it only by killing Africa’s human capital that the rest of the world could give the black continent a chance of turning the tides of global inequality? France seems resolved to spin the grim images of Ivorian youth falling under French multinationals’ hired guns into a neo-classical resolution of income inequality; one which would eerily assert, on account of the role of population growth in the race for development, that “we are saving them from themselves.” If growth is a race between increases in population and capital stock, this pessimistic-optimist argument would thus go, then, wars which have been more exogenous than endogenous in French Africa by their ensuing effects of population decrease, will lead to better distribution of wealth in Africa. How depressing! And how disingenuous, too, to link the slaughter of the dynamic and educated force of a country to its chances for progress! In fact, until an international outcry puts an end to the incendiary practices of the hired armies of imperial nations, the butchering of the young brains of Africa will continue to widen the technological gaps between North and South one of the major causes of global inequality and maintain an East-West-West-East-bound spread of technology and
industrialization. It is not by accident that most Third World countries, claim appurtenance to the Orient when they cannot establish their belonging to the Occident. Have not theorists of economic geography told us that the Occident, with its temperate climate and smoother terrains, is blessed by the gods and has all the best prospects for development? Nevertheless, has African geography really been a hindrance at any time in history for opportunists resolute to plunder the riches of the African continent? Have not European explorers, as far back as the sixteenth century, defied the negative endowments of Africa and pushed deep into the heart of darkness to dig up Africa’s iron ores, its gold, its diamond, to cut its timber, to bleed its rubber trees, to remove its elephants’ defenses, to practice their shooting ability on its game? Have not European speculators designed ingenious methods to transfer Africa’s human capital and riches to the Occident despite Africa’s much-heralded negative endowments? Why has Europe become so paradoxically impotent when it came to developing infrastructures in the continent that would benefit African populations? And what to say of this so-called poor continent that yet continues to stir up so much interest in greedy multinationals? Geography and poverty have nothing to do with the underdevelopment of Africa. In fact, to be fair, Africa is victim of its wealth and a globalization gone mad.
Read more @ http://www.africason.com/2014/12/from-colonization-to-globalization.html
ETHIOPIA: Outbreak of Deadly Disease in Jail, Denial of Graduation of University Students
HRLHA – URGENT ACTION
December 10, 2014
The Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (HRLHA) would like to express its deep concern over the outbreak of a deadly disease at Gimbi Jail in Western Wollega, as a result of which one inmate has already died and sixty (60) others infected. HRLHA strongly believes that the very poor sanitation in the jail, absence of basic necessities, and denial of treatment after catching the illness have contributed to Mr. Yaikob Nigaru’s death. HRLHA fears that those who have already caught the disease might be facing the same fate. It is well documented that particularly inmates deemed “political prisoners” are deliberately subjected to unfriendly and unhealthy environments and, after getting sick as a result, are not allowed access to treatment until they approach or reach the stage of coma, which is when recoveries are very unlikely. HRLHA considers it one way of the systematic eliminations of alleged and/or perceived political dissidents.
Mr. Ya’kob Nigatu was one of the 224 Oromo Nationals (139 from Gimbi in Western Wollaga, 80 from Ambo, and 5 from Ma’ikellawi in Addis Ababa/Finfinne) who were charged by the Federal Government on the 10th of November, 2014 for allegedly committing acts of terrorism in relation to the April/May, 2014 peaceful protests by Oromo students in different parts of the regional state of Oromia. HRLHA has learnt that five of the 224 Oromo defendants, who were held at the infamous Ma’ikelawi Criminal Investigation for about six months, were subjected to harassments and intimidations through isolations and confinements, with no visitations by relatives and friends, no access to a lawyer, and no open court appearance until when they were eventually taken to court to be given the charges. Those five Oromo nationals, who were transferred to Kilinto Jail right after receiving the alleged terrorism charges, were:
Ababe Urgessa Fakkansa (a student from Haromaya University),
Magarsa Warqu Fayyisa (a student from Haromaya University),
Addunya Kesso (a student from Adama University),
Bilisumma Dammana (a student from Adama University),
Tashale Baqala Garba (a student from Jimma University), and
Lejjisa Alamayyo Soressa (a student from Jimma University).
Besides the outbreak of a deadly disease witnessed at Gimbi Jail, and the likelihood of the same situations to occur particularly at highly populated and crowded jails, Kilinto is known to be one of the very notorious substandard prisons in the country. Such facts taken into consideration, HRLHA would like to express its deep concern over the safety of those young Oromo prisoners.
HRLHA has also received reports that 29 Oromo nationals, who have been attending the Addis Ababa/Finfinne University, have been denied proofs of graduations (degrees and/or diplomas) and, as a result, prevented from graduating after completing their studies for allegedly taking part in the April/May peaceful protests of Oromo students and other nationals against the newly drafted and introduced Finfinne Master Plan. The 29 Oromo students were first detained along with 23 other Oromo students of the same university, following the protests, and released on bails ranging between $1000.00 and $4000.00 Birr. Upon re-admission back to the University, they were all (52 of them) forced to appear before the disciplinary committee of the University, where they were asked to confess that their involvement in the peaceful demonstrations was wrong and that they should apologize to the Government and the public. According to reports from HRLHA’s correspondents, it was the students’ refusal to confess and apologize that has resulted in their prevention from graduating, despite their fulfillment of all the academic requirements. HRLHA describes the University’s becoming a political weapon as shameful, and the restrictions imposed on Oromo students as a pure act of racism aimed at partisan political gains. Of the 29 Oromo students who have become victims of the University’s non-academic action, HRLHA has obtained names of the following nine students:
Jirra Birhanu
Jilo Kemee
Mangistu Daadhii
Taddasaa Gonfaa
Lammeessa Mararaa
Ganna Jamal
Nuguse Gammadaa
Dajanee Daggafaa
Gaddisaa Dabaree
BACKGROUNDS:
The human rights League of the Horn of Africa (HRLHA) has reported (May 1st and 13th, 2014, urgent actions, www.humanrightleague.org) on the heavy-handed crackdown of the Ethiopian Federal Government’s Agazi Special Squad and the resultant extra-judicial killings of 34 (thirty-four) Oromo nationals; and the arrests and detentions of hundreds of others. Besides, Amnesty International in its most recent report on Ethiopia – “Because I am Oromo – Sweeping repression in the Oromia region of Ethiopia” – has exposed how Oromo nationals have been regularly subjected to arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without charge, enforced disappearance, repeated torture and unlawful state killings as part of the government’s incessant attempts to crush dissent.
Also, the provisions in Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism law have been criticized by local, regional, and international human rights agencies such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International as violating most of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Ethiopian Constitution, other legal documents and international human rights standards that the Country has ratified. Given Ethiopia’s proven track record of mistreating and/or torturing suspected members and supporters of opposition political organizations, HRLHA calls upon the world communities, human rights, humanitarian, and diplomatic agencies so that they monitor using all means available how those young prisoners are treated in Ethiopian jails.
Please direct your concerns to:
His Excellency, Mr. Haila Mariam Dessalegn, Prime Minister of Ethiopia
P.O.Box – 1031 Addis Ababa
Telephone – +251 155 20 44; +251 111 32 41
Fax – +251 155 20 30 , +251 15520
Office of the President of Oromia Regional State
Telephone – 0115510455
Office of the Ministry of Justice of Ethiopia
PO Box 1370,
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia
Fax: +251 11 5517775; +251 11 5520874
Email: ministry-justice@telecom.net.et
UNESCO Headquarters, Paris.
7 place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France
1 rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France
General phone: +33 (0)1 45 68 10 00 www.unesco.org
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)- Africa Department
7 place Fontenoy,75352
Paris 07 SP
France
General phone: +33 (0)1 45 68 10 00
Website: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/africa-department/
UNESCO AFRICA RIGIONAL OFFICE
MR. JOSEPH NGU
Director, UNESCO Office in Abuja
Mail: j.ngu@unesco.org
Tel: +251 11 5445284
Fax: +251 11 5514936
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
United Nations Office at Geneva – 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
Fax: + 41 22 917 9022 (particularly for urgent matters)
E-mail: tb-petitions@ohchr.org (this e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.)
Office of the UNHCR
Telephone: 41 22 739 8111
Fax: 41 22 739 7377
Po Box: 2500
Geneva, Switzerland.
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR)
48 Kairaba Avenue, P.O.Box 673, Banjul, The Gambia.
Tel: (220) 4392 962 , 4372070, 4377721 – 23 Fax: (220) 4390 764
E-mail: achpr@achpr.org
Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights,
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, FRANCE
+ 33 (0)3 88 41 34 21, + 33 (0)3 90 21 50 53
Email (C/O): pressunit@coe.int
U.S. Department of State
Laura Hruby, Ethiopia Desk Officer
U.S. State Department
Email: HrubyLP@state.gov
Tel: (202) 647-6473
Amnesty International – London
Claire Beston, Claire Beston”
Claire.Beston@amnesty.org
Human Rights Watch
Felix Horne, “Felix Horne” hornef@hrw.org.
For the purpose of development policy, the report explores three principles of human decision making: thinking automatically, thinking socially, and thinking with mental models.
World Development Report 2015 explores “Mind, Society, and Behavior”
The WDR 2015 holds new insights on how people make decisions; it provides a framework to help development practitioners and governments apply these insights to development policy.
Research in the WDR suggests that poverty constitutes a cognitive tax that makes it hard for poor people to think deliberatively, especially in times of hardship or stress.
When used with existing policy approaches, new tools ranging from simple, low-cost changes such as better framing of messages and changing the timing of aid, can significantly improve outcomes.
Real people are rarely as coherent, forward-looking, strategic or selfish as typically assumed in standard economic models—they sometimes do not pursue their own interests, and can be unexpectedly generous. Such dynamics should be factored more carefully into development policies, a point made in the World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior.
The newly launched report argues that development policies based on new insights into how people actually think and make decisions will help governments and civil society more readily tackle such challenges as increasing productivity, breaking the cycle of poverty from one generation to the next, and acting on climate change. Drawing from a wealth of research that suggests ways of diagnosing and solving the psychological and social constraints to development, the WDR identifies new policy tools that complement standard economic instruments. For instance, an experiment in Colombia modified a cash transfer program by automatically saving a part of the funds on behalf of beneficiaries, and then disbursing them as lump a sum at the time when decisions about school enrollment for the next year were being made. This tweak in timing resulted in increased enrollments for the following year. “Marketers and politicians have long understood the role of psychology and social preferences in driving individual choice,” said Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, “This Report distills new and growing scientific evidence on this broader understanding of human behavior so that it can be used to promote development. Standard economic policies are effective only after the right cognitive propensities and social norms are in place. As such, this WDR can play a major role in enhancing the power of economic policymaking, including standard fiscal and monetary policies. My only worry is that it will be read more diligently by private marketers selling wares and politicians running for office than by people designing development interventions.” To inspire a fresh look at how development work is done, the Report outlines three principles of human decision making: thinking automatically, thinking socially, and thinking with mental models. Much of human thinking is automatic and depends on whatever comes to mind most effortlessly. People are deeply social and are influenced by social networks and norms. Finally, most people do not invent new concepts; rather they use mental models drawn from their societies and shared histories to interpret their experiences. Because the factors affecting decisions are local and contextual, it is hard to predict in advance which aspects of program design and implementation will drive the choices people will make. Interventions therefore need to take account of the insights found in the report and be designed through a ‘learning by doing’ approach. The Report applies the three principles to multiple areas, including early childhood development, productivity, household finance, health and health care, and climate change.
This Report distills new and growing scientific evidence on this broader understanding of human behavior so that it can be used to promote development. Standard economic policies are effective only after the right cognitive propensities and social norms are in place.
Kaushik Basu Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, World Bank
When it comes to assisting poor people, a key message from WDR 2015 isthat poverty is more than a deprivation in material resources. It is also a “cognitive tax.” Take the case of sugar cane farmers in India, who were asked to participate in a series of cognitive tests before and after receiving their harvest income. Their performance was the equivalent of 10 IQ points higher after the harvest, when resources were less scarce. Policy can be designed to reduce some of the impact of poverty on the ability to make choices and plan for the future. Policy makers should try to move crucial decisions out of periods when cognitive resources are scarce. This may mean shifting school enrollment decisions to periods when poor farmers’ seasonal income is higher. There may also be ways of simplifying typically complex decisions such as applying to a higher education program. These ideas apply to any initiative in which good decision making is a challenge. Poverty in childhood, which is often accompanied by high stress and neglect from parents, can impair cognitive development, according to the report, so public programs that provide early childhood stimulation are critical. A 20-year study in Jamaica found that a program aimed at altering the way mothers interacted with their infants led to an increase in earnings by 25 percent once those children became adults, as compared to others who did not participate in the program. All major developing regions are featured in the Report, including the following examples:
In Malawi, a small performance incentive to encourage farmers to work with their peers increased the take-up of productivity-enhancing agricultural technologies (Ben Yishay and Mobarak 2014). This intervention used social networks to amplify the effects of information programs.
In the Philippines where encouraging saving was a challenge, one effective fix was to create products that allow individuals to commit to certain savings goals and not allow them to easily renege. When savings accounts were offered in the country without the option of withdrawal for six months, nearly 30 percent of those offered the accounts accepted them (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006). After one year, individuals who had been offered and had used the accounts increased savings by 82 percent more than a control group.
In Asia, a new approach, focused on establishing new norms that holds promise is Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS). In CLTS, leaders work with community members to make maps of dwellings and the locations where individuals defecate in the open. The facilitator uses a repertoire of exercises to help people recognize the implications of what they have seen for the spread of infections and to develop new norms to protect against the damaging effects of open defecation. A set of these programs in Indian villages lowered open defecation by 11 percent from very high levels. (Patil and others 2014).
According to the Report, because the decisions of development professionals often can have large effects on other people’s lives, it is vital that development actors and organizations put mechanisms in place to check and correct for their own biases and blind spots. Ultimately, behavior change matters for all actors in the development process. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/12/02/world-development-report-2015-explores-mind-society-and-behavior http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/WDR/WDR%202015/WDR-2015-Full-Report.pdf
Insurance for Ethiopian herders aims to combat drought, conflict – TRFN
YABELO, Ethiopia, Dec 5 (Thomson Reuters Foundation) – Nomadic livestock herders in Ethiopia have received their first payout from an insurance scheme that tracks poor pasture conditions with satellite technology.
Ethiopia has difficulty drawing full advantage from its livestock resources – the largest in Africa – because of the unreliability of pasture and water caused by persistent drought.
The new insurance scheme, known as index-based livestock insurance, aims to reduce losses, support pastoral communities, and lower the risk of conflict sparked by pastoralists migrating into agricultural areas in search of forage or water.
Coverage has been sold since July 2012 in southern Ethiopia’s Borena zone by Oromia Insurance Company (OIC), with technical assistance from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), U.S.-based Cornell University, and Mercy Corps, an international development organisation. Just over 500 pastoralists took up coverage initially.
The scheme was based on an earlier insurance effort rolled out in 2010 in neighbouring Marsabit region in northern Kenya, said Andrew Mude, principal economist at ILRI in Nairobi.
There, payouts were based on livestock deaths. But “the (experience) we had with the Kenyan programme was that some animals are more hardy than others, and so (with) differential mortality rates … (it) was a bit complex,” Mude said.
The insurance offered by OIC in Ethiopia instead offers coverage based on the actual scarcity of the herders’ forage, rather than the mortality rate of their livestock.
HOW IT WORKS
The insurance uses NASA satellite data to look at forage availability in the Borena zone. Experts from ILRI and Cornell University compare current images with historical data from the past 30 years.
“We provide the technical expertise to understand how to use the information from satellites on the state of forage on the ground,” Mude said.
The timing and amount of insurance payouts are then calculated based on the severity of the lack of forage.
OIC’s insurance will pay out up to 6,000 Ethiopian birr ($300) for a cow, 10,000 birr ($500) for a camel, and 800 birr ($40) for a sheep or goat annually. Pastoralists pay premiums averaging about 7.5 percent of the value of the maximum payout.
If forage levels become scarce compared to the index based on the historical satellite data, the herder receives compensation, even if no livestock have been lost.
In response to poor forage conditions, OIC made its first payout to all the insured holders, totalling 570,000 birr ($28,300), at the beginning of November this year at a ceremony in Yabelo, a town 565 km (353 miles) south of the capital, Addis Ababa.
Mude said that although livestock is the key productive asset and source of income for pastoralists, the novelty of insurance in this remote region initially made it difficult to sell.
ILRI spent two years researching the needs of the Borena zone herders before formally launching the insurance.
A further challenge is how to assess the damage suffered by policyholders when dealing with a mobile population.
Mude explained that an important feature of the insurance is that pastoralists remain covered even if they migrate out of the woredas (districts) where they are insured, since migration itself implies that there is a severe lack of forage. Compensation is therefore calculated based on the area where they were initially insured.
Wondimu Beteyo, a pastoralist who received a payout for his cattle and goats, says that until recently he had to trek several days for pasture and water. Now, he says, the money he has received will allow him to replenish the cattle he lost during the recent drought.
Dono Kotelo, from Teltale woreda, insured his two goats and two cattle for a total of 1,048 birr ($50) after learning about the insurance scheme. Although none of his animals died, because he migrated to find pasture, he received a payout of 192 birr ($10) for costs associated with the dry season and said he plans to buy insurance again for the coming year.
LOWERING CONFLICT RISK?
Getaneh Eerena, a livestock insurance officer at the micro-insurance department of OIC, said that in the long run the programme is not just about financial payments but about avoiding conflicts.
“The area tends to have high conflict incidence, both within (the) pastoralist community and against agricultural communities,” Eerena said.
Kotelo, the herder, said his Borena community used to cross into the land of agricultural communities when their own pastures were exhausted, often leading to deadly clashes.
Mude and Eerena said their organisations planned to extend the insurance scheme eventually across the country.
In June more protests erupted just outside Addis Ababa in opposition to what is considered a discriminatory plan by the city council to expand the capital and displace many of the ethnic Oromos who live at its edges. The government often makes blanket accusations against critics based on their ethnicity. At least 5,000 ethnic Oromos have been arrested between 2011 and 2014 based on their actual or suspected opposition to the government, according to an October 2014 Amnesty International report.
The EPRDF has portrayed itself as a vanguard party, charged with a sacred duty to articulate the “developmental state”. Its dictum is “You are either with or against us.” It has evolved a rich rhetoric for those who oppose it by labelling them “anti-development” or “neoliberal”. In the meantime, the state’s command economy depends on dollars from “neoliberal” donors. It took $3 billion in external assistance in 2012, according to the World Bank, more than any other country in Africa.
In the run-up to the May 2015 general election, will the EPRDF allow the opposition to compete? Will the opposition participate or boycott the polls? Such queries are beside the point: the struggle for democracy in Ethiopia was lost long ago. The next election will be another EPRDF landslide, in keeping with the history of the current ruling party and its revolutionary roots. http://unpo.org/article/17759
Oromo: Only One Opposition MP Left in Ethiopian Parliament
In the Ethiopian Parliament, out of 548 MPs, only one is not part of the government coalition. Many other opposition party members, including leaders of the Oromo People’s Congress Party and of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, have been imprisoned, joining over 30,000 political prisoners in the country. The ruling party has progressively eliminated any opposition through abuse of anti-terror laws and banning NGOs, which are mainly funded from abroad.
Few political rights exist in Ethiopia and even fewer voices criticise the government.
The right to remain silent is one liberty not denied to critics of the Ethiopian government. Most other political entitlements have vanished. This explains the puzzle of Ethiopia’s invisible political opposition: it is so battered and brutalised, tattered and torn, that what is left of its pieces may never fit together again.
The current government is mostly to blame. It came to power in 1991 after it toppled the communist military junta led by despot Mengistu Haile Mariam. The victorious coalition of ethnic militias promised a new dispensation, based on the concept of “ethnic federalism”.
But nearly a quarter of a century later, Ethiopia remains a de facto one-party state. As countless analysts have noted, including successive European Union election observation missions, there is no separation between the government bureaucracy and the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). No political space is allowed to dissenting voices.
Most critics are behind bars, the first and main reason for the absence of a political opposition in Africa’s oldest independent nation.
Of the 547 members of Parliament (MPs), only one is from an opposition party. Girma Seif Maru of the Unity for Democracy and Justice party (UDJ) is the lonely MP–window dressing whom the government allowed to win a seat in the last general election in 2010. But large swathes of the UDJ are in prison.
Other opposition party members, including Bekele Gerba, a leader of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, and Olbana Lelisa of the Oromo People’s Congress Party, were imprisoned days after meeting with representatives from Amnesty International in 2011.
Andualem Arage, the UDJ’s vice-chairman, and another UDJ leader, Natnael Mekonnen, were put behind bars for debating the 2011 Arab spring rebellions. So was outspoken journalist Eskinder Nega, who posed questions about the possibility of a similar Ethiopian movement in his online pieces. In June 2012 Mr Andualem was sentenced to 75 years in prison, while Messrs Eskinder and Natnael got off lighter with 18 each.
They are just three of the thousands of government critics silenced in the slammer. Barely a month goes by without news of fresh arrests and detentions. In July, four more leaders of the UDJ, Arena Tigray and Semayawi (“Blue”) opposition parties were detained. In addition, Andargachew Tsige, an Ethiopian opposition leader and British citizen, was arrested in Yemen and extradited to Addis Ababa, the capital, in July. He is facing the death penalty for allegedly plotting a coup in 2009.
In July 2013, thousands of people took to the streets of Addis Ababa demanding the release of some of Ethiopia’s estimated 30,000-40,000 political prisoners, according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The protestors also called for the repeal of a draconian anti-terror law that has been exploited to target legitimate opposition members. Crackdowns and arrests followed, including the detention of 40 UDJ activists who had distributed flyers encouraging people to protest.
The second reason for the opposition’s muffled voice is fear: a decade or more of repression has taken its toll. The government spies on dissidents in the diaspora and uses its control of food aid to literally starve the opposition at home, according to Human Rights Watch. Yet, Ethiopia’s citizens seem to passively accept each new transgression of their rights. They are just too scared to fight back.
A brief emancipatory moment swept Ethiopia in 2005. The ruling EPRDF, under the leadership of the late Meles Zenawi, allowed the forerunner of the UDJ, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), a degree of freedom to campaign in the general elections that year. In polls that appeared relatively free, 174 opposition MPs were elected.
But the CUD disputed the results and protests erupted in the capital. Police killed nearly 200 unarmed protestors and arrested 40,000 CUD members and sympathisers in a nationwide clampdown, according to media reports. The memory of that brutality still casts a long shadow. Since then, the government has given no quarter.
This is the third factor explaining Ethiopia’s invisible opposition: the government controls every aspect of daily life. In 2010 Human Rights Watch documented the strategic use of food aid, agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilisers, access to microcredit, teacher training and even university admissions to encourage support for the ruling party.
It worked. In the 2008 local election the ruling party won 99% of the votes and 3m local government seats. In the 2010 general election, the debacle of 2005 was avoided and voting was peaceful. The EPRDF took 99.6% of the parliamentary slots, leaving the UDJ with the one decorative seat.
The final squeeze on the political opposition and any form of dissent has been the use of repressive laws. The 2009 anti-terror law has a sweeping definition of terrorism. Another 2009 law bans NGOs that engage in human rights or advocacy activities from receiving more than 10% of their funds from abroad. It also requires all NGOs to re-register with a new government agency. This legislation closed down Ethiopia’s critical organisations and made hundreds of activists redundant.
As long-time Ethiopia observer, René Lefort, commented in July in an article on the Open Democracy website: “When the political space is impermeable, the inevitable internal conflicts can only overflow into the ethnic and/or religious sphere.”
They have. The government has been jostling for the last two years with the Muslim community that objected to government attempts to interfere in the appointments of the Islamic council. Every Friday, peaceful protests are held at mosques in Addis Ababa. Every Friday security forces shut them down and jail religious leaders, as reported in the media and acknowledged implicitly by government statements.
In June more protests erupted just outside Addis Ababa in opposition to what is considered a discriminatory plan by the city council to expand the capital and displace many of the ethnic Oromos who live at its edges. The government often makes blanket accusations against critics based on their ethnicity. At least 5,000 ethnic Oromos have been arrested between 2011 and 2014 based on their actual or suspected opposition to the government, according to an October 2014 Amnesty International report.
The EPRDF has portrayed itself as a vanguard party, charged with a sacred duty to articulate the “developmental state”. Its dictum is “You are either with or against us.” It has evolved a rich rhetoric for those who oppose it by labelling them “anti-development” or “neoliberal”. In the meantime, the state’s command economy depends on dollars from “neoliberal” donors. It took $3 billion in external assistance in 2012, according to the World Bank, more than any other country in Africa.
In the run-up to the May 2015 general election, will the EPRDF allow the opposition to compete? Will the opposition participate or boycott the polls? Such queries are beside the point: the struggle for democracy in Ethiopia was lost long ago. The next election will be another EPRDF landslide, in keeping with the history of the current ruling party and its revolutionary roots.
Call it a coup or a revolution—Burkina Faso has finally overthrown its longtime strongman Blaise Compaoré. During his 27-year-long rule, Compaoré’s regime was accused of corruption and nepotism and of violently quelling a student and military rebellion in 2011.
Revolutions now happen in real time and Compaoré’s overthrow was no different. This October, protestors, journalists and politicians used the hashtags #Lwili and #Burkina to live-tweet their way through a chain of events that started with massive street protests and ended with a cellphone video of Compaoré fleeing the country with his convoy of SUVs.
Images showing streets and squares flooded by demonstrators, many of whom were women brandishing wooden spatulas, a local symbol of gender defiance, were shared thousands of times on Twitter and Instagram.
Alongside international focus in Burkina Faso has been a resurgence of interest in the man many protesters credit as their inspiration—Thomas Sankara.
Overthrown and murdered in Compaoré’s 1987 coup, Sankara has long been revered by African nationalists and leftists for his charismatic blend of revolutionary zeal and progressive philosophy. President of the country for four years between 1983 and 1987, Sankara has only a few interviews and speeches attributed to him—yet his legacy is far larger. Today, his message is finding a new, broader of pool of admirers in the social media generation both in Burkina Faso and abroad.
As president, he changed the name of the country from the colonial Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, which means “land of upright people” in an amalgam of the country’s most popular languages. A guitarist, he wrote the national anthem, a stirring ode against neo-imperialism.
Coat of arms of Burkina Faso 1984-1991(Image via Wikimedia Commons)
And the phrase on the lips of protesters this summer—“La patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons,” (homeland or death, we shall overcome)—was on the national crest during his tenure.
One of the popular movements behind Compaoré’s recent ouster—Le Balai Citoyen or The Civic Broom movement—was led by two self-professed Sankarist musicians, who spread their message of “sweeping clean” Burkina politics through social media, a number of popular songs, and large political gatherings. In May they held a rally with the political opposition that filled a 35,000 capacity stadium.
Sankara was famous for his stance against repayment of African debts and his advocacy of economic self-reliance. Under him, Burkina Faso accomplished massive child immunizations, started a national campaign to fight desertification by planting 10 million trees, banned female circumcision and forced marriage, and had a government with women in high positions.
Feminist activist Minna Salami, one of Applause Africa’s “40 African Changemakers under 40,″ has been writing about Thomas Sankara on her influential Ms. Afropolitan blog since 2010. For her, discovering the works of Sankara was a revelation.
“Like other young women of African heritage—and men as well— I thought, why did I not know about this person?” she told Quartz. “Why are we so many millions of miles away from the vision he had for the African continent?”
It’s unclear what will happen next in Burkina Faso. After seizing power when Compaoré fled, the military agreed to form an interim government that will run the country until elections in Nov. 2015. The new prime minister, former military leader, Isaac Zida has vowed to repatriate Compaoré, stamp out corruption and launch an inquiry into Sankara’s 1984 death.
Since the Compaoré’s ouster, neighboring Togo (#tginfo) and nearby Chad have seen large demonstrations with protestors invoking Burkina Faso as a roadmap to unseating their own long-term autocratic leaders just like the Burkinabé activists credited the movement that ousted Senegal’s Wade before them.
You can follow Aaron on Twitter at @aaronleaf. We welcome your comments at ideas@qz.com.
Read more @ http://qz.com/305056/how-burkina-faso-rediscovered-a-revolutionary-hero-and-overthrew-a-dictator/
According to Freedom House: “The internet is a crucial medium through which people can express themselves and share ideas and has become an increasingly important tool through which democracy and human rights activists mobilize and advocate for political, social, and economic reform. Fearing the power of the new technologies, authoritarian states have devised subtle and not-so-subtle ways to filter, monitor, and otherwise obstruct or manipulate the openness of the internet.”
Ethiopia (80 marks) is the worst performer in Africa and one of the 5 worst performers in the world (Iran, Syria, China, Cuba and Ethiopia).
2014 FREEDOM ON THE NET TOTAL (0 = BEST, 100 = WORST)
80
2014 SCORES
FREEDOM ON THE NET STATUS
Not Free
FREEDOM ON THE NET TOTAL
(0 = BEST, 100 = WORST)
80
OBSTACLES TO ACCESS
(0 = BEST, 25 = WORST)
23
LIMITS ON CONTENT
(0 = BEST, 35 = WORST)
28
VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS
(0 = BEST, 40 = WORST)
29
2013 FREEDOM ON THE NET TOTAL (0 = BEST, 100 = WORST)
79
KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
May 2013 – May 2014
Telecom services worsened, characterized by frequently dropped phone calls, prolonged internet service interruptions, and slow response times to service failures (see Obstacles to Access).
Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, and CNN were inaccessible for 12 hours in July 2013, while the number of permanently blocked webpages also increased (see Limits on Content).
A law enacted in November 2013 gives the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) carte blanche to inspect private online activities without oversight (see Violations of User Rights).
The government launched sophisticated surveillance malware against several online journalists in the Ethiopian diaspora and dissidents in exile (see Violations of User Rights).
Six bloggers of the prominent Zone9 blogging collective were arrested in April 2014 on charges of terrorism (see Violations of User Rights).
Introduction
Ethiopia continues to have one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile phone connectivity in the world, as meager infrastructure, government monopoly over the telecommunications sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the country. Coupled with highly repressive laws and tactics aimed at restricting freedom of expression and access to information, internet freedom in Ethiopia is consistently rated the worst in sub-Saharan Africa and among the worst in the world.
Despite the country’s extremely poor telecommunications services and a largely disconnected population, Ethiopia is also known as one of the first African countries to censor the internet, beginning in 2006 with opposition blogs.[1] Since then, internet censorship has become pervasive and systematic through the use of highly sophisticated tools that block and filter internet content and monitor user activity. The majority of blocked websites feature critical news and opposition viewpoints run by individuals and organizations based mostly in the diaspora. Surveillance of mobile phone and internet networks is systematic and widespread, enabled by Chinese-made technology that allows for the interception of SMS text messages, recording of phone calls, and centralized monitoring of online activities. The government also employs commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape.
During the report’s coverage period, internet freedom in Ethiopia worsened due to increasing restrictions on access to social media and communications tools, such as Storify, and the temporary blocking of Facebook and Twitter in July 2013. A new law passed in November 2013 gave the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) carte blanche to track private online communications and investigate electronic devices without oversight. In addition, a number of diaspora journalists and exiled dissidents were targeted with surveillance malware, demonstrating a growing level of sophistication in the government’s effort to silence critical voices that extends beyond the country’s borders.
In 2014, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown against bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and quash dissent. Most alarmingly, six bloggers from the critical Zone9 blogging collective and three journalists associated with Zone9 were arrested in late April 2014 on charges of terrorism, which, under the Telecom Fraud Offenses Law and anti-terrorism proclamation, can entail a sentence of up to 20 years in prison if the bloggers are found guilty. The Zone9 case was repeatedly stalled by the courts throughout 2014, leaving the bloggers in pre-trial detention for over six months as of late-2014. Meanwhile, two online radio journalists were arrested and detained for a week without charges in August 2013, and the prominent dissident blogger, Eskinder Nega, and award-winning journalist, Reeyot Alemu, continue to serve lengthy prison sentences, despite international pressure for their release. The overall crackdown has had a major chilling effect on internet freedom and freedom of expression in the country, leading to increasing levels of self-censorship among online journalists, bloggers, and ordinary users alike.
OBSTACLES TO ACCESS:
In 2013 and 2014, access to ICTs in Ethiopia remained extremely limited, hampered by slow speeds and the state’s tight grip on the telecom sector.[2] According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), internet penetration stood at a mere 1.9 percent in 2013, up from 1.5 percent in 2012.[3] Only 0.25 percent of the population had access to fixed-broadband internet, increasing from 0.01 percent in 2012.[4] Ethiopians had more access to mobile phone services, with mobile phone penetration rates increasing from 22 percent in 2012 to 27 percent in 2013,[5] though such access rates still lag behind a regional average of 80 percent.[6] Meanwhile, less than 5 percent of the population has a mobile-broadband subscription.[7] Radio remains the principal mass medium through which most Ethiopians stay informed.
While access to the internet via mobile phones increased slightly in the last year, prohibitively expensive mobile data packages still posed a significant financial obstacle for the majority of the population in Ethiopia, where per capita income in 2013 stood at US$470.[8] Ethiopia’s telecom market is very unsaturated due to monopolistic control, providing customers with few options at arbitrary prices.[9] Prices are set by the state-controlled Ethio Telecom and kept artificially high. As of mid-2014, monthly packages cost between ETB 200 and 3,000 (US$10 to $150) for 1 to 30 GB of 3G mobile services.[10]
The computer remains the most practical option for going online, though in 2014, personal computers are still prohibitively expensive. The combined cost of purchasing a computer, initiating an internet connection, and paying usage charges makes internet access beyond the reach of most Ethiopians. Consequently, only 2 percent of Ethiopian households had internet access in their homes in 2013.[11] The majority of internet users rely on cybercafes to log online, leading to a growth of cybercafes in recent years, particularly in large cities. A typical internet user in Addis Ababa pays between ETB 5 and 7 (US$0.25 to $0.35) for an hour of access. Because of the scarcity of internet cafes outside urban areas, however, rates in rural cybercafes are more expensive.
For the few Ethiopians who can access the internet, connection speeds are known to be painstakingly slow. For years, logging into an email account and opening a single message could take as long as six minutes at a standard cybercafe with broadband in the capital city.[12]According to May 2014 data from Akamai’s “State of the Internet” report, Ethiopia has an average connection speed of 1.2 Mbps (compared to a global average of 3.9 Mbps).[13] Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s broadband adoption (characterized by connection speeds greater than 4 Mbps) is less than 3 percent,[14] while the country’s narrowband adoption (connection speed below 256 Kbps) is about 20 percent among those with access.[15] Numerous users reported that internet and text messaging speeds were extremely slow during the coverage period, with services completely unavailable at times.[16] Frequent electricity outages are also a contributing factor to poor telecom services.
Despite reports of massive investments from Chinese telecom companies in recent years,[17] Ethiopia’s telecommunications infrastructure is among the least developed in Africa and is almost entirely absent from rural areas, where about 85 percent of the population resides. The country is connected to the international internet via satellite, a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to its international gateway, and the SEACOM cable that connects through Djibouti to an international undersea cable. In an effort to expand connectivity, the government has reportedly installed several thousand kilometers of fiber-optic cable throughout the country over the past few years.[18] Construction of the East African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) was completed and launched in July 2010, but its effects on Ethiopia have yet to be seen as of mid-2014.[19]
The space for independent initiatives in the ICT sector, entrepreneurial or otherwise, is extremely limited,[20] with state-owned Ethio Telecom holding a firm monopoly over internet and mobile phone services in the country. Consequently, all connections to the international internet are completely centralized via Ethio Telecom, enabling the government to cut off the internet at will. As a result, the internet research company Renesys classified Ethiopia “as being at severe risk of Internet disconnection,” alongside Syria, Uzbekistan, and Yemen in a February 2014 assessment.[21] During the coverage period, one Renesys report found that 40 percent of Ethiopia’s networks were down for a few hours on July 18, 2013 as a result of a disruption on the SEACOM network, though the exact reason for the disruption was unknown.[22]In September 2013, a number of cybercafe owners in Ethiopia reported an increasing trend of unpredictable internet connections and speeds beginning in June that resulted in a significant decline in business, with internet connections reported as unavailable for up to 15 days in a month.[23]
Mobile phone networks—also completely centralized under Ethio Telecom—are similarly vulnerable to service disruptions and shutdowns by the government, which often occur during politically sensitive times. During the coverage period, there were frequent reports of dropped cell phone and landline calls, complete network blackouts in many parts of the country,[24] and overlapping voices in calls. The latter phenomenon led people to suspect government engagement in a widespread eavesdropping scheme (see “Violations of User Rights” for details on surveillance).
Meanwhile, cybercafes are subject to onerous requirements under the 2002 Telecommunications (Amendment) Proclamation,[25] which requires cybercafe owners to obtain an operating license with Ethio Telecom via a murky process that can take months. During the coverage period, Ethio Telecom began enforcing its licensing requirements more strictly in response to the increasing spread of cybercafes, reportedly penalizing Muslim cafe owners more harshly. Violations of the stringent requirements, such as a prohibition on providing Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services, entail criminal liability.[26]
Despite repeated international pressure to liberalize telecommunications in Ethiopia, the government has not eased its grip on the sector.[27] In June 2013, the prime minister publicly affirmed that the government would maintain a monopoly over the country’s telecoms.[28] In the meantime, China has emerged as a key investor and contractor in Ethiopia’s telecommunications industry,[29] and in July 2013, the government signed a US$1.6 billion agreement with the Chinese telecom companies, Zhongxing Telecommunication Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei, to upgrade its broadband network to 4G in Addis Ababa and expand 3G across the country.[30] The networks built by the Chinese firms have been criticized for their high costs and poor service,[31] though the partnership has enabled Ethiopia’s authoritarian leaders to maintain their hold over the telecom sector.[32] Furthermore, the contracts have led to increasing fears that the Chinese may also be assisting the authorities in developing more robust internet and mobile phone censorship and surveillance capacities.[33]
The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA) and the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA) are the primary regulatory bodies overseeing the telecommunications sector. These two organizations were established as autonomous federal agencies, but both are highly controlled government bodies.
LIMITS ON CONTENT:
During the coverage period, over a hundred websites remained inaccessible in Ethiopia, with a greater number of online tools and services targeted for blocking.A June 2014 report affirmed the government’s efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online.
The Ethiopian government imposes nationwide, politically motivated internet blocking and filtering that tends to tighten ahead of sensitive political events. The majority of blocked websites are those that feature opposition or critical content run by individuals or organizations based in the country or the diaspora. The government’s approach to internet filtering generally entails hindering access to a list of specific internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the Ethio Telecom-controlled international gateway. A more sophisticated strategy of blocking websites based on a keyword in the URL path, known as deep-packet inspection (DPI),[34] was detected in May 2012 when the Tor network—an online tool that enables users to browse anonymously—was blocked.[35]
In January 2014, an independent test conducted by a researcher based in the country found 120 unique URLs that were inaccessible in the country, 62 of which were Ethiopian news websites, 14 of which were political party websites, 37 of which were blogs, and 7 of which were television and online radio websites.[36] During the test, some websites opened at the first attempt but were inaccessible when refreshed. The test also found that select tools and services on Google’s Android operating system on smart phones were inaccessible at irregular intervals but for unclear reasons. A separate test on over 1,400 URLs between July and August 2013 by the OpenNet Initiative in partnership with Human Rights Watch similarly found 62 websites blocked altogether and numerous others intermittently inaccessible.[37]
International news outlets were increasingly targeted for censorship. Al Arabiya, a Saudi Arabia-based media outlet, and both of Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English websites were intermittently blocked during the coverage period.[38] In July 2013, websites belonging to Yahoo and CNN were reportedly inaccessible for about 12 hours. Facebook and Twitter were also targets of the short-term July 2013 blocking.[39]There was no evident impetus or reason for the short-term blocking, and other major services such as Gmail and new outlets such as the New York Times remained accessible. Nevertheless, the incident further increased worries over reports of government plans to block popular social media tools completely.[40] Facebook and Twitter platforms were otherwise generally accessible, although some individual Facebook groups belonging to opposition individuals remained blocked altogether, particularly when accessed via the unencrypted (http://) URL pathway. Meanwhile, the social media curation tool Storify—first blocked in July 2012[41]—remained blocked during the coverage period,[42] while the URL shortening tool Bit.ly was inexplicably blocked in late 2013.[43]
In the past few years, the authorities have become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, electing to block select webpages as opposed to entire websites. Critical online news articles are usually targeted, such as an August 2012 Forbes article titled, “Requiem for a Reprobate Ethiopian Tyrant Should Not Be Lionized,” which was blocked for criticizing the local and global praise of the former prime minister’s debatable economic growth achievements; the article remained blocked as of June 2014.[44] A July 2013 YouTube video of the antigovernment Muslim protests that occurred from 2012-13 was also blocked as of late 2013.[45]
International blog-hosting platforms such as Blogspot have been frequently blocked since the disputed parliamentary elections of 2005, during which the opposition used online communication tools to organize and disseminate information that was critical of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.[46] In 2007, the government instituted a blanket block on the domain names of two popular blog-hosting websites, Blogspot and Nazret, though the authorities have since become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, now blocking select pages such as the Zone9 independent blog hosted on Blogspot,[47] as opposed to the entire blogging platform. Nazret, however, remained completely blocked as of June 2014. Circumvention strategies have also been targeted, with the term “proxy” yielding no search results on Google,[48] according to an independent source. Meanwhile, the terms “sex” or “porn” are still searchable.
In addition to increasing blocks of online content, politically objectionable content is often targeted for removal, often by way of threats from security officials who personally seek out users and bloggers to instruct them to take down certain content, particularly critical content on Facebook. The growing practice suggests that at least some voices within Ethiopia’s small online community are being closely monitored. Some restrictions are also placed on mobile phones, such as the requirement for a text message to obtain prior approval from Ethio Telecom if it is to be sent to more than ten recipients.[49] A bulk text message sent without prior approval is automatically blocked.
There are no procedures for determining which websites are blocked or why, which precludes any avenues for appeal. There are no published lists of blocked websites or publicly available criteria for how such decisions are made, and users are met with an error message when trying to access blocked content. This lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s continued denial of its censorship efforts. Meanwhile, the decision-making process does not appear to be controlled by a single entity, as various government bodies—including the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), Ethio Telecom, and the ministry of ICT—seem to be implementing their own lists, contributing to a phenomenon of inconsistent blocking.
Lack of adequate funding is a significant challenge for independent online media in Ethiopia, as fear of government pressure dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites. Local newspapers and web outlets receive their news and information from regime critics and opposition organizations in the diaspora. While the domestic Ethiopian blogosphere has been expanding, most blogging activity on Ethiopian issues still originates in the diaspora. Few Ethiopian journalists work for both the domestic print media and overseas online outlets due to the threat of repercussions.
Increasing repression against journalists and bloggers has had a major chilling effect on expression online, particularly following the arrest of the Zone9 bloggers in April 2014 (see “Violations of User Rights”). Fear of pervasive surveillance has led to widespread self-censorship, and many bloggers publish anonymously to avoid reprisals.[50] Notably, users on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter seem to practice a lower degree of self-censorship, which may be due to poor awareness of privacy settings, or the perception that posts on social media are anonymous or more secure.
Despite extremely low levels of internet access, the authorities employ progovernment commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape. Acrimonious exchanges between commentators on apologist websites and an array of diaspora critics and opposition figures have become common in online political debates. There was a noticeable increase in the number of progovernment commentators during the coverage period, as confirmed in a June 2014 report by the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT) that detailed the government’s efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online. According to the ESAT report, hundreds of bloggers who report directly to government officials had been trained on how to post progovernment comments and criticize antigovernment articles on social media platforms.[51]
As the country prepares for the upcoming 2015 National Election, the state media has stepped up its campaign against the press in general and the use of social media in particular, claiming that foreign agents and terrorists are using social media to destabilize the country. Consequently, many civil society groups based in the country are wary of mobilizing against the government, and calls for protest come mostly from the Ethiopian diaspora rather than from local activists who fear the government’s violent crackdowns against protest movements.
Nevertheless, over the past few years, Facebook has become one of the most popular mediums through which Ethiopians share and consume information. Social media services have also become significant platforms for political deliberation and social justice campaigns. For example, in September 2013, a group of young Ethiopian bloggers and activists based in Addis Ababa launched a Facebook and Twitter campaign on the occasion of Ethiopia’s New Year celebration to share their vision of a better Ethiopia, using the hashtag #EthiopianDream.[52] In November 2013, Ethiopians responded to the Saudi government’s crackdown on undocumented Ethiopian immigrants in Saudi Arabia by organizing the online campaign, #SomeoneTellSaudiArabia, to protest the abusive treatment of Ethiopian immigrants.[53]
Netizen activism was particularly pronounced and widespread following the arrest of six Zone9 bloggers and three journalists for their alleged affiliation with the Zone9 collective (see “Violations of User Rights”). Ethiopian bloggers and social media users flocked online to spread the #FreeZone9Bloggers hashtag in a campaign that quickly swept across the social media sphere and garnered widespread support from around the world. Within five days, the #FreeZone9Bloggers hashtag had been tweeted more than 8,000 times.[54] Unfortunately, the international campaign elicited no response from the government, and the imprisoned bloggers and journalists are still awaiting trial on charges of terrorism as of late-2014.
VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS:
During the coverage period, the Ethiopian government’s already limited space for online expression continued to deteriorate alongside its poor treatment of journalists. A new proclamation passed in November 2013 empowered INSA with sweeping surveillance capabilities without judicial oversight. Sophisticated malware was launched against online radio journalists and dissidents in exile, while repression against bloggers and ICT users in the country increased notably. Six bloggers of the critical Zone9 blogging collective were arrested for their alleged terrorist activities.
The 1995 Ethiopian constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and access to information, while also prohibiting censorship.[55] These constitutional guarantees are affirmed in the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, known as the press law, which also provides certain protections for media workers, such as prohibiting the pre-trial detention of journalists.[56]Nevertheless, the press law also includes problematic provisions that contradict constitutional protections and restrict free expression. For example, media outlets are required to obtain licenses to operate through an onerous registration process that applies to all outlets, regardless of size, though it is uncertain whether the press law’s broad language encompasses online media.[57] Penalties for violating the registration requirement and other restrictions on content, such as defamation, involve high fines and up to two and three years in prison, respectively.[58]
In September 2012, the government codified specific restrictions on various telecommunications activities through the passage of the Telecom Fraud Offences law,[59] which revised a 1996 law that had placed bans on certain communication applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)[60]—including Skype and Google Voice—call back services, and internet-based fax services.[61] Under the new law, the penalties under the preexisting ban were toughened, increasing the fine and maximum prison sentence from five to eight years for offending service providers, and penalizing users with three months to two years in prison.[62] The law also added the requirement for all individuals to register their telecommunications equipment—including smart phones—with the government, which security officials typically enforce by confiscating ICT equipment when a registration permit cannot be furnished at security checkpoints, according to sources in the country.
Most alarmingly, the Telecom Fraud Offences law extended the violations and penalties defined in the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and 2004 Criminal Code to electronic communications, which are broadly defined yet explicitly include both mobile phone and internet services.[63] The anti-terrorism legislation prescribes prison sentences of up to 20 years for the publication of statements that can be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism, vaguely defined.[64] Meanwhile, the criminal code holds any “author, originator or publisher” criminally liable for content allegedly linked to offenses such as treason, espionage, or incitement, which carries with it the penalty of up to life imprisonment or death.[65] The criminal code also penalizes the publication of a “false rumor” with up to three years in prison.[66]
In 2014, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown against bloggers and online journalists, using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and silence dissent. Most alarmingly, six bloggers from the critical Zone9 blogging collective and three journalists associated with Zone9 were arrested in late April 2014 on charges of terrorism. They were accused of “working with foreign organizations that claim to be human rights activists… and receiving finance to incite public violence through social media,”[67]though the arrests had occurred just days following Zone9’s Facebook post announcing plans to resume its activism. The blogging collective had been inactive for seven months as a result of “a considerable amount of surveillance and harassment” the bloggers had suffered at the hands of security agents for their writings and social media activism.[68] Despite widespread international condemnation of the Zone9 arrests, the detainees were denied bail in August and remained in jail as of fall 2014, awaiting trial.[69] Meanwhile, the well-known dissident journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega is still carrying out an 18-year prison sentence handed down in July 2012 under the anti-terrorism law.[70]
Numerous other journalists and media outlets—both online and print—were targeted for arrest and prosecutions during the coverage period, including Darsema Sori and Khalid Mohammed who were arrested in August 2013 for their work with the online radio station, Radio Bilal, which is known for its extensive coverage of the 2012-13 antigovernment protests organized by Ethiopian Muslims. They were released after being held for a week without charges,[71] but the arrests were in keeping with the government’s concerted efforts to silence the protests.
Given the high degree of online repression in Ethiopia, some political commentators use proxy servers and anonymizing tools to hide their identities when publishing online and to circumvent filtering, though the ability to communicate anonymously has become more difficult. The Tor Network anonymizing tool was blocked in May 2012, confirming that the government has deployed deep-packet inspection technology, and Google searches of the term “proxy” mysteriously yield no results.
Anonymity is further compromised by strict SIM card registration requirements. Upon purchase of a SIM card through Ethio Telecom or an authorized reseller, individuals must provide their full name, address, government-issued identification number, and a passport-sized photograph. Ethio Telecom’s database of SIM registrants enables the government to cut-off the SIM cards belonging to targeted individuals and to restrict those individuals from registering for new SIM cards. Internet subscribers are also required to register their personal details, including their home address, with the government. In 2013, an inside informant leaked worrying details of potential draft legislation that seeks to mandate real-name registration for all internet users in Ethiopia, though there are no further details of this development as of mid-2014.[72]
Government surveillance of online and mobile phone communications is pervasive in Ethiopia, and evidence has emerged in recent years that reveal the scale of such practices. According to 2014 Human Rights Watch research, there are strong indications that the government has deployed a centralized monitoring system from the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE, known as ZXMT, to monitor phone lines and various types of communications, including mobile phone networks and the internet.[73] Known for its use by repressive regimes in Libya and Iran, ZXMT enables deep-packet inspection (DPI) of internet traffic across the Ethio Telecom network and has the ability to intercept emails and web chats.
Another ZTE technology, known as ZSmart, is a customer management database installed at Ethio Telecom that provides the government with full access to user information and the ability to intercept SMS text messages and record phone conversations.[74] ZSmart also allows security officials to locate targeted individuals through real-time geolocation tracking of mobile phones.[75] While the extent to which the government has made use of the full range of ZTE’s sophisticated surveillance systems is unclear, the authorities frequently present intercepted emails and phone calls as evidence during trials against journalists and bloggers or during interrogations as a scare tactic.[76]
In November 2013, a new Cyber Security Law expanded the surveillance powers of the Information Network Security Agency (INSA)—the government body established in 2011 to preside over the security of the country’s critical communications infrastructure.[77] According to reports, the law states that “social media outlets, blogs and other internet related media have great capabilities to instigate war, to damage the country’s image and create havoc in the economic atmosphere of the country”—setting the logic for expanding INSA’s duties to include developing offensive cyber capabilities and ICT tools. The proclamation also empowers INSA to investigate computers, networks, internet, radio, television, and social media platforms “for any possible damage to the country’s social, economic, political and psychological well being.”[78]
INSA reportedly uses sophisticated spyware, such as the commercial toolkit FinFisher—a device that can secretly monitor computers by turning on webcams, record everything a user types with a key logger, and intercept Skype calls—to target dissidents and supposed threats.[79] A leaked document confirmed that the UK-based company, Gamma International, had provided Ethio Telecom with the FinFisher surveillance toolkit at some point between April and July 2012.[80] In addition, research conducted by Citizen Lab in March 2013 worryingly found evidence of an Ethio Telecom-initiated FinSpy campaign launched against users that employed pictures of the exiled prodemocracy group, Ginbot 7, as bait.[81]
There has been an increasing trend of exiled dissidents targeted with surveillance malware in the past few years. In April 2013, Tadesse Kersmo, a senior member of Ginbot-7 living in exile in the United Kingdom since 2009, came across the above-mentioned Citizen Lab FinSpy report and noticed that one of the spyware campaign’s bait was a picture of himself.[82] He contacted Citizen Lab to have his computer examined and found that FinSpy had been active on his computer over two days in June 2012.[83] The spyware may have transmitted any or all of Kersmo’s emails, chats, Skype calls, files, and web searches to a server based in Ethiopia, which could have provided the authorities with names of contacts, colleagues, and family members still living in the country.[84] In February 2014, Privacy International filed a criminal complaint to the UK’s National Cyber Crime Unit on Kersmo’s behalf, urging them to investigate the potential unlawful interception of communications.
In the same month, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a similar suit in the United States on behalf of another Ethiopian dissident (and American citizen) identified publicly under the pseudonym Mr. Kidane.[85] Kidane’s computer had also been found infected with the FinSpy malware sometime between late October 2012 and March 2013, which had secretly recorded dozens of his Skype calls, copied emails he had sent, and logged a web search conducted by his son on the history of sports medicine for a school research project.[86] The FinSpy IP address was linked to a server belonging to Ethio Telecom.
Recent Citizen Lab research published in February 2014 uncovered the use of Remote Control System (RCS) spyware against two employees of the diaspora-run independent satellite television, radio, and online news media outlet, Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT), based in Alexandria, VA.[87] Made by the Italian company Hacking Team, RCS spyware is advertised as “offensive technology” sold exclusively to law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world, and has the ability to steal files and passwords, and intercept Skype calls/chats. [88] While Hacking Team claims that they do not deal with “repressive regimes,”[89] the RCS virus sent via sophisticated bait to the two ESAT employees made it clear that the attack was targeted, and researchers have strong suspicions of the Ethiopian government’s involvement.[90]
While the government’s stronghold over the Ethiopian ICT sector enables it to proactively monitor users, its access to user activity and information is less direct at cybercafes. For a period following the 2005 elections, cybercafe owners were required to keep a register of their clients, but the requirement has not been enforced since mid-2010.[91] Nevertheless, some cybercafe operators revealed that they are required to report any “unusual behavior” to security officials, and officials often visit cybercafes (sometimes in plainclothes) to ask questions about specific users or monitor user activity themselves.[92]
Government security agents frequently harass and intimidate bloggers, online journalists, and ordinary users for their online activities. Independent bloggers are often summoned by the authorities to be warned against discussing certain topics online, while activists claim that they are consistently threatened by state security agents for their online activism. Bloggers from Zone9, for example, reported suffering a considerable amount of harassment for their work, leading them to go silent for several months. Shortly after the blog announced on Facebook that it was resuming activities in April 2014, six Zone9 bloggers were arrested and sent to a federal detention center in Addis Ababa where the torture of detainees is reportedly common.[93] The active Gmail accounts belonging to several of the Zone9 bloggers[94] while in detention suggests that they may have been forced give their passwords to security officials against their will.
[25] “Proclamation No. 281/2002, Telecommunications (Amendment Proclamation,” Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 28, July 2, 2002, http://bit.ly/1snLgsc.
[26] Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency, “License Directive for Resale and Telecenter in Telecommunication Services No. 1/2002,” November 8, 2002, accessed August 4, 2014,http://bit.ly/1pUtpWh.
[40] An old Amharic saying that demonstrates the country’s deep-rooted culture of fear —“Stay away from electricity and politics”—recently evolved to: “Stay away from Social Media.” The contemporary saying implies that giving one’s political opinions via social media could cause grave bodily injury similar to exposing oneself to electricity.
[48] A 2014 report from Human Rights Watch also noted that the term “aljazeera” was unsearchable on Google while the news site was blocked from August 2012 to mid-March 2013. According to HRW research, the keywords “OLF” and “ONLF” (acronyms of Ethiopian opposition groups) are not searchable on the unencrypted version of Google (http://) and other popular search engines. Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” March 2014, pg 56, 58.
[49] Interview with individuals working in the telecom sector, as well as a test conducted by a Freedom House consultant who found it was not possible for an ordinary user to send out a bulk text message.
[60] The government first instituted the ban on VoIP in 2002 after it gained popularity as a less expensive means of communication and began draining revenue from the traditional telephone business belonging to the state-owned Ethio Telecom. In response to widespread criticisms, the government claimed that VoIP applications such as Skype would not be considered under the new law, though the proclamation’s language still enables the authorities to interpret it broadly at whim.
[61] Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency, “Telecommunication Proclamation No. 281/2002, Article 2(11) and 2(12),” July 2, 2002, accessed July 25, 2014,http://www.researchictafrica.net/countries/ethiopia/Telecommunications_(Amendment)_Proclamation_no_281:2002.pdf. As an amendment to article 24 of the Proclamation, the Sub-Article (3) specifically states, “The use or provision of voice communication or fax services through the internet are prohibited” (page 1782).
Why Resist the Master Plan? A Constitutional Legal Exploration
Tsegaye R. Ararssa
When the Ethiopian government announced its readiness to implement its “Integrated Regional Development Plan” (the “Master Plan” for short) in the middle of April 2014, it provoked an immediate reaction from university students across the National Regional State of Oromia. Through the instrumentality of its security forces (such as the Federal and State Police, the Army, and the Special Forces), the Ethiopian government responded with brutal repression of the protests. In a series of campus-based and street protests that barely lasted for two weeks, over a hundred innocent Oromos are killed and thousands are jailed. To date, sporadic and spontaneous protest demonstrations continue to erupt in various parts of Oromia. Fuelled by anger triggered by the reckless words and utter disdain expressed in the course of a televised discussion between the Addis Ababa City Administration and the mayors and other executive heads of the surrounding towns over the Master Plan, and informed by history of killing, mutilation, dispossession, and political marginalization (all of which continue unabated), the protests were more a spontaneous reaction than a planned resistance.
Ignored by the state and local government, lied on by the national propaganda machine, neglected by international media and NGOs (with few exceptions), the students continue to resist. Diaspora Oromo communities, in a gesture of solidarity, voiced the plights of the students at home, and they took the occasion to ‘witness’ the violence once more. The non-Oromo Ethio-political elite, which always finds it difficult to speak out on atrocities perpetrated on Oromos, rather characteristically, is still struggling with itself on how to express anger at the mass killings without siding with the cause of the Oromo. (Basking on the nation-wide challenge to the regime as a fertile political moment, they sought to make gestures of solidarity in the hope that they won’t be left out in the event that the tide gets traction thereby leading to the eventual crumbling of the regime.) But very few groups came out in public and condemn this state-orchestrated terror. To be fair, they did well in voicing the plight of the six bloggers and three journalists arrested in the weeks following the start of the unrest. And that is to be appreciated. But the contrast was nothing less than disheartening to those who expected more than gestures of solidarity and had hoped that Oromo lives and rights would be valued as any other lives and rights in Ethiopia.
In this piece, I seek to make a close reading of the constitutional-legal frame within which to situate the master Plan. Accordingly, first, I seek to explore the constitutional-legal context within which the Master Plan should be considered and analysed. Next, I will present a summary of four major constitutional-legal arguments against the Master Plan.
2. Constitutional Context
The point of departure is the assumption that—the important debate about legitimacy aside—the constitution is ‘the supreme law of the land’ against which the validity of all laws, decisions, and practices is measured (art. 9). According to the constitution, the Ethiopian state is federal in structure (arts 1 and 50-52). Ethiopia is a ‘nation of nations’ (Fasil 1997) that can be considered a multinational federation. In the language of the constitution, ‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ are the locus of sovereignty (art 8) and have the right to self-determination (art-39). As sovereign entities, they are the ‘building blocks’ that have a co-equal share in the founding of the contemporary Ethiopian polity. As subjects with the right to self-determination, they have, inter alia, the right to a ‘full measure of self-government’ (art 39(3)). Accordingly, most of these ‘nations,’ based on the four-fold criteria of settlement pattern, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned’ (art 46(1)), have established the nine states that constitute federal Ethiopia (art. 47), one of which is the state of Oromia (art.47(1)4))).
Addis Ababa (which Oromos call Finfinne) is designated as the “capital city of the federal” government (art 49(1)) whose ethnically diverse people have a right to self-government (art 49(2)) that is ultimately responsible to the federal government (art 49(3)). Being an Oromo city (albeit the constitution talks only about its ‘location’ in Oromia), it is also the capital city of the state of Oromia. This was stated in both the old and revised constitutions of Oromia (i.e. Art 6 of the 1995 constitution and Art 6 of the revised 2001 Constitution as amended in 2005). Owing to its being an Oromo city, the constitution clearly recognizes Oromia’s ‘special interest in Addis Ababa’ particularly in relation to social services, natural resources, and joint administrative matters (art 49(5)).
The articulation of the content of this special interest has been a matter of quiet controversy between the two governments on the one hand and between the Oromia government and the federal government on the other. The law envisaged to come to effect in order to articulate it was never made. Oromia’s request for the law fell on deaf ears. Oromia’s formal request for interpretation from the constitutional interpreter (the House of Federation cum Council of Constitutional Inquiry) was rejected by the latter on the ground that they do not give ‘advisory opinion’ in the absence of ‘case and controversy’. In the meantime, the formal and informal land-grabbing continued to spread into the neighbouring towns and districts. There being no formal institution that regulates inter-governmental relations—and the federal government being indifferent to the concerns of Oromia and the city government virtually absent from the scene since 2005—the matter became increasingly irritating to the Oromia officials. Frustrated, in 2009, the legislature of Oromia, the Caffee, established a ‘Special Zone’ of towns and districts that surround the city of Addis Ababa. This, they hoped, would give them a focused mode of operation in relation to the specific problems of these towns that are hard hit by the spill over effect of Addis Ababa’s problems (such as wanton destruction of the forest, environmental pollution due to emissions from factories and flower farms, illegal constructions and settlements, all of which was buttressed by absence of governance and corruption).
The boundary of the city was long agreed to be the boundary of the city as circumscribed in 1992 (as per Proclamation No.7/1992 which identified the city as one of the 14 Regions). According to the constitution, the boundaries of states is subject to review either through referendum organized in relation to self-determination (art 39), or through a formal constitutional amendment process (art 105(2)). To date, no such referendum was held[1] nor was there any attempt to amend the constitution.[2]
3. Four Legal Arguments against the Master Plan:
The whole thrust of this piece is to argue that the Master Plan is legally indefensible. Contrary to what government lawyers claim (arguing that the plan is part of constitutional mandate to create one ‘economic’ and ‘political’ community),[3] the plan violates the letter and the spirit of the constitution on many levels. In this section, I present four arguments that indicate that the plan is unconstitutional. As I do so, I will touch upon the content, process, and consequence of the plan and its political implications.
3.1. Argument from Federalism
The plan violates the principle of federalism. In particular, it violates the principle of comity and mutual respect (art 50(8)) and the proper mode of managing intergovernmental relations pertaining to cities. This seems to emanate from a fundamental misunderstanding of federalism. In an unending turn of irony, the government is blaming the Oromo public for misunderstanding the ‘true goal’ of federalism. This misunderstanding is also compounded by the belief held among many that Addis Ababa belongs to the federal government. It also stems from mistaking the federation for a decentralized unitary system. Nothing typifies this more than the heavy reliance on the Master Plans of cities in a unitary country, namely Paris and Lyon of France.[4]
As indicated above, the Master Plan also wrongly conceives Addis Ababa as a federal territory when what it actually is, is the seat of the federal government. In other words, it is wrongly thought that Addis Ababa is the territory of the federal government. In reality, Addis Ababa is not a federal capital territory. It is an Oromo city which serves as the capital city of both the federal government and the government of Oromia.[5] That this has not been clearly spelt out in the constitution has caused an immense sense of insecurity and agitation among Oromos for a long time. The fact that the constitution speaks about it in terms of its ‘location in Oromia’ makes the issue of ownership ambiguous thereby reinforcing the sense of insecurity among Oromos. The ambiguity has also caused the confusion as to who the host is and who the guest is.
As a self-governing city ultimately accountable to the federal government, Addis Ababa is governed through its own city charter (which, legally, is expected to be revised every ten years). The city’s charter defines the powers and responsibilities of the different organs of the city government (the council, the Mayor and the Executive (the Cabinet/the Bureau Heads, and the General Managers), and the Municipality Court. It also defines the powers and responsibilities of the sub-cities (alias Kifle-Ketema) and districts (Kebeles). The city’s territorial limit is defined and the competence/jurisdiction of the city government has been clearly established. The boundary of the city ends at the outer limits of the ten Kifle-Ketemas.
As one of the nine constituent states of the Ethiopian federation, it has its own jurisdiction over its own bounded territory, with its own government that operates (ideally) in accordance with its own constitution. The powers of the states (exclusive and shared as concurrent) are clearly defined in the federal constitution (arts 51-52). The Constitution of Oromia is the supreme law of the territory of Oromia (art 9). Caffee Oromia is the legislature and the supreme political organ in the parliamentary system of government that the state has adopted for itself (art. 50(3) of FDRE and art 46 of the Oromia Constitution). As such, theCaffee is responsible for making any decision (legislative, financial, and political) over matters in its territory within its jurisdictional competence. Needless to say, it does not involve in the administration of the city of Addis Ababa—although one expression of its special interest is its involvement in joint administration of the city.[6]
Imposing a Master Plan designed by the Federal Government[7] on the towns of Oromia and incorporating these towns into Addis Ababa violates the principle of federalism. Ideally, if the city seeks to coordinate its development with the adjacent territories and townships, then it initiates a formal intergovernmental coordination of city development. It can invite the government of the State of Oromia to make a similar effort to raise the level of development of the surrounding cities so that necessary linkages are created in accordance with agreed terms of reference and agreed set of logistical and financial responsibilities. A joint inter-governmental body that oversees the legality, political propriety, financial efficiency, and administrative effectiveness of the project is established. This body could be an ad hoc bilateral inter-governmental relations (IGR) body or it could be a permanent and multilateral body that manages the intergovernmental relations under a pre-existing set of principles and rules. In Ethiopia, the latter framework does not exist. The Master Plan under discussion now is prepared entirely by the Addis Ababa City government, to be run by a project team of the city overseen by a Board of senior officials of the two governments. That it is the city officials that train the Oromia officials about the implementation of the plan betrays the truth about who is in charge of the plan. The fact that some of the Oromia mayors raised questions about the need to consult the government and people of Oromia regarding the matter, even at this late stage, is another indication of how the task is an exclusively Addis Ababa business that is conducted at the expense of the excluded Oromia.
The fact that the plan speaks of incorporating 36 towns and 17 Woredas of Oromia to make them part of the Greater Addis Ababa territory is also a blatant attempt at modifying the territory of the state of Oromia unilaterally. This act of altering boundaries cannot normally happen without a formal constitutional amendment or through the self-determination act that is overseen by the house of federation under article 39(1) & (4) cum arts 62 of the Federal Constitution. Moreover, by subsuming these towns and Woredas of Oromia under Addis Ababa administration, the plan submerges and liquidates the long-demanded special interest of Oromia in the city. Instead of answering the question, this plan now makes the special interest irrelevant by further peripheralizing the state of Oromia from matters concerning the city or the wider country.
In short, the Master Plan is constitutionally indefensible because it: a) violates the principle of federal comity (mutual respect of the different orders of government); b) usurps the power/jurisdiction of the state of Oromia; c) alters the boundary of Oromia by incorporating 36 towns and 17 Woredas of the regional state of Oromia into Addis Ababa and subordinating their jurisdiction under the city government; and d) eliminates the special interest of Oromia and makes the question irrelevant.
3.2. The Master Plan violates the Procedure for Constitutional Amendment
In altering the boundaries of the state of Oromia and the city administration of Addis Ababa, the plan delves into measures that necessitate constitutional amendment. According to the constitution (arts 46-47), states are formed on the basis of settlement pattern, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned. In theory, this act of carving the constituent units is completed when the constitution was adopted in 1995. Presumably, it is based on these criteria that the units were established. The imperative of self-determination allows the possibility of forming a new unit in the federation and/or a separate state (outside of the federation). But when that happens, that effects a constitutional amendment. In order to change the boundaries of existing states, like the one that the Master Plan is forcing upon the State of Oromia, however, one needs to initiate a constitutional amendment in which one either changes the criteria of unit formation or just injects a clause that takes note of the boundaries of the concerned states in article 46-47. To do so without such an amendment or through an act of self-determination will challenge the integrity of the constitution. This Master Plan, by incorporating the new towns and woredas into Addis Ababa, alters too much without a formal constitutional amendment and as such is unconstitutional. This by passing of procedures of amendment will ultimately affect the integrity of the constitution and the order thereof. But in an ‘authoritarian constitutional system’ in which the text of the constitution is invoked more to legitimize sinister political goals than to advance just ideals, subverting the constitutional ideals through other laws and/or policies does not come as a surprise.
3.3. The Master Plan Violates Human Rights
More importantly, the Master Plan leads to the violation of individual rights of Oromo farmers, the collective rights of Oromos qua Oromos, and the rights of the State of Oromia. To begin with, the Master Plan violates the rights of Oromo farmers to socio-economic benefits. Accordingly, the Oromo farmers’ “right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession” (under art 40(6)) will be violated by the evictions that this Master Plan entails. Similarly, their right to livelihood, adequate living standard, chosen work, or generally, access to economic facilities (e.g. land) and social opportunities (including mother-tongue education) will be at risk in the event that this master Plan is implemented. All these rights, one notes, are elaborately stated in art 41 of the FDRE constitution. The right of these farmers to participate in the design of development plans (arts 89(6)), is also affected by the master Plan. Moreover, the cultural rights of Oromos under art 41(9) such as preservation of historical and cultural legacies will be compromised in a city that has historically neglected and/or actively denigrated the Oromo culture and identity. Depending on the aim and content of the Master Plan (which is not clear so far in spite of the insistence of the officials to the contrary), the right of Oromo farmers to a “clean and healthy environment” (under art 44(1) cum art 92(1)) may be adversely affected. The right of displaced persons or those “whose livelihoods have been adversely affected as a result of programs” to “commensurate monetary or alternative means of compensation, including relocation with adequate state assistance” will be violated. This is because past experience shows that the state neither paid compensation nor provided relocation funds. The token of ‘compensation’ investors paid was neither adequate nor voluntary. If experience is something to go by, there is hardly a reason for anyone to expect that the displacements that come about because of the implementation of this plan will be any different. The fact that the “right to administrative justice” and the right to remedies is not explicitly recognized in the constitution compounds the problems that might arise in the event that the Master Plan is implemented.[8]
The second category of rights that the Master Plan violates pertains to the collective right of Oromos. If land is jointly owned by the “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” and the State (as per art. 40(3) cum 40(6)), the Master Plan defies the right of the Oromos as Oromos to their land. In addition, the right of Oromo communities to development (art 43) and environment (art 44) in their own state will be violated. Moreover, as a matter of state policy objectives, the constitution also considers ‘peoples’ right to participation in policy formulation (art 90(6)) and to “consultation and expression of views” (art 92(3)). The fact that the process so far lacked participation of the public makes it evident that these rights of the Oromo are already violated and/or are exposed to violation. The Master Plan also continues the decades-long neglect of the special interest of the State of Oromia. In fact, it renders it irrelevant.
The principle of direct democracy in art 8 (3) demands that citizens not only engage in consultation but also protest government policies when they disagree with them. The students’ and the peoples’ protest should not have been met with killings, shootings, and arrests and detentions. The junior Oromo officials’ objection to the Master Plan in the training sessions shouldn’t have been met with reprisals. That the protest to resist the implementation of the Master Plan has led to arbitrary killings, injuries, arrests, and detentions implicates it not only in a blatant defiance of peoples’ voices but also in a gross violation of human rights of Oromo citizens.
3.4. The Master Plan Ignores State Duty to ensure Good Governance
Transparency and accountability are the epitome of good governance. The Ethiopian government officials make a frequent use of the term to justify almost any measure they take. In fact, most of their policies are justified in the name of enhancing development and ensuring good governance.[9] Constitutionally speaking, the state has the obligation to conduct its affairs in a transparent and accountable manner. Thus, according to article 12 of (both the FDRE and Oromia) constitution, “the conduct of government shall be transparent (1). Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties (2).”That is to say that, first, the conduct of government (i.e., its deliberations, decisions, and actions) is done openly before a watching public. Policies, laws, programs, and measures adopted by state are expected to be made available to the public. To ensure accountability, the officials are expected to listen to the peoples’ views, be responsive to the public’s demands, and take responsibility for such policies, laws, programs, and measures (especially if they have adverse consequences for the people).
The Master Plan’s design is shrouded in secrecy. To date, despite all efforts, I could not trace the authoritative version of the Master Plan document that also explains the goals and objectives, the rationales, the enabling/disabling legal environment, etc. Nor could I find a person who is in possession of the document. My attempt to make a close reading of the Master Plan and to make a comprehensive content-context-process analysis is compromised because of the unavailability of the document.[10] The process was thus hardly transparent.
To date, the government did not assume responsibility for the adverse consequences that flew from the Master Plan. After brutal repression of the protest by the security forces, the officials have been trying to persuade the public about the “supreme importance” of the plan and to demand that people should not listen to the distraction by “some external forces seeking to make political gains” out of this unrest, forces that want to disrupt “our development”. The government officials repeatedly suggested that the Oromo public are misinformed and agitated by ‘others’. They are thus conducting a series of meetings “to correct the public’s misunderstanding of the matter.” No measure is taken to bring to justice the security forces that went on a rampage of shooting. Not even a commission of inquiry is instituted. No government official expressed regret[11] or apology for the death of innocent students, children and other protestors. No government official came out to make any statement showing a willingness to rethink the Master Plan. This refusal to take responsibility and to be accountable to the public may exacerbate the tension impacting negatively on the peace and stability of the country in general. While that does not come as a surprise to people constantly living in an overly securitized state, to legal professionals, the absence of any gesture in the direction of ensuring accountability suggests the need for us to consider international tribunals before which the officials should be held accountable personally as individuals and collectively as a government.
4. Conclusion
In this piece, an attempt is made to make a close reading of the constitutional frame within which to analyse the Master Plan fiasco and the deadly consequences that emerged therefrom. By showing how the plan is against the principle of federal comity and by demonstrating its incompatibility with the federal structure of the contemporary state; by showing how the Plan destabilizes the integrity of the constitutional order by neglecting the procedural rules for constitutional amendment; through identifying the human rights (individual and collective) that the Master Plan will put at risk; and by discussing how the design and implementation of the plan is shrouded in secrecy and the consequent defiance of the constitutional principle of transparency and accountability, an attempt is made to present an argument that the plan is constitutionally-legally indefensible. It is important to note that the invocation of development as an overarching goal does not justify the inappropriateness of the plan or the massive violation of the rights of the displaced farmers and of the protestors that held demonstrations to resist the implementation of the master plan. In a ‘constitutional’ order that supposedly recognizes the importance of the voice and votes of the peoples of Ethiopia (let alone in one where they are sovereign), to protest a policy would be a mere exercise of a right, one that helps to overcome the democratic deficits of a representative government, not a condition that will render a citizen an enemy to be eliminated by all means necessary (including murder and torture by Special Forces of the Ethiopian army).
The announcement of the Master Plan has led to another round of killing and arrests of the Oromo youth. Ethiopian jails are beefed up yet more. Oromia is subjected to a continued state terror. Ethiopia is fast becoming a concentration camp of Oromos. But Oromo national resistance is also taking a national scale and continuing to haunt Ethiopia once more. Coming back in resilience, Oromo nationalism refuses to die, defies the repression, and returns to the Ethiopian scene once more.
The protest has brought to light several other questions that were simmering underground. The demand for legal articulation and enforcement of Oromia’s special interest in Addis Ababa was raised. The long-held demand to make Afaan Oromo a co-equal working language of the Federal government was also raised. The call for the demolition of the statue of Emperor Menelik II, the demand to bring Tewodros Kassahun (Tedy Afro) to justice for his controversial claim that Menelik’s war of conquest was “a Holy war made to unite the country”, the demand to see those who denigrated the Oromo people and abused the Oromo athletes in the All-Ethiopian Sports tournament in Bahr Dar brought to justice, and other demands were aired in the course of these protests. The fact that these and other issues are expressed with this intensity and rage should spell out to the government that Ethiopia has yet to adequately respond to “the question of nationalities” especially to the question of the Oromos. As ever, in its response to the protests, Ethiopia demonstrated that it did not know how to handle peoples’ demand politically. Of course it does know how to handle it militarily. But then, one needs to ask: when will these men in the uniform (the soldiers) face and bow to the men in robes (the judges)? When will the men in suits (the politicians) face and bow to the men in robes (the judges)? When will the law (with all its limitations and its embeddedness in politics) take precedence over politics as policing? Only time will tell.
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References
* Fasil Nahum, Constitution for a Nation of Nations. Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1997.
* Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, Negarit Gazetta, Proclamation No. 1/1995,1995.
* The Constitution of the State of Oromia, Magalata Oromiya Labsii Lakk.1/1995.
* The Revised Constitution of the State of Oromia, 2001 (as amended in 2005).
[1] The closest we came was when the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) was rumoured to want to hold a referendum about the identity of the city (politically aimed to delink it from Oromia) in the wake of its electoral success in 2005.
[2] No constitutional amendment was considered so far save the one (in 2004/5) pertaining to Parliament’s power to postpone the year of census whenever it coincides with election year.
[3] In a televised interview of a lawyer (named Tesfaye Neway) in May 2014, it was argued that the ultimate goal of the federalism is to build one economic and political community. (Seehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKsseT1KtJw, accessed on 3 June 2014). The preamble of the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) indicates, among other things, that the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia, exercising their right to self-determination, have agreed to build one political community based on rule of law, peace, democracy and socio-economic development in the context of the right to equality and non-discrimination. Note that self-determination is the organizing principle that is constitutive of the polity and its foundational principles identified above. The Preamble also talks about the need to build ‘one economic community’ that can enhance mutually supportive relations to effect respect for human rights and to pursue collective interest. These provisos of the preamble are conveniently used by government officials to claim that the overarching goal of the federal dispensation is to consolidate political unity and to create one big market that is indifferent to ethno-national diversity and the federal structure that seeks to respond to the challenge of diversity. This is a misreading of the constitution. This is aside from the putative argument one can make by insisting on the cardinal principle of constitutional interpretation: preambles are not part of the constitution. As such, the principles therein cannot be invoked as legally binding rules. At best, they can only serve as a framework of understanding the constitution.
[4] A government power point prepared for training purposes in June 2013 indicates that the foreign experience shows the same trend in Western Europe, in some regions in China (i.e., Hong Kong, Macau, and Hunan) and some cities in Africa such as Greater Lagos, Greater Johannesburg, and Greater Cairo.
[5] From 1991-2003, Addis Ababa was the capital city of Oromia. In 2004, the Federal Government forced the government of Oromia out of Addis Ababa and the government was relocated to Adama. In the wake of the 2005 election, the Federal Government decided that the Oromia Government relocate again to Addis Ababa. From 2005 to date, Addis Ababa serves as the capital city of Oromia. The constitutional provision relating to the capital city of the State of Oromia has been amended twice.
[6] Article 49 (5) of the constitution reads as follows: “The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the state of Oromia, shall be respected. Particulars shall be determined by law.”
[7] Contrary to this, a series of interviews by the political leaders (e.g. Kumaa Dammaqsaa, Abba Dulaa Gammadaa, Muktar Kadir, Abdulaziz Mohammed, etc) and the architect involved in the design, Matheos Asfaw, insist that the Master Plan is a joint project designed by the two governments. Even if that is the case, how can one ignore the asymmetry of power between the two? We should also note that this new raft of interviews was given to quell the unrest and dampen the resistance staged by the Oromo public.
[8] Not, however, that there is the general right of access to justice under Article 37 of the Federal Constitution and its State equivalent.
[9] Even the massive constitutional revisions of the National Regional States between 2001 and 2002 were justified on these two grounds. Of course the political motivation for this is rooted in the splinter that happened within the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), during which time the ‘Splinter Group’ exploited the absence of the principle of separation of powers in the State Constitutions to easily bring some of the States Presidents to their sides. Between 1995 and 2001, the State presidents were also chairmen of the State Legislatures. At the time, there was no office of the Speaker. The result was that whoever has managed to woo the presidents to her/his side will have taken the state. And some of the members of the Splinter did in deed manage to woo Presidents Abate Kisho of the SNNPRS and Kumaa Damaqsaa of Oromia to their side.
[10] Even for the purpose of this analysis, I had to depend on a set of Power Point presentations prepared in June 2013 to help facilitate a training conducted on the Master Plan. The slides are available with the author.
[11] Abbaa Duulaa Gammadaa came close to expressing regret in radio interview he gave to the Voice of America (VOA), Amharic service.
Read orginal article @ Gulele Post, June 4, 2014, titled “Why Resist the Master Plan?: A Constitutional Legal Exploration”, authored by Tsegaye Regassa Ararssa (LL.B, LL.M), former lecturer at Ethiopian Civil Service University and Addis Ababa University, is currently a PhD Candidate at the University of Melbourne Law School.
Effects of Boiling Methods on Anti-nutritional Factors of Anchote (Coccinia Abyssinica (lam.) Cogn) tubers Grown in Western Ethiopia
Habtamu Fekadu Gemede* **
Abstract: the raw and boiled Anchote (Coccinia abyssinica) tubers were studied and compared for their antinutritional factors. The raw, boiled after peeling and boiled before peeling Anchote tubers had respective contents (mg/100g) of phytate 389.30, 333.63 and 334.74; for oxalate contents were 8.23, 4.23, and 4.66; for tannin contents were 173.55, 102.36 and 121.21; for cyanide contents were 12.67, 8.16 and 11.14. Keywords: Anchote, boiled after peeling, boiled before peeling, anti-nutritional factors
1. Introduction
Anchote (Coccinia abyssinica) tubers are an endemic to the Western parts of Ethiopia (Amare, 1973), mainly in the Western region of Ethiopia highlands in Eestern Wollega, Western Wollega, Kelam Wollega, and Mattu (Westphal, 1974). The most widely used vernacular name is Anchote, spelt Ancootee in Oromo. It is also called: Ushushu (Welayita), Shushe (Dawuro), and Ajjo (Kafigna) (Demel et al., 2010). Like many other root, and tuber crops, Anchote is rarely eaten raw (Fufa, and Urga, 1997). Traditionally, boiled after peeling or boiled before peeling and/ or further cooking are applied prior to consumption. Anchote is found both cultivated and wild (Edwards, 1991). The total yield of Anchote is 150-180 quintals/hectare, which is in the range of the total yield of sweet potato, and potato (IAR, 1986). Anchote is Anchote is a valuable food source and according to local farmers, it helps in fast mending of broken/ fracture bones and displaced joints, as it contains high calcium, and proteins than other common and wide spread root and tuber crops (Endashaw, 2007). Traditionally, it is also
believed that, Anchote makes lactating mothers healthier and stronger (Abera, 1995). Dawit and Estifanos (1991) reported that the juice prepared from tubers of Anchote has saponin as an active substance and is used to treat Gonorrhoea, Tuberculosis, and Tumor Cancer.
According to Aletor (1993), there are several antinutritional factors that are very significant in plants used for human foods. Anti-nutritional factors are known to reduce the maximum utilization of nutrients especially proteins, vitamins, and minerals (Ugwu and Oranye, 2006). Several anti-nutritional factors are present in root and tuber crops and are partially neutralized during ordinary cooking (Bhandari and Kawabata, 2004). Among Various antinutrients, and plant toxins, Phytate, Oxalate, Tannin, Cyanide and Trypsin inhibitors are found in root and tuber crops (Wanasundera and Ravindran, 1994), which may have adverse effects on health through inhibition of digestion, absorption, and growth.
Anchote, like many other root, and tuber crops, is rarely eaten raw. Traditionally, boiled after peeling or boiled before peeling and/or further cooking are applied before consumption. Presumed purpose of such processing is to make Anchote more palatable, digestible, to inactivate enzyme inhibitors, and other anti-nutritional factors to qualify it for human consumption. In the case of Anchote, however, no published information is available as to which traditional processing methods are optimal to reduce the effects of the inherent antinutritional factors.
Therefore, it is imperative to investigate which traditional methods are decreases of its risk of human health. The main objective of this research was to determine the effect of traditional processing methods on anti-nutritional factors of Anchote (Coccinia abyssinica (Lam.) Cogn.) tubers grown in Western Ethiopia. 2. Materials and methods 2.1. Sample collection
A total of about 6 kilograms uninfected Anchote were collected from the 12 famers randomly selected (0.5 kilogram per house hold) of study site (Hara, Wayu kumba and Wayu kiltu kebeles) in Jima Arjo woreda, East Wollega Zone, Western Ethiopia. The samples were packed in polyethylene bags, kept in an ice box (to prevent moisture loss), and transported to Food Science and Bioprocess Technology Institute Research laboratory of Wollega University within three hours. Once in the laboratory, samples were mixed for composite analysis of the study variables and washed by clean water all together. The washed tuber was used for nutritional analysis. 2.2. Sample preparation The washed sample was grouped into three lots of two kilograms each. The first lot was used for analysis of raw Anchote tubers. The raw sample was sliced to uniform thickness 5 mm using a stainless steel knife. The second lot was used as boiled after peeling. The tuber was peeled and boiled for about three to three and half hours and sliced to uniform thickness 5 mm using a stainless steel knife. The third lot was served as boiled before peeling. The washed tuber was boiled for about three to three and half hours, peeled and sliced to uniform thickness 5 mm using a stainless steel knife. For anti-nutritional factors analyses, each of the three lot of samples were dried at a time in oven (Gallenkamp Hotbox Oven, size 2, Gallenkamp, UK) at 60°C for 72 hours. Each dried samples were milled into fine powder using electric grinder (NIMA-8300Burman, Germany) until to pass through 0.425 mm sieve mesh size, and finally packed into airtight polyethylene plastic bags to minimize heat build-up, kept in ice box and transported to Addis Ababa University, and stored in the desiccator until required for analysis. 2.4. Analysis of antinutritional factors
Determination of phytate content
The phytate was determined according to Latta andEskin (1980) and later modified by Vaintraub and Lapteva (1988). The absorbance of supernatant was measured at 500 nm using a UV-1600 spectrophotometer (UVVisible spectrophotometer, Shimadzu, Japan). The phytate concentration was calculated from the difference between the control absorbance and that of the assayed sample. A series of standard solutions containing 5-40 mg/ml of phytic acid in distilled water was prepared and a standard curve was prepared (Latta & Eskin, 1980).
The concentration of phytate was calculated from the standard curve, and results were expressed as phytic acid in mg per 100 g dry matter. Determination of oxalate content
Oxalate was analyzed using the method originally employed by Ukpabi and Ejidoh (1989) in which the
procedures involve three steps: digestion, precipitation, and permanganate titration. About 2.000 g of Anchote samples of each treatment in triplicates were suspended in 190 ml de-ionized water contained in a 250 ml volumetric flask; 10 ml of 6 M HCl was added and the suspension digested at the boiling point of water for 1 hr that followed by cooling. Then made up to 250 ml and filtered. Duplicate portion of 125 ml of filtrate were measured in to a beaker and four drops of methyl red indicator added, followed by the addition of concentrated NH4OH solution drop wise until the test solution changes from salmon pink color to faint yellow color (pH 4-4.5). Each portion was then heated to 90 oC, cooled and filtered to remove precipitate containing ferrous ion. The filtrate was then again heated to 90 oC and 10 ml of 5 % CaCl2 solution was then added while being stirred constantly. After heating it was cooled and left overnight in refrigerator. The solution was then centrifuged at a speed of 2500 rpm for 5 min the supernatant was decanted and the precipitate completely dissolved in 10 ml of 20 % (v/v) H2SO4 solution. At this point the total filtrate resulting from digestion of 2 g of flour was made up to
300 ml. aliquots of 125 ml of filtrate were heated until near boiling, and then titrated against 0.05 M standard KMnO4 solution to a faint pink color which persists for 30 seconds.
Determination of condensed tannin content Tannin content was determined by the method of Burns (1971) as modified by Maxson and Rooney (1972), using catechin as the tannin standard. About 2.0000g of Anchote samples of each treatment in triplicates were weighed in a screw cap test tube and extracted with 10ml of 1% HCl in methanol for 24 hours at room temperature with mechanical shaking. After 24 hours shaking, the solution was centrifuged at 1000rpm for 5 minutes. A 1ml of supernatant was taken and mixed with 5 ml of vanillin-HCl reagent (prepared by combining equal volume of 8% concentrated HCl in methanol and 4% Vanillin in methanol).
D-catechin was used as standard for condensed tannin determination. A 40mg of D- catechin was weighed and dissolved in 1000 ml of 1% HCl in methanol, which was used as stock solution. A 0, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 ml of stock solution was taken in test tube and the volume of each test tube was adjusted to 1ml with 1% HCl in methanol. A 5ml of vanillin-HCl reagent was added into each test tube. After 20 minutes, the absorbance of sample solutions and the standard solution were measured at 500nm by using water to zero the spectrophotometer, and the calibration curve was constructed from the series of standard solution. A standard curve was made from absorbance versus concentration and the slope and intercept were used for calculation. Determination of cyanide content
Cyanide content of Anchote samples were determined according to the official standard method of AOAC (1984), by Silver Nitrate titrimetric methods, in which the steps of distillation and titration was involved. About 10g of Anchote samples of each treatment in triplicates were weighed into a flask and soaked in 100ml of distilled water in separate 500 ml round bottom flask for 2hr. The Kjeldahl flask was adjusted before distilling the tip of delivery tube below surface of liquid and 100 ml distilled water were added. Thereafter, the mixtures in the flask were heated by steam distillation. The released cyanide was collected in a conical flask containing in 20 ml 0.01N AgNO3 acidified with 1 ml concentrated HNO3. When the gas has passed over, the distillate was filtered through sintered glass crucible and rinsed the test tube with little water. The distillate was then titrated against excess AgNO3 with 0.02N KSCN, using ferric alum indicator. At the end point of titration, the color of the indicator changed from red to purple color. Using the relationship1 ml of 0.01 N AgNO3 = 0.27 mg of cyanide.
2.6. Statistical analysis
Samples from each treatment were analyzed in triplicate. Data were subjected to analysis of variance (ANOVA) using SPSS version 15.0 for windows. Means were compared using Duncan’s multiple range test. 3. Result and Discussion
3.2. Anti-nutritional factors content of raw and processed Anchote tubers
Some anti-nutritional factors (phytate, oxalate, tannin and cyanide) content of the raw and processed Anchote tuber is shown in Table 1. Phytate
The raw Anchote tuber contained 389.30 mg/100g phytate. The phytate content of Anchote boiled after peeling and before peeling had 333.63 mg/100g and 334.74 mg/100g, respectively. The phytate content of Anchote boiled after peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than both boiled before peeling and raw Anchote tubers.
Similarly, the mean phytate content of Anchote boiled before peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than raw Anchote tuber. The mean phytate content was reduced in boiled after peeling by 14.30% and in boiled before peeling by 14.01% compared to raw tubers. The evident reduction in phytate during cooking may be caused by leaching into the cooking medium, degeneration by heat or the formation of insoluble complexes between phytate and other components, such as phytate-protein and phytate-protein-mineral complexes (Sidhtraju and Becker, 2001). The reduction of phytate during processing Anchote tuber is expected to enhance the bioavailability of proteins and dietary minerals of the tubers and at the same time the lower level of phytate may have some health promotional activities. Currently there is evidence that dietary phytate at low level may have beneficial role as an antioxidant, anticarcinogens and likely play an important role in controlling hypercholesterolemia and atherosclerosis (Phillippy et al., 2004). Because Anchote may provide a substantial
portion of phytate, the nutritional consequences of phytate in Anchote should be investigated. Oxalate
The raw Anchote tuber contained 8.26 mg/100g oxalate. The oxalate content of boiled after peeling and boiled before peeling of Anchote tuber had 4.23 mg/100g and 4.66 mg/100g, respectively. The oxalate content of Anchote boiled after peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than both boiled before peeling and raw Anchote tubers. Also the mean oxalate content of Anchote boiled before peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than raw Anchote tuber. The mean oxalate content was reduced in boiled after peeling by 48.79% and in boiled before peeling by 43.58% compared to raw Anchote tubers. The traditional processing methods were found effective methods to reduce the oxalate content in these tubers. Boiling may cause considerable cell rupture and facilitate the leakage of soluble oxalate into cooking water (Albihn and Savage, 2001), this may be the possible reason to observed high reduction in oxalate level upon boiling.
Oxalates can have a harmful effect on human nutrition and health, especially by reducing calcium absorption and aiding the formation of kidney stones (Noonan and Savage, 1999). High-oxalate diets can increase the risk of renal calcium oxalate formation in certain groups of people (Libert and Franceschi, 1987). The majority of urinary stones formed in humans are calcium oxalate stones (Hodgkinson, 1977). Currently, patients are advised to limit their intake of foods with a total intake of oxalate not exceeding 50–60 mg per day (Massey et al., 2001).
The traditionally processed Anchote tubers analyzed in this study are low compared to the recommendations for patients with calcium oxalate kidney stones. Under these guidelines, processed Anchote tubers analyzed could be recommended not only for normal healthy people but also consumption for patients with a history of calcium oxalate kidney stones, assume about 1 kg of Anchote would be necessary for consumption per day. Therefore, the reduced oxalate content resulting from traditionally processed Anchote tubers could have a positive impact on the health of consumers to enhance the bioavailability of essential dietary minerals of the tubers, as well as reduce the risk of kidney stones occurring among consumers. Hence, boiling the tuber would reduce the nutritional problems that the high levels of oxa1ates could cause.
Tannin
The tannin content of raw Anchote tuber was 173.55 mg/100g. The tannin content of boiled after peeling and boiled before peeling of Anchote tuber had 102.36 mg/100g and 121.21 mg/100g, respectively. The tannin content of Anchote boiled after peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than both boiled before peeling and raw Anchote tubers. Similarly, the mean tannin content of Anchote boiled before peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than raw Anchote tubers. The mean tannin content was reduced in boiled after peeling by 41.87% and in boiled before peeling by 30.12% compared to raw tubers. The reduction in the levels of tannin during heat treatment might be due to thermal degradation and denaturation of the antinutrients as well as the formation of insoluble complexes (Kataria et al., 1989). The toxicity effects of the tannin may not be significant since the total acceptable tannic acid daily intake for a man is 560 mg (Anonymous, 1973). Since the tannin content of raw Anchote tuber is very low compared to its critical toxicity effect and further reduced during traditional processing, its anti-nutritional effect may be insignificant in both raw and processed tuber.
Cyanide
The results of the present study showed that cyanide in raw, boiled after peeling and boiled before peeling Anchote tuber were 12.67 mg/100g, 8.16 mg/100g, and 11.14 mg/100g, respectively. The cyanide content of Anchote boiled after peeling was significantly (P<0.05) lower than both boiled before peeling and raw Anchote tubers. The mean cyanide content of Anchote boiled before peeling was also significantly (P<0.05) lower compared to mean raw.
The mean cyanide content was reduced in boiled after peeling by 35.59% and in boiled before peeling by
12.08% compared to raw tubers. It has been reported that higher intake of cyanides could result in the
development of neurological disease in humans (Montgomery, 1980). The amounts of cyanide produced, only plants that accumulate more than 50 to 200 mg are considered to be dangerous (Kingsbury, 1964). However, smaller amount of cyanides could have several long-term adverse effects on human health (Bhandari and Kawabata, 2004). The results obtained showed that the processed tuber could be considered safe with regard to cyanide poisoning due to the fact that the cyanide levels were far below the detrimental levels of 50 to 200 mg (Kingsbury, 1964). However, the amount remaining cyanide content might be slightly toxic to people who consume high quantities of Anchote tubers and need to be further study.
*Food Technology and Process Engineering Department, Wollega University, Ethiopia
**Center of Food Science and Nutrition, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
Corresponding author’s E-email: fekadu_habtamu@yahoo.com, simbokom@gmail.com
Is H&M turning a blind eye to land grabs in Ethiopia? TV4 does an investigation into H&M’s cotton sourcing from Ethiopia and discovers the disturbing truth.
” The benefits of trade have been well documented throughout history. The economic case is quite straightforward. Opening up to trade allows countries to shift their patterns of production, exporting goods that they are relatively efficient at producing and importing goods at a lower price that they can’t produce resourcefully at home. This lets resources to be allocated more efficiently allowing a nation’s economy to grow. Fruits of trade can be seen in many countries. In the last 30 years, trade has grown around 7% per year on average (WTO, 2013). During this time period, developing nations have seen their share in world export increase from 34% to 47% (WTO, 2013) which at first glance seem incredible. However if we dig a little deeper, it is quickly apparent that China is the key reason for the majority of the growth and that a bulk of these developing countries aren’t benefiting fully from international trade. Why is this? Many developing countries depend on the export of a few primary products and in some cases a single primary commodity for the majority of their export earnings. In fact, 95 of the 141 developing countries rely of the export of commodities for at least 50% of their export income (Brown, 2008). This is where the problem starts. Prices in the primary good’s market tend to be highly volatile sometimes varying up to 50% in a single year (South Centre, 2005). Often, the fluctuation of these products are out of the hands of the developing countries as they individually have only a small portion of the world supply which is not enough to affect world prices. At the same time, some shocks (ie. Weather) are unpredictable. The unstable commodity price brings uncertainty, instability and often negative economic consequences for the developing countries. This also affects the policymaking in the country as it is hard to implement a sustainable development scheme or a fiscal expansionary policy with uncertain revenue. Positive shocks do increase income in the short run however a study by Dehn (2000) found that there are no permanent effect on the increase on income in the long run. Furthermore, there is often very little scope to growth through primary products as it is very hard to increase volumes of sale. This is due to the demand being inelastic. The over dependence on the export of primary products also causes another problem – a risk of a large trade deficit. Several studies (Olukoshi, 1989, Mundell, 1989) have shown that primary commodity prices are the main cause for the debt problems in many developing countries. In an empirical research done by Swaray (2005), he shows the main reason behind this is the deteriorating terms of trade, developing countries face. Terms of Trade is equal to the value of export over the value of import. Over time there has been a general trend of primary products falling in value. 41 of 46 leading commodities fell in real value over the last 30 years with an average decline of 47% in real prices, according to the World Bank (cited in CFC, 2005). This has occurs due to inelastic demand for commodities and lack of differentiation among producers hence making it a competitive market. The creation of synthetic substitutes has also suppressed prices. At the same time, manufacturing products (which generally developing countries tend to import) see a general rise in prices. Put these trends together, over time, developing countries have seen their terms of trade worsen. A study by CFC (2005), shows that the terms of trade have declined as much as 20% since the 1980s. This, alongside the difficulty to increase volumes of sales has meant many developing countries have a trade deficit. According Bhagwati (1958), it is possible that this decline in the terms of trade could result in diminished welfare. In other words, growth from trade can be negative rather than positive. ”
The benefits of trade have been well documented throughout history. The economic case is quite straightforward. Opening up to trade allows countries to shift their patterns of production, exporting goods that they are relatively efficient at producing and importing goods at a lower price that they can’t produce resourcefully at home. This lets resources to be allocated more efficiently allowing a nation’s economy to grow. Fruits of trade can be seen in many countries. In the last 30 years, trade has grown around 7% per year on average (WTO, 2013). During this time period, developing nations have seen their share in world export increase from 34% to 47% (WTO, 2013) which at first glance seem incredible. However if we dig a little deeper, it is quickly apparent that China is the key reason for the majority of the growth and that a bulk of these developing countries aren’t benefiting fully…
Denmark, Korea And Sweden are the world’s most digitally connected countries while Ethiopia is one of 10 least connected
November 26, 2014 (The Telegraph) — Denmark has been named the world’s “most connected” country based on mobile phone and internet use.
Scandinavia dominated this year’s rankings, with Sweden in third place, followed by Iceland in fourth, Norway sixth and Finland eighth. Britain came fifth.
They were compiled as part of a report by the International Telecommunication Union – theInformation and Communication Technology Development Index (IDI), which rates 166 countries according to their level of access to, use of and skills in using information and communication technology.
Hong Kong was the ninth most connected country, coming in ahead of Japan in 11th place, while Luxembourg completed the top 10.
Other countries in the top 30 included the US (which ranked 14th), Australia, Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, France, New Zealand, Estonia and Macau, as well the principalities of Andorra and Monaco.
The 10 least connected countries were all in Africa, with the Central African Republic being the worst, followed by Niger, Chad, Eritrea and Ethiopia.
All countries were shown to have improved their IDI values in the last year, while the nations with the “most dynamic” improvement in ranking included the United Arab Emirates, Fiji, Cape Verde, Thailand, Oman, Qatar, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Georgia. Improvements were said to have been driven mostly by better wireless broadband connection.
Europe proved to be the most connected region, scooping up eight of the top 10 rankings, while Africa had the lowest regional ranking. The continent, however, did show a mobile broadband growth rate of more than 40 per cent in 2014 on last year.
Nearly three billion people globally will be using the internet by the end of this year, up by nearly 40 per cent on last year. But 450 million people still don’t live within reach of a mobile signal, while 4.3 billion people are not connected to the internet – with 90 per cent of those living in developing countries, the report said.
Earlier this year, Telegraph Travel’s technology expert Donald Strachan outlined the “world’s Wi-Fi-friendliest cities”, featuring various countries from the top 40 of this year’s IDI report.
Connecting in the Finnish capital of Helsinki is password-free and easy thanks to a network of hotspots in public buildings, civic squares and even on some buses and trams around the city.
Hong Kong, “one of the world’s most futuristic cities”, was said to be generous with free internet access in public areas. There are several free Wi-Fi networks, the key ones being GovWiFi (at parks, libraries, public buildings, ferry terminals and more) and MTR WiFi, which provides 15 minutes of free Wi-Fi per device up to five times every day at MTR stations.
Taipei offers 30 days of free access to a national, government-backed network of over 5,000 hotpsots. Hundreds of these free iTaiwan hotspots are available throughout the Taiwanese capital.
Macau was noted for its WiFiGo service which offers free internet for visitors every day between 8am and 1am. The network has around 150 hotspots, meaning there’s usually Wi-Fi close by, including at ports, museums and tourist information centres.
Other major cities with free public Wi-Fi access include New York, Paris and Perth, Australia, as well as Florence and Tel Aviv, which has eighty hotspots dotted around its centre.
Access to free Wi-Fi has been an increasingly important factor for travellers around the world, especially when booking a hotel. Britain’s hotels were found to be among the worst in Europe for free Wi-Fi access, while the two best performing cities were both Swedish – Malmö and Gothenburg, where 98 per cent and 96 per cent of hotels were found to offer free Wi-Fi, a survey by the travel search engine KAYAK earlier this year revealed.
A new website aiming to help travellers in the search for free and fast wireless internet access was introduced earlier this year.Hotewifitest.com lets hotel guests test the speed of their internet connection, and then stores the results for others to view. It also records whether the Wi-Fi is free or comes at a price.
Several airports around the world also offer free Wi-Fi services, with Dallas-Forth Worth in Texas being among the best, providing free Wi-Fi in all five of its terminals since 2012. Since upgrading its former paid network, the number of daily Wi-Fi connections has risen from 2,000 to 55,000. Helsinki Airport, Singapore’s Changi Airport, Seoul’s Incheon Airport and Amsterdam Schiphol complete the world’s top five for airport Wi-Fi quality.
None of Britain’s six busiest airports – Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester, Stansted, Edinburgh and Luton – offer unlimited free internet access, according to a study by Skyscanner, the flight comparison website.
The paradox, however, and one of the reasons why despite having so little land, small producers are feeding the planet, is that small farms are often more productive than large ones. If the yields achieved by Kenya’s small farmers were matched by the country’s large-scale operations, the country’s agricultural output would double. In Central America, the region’s food production would triple. If Russia’s big farms were as productive as its small ones, output would increase by a factor of six. Another reason why small farms are the feeding the planet is because they prioritise food production. They tend to focus on local and national markets and their own families. In fact, much of what they produce doesn’t enter into trade statistics – but it does reach those who need it most: the rural and urban poor. If the current processes of land concentration continue, then no matter how hard-working, efficient and productive they are, small farmers will simply not be able to carry on. The data show that the concentration of farmland in fewer and fewer hands is directly related to the increasing number of people going hungry every day. – http://www.grain.org/article/entries/5072-telling-family-farming-fairy-tales
The United Nations declared 2014 as the International Year of Family Farming. As part of the celebrations, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) released its annual “State of Food and Agriculture”, which this year is dedicated to family farming. Family farmers, FAO say, manage 70-80 percent of the world’s farmland and produce 80 percent of the world’s food.
But on the ground – whether in Kenya, Brazil, China or Spain – rural people are being marginalised and threatened, displaced, beaten and even killed by a variety of powerful actors who want their land.
Farmer Djeneba Diarra on her farm in Heremakono, Mali (Photo: Joe Penney/Reuters)
A recent comprehensive survey by GRAIN, examining data from around the world, finds that while small farmers feed the world, they are doing so with just 24 percent of the world’s farmland – or 17 percent if you leave out China and India. GRAIN’s report also shows that this meagre share is shrinking fast.How, then, can FAO claim that family farms occupy 70 to 80 percent of the world’s farmland? In the same report, FAO claims that only 1 percent of all farms in the world are larger than 50 hectares, and that these few farms control 65 percent of the world’s farmland, a figure much more in line with GRAIN’s findings.
The confusion stems from the way FAO deal with the concept of family farming, which they roughly define as any farm managed by an individual or a household. (They admit there is no precise definition. Various countries, like Mali, have their own.)
Thus, a huge industrial soya bean farm in rural Argentina, whose family owners live in Buenos Aires, is included in FAO’s count of “family farms”. What about sprawling Hacienda Luisita, owned by the powerful Cojuanco family in the Philippines and epicentre of the country’s battle for agrarian reform since decades. Is that a family farm?
Looking at ownership to determine what is and is not a family farm masks all the inequities, injustices and struggles that peasants and other small scale food producers across the world are mired in.
It allows FAO to paint a rosy picture and conveniently ignore perhaps the most crucial factor affecting the capacity of small farmers to produce food: lack of access to land. Instead, the FAO focuses its message on how family farmers should innovate and be more productive.
Small food producers’ access to land is shrinking due a range of forces. One is that because of population pressure, farms are getting divided up amongst family members. Another is the vertiginous expansion of monoculture plantations.
In the last 50 years, a staggering 140 million hectares – the size of almost all the farmland in India — has been taken over by four industrial crops: soya bean, oil palm, rapeseed and sugar cane. And this trend is accelerating.
In the next few decades, experts predict that the global area planted to oil palm willdouble, while the soybean area will grow by a third.These crops don’t feed people. They are grown to feed the agroindustrial complex.
Other pressures pushing small food producers off their land include the runaway plague of large-scale land grabs by corporate interests. In the last few years alone, according to the World Bank, some 60 million hectares of fertile farmland have been leased, on a long-term basis, to foreign investors and local elites, mostly in the global South.
While some of this is for energy production, a big part of it is to produce food commodities for the global market, instead of family farming.
SMALL WORKS BETTER
The paradox, however, and one of the reasons why despite having so little land, small producers are feeding the planet, is that small farms are often more productive than large ones.
If the yields achieved by Kenya’s small farmers were matched by the country’s large-scale operations, the country’s agricultural output would double. In Central America, the region’s food production would triple. If Russia’s big farms were as productive as its small ones, output would increase by a factor of six.
Another reason why small farms are the feeding the planet is because they prioritise food production. They tend to focus on local and national markets and their own families. In fact, much of what they produce doesn’t enter into trade statistics – but it does reach those who need it most: the rural and urban poor.
If the current processes of land concentration continue, then no matter how hard-working, efficient and productive they are, small farmers will simply not be able to carry on. The data show that the concentration of farmland in fewer and fewer hands is directly related to the increasing number of people going hungry every day.
According to one U.N. study, active policies supporting small producers and agro-ecological farming methods could double global food production in a decade and enable small farmers to continue to produce and utilise biodiversity, maintain ecosystems and local economies, while multiplying and strengthening meaningful work opportunities and social cohesion in rural areas.
Agrarian reforms can and should be the springboard to moving in this direction.
Experts and development agencies are constantly saying that we need to double food production in the coming decades. To achieve that, they usually recommend a combination of trade and investment liberalisation plus new technologies.
But this will only empower corporate interests and create more inequality. The real solution is to turn control and resources over to small producers themselves and enact agricultural policies to support them.
The message is clear. We need to urgently put land back in the hands of small farmers and make the struggle for genuine and comprehensive agrarian reform central to the fight for better food systems worldwide.
FAO’s lip service to family farming just confuses the matter and avoids putting the real issues on the table.
Read more @ http://www.grain.org/article/entries/5072-telling-family-farming-fairy-tales
They tell us that poverty has been cut in half in the last fifteen years or so, but independent watchdogs have repeatedly shown that this claim rests on statistical sleight-of-hand. Moreover, it relies on a poverty line of $1.25 a day, which no longer has any credibility. A more realistic line of $2.50 – the absolute minimum for achieving normal human life expectancy – shows that 3.1bn people remain in poverty today, which is 352m more people than in 1981, according to a 2008 study. And all the while, the wealth ratio between the richest and poorest countries has grown from 44:1 in 1973 to nearly 80:1 today (according to my estimation). The richest 85 people in the world (Mr Gates being one of them) now have more wealth than the poorest 3.5 billion, or half the world’s population. The aid project is failing because it misses the point about poverty. It assumes that poverty is a natural phenomenon, disconnected from the rich world, and that poor people and countries just need a little bit of charity to help them out. People are smarter than that. They know that poverty is a feature of the global economic system that it is very often caused by people, including some of the people who run or profit from the aid agenda. People have become increasingly aware – particularly since the 2008 crash – that poverty is created by rules that rig the economy in the interests of the rich. – http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/death-international-developmen-2014111991426652285.html
The death of international development
The development industry needs an overhaul of strategy, not a change of language.
By Jason Hickel*
International development is dying; people just don’t buy it anymore. The West has been engaged in the project for more than six decades now, but the number of poor people in the world is growing, not shrinking, and inequality between rich and poor continues to widen instead of narrow. People know this, and they are abandoning the official story of development in droves. They no longer believe that foreign aid is some kind of silver bullet, that donating to charities will solve anything, or that Bono and Bill Gates can save the world.
This crisis of confidence has become so acute that the development community is scrambling to respond. The Gates Foundation recently spearheaded a process called the Narrative Project with some of the world’s biggest NGOs – Oxfam, Save the Children, One, etc. – in a last-ditch attempt to turn the tide of defection. They commissioned research to figure out what people thought about development, and their findings revealed a sea change in public attitudes. People are no longer moved by depictions of the poor as pitiable, voiceless “others” who need to be rescued by heroic white people – a racist narrative that has lost all its former currency; rather, they have come to see poverty as a matter of injustice.
These findings clearly demonstrate that people are beginning to reject the aid-centric approach to development. But instead of taking this as an opportunity to face up to their failures and change the way the industry works, the Gates Foundation and its partner NGOs have decided to stick with business as usual – but to cloak it with fresh language.
Leaked internal documents make it clear that the Narrative Project is nothing more than a PR campaign – a bid to “change public attitudes” by rolling out fresh language that will be more effective at securing public support and donations. The strategy goes like this: Talk about the poor as “equals” who share our values; emphasise that development is a “partnership”; stop casting rich people and celebrities as saviours of the poor; and above all, play up the idea of “self-reliance” and “independence”, with special attention to empowering women and girls. Progressive Westerners love this stuff.
This new framing amounts to little more than a propaganda strategy. Instead of changing their actual approach to development, the Narrative Project just wants to make people think they’re changing it. In the end, the existing aid paradigm remains intact, and the real problems remain unaddressed.
A failing project
Why do people no longer believe in the charity and aid-centric model of development? According to the Narrative Project, it’s because they’re all a bit stupid. They let their personal beliefs override the “facts”. They’re “old” and “conservative”. And they’re too calloused to care about social causes. It doesn’t occur to the development industry that people might have good reasons for their scepticism. And there are many.
For one, the aid project is in fact failing. There have been some achievements, to be sure, but the Gates Foundation and official sources like the UN want the public to believe that these piecemeal gains are tantamount to overall success. They tell us that poverty has been cut in half in the last fifteen years or so, but independent watchdogs have repeatedly shown that this claim rests on statistical sleight-of-hand. Moreover, it relies on a poverty line of $1.25 a day, which no longer has any credibility. A more realistic line of $2.50 – the absolute minimum for achieving normal human life expectancy – shows that 3.1bn people remain in poverty today, which is 352m more people than in 1981, according to a 2008 study.
And all the while, the wealth ratio between the richest and poorest countries has grown from 44:1 in 1973 to nearly 80:1 today (according to my estimation). The richest 85 people in the world (Mr Gates being one of them) now have more wealth than the poorest 3.5 billion, or half the world’s population.
The aid project is failing because it misses the point about poverty. It assumes that poverty is a natural phenomenon, disconnected from the rich world, and that poor people and countries just need a little bit of charity to help them out. People are smarter than that. They know that poverty is a feature of the global economic system that it is very often caused by people, including some of the people who run or profit from the aid agenda. People have become increasingly aware – particularly since the 2008 crash – that poverty is created by rules that rig the economy in the interests of the rich.
A system of plunder
We can trace this rigging process through history. The programmes that global South countries used successfully to build their economies and reduce poverty after the end of colonialism – trade tariffs, subsidies, social spending on healthcare and education – were in many cases actively destroyed by Western intervention in the name of “development”. Western-backed coups in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Congo in 1961, Brazil in 1964, Indonesia in 1965, Chile in 1973 – to name just a few – deposed democratically elected leaders with pro-poor platforms to install dictators friendly to multinational corporations. Most of these dictators received billions of dollars in “aid” from Western governments.
When coups fell out of favour with the voting public, the World Bank and the IMF stepped in instead. They leveraged debts to impose crushing “structural adjustment” programmes on poor countries, forcing them to privatise public assets, open their markets to Western goods, cut social spending and reduce wages, and give foreign companies access to extra cheap labour and raw materials. Structural adjustment was one of the greatest single causes of poverty in the global South in the 20th century, and it continues to this day under the guise of “austerity” .
These destructive policies only persist because voting power in the World Bank and the IMF is controlled by rich countries. High-income countries control more than 60 percent of the voting power at the World Bank, but are home to less than 15 percent of the world’s population.
Right now, developing countries lose as much as $900bn each year to tax evasion by multinational companies through trade mispricing, and almost the same sum again through transfer pricing. They lose another $600bn each year in debt service to mostly firslt world banks. These losses alone amount to nearly 20 times more than the total flow of aid, which is a paltry $135bn – and that’s not counting land grabs and other forms of resource theft.
All of this makes it clear that poverty is not a natural condition. It is a state of plunder. It is delusional to believe that charity and aid are meaningful solutions to this kind of problem.
Some people in the NGO community know this all too well, and they are calling for genuine political change: The democratisation of the World Bank and the IMF, fairer trade rules, and an end to tax evasion. But because the leadership at the Gates Foundation and some NGOs find these issues inconvenient such alternative voices are being side-lined in favour of a disingenuous attempt to “fix” public attitudes by pushing ever harder on the same old charity and aid story.
If the Gates Foundation and NGO leadership want to get serious about tackling poverty, they might start by talking to the public about the importance of releasing developing countries from the siphons of rich countries and their corporations. They might help put the final nails in the coffin of the paternalistic story of charity and aid, white saviours and poor brown victims, and tell the real story about how the rich get richer off the backs of the poor. That would be a true starting point for development in the 21st century.
*Dr Jason Hickel lectures at the London School of Economics and serves as an adviser to /The Rules.
Martin Kirk, Global Campaigns Director of /The Rules, contributed to the analysis for this article.
Read more @ http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/death-international-developmen-2014111991426652285.html
African presidents ‘use China aid for patronage politics’
Most of the $80bn of development funds sent to Africa went to areas where national leaders were born rather than the most needy, says AidData report
African leaders are almost three times more likely to spend Chinese development aid in areas where they have ethnic ties, casting doubt on the humanitarian effectiveness of Beijing’s strict “hands-off” policy in the continent.
China says it spends more than half of its foreign aid in 51 African countries, and AidData, an open-source data centre, says Beijing sent more than $80bn in “pledged, initiated, and completed projects” between 2000 and 2012. Most of that aid went to areas where national leaders were born, indicating a strong political bias, AidData said.
“As soon as [a region] becomes the birthplace of an African president this region gets 270% more development assistance (from China) than it would get if it were not the birth region of the president,” said Roland Hodler, professor of economics at the University of St Gallen in Switzerland and co-author of a report, Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance, published in conjunction with the database.
Ghana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia received the most Chinese development assistance over the reporting period, the study showed.
China is sending development funds to African governments with the aim of buying long-term political alliances, Hodler said. Sierra Leone’s president, Ernest Bai Koroma, recently used Chinese aid to build a school in Yoni, his hometown, according to the report.
“To us, this suggests that the Chinese principle of non-interference in domestic affairs allows African presidents to use Chinese aid for patronage politics. I am sure the Chinese are aware of this, and I would argue that they accept it because they care more about having a president who is sympathetic to them than about the poor,” said Hodler.
But the study also noted that, contrary to popular belief, Chinese aid to Africa is not strongly tied to countries that host Beijing’s oil and mining operations. “We do not find a strong pattern that Chinese aid only goes to regions where there’s a lot of natural resources. The picture that they only go after natural resources is not really confirmed by our sub-national level analysis,” Hodler said.
Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins University, said: “Most Chinese finance in Africa is not official aid, but business-related export credits borrowed by governments to finance infrastructure projects of various kinds. If these governments want to channel projects to their home town, Chinese banks would have no objection.
“For official aid, which is heavily diplomatic, the Chinese government looks beyond any sitting African leader to all the leaders to come, and to public opinion more generally. This is why they use their official aid for big, visible projects like stadiums, ministry buildings, and airports that can be seen and used by many people – in the capital city – and not tucked away in a rural hamlet.”
Researchers took data that China published on its foreign assistance and mapped where development projects were located. “The Chinese tend to send more aid to countries that are somewhat poorer but within these countries they go for the relatively rich regions,” said Hodler.
China maintains that it sends aid to African governments with the aim of furthering their development agendas.
The Chinese government said in July: “When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, keeping promise[s], mutual benefits and win-win.”
• This article was amended on 21 November 2014 to clarify that the $80bn figure for aid to Africa between 2000 and 2012 was an estimate by AidData, not an official Chinese government figure, and that the estimate includes “pledged, initiated, and completed projects”.
Read more @ http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/19/african-presidents-china-aid-patronage-politics
The tradition of the Somali population, that is prevalently (especially in the north) but not exclusively pastoral is shaped, I argue, first of all in reaction to the harsh environmental conditions which have forced life to be mobile, fast, less hierarchical, more communitarian and violent because resources are scarce and unequally distributed on the territory. That’s why the Somalis developed a different way to secure themselves from risks and a different system to ensure social security, to which the clan is an essential part. The imposed top-down approaches to state-building are overlooking this aspect and, by claiming and financing the imposition of the state as the competent body to both manage risks for the population and create safety nets for the “citizens”, they also demonstrate to ignore history. They ignore, for example, that the legacies of both colonialism and Barre’s autocratic rule have left behind little trust and much suspicion towards the state among the Somalis, who are unlikely to change this attitude for the short-term period. Hence, the citizens that the state is trying to reach are not there, because a culture mediating the relation between the state and the population is missing in Somalia, and needs to be built from scratch. But before doing that, reconciliation among citizens is required: in a society so threatened by resource scarcity, yet well equipped with traditional institutions devoted to settle disputes, the fact that reconciliation processes have been hindered has particularly plenty of social implications. Therefore, the priority given by the federalist government to security issues may not be the ideal path forward, since it would mean operating on the consequences and not on the root causes. The legitimacy of state institutions is, after all, still missing and for a good reason: it is redundant to say that the lack of legitimacy is likely to influence internal stability as well. The state, rather than a prerequisite for stability, should be conceived instead as a major achievement following the enactment of agreed-upon political practices. – http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/93436
Somalia: Let’s just forget the past?
Marco Zoppi*
I recently attended a conference where I had the chance to hear the speech of one Somali diplomat, whose identity or post is not what is important here. What he said, however, matters much more as he has indeed brought on the table many issues concerning the Federal Republic of Somalia’s future. Although his speech was preceded by a disclaimer that his opinions were not necessarily those of the Somali government he is representing abroad, it is fair to assume that many of his statements necessarily correspond to actual policies put in place by the federal government which appointed him, as media evidence seems to suggest. Starting from this conference, yet moving forward to analyze current Somali affairs, in this article I would like to engage on questions of reconciliation and (transitional) justice in Somalia: I argue that it’s a proper time to bring these elements in the debate, or rather to bring them back again in the debate, now that the federal system has been set to govern the country, but its realization is yet advancing with manifest strain and tension: in fact, we need to ask what can be held accountable for the slow implementation of the federalist project, and in doing so, it doesn’t seem reasonable to only take into account the flaws in the constitutional text, or the logic of clanpolitics, as a number of analysis have tried to do so far.
To pinpoint the core of the matter, the main concern I am confronted with is the diplomat’s affirmation regarding what to do with Somalia’s past, namely: “the past? Let’s just forget that”, while focusing all efforts to re-build a functioning state, first of all through the securitization of the territory, as he went on to suggest. But is it really the case that the Somali state can be re-built without even attempting any reconciliation among Somali population? In other words, where does the pivot of the discussion about peace and justice in Somalia lie (or should lie)? In the top-down state engineering or in the social norms regulating the harmonious relations among citizens and between them and the state? These are not rhetorical questions, and their answers call for historical as well as social analysis, as I will try to underline now.
The first point that I would like to stress is the following: if we look at the different reconciliation processes which have taken place over time since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime, the emphasis has prevalently been on the need to resurrect the state or to gather all relevant leaders/warlords around the same table, taking for granted that they would fairly represent the vast majority of the Somalis population. This modus operandi reveals that the international community presupposed a convergence of the socio-political dynamics shaping the Somali society with the ones characterizing western countries: accordingly, they mobilized concepts such as “state institutions”; “representation”, “democracy” without even scrutinizing their factual compliance with local patterns of political behavior. Thereafter, in the face of the poor governance established by those leaders, which nourished rather a state of protracted war, the same international actors would conclude that Somali and African societies in general are hostages of corruption, nepotism, ethnic hatred and similar issues which they treat as “pathologies” that need to be cured. While there is some space to partly concur with what is said above, it is still interesting to note that western institutions were not, anyhow, the ones whose effectiveness was to be put into question in this discourse: poverty, clan rivalry, weak African leadership were to blame, and not much of this myopic way to see things has changed nowadays.
Nevertheless, there is a reality that we need to face: the solution to these exacerbated political issues is not derived from “better” governance alone or, in the case of Somalia, from the federalist structure per se; what is missing in the framework of action of the international community is, first of all, the understanding, or the willingness to understand, the role of history as well as of historical consciousness for reconciliatory processes; secondly, there has not been a serious engagement to include or at least mediate the tenets of the “social contract” of the Somalis, namely the norms which regulate at least three dynamics: the social interactions among people; the definition of citizenry (not so much in a legal way but in the sense of recognized participation in common activities); and the criteria for community membership. As many scholars have underlined, this form of indigenous governance is capable of producing remarkable levels of governance, but unfortunately it is often neglected in the state-building process, notwithstanding their relevance for the everyday life of the people who are supposed to live in that precise state. Hence, what happens is that there is a discrepancy between the rights and duties of the citizen so as described in the federal constitution (articles from 10 to 42) and the kind of “civil society” defined by Somali traditional norms. The overlapping of these two types of both public and private spheres has relevant implications, mistrust and lower loyalty towards the state. To be sure, these traditional norms are not a relic from a primordial past that must change in order to enter an alleged “modernity”.
The tradition of the Somali population, that is prevalently (especially in the north) but not exclusively pastoral is shaped, I argue, first of all in reaction to the harsh environmental conditions which have forced life to be mobile, fast, less hierarchical, more communitarian and violent because resources are scarce and unequally distributed on the territory. That’s why the Somalis developed a different way to secure themselves from risks and a different system to ensure social security, to which the clan is an essential part. The imposed top-down approaches to state-building are overlooking this aspect and, by claiming and financing the imposition of the state as the competent body to both manage risks for the population and create safety nets for the “citizens”, they also demonstrate to ignore history. They ignore, for example, that the legacies of both colonialism and Barre’s autocratic rule have left behind little trust and much suspicion towards the state among the Somalis, who are unlikely to change this attitude for the short-term period. Hence, the citizens that the state is trying to reach are not there, because a culture mediating the relation between the state and the population is missing in Somalia, and needs to be built from scratch.
But before doing that, reconciliation among citizens is required: in a society so threatened by resource scarcity, yet well equipped with traditional institutions devoted to settle disputes, the fact that reconciliation processes have been hindered has particularly plenty of social implications. Therefore, the priority given by the federalist government to security issues may not be the ideal path forward, since it would mean operating on the consequences and not on the root causes. The legitimacy of state institutions is, after all, still missing and for a good reason: it is redundant to say that the lack of legitimacy is likely to influence internal stability as well. The state, rather than a prerequisite for stability, should be conceived instead as a major achievement following the enactment of agreed-upon political practices.
The second matter I wish to deal with now is: what can Transitional Justice (TJ) bring to Somalia? Somali society is in desperate need to re-conciliate after the widespread violence connected to the civil war. Intra-clanic fights; confrontation between nomad/pastors and settled farmers; the emergence of discriminated minorities: these are some of the thorny issues of Somali past are still to be addressed in the post-1991 context. However TJ as commonly understood (including by United Nations) implies too much of state institutions or western-born concepts like the rule of law, to be a viable solution for African problems, it is argued here. In fact, if many African political crises are somehow the outgrowth of the “politics of the belly” (to quote Jean-François Bayart), namely of clientelist practices involving the state and the private sector or the broader population, the solution out of this deteriorated political situation should then come from other political bodies which enjoy people’s legitimacy, the latter built around both common definitions of what is justice as well as generalized perceptions of what is desirable and appropriate for the community’s common good.
At the moment, the state is thus not representing the ideal political body considered able to attract adequate degrees of legitimacy. That’s why the strengthening of state institutions advocated by TJ theories may not be what is firstly needed here, especially if reconciliation and the coming to terms with the past in reverse are not included at any level in the post-conflict recovery process. I intend to underline the need to develop African recipes for reconciliation which can be more responsive to population’s needs: these kinds of indigenous institutions, including the clan, can convey values which are intelligible to the population because they are born out of the local social contract: the respect of this social contract would alone ensure a satisfying degree of national safety while, on the other hand, “the creation of a national army” prioritized by Somali the federal government is not necessarily a synonym for peace-building. I am affirming this because the univocal notion of citizenship proposed by the state is hardly fitting into the reality of the constellation of clans already equipped each with its own respective definition for establishing who is a member.
So, while TJ’s truth-telling initiatives could help establishing an egalitarian approach that affords acknowledgment and dignity to all, the state framework is an inhibitor which would deliberately fragment that “all” into exclusionary definitions of citizenship and partisan factions, eventually jeopardizing the whole process. While these issues should be properly addressed, the specific provocation: “stop being slave of the tribal system and start behaving like a nation” that the diplomat directed to the Somali diaspora, is an indication of the government’s adoption of a mono-strategy to deal with the future of Somalia.
How could Transitional Justice manage the societal diversity? Just for clarity, it should be underlined that even the realization of a state-led reconciliation process based on TJ’s principles would not necessarily mean the consolidation, right away, of a national identity: Somalia is still composed of clans, and the clan is not just a political entity, but also a welfare provider for its members, as well as a security net: it performs a way more complex social role of than usually represented in international media, and it is even more efficient than the state in doing so in the Somali context: the clan makes the life of its member less insecure and problematic, yet more communitarian and more connected to kin through nets of duties and moral obligations. So, once more, reconciliation in Somalia should rather start from the full resurgence of the social contract and the traditional norms, the only ones that at the moment are able to attract the trust of the people and that are thus granted social legitimacy. The reconstruction of fragmented societies through Transitional Justice should be based on cultural forms and systems of knowledge which can be recognized by the concerned population: in the recent history of the international community engagement in Somalia, this would represent a novelty, and it would substantially change the meaning of transition itself: a transition from solely state-based approaches towards the inclusion of local social contract-based elements.
The last point of the discussion is about people. Not only institutions, whether western or Africans, count. People also matter, and people as a matter of fact make the institutions alive. How can history be just forgotten in order to leave space to new nation-building imperatives? Memories of the people are extremely important as they are actively contributing in determining current people’s life decisions; the historical consciousness is too relevant in this discourse to be left instead in the corner; better yet, the fundamental peace effort for Somalia may come exactly from those who have experienced the war and endure painful memories.
To conclude, I firstly stated that the federalist structure of Somalia is faces obstacles for its full implementation in virtue of a missing agreement on who is a citizen, and how relationships among citizens and between them and the state should be regulated. I then underlined that the inclusion of provisions contained in the Somali social contract and in the norms known as “xeer” in the current political development would increase the overall legitimacy of the process. I went on to say that, however, without reconciliation in a post-war traumatized and truth-seeking population, social cohesion is hard to be achieved. I then questioned the potential role of Transitional Justice, a point which I wish to expand now: in the case of Somalia, the current definition of TJ appears too narrow to be beneficial, since it limits the space for local-based procedures of definition of justice as well as consequent means to achieve it: it does so somehow implicitly, in the specific focus given to state, rule of law, democracy and other conceits belonging to the western political dictionary. I have claimed instead the need for a bottom-up reconciliation process in Somalia, based on the indigenous social contract or at least the integration of some of its tenets: these already include, in fact, measures for dispute settlement and are thus preconditions for a working variation model of TJ which would have more chances to be applied successfully. However, as it appears, this solution entails a direct challenge to the well-established strategies of state-building proposed by the west: the key point turns thus around the poor legitimization that Afro-based transitional justice processes would receive by international actors, notwithstanding the rather higher social recognition they would get internally. In other words, TJ as it is framed today in the general debate is at risk of creating an ideological alliance with the theories of the state, which in the African context would be nothing but detrimental, just as the past political record clearly shows. Most likely, it would reiterate the endless confrontation between the alleged “modernity” of the west, on the one hand, and the African tradition on the other, without bringing forward a valid as well as agreed-upon path to reconciliation.
* Marco Zoppi is a PhD fellow in Histories and Dynamics of Globalization at Roskilde University, Denmark. He is currently researching on the Somali diaspora in Scandinavia. He holds a MA in African Studies pursued at the University of Copenhagen. His personal interests include Geopolitics, history of Africa and colonialism. He can be contacted at: marzo@ruc.dk
Read more @ http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/93436
Rome Declaration on #Nutrition, endorsed by over 170 countries, enshrines everyone’s right to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious #food and commits governments to preventing malnutrition in all its forms, including hunger, micronutrient deficiencies and obesity.
The second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) endorsed a political outcome document, the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and an accompanying technical Framework for Action to guide its implementation. The Declaration commits countries to eradicate hunger and prevent all forms of malnutrition worldwide – particularly undernutrition in children, anaemia in women and children, among other micronutrient deficiencies – as well as reverse the trend in obesity. It aims to do this by increasing investments in food systems to improve people’s diets and nutrition. The Framework proposes the creation of an enabling environment for effective action and for strengthening sustainable food systems, including through investments in pro-poor agriculture and smallholder agriculture to improve diets and raise levels of nutrition; nutrition education and information; social protection; strengthened health systems for addressing specific conditions; improved water, sanitation and hygiene; and improved food safety.
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